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STUDIES IN HUMAN NATURE

STUDIES IN HUMAN NATURE

BY

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TO THE MEMORY
OF MY FRIEND
S. S. LAURIE
THIS VOLUME IS
GRATEFULLY
INSCRIBED

PREFATORY NOTE

THE aim of these studies is to examine with all possible freedom from theoretical bias some phases of human nature which are of great interest in themselves, and in the light of the analysis to draw certain conclusions. It would have been natural to have included in such a series the consideration of certain other aspects of human nature, more especially those which concern morality and civic institutions. Morality and the conditions of citizenship are in many ways the most important forms of human life which can engage our attention at the present time ; and the influence of the recent upheaval in our experience has brought before us many moral problems with a peculiar, and perhaps even a new, prominence. It has seemed better, however, to reserve the consideration of these and kindred subjects for another occasion.

It is not the purpose of these papers to defend or support any of the familiarly accepted theories, whether of idealism or realism. Human nature is far more interesting and much more important than any theory, and on that account perhaps is tolerant of many theories. It may be remarked, however, that the momentum which carried forward one peculiar form of idealism—the confident and confiding idealism of a generation ago—seems now to have spent its force ; and that a realism which takes the form of a new materialism can hardly claim to be in a position to show a better way. For, apart from the shock which optimistic idealism has received from the international catastrophe of the recent war, the elaboration of a theory of a completed and perfect universe, “all inclusive and harmonious,” (whether this be a demand or a fact, matters not), leaves too little for the creative spirit of man to do ; while, on the

other hand, the exposition of the world in a way which treats human suffering and human ends as derivative or secondary leaves for man nothing worth doing. We best avoid the defects of one-sided theories if we follow the path of what Sidgwick used to call critical common sense, and hold to the natural solidarity of human experience to which it clings. This may lead us to a theory, or it may not. But we may feel sure that our reflection can never keep close enough to common sense. "To the solid ground of nature trusts the mind that builds for aye."

The best service which philosophy can render at any time is that of supplying a criticism of life. At a time like the present, when so much of the past has broken from us, and our main hopes for security lie in the future, this service seems all the more necessary. It should have its effect more particularly on the higher aims of the education of a nation, on the proper direction of which so much of the future depends. It is not promising in these days to see this great agency for advance operating without convincing plan of action or clear guidance, and, in default of these requirements for success, withdrawing behind mediæval defences slightly altered to meet the demands of modern economic efficiency. Men want confidence in the future as well as confidence in the past to make life tolerable in the present. And this confidence can only come from a fuller insight into the resources of human nature.

J. B. BAILLIE.

KING'S COLLEGE,
ABERDEEN.

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STUDIES IN HUMAN NATURE

INTRODUCTION

“Oh, qu’il est difficile d’être à la fois ingénieux et sensé.”—**JOUBERT.**

I

CONSIDERATION of the history of philosophical theories lends little or no support to the opinion, which appears to be held in certain quarters, that philosophy reveals a progressive continuity in its history. The theories have indeed one element in common : their purpose is the same from one generation to another. Their aim is to undertake a critical investigation or exposition of “first principles.” There the similarity ends ; for even the meaning of “first principles” is not a matter on which all philosophers are agreed. Doubtless we can trace a certain limited continuity for a short period ; and then we have a school or again a reaction from a type of thought which has for a time become dominant. But the controlling influence of one thinker has ere long to give way before the stronger claim of the instinct to examine or re-examine afresh ultimate principles. What is true of the history of philosophy is equally true of contemporary philosophy. Not merely are the problems discussed different, but the most diverse theories on the same topics are expounded and defended at one and the same period of time, with no resulting concurrence and very little convergence of opinion.

This want of unanimity would not be of great moment were it not for an underlying conviction which many scientists and some philosophers seem to share, that in the region of the intellect human minds have common ground, and that in the operations of the reason, if anywhere, all men may be expected to agree. In the ordinary way of human intercourse such a conviction is certainly not supported ; but when we find that those whose

métier it is to cultivate rationality for its own sake equally fail to secure intellectual concord, the conviction in question loses all authority or self-evidence, and becomes little more than an aspiration or a point of view. Neither in the realm of pure philosophy, nor in the minor matters of daily life, nor in the greater affairs of civilisation, does there seem to plain common sense any solid foundation in experience for maintaining that intellectual activity as such is a sure pathway to unanimity between human individuals. The recent overwhelming catastrophe to the civilisation of Europe has made it all too painfully evident, though not for the first time in history, that neither man's reason nor his ideals are proof against the onslaughts of chaos and the agencies of disorder which reserve their impending ruin for the purposes of mankind till the appointed time. It may be said, indeed, that if all men did follow the leading of intellectual insight they would come to an understanding. There is, however, not much satisfaction in this hypothesis. The fact which has to be recognised is rather that man's concrete individuality is all compact of many functions besides that of the intellect; and it is in the inseparable co-operation and interaction of all the various factors of his individual being that his real life consists. In the day's business and in the task of the philosopher this complexity of his nature dominates the entire situation with which he is confronted, and from this there is no successful escape by any process of mere abstraction.

II

When we turn to the specific fields of philosophy, not merely do we find that there is recurring diversity of treatment, but in no sphere can it be held that a single comprehensive problem has been solved beyond further dispute. The problem of human knowledge is handled differently according as one or other of the three most prominent types of knowledge is taken to be of primary importance for the attainment of the truth about reality. These types are sense-perception, judgment, and the process of inference. A theory of knowledge or system of logical doctrine

will be found to take one of these as fundamental for all knowledge and to treat the others as relatively subordinate.¹ The form and substance of the theory will vary accordingly. To one philosopher truth is obtained mainly through the channel of sense-perception; judgment and inference are processes which assist in realising, and which are essentially concerned with, the varied content of perceptual truth. To another the chief problem of knowledge is concentrated in the nature of judgment to which sense-perception supplies "material," and for which inference has significance because and in so far as it can issue in a correct judgment. While to other thinkers truth is essentially expressible as an explicitly connected arrangement of thoughts or process of inference, relatively to which both sense-perception and judgment are subordinate, either in the sense of providing the material for inference in different ways, or of being imperfectly developed stages in the realisation of systematically connected thought.² Which of these types of knowledge is adopted as primary depends, as far as we can see, not on any intellectual necessity, but on the individual constitution of the thinker and his mental attitude to the world. It is, in a word, a selective interest in the truth rather than a logical necessity which determines the choice; while this selective interest again is controlled largely by historical associations and development.

¹ It is strange to find Mr. Bosanquet stating that "Logic has no criterion of truth or test of reasoning" (*Logic*, vol. i. p. 3). One may fairly ask how he can maintain such a position in the face of his declaration that for "logic at all events it is a postulate that the truth is the whole"? What is such a proposition except a "criterion of truth," a criterion, moreover, which he is at pains to apply throughout his entire work?

² It is indeed remarkable to observe how these types of logical theory repeatedly recur in the history of philosophy, without bringing philosophers any nearer to unanimity. In Greek philosophy we have the problem of knowledge handled by the Sophists from the point of view of sense-perception; to Plato the chief interest in knowledge was concentrated in the question of predication or the nature of judgment; while for Aristotle knowledge was supremely realised in the form of demonstrative proof or inference. When attention was directed to the question of knowledge in the eighteenth century the same theories recur; Locke laying stress on the fundamental importance of truth as revealed by sense-perception, Kant on truth as expressed in the function of judgment, while after him Hegel placed the main emphasis on rational connection or inference. And in more recent years we have a similar sequence of theories of knowledge in Mill, Bradley, and Bosanquet.

There is no way of securing agreement between thinkers who start from essentially different primary convictions, and no expectation, therefore, that the problem of knowledge will be solved in a form which will meet with universal assent.

In the sphere of Ethics, it cannot be maintained by the most sympathetic interpreter of theories of the good, that the fundamental questions raised by the moral life have been answered in a way which meets with general assent from those who have considered the subject. What we find in the history of Ethics is the discussion of morality from the most diverse points of view, and the promulgation of theories having little or nothing in common except their subject-matter and the confident assurance of each philosopher in the soundness of his own particular theory.¹

As to Metaphysics, few would maintain in the light of the history of philosophy that agreement amongst philosophers on this subject was even to be expected, much less that it had been secured. Each theory stands by itself in splendid isolation, a monument to the daring of some heaven-scaling intellectual adventurer with neither ancestor nor posterity. It is not merely that the structure created by one mind does not meet the requirements of another: what is equally important is that the style of architecture adopted by one does not adequately satisfy the artistic sense of another, whose individuality must find expression in a different way. The composition of one acts as a stimulus to another not so much because of the failure of the first as because of the awakening of a new inspiration in the second. Hence no metaphysician is daunted or hindered by his predecessors' work; and in the generously vast territory of reality there is abundance of room for different structures of thought with freehold property in perpetuity for the builder. Each builds as he may and as he can for his own sake.

¹ It seems needless to illustrate this in detail. If we take the three chief works in the history of Ethics, where the moral life is handled with equal intellectual frankness and with unbiassed insight into the actual facts of moral experience—Aristotle's *Ethics*, Von Hartmann's *Phänomenologie des sittlichen Bewusstseins*, and Sidgwick's *Methods of Ethics*—we shall find that neither in method nor in results is there any essential agreement.

- "If tired with systems, each in its degree
Substantial, and all crumbling in their turn,
Let him build systems of his own, and smile
At the fond work, demolished with a touch."¹

So great is the diversity of theories propounded by metaphysicians that some philosophers in despair of finding unanimity in this sphere of intellectual activity maintain that the problem is insoluble, while some have sought to prove that the human intellect is not in a position to undertake it at all. But such views cannot fail to manifest their own ineptitude by the very attempt to establish them. It is at once ironical and ridiculous to offer our incompetence as our supreme sacrifice on the altar of truth.² If what is most worth knowing is incapable of being known, one naturally asks whether knowledge is of any serious importance to human life. It may not be the business of metaphysics to provide intellectual finality, but it is certainly folly to try to give a final proof that finality is unattainable. We can only find out how much we can know by making the attempt. Very few indeed are capable of composing the "dialectical hymn" of philosophy; and the hymns which are composed generally seem to be but the swan songs of passing epochs of human thought. But those who feel called upon to propound metaphysical theories have never been and will never be deterred from doing so by the failure of metaphysicians to agree amongst themselves. The disagreement in fact is part of the interest of the undertaking.

The mere formulation of the problem shows that diversity of views is inevitable. Metaphysicians claim to start on their way "without presuppositions." This is manifestly impossible both in fact and in logic. Left without presuppositions from which to begin, the thinker has no absolute starting point at all. The starting point is therefore a matter of choice or even caprice, and must depend on the interest of the historically placed individuality of each thinker. And this is precisely what takes

¹ Wordsworth, *Excursion*, IV.

² It reminds one of certain primitive tribes who in their religious ceremonies consume all the parts of the animal that are fit to eat and offer to the god the parts that are unfit for human consumption.

place. Each makes his own assumptions, and proceeds as he thinks best.

Moreover, it is quite clear that most metaphysicians do start with some presuppositions. One of the commonest of these is that Reality is a completed whole, fixed in its constitution and final in its arrangement. This is surely a profoundly important assumption, which seriously governs the interpretation of the metaphysician. Nor is the assumption self-evident or beyond question. Why should not Reality be ever changing or, like life, ever growing, with æons instead of epochs for its units of change? At each stage it would be constant or fixed for beings with so small a time-span and so imperfectly developed as ourselves. Yet for itself it would never be a fixed or final whole in any logically exact sense.¹

It is useless therefore to condemn metaphysicians for offering essentially different answers to what ostensibly seems the same problem, or to find fault with the human mind for undertaking to give a solution. Each interpretation is but a point of view, and each individual thinker has his own perspective of his subject. Those thinkers will be found to make the most hazardous adventure who most strongly claim finality for their theories. An excellent illustration of this is provided by a recent theory which presents an impressive and persuasive argument for universal acceptance—that of Mr. Bosanquet. Not merely do the logical foundations of his theory seem insecure,²

¹ The view that Reality is absolutely fixed in its scope and substance seems to me an illustration of the powerful influence which the spatially constituted physical world of science always exerts on the mind of the philosopher as of other men. It is so difficult for thought to grasp the significance of life and mind for the nature of reality.

² See *Logic*, vol. i., Introduction, 2 and 3 and especially 7. I refer more particularly (a) to his effort to get the logical idea absolutely clear of the psychological occurrence in the individual mind; (b) to the identification of the phrase the "meaning of the world" with the hardly intelligible phrase a "world of meanings"; (c) to the paradox that "the world as known to each of us is constructed and sustained by his individual consciousness," when it seems all too evident that it is not we who sustain our world but our world which sustains us, whether we are awake or asleep; and (d) to the transparent ambiguity in the use of the term "reality" as applying at once to a "construction" of thought and to a world brought home to the intelligence as real by sense-perception which is not thought but a "point of contact" with reality as thought.

and his method of procedure unworkable,¹ but certain legitimate and admitted developments of the argument seem to produce confusion in the whole system. It is held that in the Absolute all finite individuality requires and receives such supplementation and internal transformation that what constitutes its peculiar character as a finite and therefore imperfect individuality completely disappears; and in particular that all finite truth is so transformed by its setting in the absolute truth that in the long run finite truth cannot be said to be really true. But if this is so it must apply in all its force to the truth contained or presented in the system of the philosopher who is propounding this theory, for that is transparently a truth delivered by a finite being and holding for a finite being with all his limitations. The truth of this system is "in the long run" not true. Moreover, truth which is not true in the long run cannot be accepted as true even in the short run of finite experience, for the only truth worth having, at any rate in metaphysics, is that which holds in the long run. Thus the theory which claims to be absolute truth turns out to be only relatively true. It is in a worse position than pure relativism; for absolute relativism is at the worst inconsistent, but a relative absolutism is meaningless. Such is the penalty of trying to establish absolute truth by means of "the dialectic of finitude."²

¹ For even if, in justice to the Absolute, we accept the proposition that absolute Reality is devoid of contradiction, is all inclusive and harmonious, and that finite reality is inherently contradictory, how is it possible for a finite being either to establish such a result or to remove final contradiction? Transparently the finite individuality of the philosopher as of everything else is inherently contradictory, and his mind therefore never can transcend the state or stage of contradiction in which his nature consists and which, being essential, must infect all his processes.

This school seems to take a satisfaction in showing that finite reality is "contradictory" or "self-contradictory," or "internally discordant." It is surely dangerous to attack finitude with such a double-edged weapon as the principle of contradiction. Why should the "contradiction" not be our own creation? If Reality is indeed so perfect and self-complete why should we quarrel with its component factors?

² In another connection I have tried to show that by the dialectic development of thought or of experience it is impossible to reach the finality of an absolute system. See *The Origin of Hegel's Logic*, chap. xii.

Perhaps every system which claims to be final is open to a similar line of criticism. Dr. Ward remarks (in his paper on "Method," in the *Transactions of the*

It is indeed a curious irony that a logical development of a "final system" should be hardly distinguishable from pure scepticism.

Again, it is maintained that all finite individuals are predicates of a subject, and in the long run of an absolute subject, and that as predicates they have no substantiality. They are transient. As substantiated they are torn from their real substance and are in effect illusory. If this be so, it holds of the individual thinker who maintains this theory, and still more of his theory as a quality or predicate of his being. Ultimately, therefore, the philosopher himself has no substantiality. What then becomes of his theory? Moreover, if all finite individuals are ultimately predicates of one subject, the distinction between finite subject and predicate becomes purely relative. The finite subject is in the long run not real and has no real predicates; for a subject without real predicates ceases to be a subject. But if in the sphere of finitude, in which our experience is rooted, the reality of the distinction between subject and predicate disappears, we have removed the basis on which to rest the relation of an absolute subject to its predicates, for this derives its significance primarily from our finite experience.

III

This review of the want of unanimity between philosophers and the failure of philosophy to reach certainty on the main issues discussed, must give any candid mind ground for reflection concerning the claims of the philosopher to supply the final or the whole meaning of reality.¹ The diverse results seem so

Aristotelian Society, 1919) that it is more important that a philosophy should be systematic than that it should be complete.

¹ It is often said that the explanation of the disagreement amongst philosophers is to be found in the ambiguity of words, or again in the total inadequacy of ordinary language to convey their ideas. Hence the various attempts which have been made to invent or establish a conventional philosophical language, a system of agreed symbols which all philosophers should accept and use in expounding philosophical truth. Such attempts are doomed to failure, and in fact have never succeeded. Philosophy is too closely bound up with the issues of living experience, deals with too concrete material, and is too intimately associated with the purposes of personality, to be confined arbitrarily to one type of language or deprived of the full

inadequate and unsatisfying in face of the complex riches and teeming life of the world. Philosophy, no doubt, seeks by the concentrated use of the intellect to bring us nearer to reality. But unless the philosopher can offer in his theory a better and a deeper sense of reality than men ordinarily have, no one will thank him for his pains. Sandpapered concepts and ingeniously soldered systems seem far removed from the vivid intensity of actual experience. The divergence of views doubtless partly arises from a difference of personality which inevitably creates a difference in perspective. But the inadequacy of their results seems to a great extent due to a want of responsiveness to the immense resources of reality. Reality requires an uncommonly rich and full personality to do it complete justice in a system. Most philosophers have been seriously handicapped in their task

resources of literary exposition. Science can afford to be technical, and to utilise the unvarying and, by the nature of the case, invariable terminology supplied by the vanished civilisations of Greece and Rome. This secures constancy of meaning, which corresponds aptly to the fixity of scientific concepts. But a technical language in philosophy would alienate philosophy from the restless and inexhaustible spirit of truth which is its ceaseless inspiration, and would in consequence quickly terminate its enterprise.

This attempt to ensure philosophical certainty by a technical form of exposition has always been as attractive as it is ingenuous, and it constantly recurs. For reasons which are obvious it appeals perhaps most frequently to those whose minds have been much influenced by the orderliness and æsthetic symmetry of mathematical reasoning. It seems natural to suppose that a manner of exposition which is so serviceable in an exact science might with advantage be adapted to knowledge generally and in particular to philosophy. This easily leads the mind to entertain the still more perilous suggestion that somehow the manner of exposition adopted in mathematics has an essential connection with the truth expressed.

We find at the present day a reappearance of this artifice. Certain writers seem to imagine that philosophical ideas gain in clearness and cogency when formulated in the language of algebraical symbol. If this be their assumption it seems a strange illusion. A man does not alter his character by changing his tailor. We cannot escape the risks of contradiction by writing in shorthand. Nor does truth become any more valuable by a process of condensation. And when words of ordinary speech are contracted or mutilated to serve the purposes of symbolic philosophical writing, the procedure loses even the appearance of seriousness and becomes ridiculous. This is illustrated in a recent article, by an ingenious writer of this school, when in all solemnity he proposes to escape the risks of using such words as "imply" or "infer" by a symbolic adoption of "ent" in place of the word "entail." What special advantage can be gained by such a process of mutilation, or why this writer should have made off with one end of the word rather than with the other, are questions which it is not easy for any one with a sense of humour to answer.

by the inadequacy of their mental equipment and the comparative narrowness of their outlook: and it is neither easy nor satisfactory to make up for the want of penetrating insight by the industrious pedantry of logic. For human life vision and prevision are far more important than logical technique. Too often the philosopher's work shows a second-hand knowledge of human nature, a precarious acquaintance with science, and a naïve ignorance of the world. But defects of personality are not the only source of the unsatisfactoriness of their results. It is perhaps mainly due to their attempt to concentrate the entire meaning of the world into the processes of the abstract intellect. Against this plain common sense maintains and will always assert that the intellect is but one activity of man's soul, that it never acts by itself but always in co-operation with the many other functions of his life, that all his functions act and re-act on each other, and that through each and all of these in distinction as well as together he acquires his full sense of reality. In this contention I cannot doubt that common sense is amply justified by the facts of actual experience.

It seems to me important to point out not merely what knowledge in general and philosophy in particular can do, but what they cannot accomplish, and to insist that the complex individuality of man is the best clue to the nature of reality and not intellectual activity alone. It is with this in view that I have sought in these essays to show how thought is in fact affected and influenced by other factors of our mental life; and to maintain the position, which I take to be that of common sense, that we require and use all our functions to sustain the equilibrium of our individuality with the real and to become alive to what reality is for us. Even with all our powers working at their best and to their utmost, we shall not exhaust or realise in conscious experience the fullness of the world in communion with which we seek to discover our souls. Knowledge alone is insufficient for our ends. It is one form of experience, and neither the whole of experience nor a substitute for any other kind. Men encounter reality through the secondary mind of their organic senses, through their interaction with their fellow-creatures or through the unheard melodies of memory, as

well as through the strenuous energy of intellectual reflection. And if it be said that the deliverances of these various channels of approach to reality which experience provides, are too diverse or even discordant to be accepted, and that systematic reflection is necessary to reduce them somehow to consistency, the reply of common sense is unanswerable: it prefers the apparent discordance of healthy natural sanity to the artificial symmetry of a philosophical system. The philosopher is too eager to find contradictions and in too great a hurry to reconcile them. The man of common sense thinks the philosopher's truths are self-created, and that, having identified the apparent incongruities of actual experience with the inconsistencies of his own thought, he puts the blame on the nature of things. Common sense points to the historical failure of philosophy to create a fuller sense of reality. Judged by results, indeed, it would even appear that the human intellect is less fitted for its task than almost every other function of the human mind. For whereas most functions of the mind adjust us with apparent adequacy to the world, the intellect never seems adequately to realise its end. It would seem that this part of man's constitution is not yet sufficiently developed to accomplish what it undertakes, and hence its constant defeat. The philosopher would have nature and human life expressed in terms of reason, consistent and complete. But, looking no further afield than the recent appalling calamity in our history, one is bound to conclude that in the cosmic ordering of human life the Spirit of the World must have something else to do than to be reasonable as we count reasonableness. It is possible that not reasonableness but dramatic completeness may be the chief unifying quality of man's life. Human life is not a scientific enterprise, nor the universe a mere riddle for philosophers. Nor when we are face to face with physical nature can we seriously maintain that it will offer up its whole secret to the human intellect. No one who has seen a summer sunrise transmute the rocks and hills into diaphanous jewels set upon the regal robes of dawn will ever imagine that the full significance of the scene is reserved for the text-books of the geologist or the cosmology of the philosopher. Knowledge is but one channel of satisfaction for the mind. It fulfils

its purpose in the larger plan of experience, and makes its special contribution to the process by which man discovers the real.

Human experience seems an experiment or a venture for the conservation and fulfilment of our personality. Instead of the course of experience ultimately merging the individual in the Absolute, as is currently held by a certain type of philosophical theory, there seems good ground for maintaining precisely the opposite—that the process, under the conditions of space and time, consists in the emergence of the individual out of the Absolute or Nature into the definiteness of a substantive personality.¹ The world provides the opportunity for the discovery of the Divine and the Human Spirit. And we must be prepared to find that the process of discovery is partly one of disillusionment. In that enterprise philosophy will always play its part ; but only for a few. Not because more might not adopt it, but because they have other and for them better ways of arriving at Reality. There can be no obligation on any one to take the critical highway of philosophy : it is a matter of choice or inclination. Doubtless, as Plato remarks, a life without self-examination is not a life for man. But philosophy is not the only form of self-examination. It is one way to mental freedom, a way which those will take who think it worth while. They need not expect that their solutions will be accepted, or even their problems fully appreciated, by other minds. But the spirit of intellectual freedom must be kept alive from generation to generation, and for this no labour is too great and, let us hope, none is ultimately thrown away.

¹ In the explanation of human life, philosophers are apt to lay far too much stress on the end. In dealing with life what we come from is just as important as where we are going to ; and the former has the advantage, for purposes of explanation, in being more ascertainable.

I

ANTHROPOMORPHISM AND TRUTH

Αὐτὸς (ὁ Θεός) ἐνηνθρώπησεν ἵνα ὑμεῖς θεοποιηθῶμεν.

ATHANASIUS : *De Incarnatione.*

“Ist nicht der Kern der Natur
Menschen im Herzen?”

GOETHE.

I

THERE is a pathetic irony in the constant recurrence throughout the history of the human intellect of the elementary question “What is truth?” After the brilliant and comparatively successful achievements of science during the last hundred years, this question is still raised with all the freshness of a new problem. And it is perhaps all the more curious that the scientists who claim to possess truth hardly seem to trouble themselves about its nature; while those who seek to know its meaning are not in general scientists, but “philosophers.” Underlying the question there seems to lurk a sense of disappointment with the results derived from the arduous activity of the human intellect, a feeling which suggests not so much “Was it worth while to spend human energy in this way?” but rather “Is this all that the intellect can contribute to enrich the human spirit?” A skilfully linked chain of reasoning, a system of ideas or concepts, be they never so “objective,” an orderly arrangement of categories—in what way do these or can these satisfy the mind? There is also implied the suggestion that, even on the most favourable view of truth, it is but one direction in which the mind seeks fulfilment; and that its direction must be distinguished from, or co-ordinated with, other equally important human interests in what is good, or, again, in what is beautiful. There would clearly be

no meaning in raising the question if scientific truth were literally all that the human mind sought ; or, at any rate, the question regarding truth could not be raised in this simple form. If the answer is to be forthcoming it can only be given in terms different from and, in general, wider than truth itself : otherwise we should raise the question again in our answer, or know the answer before we raised the question ; and either way our procedure would be frivolous.¹

It is because of this inherent limitation in the significance which truth has for the human mind, a limitation which becomes as obvious by our increasing success in reaching truth as by our failure to attain it, that the mind in its concern for its completer life seeks to fix the place of truth in the economy of its experience. In our own time we find those who, laying stress on the independence of truth, treat the human mind as but a medium in which truth is intermittently realised or focussed ; the mind is subordinate to the truth, and shapes its conscious processes in terms of an " objective " order or system. In inevitable reaction from this position there are those who consider that truth is not independent of the mind, that truth is at best subordinate to and dominated by the prior practical interests of the mind, is a mere instrument for its purposes. The one, it may be said, holds that the individual mind is made what it is by the truth, the other that the truth is what the mind practically makes it to be ; the one insists that ideas " work " because they are true, the other that they are true because they work ; the one maintains that the course of our ideas is determined in the interest of the truth, the other that the truth is determined in the interest of our practical ideas. Between these two, clearly no reconciliation is possible ; nor can one give way to the other, for no argument from either side reaches the underlying assumptions of the other. Both, indeed, may agree that a truth can be true only for an individual mind, since there is no mind which is not an individual mind in some sense or degree of individuality ; but there is no

¹ Similarly the complete answer to the question cannot be found by postulating a " criterion " of truth. A criterion of truth must itself be a true criterion, and we are thus at once in an indefinite regress in the search for such an instrument, or we already have it in our hands all the while.

possible agreement between them when one says that a truth is never true if it is only "my truth," while the other says that a truth which is not "my truth" is no truth at all. These are contrary propositions: they may both be false, but cannot be true together or be reconciled as they stand. The assumption in the one case is that the individual mind is always qualified by a particular element which either is, or should be, in process of dissolution into the universality characteristic of truth; the assumption in the other case is that the particular element is in itself precious to the individual, and neither can nor should be surrendered to the claims of a universal which, however important, is always "abstract" and incapable of doing full justice to what is particular. Whatever language may be used to express these views, and whatever special aspect of individuality may be emphasised in one case or denied in the other, the generalisation of the principles defended in the two cases leads us inevitably to this sheer divergence between their fundamental presuppositions.

Both views ignore two fundamental conditions of human experience, and neglect of these is the chief source of the difficulty of finding any reconciliation between their opposing positions. They both deal with the individual mind as a fully developed and fully equipped finite reality face to face with a statically complete and finished realm of objects or groups of objects existing alongside the individual mind. The activity of the mind is thus made to consist in co-ordinating its processes to this objective realm, one view laying chief stress on the reference to the objective sphere with which the mind has to be co-ordinated, the other on the mental process of co-ordination. It is forgotten by both alike that the individual mind is never fully developed at all, but is ever growing from the earliest date of its existence to the last. Its growth towards ever-increasing fulfilment of its being and of unison with its world is the very essence of its experience.

Again, both overlook the fact that behind the processes of both practical action and intellectual procedure lies the more ultimate reality of the single indivisible individuality itself. It is this which determines the laws and conditions of practice, and the laws and conditions of intellectual activity. Thus, for

instance, the essence of all thinking consists in grouping differences within a single principle, in finding an identity which animates distinctions. But this character of thought is derived from the nature of the individual mind, which is a living unity of all its varied manifestations. To attempt, therefore, to express the whole nature of human individuality in terms of the intellect, to describe its living procedure as a logical procedure, and its chief end as the attainment of some scheme of conceptual truth, is a complete inversion of the actual connection between thought and mental individuality. Individuality prescribes the course which thought has to take, not thought the character which individuality should possess. It is because the mind is an organic unity in variety that thought is a function of mind operating in the way it does, viz., by seeking identity in difference. Individuality is not wholly or simply logical in its procedure, because it can function logically ; and, therefore, logical procedure is neither the sole aim nor the sole clue to the nature of individuality.¹ That logical procedure is not the sole clue to the meaning of mental individuality is plain when we note that the same fundamental nature of mind, as an indivisible concrete unity of all its processes, determines the laws and conditions not merely of practical procedure in the strict sense, but the emotional life of mind, its æsthetic procedure, the process of striving, the processes of memory, imagination and perception. All these operate in their own sphere as special expressions of the fundamental nature of

¹ This fallacy, or, shall I say, misconception, seems to me to underlie the work of Mr. Bosanquet, who may be taken as one representative of the view that human individuality finds itself in becoming conscious of an independent scheme or system of intellectual truth. We have but to recall his constant use of such expressions as the logic of will, the logic of feeling, the logic of individuality, and the like, not to speak of his insistence on the logical principle of non-contradiction as a clue to ultimate truth, in order to see the justification for this remark. Doubtless he is forced by the facts to use other and quite different expressions, as I shall point out ; but there can be no question, I think, of the main tendency of his view. The facility with which the processes of will, for example, can be rendered into logical formulæ is largely illusory. Given that the mind is the source of the laws and conditions of both will and intellect, and that the same ultimate principle of mind (unity in variety) governs and determines both, and the possibility of translating the processes of one function into the terms of the other follows almost as a matter of course. In the same way we might, and do, translate intellectual processes into the language and procedure of will.

mental life, of which each is but a particular form. They require no assistance from intellectual procedure as such, and are not affected or governed by its peculiar laws. This is seen in actual experience, *e.g.* in the success with which the life of the ordinary moral agent, or again of the artist, can be prosecuted in spite of the fact that these individuals neither can nor care to understand the attempt to interpret their procedure in the language and in the terms of conception, which is the peculiar business of those who are mainly interested in intellectual activity. Nor are they perturbed by the contention, put forward by those who pursue the aims of the intellect, that thought occupies a privileged position in the life of mind, seeing that thought interprets and understands. For the reply is obvious that thought only has a primary significance for those whose business it is to pursue the aims of thought, and that it is natural to regard as more important what one finds to be one's main interest. The philosopher (or the man of science) can convince no one but a philosopher that thinking holds a place of privilege in the life of the mind. Men of action or artists will neither concede nor deny the contention of the philosopher; they will regard it with indifference or toleration, and will feel instinctively that it is an argument in defence of a foregone conclusion based on prejudice or predilection. The artist will probably say—

“The rest may reason, and welcome,
’Tis we musicians know.”

II

If then we are to determine the place which truth holds in experience, or its value for human life, we must start from a position which does justice to the nature of human individuality; for this is fundamental for the whole problem. I feel on solid ground when I regard the individual mind as a supreme conscious realisation of the energy of life, rooted in the inorganic elements of nature, inseparable from lower organic processes and conditions, and utilising all these to sustain and fulfil the higher level of vital energy in which mind consists. Being a form of life, the characteristic quality of its activity is that of development

in response to and co-response with the world in which it has become consciously alive. Being more than mere physical organisation, its development is more than mere physical growth, and is not arrested at the stage of physiological maturity. Its development consists primarily in development of internal arrangement, not of external embodiment; a qualitative rather than a quantitative process. As a developing individuality, it faces its world with its whole energies, in their global entirety, if I may call it so, a development which proceeds not in a linear direction, but as a compact whole, carrying all its specific functions along with it in indissoluble co-ordination. Differentiation of its functions arises through its action and reaction on its world, but the integrity of the whole remains a reality, the primary reality, from first to last. In much the same way (though profoundly different in kind) a plant does not cease to be a whole after it has become differentiated into trunk, branches, leaves, and fruit. What we have later in the fulfilment of mind is the same unity of life as we have earlier, and the same interpenetration of the processes constituting its life. In actual fact we never lose sight of or ignore this solid integrity of the mind's life. What I wish to urge is that we have no ground for losing sight of it in the interests of theory, but every ground for insisting on it and recurring to it, if we are to assign each operation of mind its appropriate place in the context of experience. The singleness of mind is present and omnipresent in all its operations; the slightest variation of conscious life, be it even a sensation, reverberates throughout its whole being, modifying and sustaining its course of development and relation to its world. Its unity is manifested most prominently, though not exclusively, in the concentration of its energy, now in one specific direction, now in another, a concentration which takes, amongst other ways, the form of what we call attention. With its singleness of being it faces the real world around it, and forces itself into living association with other beings, and by so doing grows to the fullness of its mental stature. The surrounding world of beings evokes its energy of self-maintenance and self-fulfilment. It does not exist for them nor they for it; they all co-exist, so far as they, too, have individuality, as single realities in a world of

real. It measures their individuality by its own, and, as certain philosophers maintain, arranges the reality of individuals as a scale of beings occupying different degrees of reality. Doubtless other real beings, especially if conscious, do the same, and also measure and scale up the real beings different from themselves. The course of the mind's development may fairly be described, relatively to its initial starting-point in time and place, as a process of discovery, a discovery of what its own nature contains, and, as the correlate of this, a discovery of the significance of the other beings in relation to which it lives and moves and has its own being. This process of discovery is what we call experience in its most general sense. Experience is thus always double-sided ; we grow into our world, our world becomes articulate in its detailed reality as we proceed. We do not make the reality of other things any more than we make our own ; we find and become conscious of both in fulfilling the energy of our own mind. We do not break down the distinction between our reality and that of other beings as we proceed ; we establish both by the process of becoming aware of both. Neither gives way to the other, neither strictly depends on the other ; they are inter-dependent. We never face other beings with one of the functions of our mind. We face other reality with our whole mind, and we estimate it in terms of our whole nature, from the first stage to the last in the career of our experience. And one being differs from another according to the call it makes on our whole being, and the response our whole being makes to it.

In the course of our development, and as the result of an indefinite variety of activities conscious and sub-conscious, specific functions of the mind arise and assume a definite place in the economy of our mental life : perception, memory, imagination, emotion, conscious striving. We come to be distinctly aware of them, and to rely on them and operate with them. Some emerge into clearness early, some later in our mental history. Instead of the first stage of quasi-undifferentiated mental unity, we have later a complex and articulate arrangement of mental functions in and through which the mind operates. These arise through the successive and successful efforts of the mind to retain its hold on its

world, and its place in it ; and so to fulfil its being.¹ Each and all have reference to reality in some form or other, and no one exclusively.

On this interpretation, the pursuit and the attainment of articulately conceived systematic truth by the intellect is a single, a distinctive, but not the exclusive, and not necessarily the highest, channel through which the individual mind fulfils its proper nature. This deliberate search for intellectual truth, moreover, is controlled by the same fundamental conditions as guide and determine the mind's activity in every other essential direction. In each and all the concrete individual is endeavouring at once to fulfil its being to the uttermost, and to become consciously alive to the world of beings which co-exist with itself ; and these two processes are but aspects of its self-maintenance.¹ No one direction of the mind's life can be a substitute for, or supersede even in importance, another, any more than in a higher organism one organ can really take the place of another organ. Perception does not make sensation any the less necessary ; both are qualitatively distinct from memory and from judgment, as these are from each other ; while, again, scientific, or systematic, knowledge is as different a level of mental energy from all of those mentioned as it is from the activity of the moral life, of art, or of religion. By each of these, and by the different degrees of each kind of activity, the individual mind attains a different level of being, acts and reacts upon its world in a new way, fulfils a distinct mode of its life, and thereby establishes its own existence, in the face of a ceaselessly varying realm of objects.

No one of the directions assumed by the energy of the human mind is less or more of a purely human activity than another : and none carries the human mind beyond the ambit of its own sphere of existence, since all subserve the fulfilment of its being as a living individuality. If religion and art, if

¹ In that sense scientific knowledge is certainly "instrumental," as it has been held : a means, that is to say, to self-fulfilment. It is obviously not merely instrumental in the interests of "practice" ; for practice itself is in the same way instrumental to the self-fulfilment of the individual mind. Both, in short, are directly instrumental to complete individuality, and only indirectly to each other. So of art, morality, and religion.

morality and technical adaptation to nature, are essentially modes of human life, forms of its expression, science and the pursuit of intellectual truth are equally so, and no more than particular manifestations of the mental energy of human beings or rather of a restricted number of individuals. And, if memory, perception, and imagination are but ways by which we apprehend the real so as to conserve the stability and unity of our individual minds, conceptual activity, judgment and inference perform a similar function in precisely the same interest.

This view of human experience in general and of knowledge in particular is what seems best described as Anthropomorphism. The term is sometimes applied in a narrow sense, to refer to certain ways of ascribing literally to non-human kinds of reality qualities which are exclusively human.¹

Properly understood, however, this is only a subordinate meaning of the term. In essence it means simply the point of view of humanity at its best, the way in which a human life, within the peculiar limitations and specific conditions of its existence, consciously arranges its world in terms of its own perspective, and in so doing at once fulfils its own nature and adjusts itself to the indefinitely complex realm of beings with which it finds its existence associated. Every type of being in the real world is constituted by its own peculiar laws, and maintains itself in terms of these laws. Man has a type of his own, and secures his place by fulfilling the laws of his special form of being, whether those laws are physical, moral, æsthetic,

¹ This is often described as a peculiar tendency of the primitive mind : but it is by no means confined to the primitive intelligence. The difference between the uncultivated and the cultivated mind does not consist in the former being anthropomorphic in the narrow sense, while the latter eschews anthropomorphism. Both may be anthropomorphic in the same sense ; the difference between the two consisting in the sort of human qualities ascribed to non-human objects. Thus, the primitive mind will ascribe human emotions—anger, pleasure, etc.—to external beings, whether natural or non-natural ; the maturer mind will ascribe human ideas—conceptions, volitions—to non-human beings. Scientists and philosophers alike show this tendency. Why the primitive attitude should be rejected with contempt, and the attitude of the more developed mind treated with profound respect, is not evident, except to those who prefer to ascribe to non-human realities human thoughts rather than human emotions, and who imagine that a later generation must necessarily be wiser than the earlier.

or intellectual matters not; the issue of his activity is, the maintenance of his individual being by the fulfilment of his type of existence.

We are not concerned here to show how this conception enables us to interpret the significance of all the modes of this life. We are more especially interested in indicating its bearing on the problem of knowledge.

We shall not deal with all the forms of knowledge, but only with those which present the greatest difficulty—scientific procedure through conception, judgment and inference, by which intellectual truth in the usual sense is obtained. In the case, *e.g.*, of sensation and perception, which are also channels of knowledge, it is fairly easy to show that these functions of the individual mind are rooted in the peculiar psycho-physical conditions of human individuality, and are constituted by the peculiar laws of man's specific organisation. The essentially human character of knowledge at these levels of man's life may be considered beyond dispute. The same is true of memory or, again, the imaginative grasp of ideals of knowledge. Let us therefore confine attention to the harder case of conceptual activity, and the higher intellectual "truth," with which indeed most theories of knowledge exclusively deal, and in reference to which the claim that truth is "transcendent," "objective," "independent," is currently made.

III

There is nothing magical in the form or the procedure of intellectual activity that we should be disposed to credit it with the power to carry us beyond the conditions or limitations of the human mind. The conceptions with which mature intellectual activity, *e.g.* science, deals, are the outcome of and display the abstract character possessed by mere intellect as a specialised function of mind. They are literally the expression of this abstract function. The intellect does not find them ready made and waiting to be apprehended or picked up by the intellect. Nor are they by chance the convenient material suitable to be

handled by the abstract activity of the intellect. We often treat them in this way, it is true. But that is because reflection upon the whole procedure of the intellect is an after-thought; and, when undertaken, we seem to have a great variety of conceptions with fixed characters on the one hand, and a uniform power which deals with them on the other. What more natural than that in such circumstances we should fancy the conceptions to be the ready-made material offered to or fortunately adapted to the operation of an abstract intellect? But, in fact, the intellect is in nature and origin prior to the conceptions with which it deals. These are one and all created by it in the course of its effort to grasp the world in the interests of the unity of the mind. The deliberate aim of the intellectual process is to bring to bear on the variety of objects confronting the mind the all-pervading unity of the mind's life, or, as we sometimes put it, to bring the variety of objects *under* the general unity of the mind. This is one of the ways in which, as we find, the mind maintains its integrity in the face of the world of beings in relation to which it stands. The unity of the mind is the single constant and uniform principle throughout all its experience. The mind may only be aware of it in a vague way at first, or it may later assume a distinctive being of its own and be looked upon as an ideal centre of reference. But in all cases intellectual activity consists in bringing this unity as such into conscious connection with the varied world of objects in the midst of which the mind lives.

The plurality of conceptions devised for this end are the outcome of its efforts in this direction. They have the generality of the single unity which they seek to carry out, but also something of the concreteness of the actual objects with which the mind as a concrete individuality is concerned. They are thus, in a manner, intermediate between the mere unity of the mind, and the complex diversity of things. But they never leave the region of abstraction, since the intellect has only to do with satisfying the mind's general principle of unity. The intellect thus always stops short at the abstract conception, not because it might go further if it chose, but because its function is limited by this purpose from the first. Hence, we find, on the one hand,

that the conception never professes to give us the full particularity of the concrete object. On the other hand, the intellect endeavours to connect the conceptions as conceptions with one another; for the same demand for unity, which starts the mind's search for conceptions, instigates the mind to unite the conceptions themselves when they are found. It does this through the intellectual processes of inference, of systematisation, or again of establishing a hierarchy of conceptions, and perhaps in other ways.

The abstractness of the conceptions devised by the intellect, and the connection of these with one another, do not furnish any ground for holding that we go beyond the mere purposes of the finite human mind in intellectual activity. The intellect does not de-anthropomorphise the human mind. Indeed there seems a transparent paradox in maintaining that a function which is less than the whole mind can carry us beyond the mind altogether. This is so evident from the forms assumed by the language of men, and from the variation in the range of conceptual span, as I may call it, from individual to individual, that it would hardly require to be emphasised were it not for the mysterious, almost magical, significance attached by some minds, scientific and philosophical alike, to the mere quality of abstraction characteristic of the conceptions of the intellect.

What is true of their abstractness is equally true of their quality of universality and objectivity. Their universality is ultimately derivable from and is determined by the extent to which they reflect the single unity of the individual mind exercising the function of intellect on its own behalf. This unity remains the same throughout all the life of mind, and if a conception can be devised in which the consciousness of this unity is maintained throughout all change in the content of the object grasped by the conception, that conception assumes the character of being universal. The assumption is that the conception will remain what it is as long as the unity of the mind subsists, and that means always. Social intercourse helps to confirm this quality by bringing out that the conception in question reflects the unity of life not merely of one individual mind but of a number, large or small, of other minds equally individual in their

life.¹ The exact number of individuals holding such intercourse is irrelevant to the universality: two may be sufficient for certain kinds of conceptions; a hundred will strengthen the claim to universality in other cases. But social intercourse does no more in any case than confirm or emphasise the universality: it cannot create the universality in default of the operation of the individual minds who affirm it.² The universality may be so indubitably a quality of the conceptions in certain cases that we find it said, for example, that certain conceptions hold "for all mankind," are confirmed by the "universal experience of humanity," are valid "for consciousness in general." Such expressions are obviously mere hyperbole; no one imagines that all mankind are really aware of these conceptions; no one has ever tested all the individuals in humanity to see if each and every one holds the conceptions in question. All that is really meant is that the conceptions so described are such that they seem bound up with the very unity of the individual mind if it is to maintain itself at all.

When conceptions have this quality, it is easy to see how they may come to be considered outside the mind altogether or independent of the individual mind, and hence to give rise to the illusion that intellectual activity working with these conceptions carries us outside the limits of human mentality. A conception which is held to be true at all times and for all seems to have a being of its own whether any individual holds it explicitly or not: just as we are apt to suppose that a social institution which remains a permanent part of the life of a society has a being of its own independently of the individuals who successively or periodically embody its purpose and then pass away. Such a view is a useful method of conveying vividly the significance of the quality of universality: as a statement of actual fact it is a transparent absurdity. For it takes the quality of universality which is derived from the more ultimate fact of the unity of an

¹ Hence the reciprocal relations of social intercourse and universality of thoughts: social intercourse secures, to some extent, the *ratio cognoscendi* of universality of thoughts, the latter being, to a like extent, the *ratio essendi* of social life.

² In point of fact, the highest forms of intellectual universality are not held to be dependent for their worth on social intercourse. Indeed, socialisation of ideas is in inverse ratio to their intellectual universality and abstraction.

individual mind to be a reason for separating the conception from the individual mind altogether. Both the conception and its quality as universal have the same source in the individual mind, and have neither being nor life apart from it. As well might a child disown all parentage and all continuity with its past when it has come to maturity, after the manner of the high priests of Israel who claimed to have neither father nor mother when once they had devoted themselves to the service of Jehovah in the Temple.

In the same way the quality of "objectivity" possessed by conceptions can be shown to have its source in the operations of the individual human mind. Conceptions are objective in the sense, and only in the sense, that they express the mind's sense of unity in dealing with the objects confronting it. It is the function of thought, as we have said, to keep the mind's sense of unity secure in the face of the variety of the world of objects. When this purpose is successfully fulfilled, the conceptions do not change, any more than the unity of the mind changes. The realm of objects is from the first as real and enduring as the being of the individual mind. Our intellectual knowledge does not alter the nature of things, and things are themselves quite indifferent to our intellectual operations. But, once conceptions are obtained, it is a convenient and perhaps a natural form of metonymy to ascribe to conceptions the quality of the objective world with which they deal, or again to ascribe to objects themselves the conceptions which the intellect has devised to enable the mind to handle the world of objects. This is convenient to emphasise the significance of the result obtained by intellectual activity, viz., that the mind has secured its unity in the midst of the real world ; it is only objectionable if taken as literal fact. We then disturb the whole situation ; we regard the conceptions as themselves objects, and thus independent of the mind as objects in fact are. This is the naïve attitude of the recent revival of mediæval realism. It is not putting the position too strongly to say that if conceptions were really objects they would not be objective at all ; for they would not be mental functions, which they are ; they would no longer refer to objects, they would be the objects themselves. But it is in their reference

to the objects that their objectivity consists. It is the reaction upon our thought of the language in which conceptions are clothed, coupled with inadequate analysis of the situation, which has led many minds, and most of us at one time or another, to treat the objectivity characteristic of conceptions as equivalent to the summary identification of conceptions with the objects.

It is sometimes held that the successful corroboration by the objective world of certain conceptual processes and results is an unanswerable argument in favour of the trans-human quality ascribed to thought. If we can predict the course of nature with invariable accuracy, surely, it is said, our thoughts cannot be merely our own as human beings ; they must be an expression for the nature of independent things themselves. This is a familiar proposition, and the illustrations usually given are drawn from stellar and planetary mechanics and applied physics or, again, chemistry, sometimes also from pure mathematics.

Setting aside the fact that the proposition does not hold of conceptions in all sciences, and setting aside also the fact that the success means no more in some cases than that scientists have agreed mainly as the result of social intercourse, there is even in the most approved cases of such success nothing to justify the assertion that thought liberates us from the limits of the human individual mind. What it really implies is that our whole mind is so constituted as to be an integral component of the world of things with which its being is associated. Our mind, as a whole, is interwoven with the very texture of the real world, is fitted, so to say, to the environment of the rest of reality ; and if it but fulfils, in its own order and according to its own conditions, the laws of its own being, the issue will confirm and establish this congruence with the world. It is not that the intellect and the intellect alone gives us the true nature of the independent world of things ; but that the individual mind is from the start and all through its history a substantive constituent of the real. Its one purpose is to fulfil itself, and its detailed operations contribute to this one end. The so-called success of the intellectual process in particular corroborates this primordial character of the life of mind. It is not, therefore, that the intellect alone finds the whole truth about the world,

but that our mind as a whole enables the intellect to bring out the essential congruence between the mind and the real. It is the mind working with its whole energy through the channel of intellectual activity which makes possible the successful operations of the intellect in dealing with the world. The intellect merely brings out explicitly in its own way what was implicit all the while—the congruence of the whole mind with the real in the midst of which it lives and moves and has its being.¹

¹ To begin with, this congruence is in a sense a postulate, as we so often say. But it is not a postulate for the mind, it is only a postulate for the specific operation of the intellect. The mind, as a whole, no more doubts or questions or even “assumes” that it has a place amongst real beings, than trees or birds; and it no more “postulates” its congruence with other real beings than it postulates their congruence with itself. A postulate is only made by a partial function in an interest going beyond itself; it always implies an end beyond itself which is presupposed before it sets out to confirm the reality of the end. The mind has no end beyond itself that it can seek; it seeks simply to fulfil itself. But a *specialised* function like the intellect, an abstraction from the whole life of mind, must make the assumption that, in spite of being an abstraction, it will yet be able to attain in its own way and to express the fundamental nature of the life of mind which it partially embodies. The success of its procedure confirms openly the assumption it has made at the outset, and explicitly reinstates in a special way the fundamental character of the mind’s life. Such a confirmation is often regarded as a kind of wonder, or surprise, as if the mind should be, as it were, grateful to the intellect for having done so much on the mind’s behalf. But the whole process is such an obvious circle that there is no more place for wonder or surprise than in the resolution of a child’s puzzle. The intellect is in the control of the mind all the while, and is brought back to its starting point, as it must be, when its operation is completed, for the starting point is its guiding assumption throughout all its procedure, directing and limiting its course of operation. This is seen without difficulty, if we merely note that the intellect is always selective in its operation, a selection which is guided by an end in relation to which the selection is made. When we say, therefore, that the intellect grasps the nature of the real, we should observe that this is at best only a partial statement even of the operation of the intellect. The successful result of the operation of the intellect has always a double-sided significance; it conveys what the real is in relation to the mind, as interpreted by intellect, it also conveys what the mind is in relation to the real world. It must do both at once, because it is a manifestation of the life of mind as one real being amongst other real beings. It is because we so often ignore the one side of this result, and lay exclusive emphasis on the grasp of the independent real object achieved by the intellect, that we treat the intellect as a revelation of the independent object, and the truth obtained as consequently independent of our own minds. Such a one-sided view is sure to distort the actual situation, for it leads us to ignore the vital connection of the intellect with the whole life of mind. If we could imagine a flower thinking about the botanist as the botanist thinks about the flower, we might have similarly one-sided misinterpretations of the significance of the results arrived at by the plant intelligence. The

IV

So far we have considered the claims of the intellect to transcend human limitations by an analysis of the conceptual as such and at its best. The same result is even more evident when we bear in mind that the creation or discovery of the conceptions and their connections, by which the intellect apprehends the world, always involves an effort of mind, experiment, trial, and error. The conceptions and conceptual connections are not given to the intellect ready made ; they are deliberately designed, and are only found after a severe intellectual struggle, in the course of which they are formed and reformed, proposed and rejected. The history of science and of philosophy is strewn with the wrecks of expeditions in the seas of thought. All conceptions are at the start nothing more than tentative efforts of the mind to establish a unity amongst things. The progress of science finds its growing point in suggested hypotheses. No one would dream of regarding the embryonic stages of true knowledge as other than phases in the life of the human mind. How then can any one maintain, when these stages have arrived at a point in their development which satisfies the mind, produces general acceptance, and enables it to maintain itself in the relation to its world, that suddenly the thoughts thus secured cease altogether to be our own and become non-human or impersonal in character? If tentative hypotheses do not give us the very "nature of things," why should a successful hypothesis do so?

plant's thoughts would surely be a mere manifestation of its life, however accurately in its process it succeeded in diagnosing the being of the botanist ; and its thoughts would emphatically not be those of the botanist, no matter how accurate they were to the plant itself. And so generally ; if other orders of beings, some of which palpably have intelligence, were to think about their world,—the things with which they are confronted,—their thoughts would, in every case, be the expression of their own specific intelligence, and would remain constant for them because accurately embodying the laws of their own being. It is hardly imaginable that the thoughts of all the different orders of beings would be the same, or that the "nature of things" would be completely revealed by each type of thought. In a word, Xenophanes' criticism of the popular religious views of his time has but to be generalised to see the inadmissibility of attributing to the specific thoughts of human intelligence a capacity to convey the nature of things in a manner which, however successful, implies that because thought is true it is therefore impersonal.

We can often go a long way with an inaccurate hypothesis. We can prophesy by it, to a certain extent, and it bears this test of success. Nevertheless we are led to give it up, and to describe it as merely a human conjecture. Since it is by a continuation of the same activity of the mind that an inaccurate becomes an accurate hypothesis, it is surely impossible to dehumanise the hypothesis once it becomes finally established. Is the only quality of thought which remains human to be the capacity to make mistakes? And shall we deny ourselves the right to call true thought human just because it is true? This seems neither justified nor intelligible.

But when we look at the process of thought as it actually takes place, we find that intellectual activity is never in fact purely intellectual activity at all. We never think in an abstract medium of pure intellect, not even in the most abstract of all sciences. We start from and constantly draw upon the resources and deliverances of our perceptual experience. We repeatedly substantiate our thinking by linking its conclusions with perceptual facts, and sometimes we call this procedure (paradoxical as it sounds) the verification of our thoughts. And we invariably make use of the medium of perceptual experience to give body, shape, and form to the whole process of thinking; for there is no continuous thinking possible without written or spoken language, which belongs wholly to the region of perceptual experience. Now perception is not merely inseparable from our specifically human mind; it is not even separable from our peculiarly constituted nervous system. When we proceed to think about things, the operation of thinking is instigated in the first instance by the mode in which things are perceived. Perception sets the task, and furnishes the character which the things possess about which we think. No thinking can dispense with its own facts or leave the facts behind. And since these are constituted by the special nature of human perception, our thinking is held captive by, and is beyond all hope of escape from, the limits of the human mind. This point has been so often emphasised, that it requires no more than a passing remark.

What is so curious is that the use of language in which to convey thoughts should ever have created the illusion

that our thought can transcend the human mind. It seems to be supposed because language is "outside," or a symbol, and the form of the symbol is irrelevant, that therefore thought is independent of all human conditions. But it is precisely the symbol which compels thought to keep in touch with the actual human mind, which always lives as a concrete whole; or conversely, it is precisely because thought cannot lose touch with the concrete mind that it must use a symbol. The symbol, be it ever so slight, *e.g.* a mere sign, holds thought in chains to the conditions and laws of perception, without which the mind would lose its living contact with its actual world. The insignificance, the very perceptual abstractness of the symbol, just corresponds to the abstractness of the conceptual activity. Indeed, only such a symbol would be adequate to the quality of the conception. Hence it is that the more abstract the conceptual activity, the more the language used becomes a mere character or sign: numbers, *e.g.*, are conveyed by mere lines in space, straight or curved or otherwise arranged. And the less abstract the conception, the more does the symbol conveying it have a greater perceptual significance, sometimes even appealing to different senses.

Again, it is important to note that contradiction, which is so characteristic of thought, is the direct consequence of the abstract nature of its procedure as a specialised operation of mind, and confirms the essentially human quality of its process and its results.

Contradiction has always been the main source of uneasiness in the intellectual conscience, goading its waking life with the remorse of doubt, and troubling the dreams of the most accomplished builder of systems. Some have treated it as a kind of thorn in the flesh, others have used it to make a crown of thorns for the brow of intellectual freedom. And indeed the fact of contradiction is at once the puzzle and the paradox of intellectual activity: a puzzle because it is difficult to see why the intellect should ever contradict itself: a paradox because the creation of a contradiction is the work of thought as much as the resolution of it. No other phase of mental life is subject to this condition. Perception, emotion, volition, imagination, memory, have no share in it. Their deliverances

are final for the mind. If these deliverances are found to contain contradictions it is not for the functions themselves that the contradiction exists, but for the intellect which reviews or criticises their results. So close is contradiction bound up with intellectual activity that a certain familiar form of speculation regards contradiction as the life-principle of thought itself and the clue to its development of the nature of truth. Contradiction, it is said, *e.g.* by Mr. Bradley, arises when a conception is pushed to the end of its meaning. And every conception, it is held, will prove contradictory if it is pushed to its extreme point. Hence thought activity essentially tends to contradiction. Such a contention at once creates suspicion and distrust, for surely the initial mistake may lie just in pushing the conception too far. Why go to extremes in thinking any more than in any other form of experience? By hypothesis we are not bound to do so, for, if thought be not pressed to the breaking point, it will not contradict, and will still be thought. Thus, in making contradiction the essence of thought, we have no right to console ourselves with the reflection that we are making a virtue of a necessity, for we are really making a virtue of a blunder. And the things about which we reflect are transparently indifferent to the contradictions into which we fall when we think about them; they remain in solid and stolid security, maintaining their full reality, regardless of the conceptual tangle into which our minds may have fallen. Indeed it is partly because they maintain their concrete integrity that our minds are checked in the course of their intellectual procedure.

The source of contradiction is to be traced to the general character of intellectual activity. It arises from the demand for complete mental unity on the one hand, and, on the other, from the tentative selective efforts of the intellect to meet this demand through a variety of conceptions. The unity of the mind is, as we have seen, the presupposition and the consummation of intellectual activity; and without its presence in the process of the intellect no contradiction would arise. Variety of conception there must be, since a plurality of real things has to be unified. When the unity of the mind is not satisfied by a particular conception or a connection of conceptions, contradiction appears. It

is thus always a transitional characteristic of intellectual procedure, and, as we find, it varies in kind from individual to individual, and in degree according to the nature of the conception involved. Thus, what seems contradictory to one mind is not always contradictory to another, as we see constantly verified in the course of debate, especially on fundamental questions. And some conceptions are found to be partially contradictory, others wholly so, by the same mind. The mental grasp of one individual differs from another, and one individual thus neither feels nor sees a contradiction, *i.e.* his mind's unity is satisfied, in a relation of conceptions which seems to another riddled with contradiction, *i.e.* giving no mental security. When we use such expressions as a "self-contradictory conception," or connection of conceptions, and, again, such terms as "absolutely contradictory," "inherently contradictory," and the like, what we mean is that, with the best intellectual effort which we and others, who agree with us, can make, no sense of mental unity can be arrived at by the conceptions in question. In a word, contradiction is nothing more than the condition in which the intellect fails to satisfy the mind's demand for complete unity in the special case of the conceptions or connection of conceptions created by the activity of the intellect. Contradictions are thus, in this sense, always created by the intellect itself, as Kant pointed out in the case of one form of intellectual activity in particular; and it is just because they are so created that the intellect can always remove them, either by retracing its steps or by advancing further. Hence it is useless to describe conceptions, or thoughts in general, as inherently contradictory. Conceptions have no being except as expressions of intellectual activity, and thought removes contradictions, as well as gives rise to them. But for the tentative, selective, piecemeal procedure of thinking, *i.e.* its human character, contradiction would not arise at all. It is neither a virtue of thought nor a disease; it is in the long run due to the self-criticism by the mind of its own thought, and reveals the negative control exercised by the mind over the fundamentally abstract nature of the intellectual activity which seeks to work in isolation from the rest of the life of mind.¹

¹ It only differs in form and not as a mental operation from the check exerted by

V

One of the most familiar admissions made regarding intellectual activity is that it is "unable to explain everything," that "it has its limits." And by this is meant not that the individual mind making the admission is incapable of advancing further, but that the intellect itself will not allow the mind to go beyond a certain point in dealing with the real world. This is not discovered and stated simply as a practical experience; we find it time after time erected into a general or philosophical tenet. We have but to recall the long-standing contrast and quarrel between faith and intellect in Western thought, the sceptical criticism of the intellect by Hume, the theory of Kant, and, more recently, the vigorous re-assertion of the same doctrine by Mr. Bradley, to find ample proof of the existence of this conviction. It is a remarkable confirmation of the same contention that those who either do not admit it or who seem to maintain the self-sufficiency of thought, do so only by blending thought with other and consciously different functions of the life of the mind. Thus Spinoza, in spite of his intentional and initial pure intellectualism, reaches true reality not by the intellect alone but by intellectual love. Hegel at once openly confesses the impotency of conceptual procedure to deal with the teeming detail of nature and history, and yet seeks by a kind of *tour de force* to establish a quasi-logical connection between thought at its highest and nature in general, an attempt which acquires whatever value it has from a covert combination of intellectual activity with the practical or creative activity of the human mind. In a work of a more recent date we find a thinker of like tendencies (Mr. Bosanquet) making the significant remark, apparently without any consciousness of its far-reaching importance for his whole view of thought, that "it is the strict and fundamental truth that

the solid integrity of the mind over all the specialised functions of its life. The analogue of contradiction in the sphere of feeling is the sense of pain arising from a misdirected course pursued by the mind in its uniform career towards satisfaction or fulfilment; while again in the case of striving or volition we similarly find the sense of failure or defeat arising from the pursuit of an end futile in itself or hostile to the supreme purpose of mental life—a sense of failure which appears in such different forms as mistaken effort or remorse of conscience.

love is the mainspring of logic." These examples are quoted merely to give an indirect proof of the contention put forward explicitly by the other thinkers above referred to.

Such a position was for long a source of grave trouble to myself; for I could neither admit the contention that the intellect cannot explain everything nor accept the philosophical theories put forward on its behalf, nor find complete satisfaction in the way of thought adopted by those who maintained or sought to maintain the opposite view. It seemed impossible to understand how the intellect could at once be taken as the only avenue to the intelligible, *i.e.* mentally satisfying, apprehension of the real, and yet to hold that it was compelled to leave over a residuum of the real as beyond its grasp. The difficulty was only increased by recognising that it seemed to be by the intellect itself that this limitation of its function was discovered and formulated. How could the intellect maintain or admit its own insolvency and yet try to carry on its proper business? When, however, one observes that the intellect is from the first and in principle a mental operation consciously distinguished from, and even set apart by the mind itself in contrast to, the other functions of the mind's life (more particularly the functions of feeling and striving), the difficulty in question disappears. For then it follows at once that it cannot be expected to get the whole of the real world into its net, since it starts by being only a partial expression of the full reality of the mind's life.¹ It does not reveal the whole nature of mind, and therefore the mind cannot be wholly satisfied with its deliverances, however rich and complete in their own order these deliverances of the intellect may be. The mind has other functions and other ways of approaching the real world, and no intellectual activity can be a substitute for these.² It is thus not because the intellect is incompetent to do its own work that it fails; it is because the

¹ The limitation of thought in its relation to the real rests on, and is due to, the initial separation of thought from other functions of the mind.

² The real makes an appeal to the emotions of the mind as well as to thought, to the will as well as to the emotions. It is this sphere of the real, which thought can neither touch nor think away, which bars the process of thought and limits its range of operation. It is, indeed, a residuum for thought, but it is an integral part of the nature of the real for mind in its concrete fullness. (See chap. v. pp. 133-171.)

mind in its entirety cannot be satisfied in its relation to reality by the exercise of only one of its own functions. The mind is aware that the real contains more than the intellect can supply because the mind is related to the real through all its functions, and finds the real responding and co-responding to the other demands made upon it by the mind. The limitation of the range of the intellect does not arise because the intellect falls into contradiction when it tries too much, as Kant maintained, nor because thought is relational, as Bradley puts it. It seems absurd to condemn thought for trying to do too much, since it can never exercise its activity too far. The more it does in fact the better the result intellectually. And the intellect can never trespass beyond the sphere of intellect. It seems equally mistaken to condemn thought because it is relational, if it cannot but be relational. The restricted range of the activity of thought is determined not by thought itself, but by the more concrete reality of the mind's whole life. The fulfilment of this can alone bring satisfaction; and while the intellect can make its own contribution to this satisfaction, the whole mind can never find that contribution sufficient for all its needs. Whatever truth the intellect attains, therefore, it must always be less than what meets the mind's requirements. If we take the full satisfaction of the mind to be the only adequate expression for the "whole truth" regarding the mind's conscious relation to its world, then the special truth achieved by the intellect can never be the "whole truth" required. And if the "intelligibility" of the world is only reached when the mind is fully satisfied, then intelligibility involves something more than the results, however great, of intellectual activity. The limitation of thought is thus not a defect of the intellect, but merely a specialisation of the life of the mind. Because it is so limited by and for human ends, its process and its results have all the more a human value. They can never be less than mentally satisfying, and they can never be more than this; and thus they can never overthrow nor imperil the major ends that make for and secure human satisfaction.¹

¹ It is a mistake in principle to describe this result as the failure of thought to grasp the real; and misleading to employ such an expression as that of Lotze,

VI

The mind is always instinctively alive to the limited possibilities of satisfaction to be achieved through thinking, and seeks through other and distinctive channels to supplement the inadequacy of thought to supply entire satisfaction. It approaches the real by the avenue of emotion as well as by that of volition, and endeavours to secure in its relation to the real the highest satisfaction that these functions alone can supply. The concentration of the integrity of its life into these channels constitutes the search of beauty on the one hand and goodness on the other. Just as the highest fulfilment of its life through the function of thought brings what we call (intellectual) truth, so the consummation of the mind's possibilities of emotion issues in the realisation of beauty, and the achievement of the work of volition is the attainment of goodness. The conventional difference of the terms employed to describe the main avenues of the self-fulfilment of the mind tends to obscure their essential connection with one another. They are connected in their source and connected in their final purpose. They emanate from the one integral life of mind seeking at all costs and by all its operations to maintain itself by developing its powers to meet the call of the real world. On the other hand, each of them finds its ultimate goal in the contribution it makes to the full satisfaction of

that "reality is richer than thought." Thought does not fail of its own purpose, nor does it fail to contribute its own meed of satisfaction to the mind. In the face of the extraordinary achievements of scientific procedure, and, we may say, also of practical reflection, it seems a travesty of the facts to speak of the failure of thought. Moreover, the failure of thought would, in the long run, mean the failure of the mind to be itself or to attain its end; and it is difficult to attach any meaning to that expression, since the mind cannot bring about its own failure, and no other reality is in a position to perform that office on its behalf. It is again misleading to say that "reality is richer" than thought: for thought always enriches reality by lighting up for mind the meaning of things. The real would be infinitely poorer for the absence of thought. And, indeed (if it be possible at all to compare thoughts and things in this way), thought, even as thought, is much more important and more valuable for mind than many forms of the real. Just as the greatest criminal is a higher being than a beast of prey, so the poorest thought of a mind is a finer product of creation than the immeasurable desert spaces of the earth. What such a questionable expression means is not strictly that reality is richer than thought but that the mind is richer in its life than the processes of thought alone.

the whole mind's life ; and to this they are subordinate, and by this the limit, the range of operation of each, is determined. Hence if we emphasise their community of interest and purpose, we may quite correctly regard them as identical ; and this is often done even by those who have a specialised concern for the pursuit of only one of them. The poet says, "Beauty is truth, truth beauty,—that is all ye know on earth and all ye need to know." The philosopher (Mr. Bradley), similarly says that in his maturer years he finds himself "taking more and more as literal fact what I used in my youth to admire and love as poetry." When, however, we do not emphasise this community of aim, and only then, we can regard these avenues towards mental satisfaction as different, each pursuing its own course in terms of its own laws and conditions.¹ Each is pursued in abstraction from the others, because only by so doing can the finite mind concentrate its energies. It concentrates in order to achieve ; and to get the utmost in one direction it must, at least temporarily, isolate one channel from the others. We find this in the case of thought ; it holds equally in the case of emotion and of volition. Each is abstract by itself, but one abstraction is as much justified and as inevitable as the other. Were it not for the abstraction of thought, we may say, the other abstractions would not be made or required. If the one abstract activity can accomplish its end, so can the others. The attainment of the utmost that emotion and volition can supply is necessary to balance the utmost which thought can achieve. And when the mind is in possession of the resources and accomplishments of all of them, it reaches the highest level of its life. This consists in the restoration or reinstatement, at a higher level, of the primordial integrity of mind from which its being as an individual whole starts, and for the maintenance of which the enterprise and adventure of its experience are undertaken. This highest level is a restoration, because the primal integrity was broken

¹ But if we lose sight altogether of their inherent connection, the inevitable result will be the creation of conflicts between their aims. And this we find constantly happens in actual experience : truth at war with goodness, goodness at war with beauty. In such conflicts we will find at once some of the greatest tragedies of experience, and the greatest comedies.

when the abstraction of functions from one another took place ; it is a reinstatement, because the maintenance of its integrity from first to last is the final purpose of all its operations. The equipoise of its being in the midst of a changing and varied world is the essence of its satisfaction and fulfilment.

The demand, therefore, for the maximum of enjoyment, or again of good, in the mind's relation to the real, is the necessary counterstroke to the effort to reach truth through the channel of the intellect. And it is important to observe that the mind insists on regarding both beauty and goodness as universal and objective, though under the same limitations as conceptions are held to be so. The ascription of beauty to the real world, and again the insistence that the world is on the side of goodness, are no more metaphors than the assertion that conceptions or truths are valid of the real. The universality of a judgment of beauty is as certain as that of a scientific judgment, and as certain because it possesses the same characteristics of universality ; it is permanent for the mind that holds it, and it holds for a plurality of minds. In fact, if beauty and goodness had not these features, so commonly ascribed to truth alone,¹ it would be impossible to give meaning to the life of the artist, or to justify the most elementary act of moral goodness. The real supports the ends of the artist and the moral agent, as completely as it corroborates the assertions of the scientist. That beauty and goodness are so often held to be merely subjective or mental states, while truth is considered to be characteristically objective, seems partly due to the fact that in the case of the former the tendency is to think more of the origin and process of achievement, in the case of the latter to pay attention to the result and overlook the process ; and partly to the fact that in the former the sensuous elements of human life are more in evidence than in the case of thinking.² What holds of truth, however, certainly-

¹ The explanation of this is the mere accident that the problems of knowledge have centred round the nature of science.

² On the other hand, when the essential universality of beauty and goodness is emphasised, the tendency is to treat them as containing conceptions of a type similar to intellectual conceptions. This is equally mistaken ; but, at any rate, it brings into prominence the affinity between the effort after beauty and goodness and the effort after truth.

holds in the same way of the pursuit of beauty and of goodness ; and, conversely, if the latter are human creations established in the interest of the self-fulfilment of the mind, the like must be maintained of the basis as well as the superstructure of thought.

It is because of the abstract character which each of these channels possesses in relation to the other and to the whole of mind, that we find in experience that one of them is exclusively chosen by certain types of mind as the main channel of satisfaction. The choice is a matter of individuality, capacity, and instinctive interest, and no principle can be laid down which shall declare that the choice of one is more essential to the mind than another. For in each case the choice is justified by the fact that the world does bring satisfaction in its own kind to the mind. The suggested emphasis on one at the expense of the other is an unfortunate, but a natural psychical consequence of the selection. Hence we find the attempt sometimes made to subordinate one to the other, or even to establish the value of one in terms of the other. Hence the forms of æstheticism, intellectualism, and pragmatism in the history of the human mind. These are at best but misdirections or exaggerations of a healthy tendency to select the line of approach to completeness that best suits an individual mind. Each individual suffers from the prejudice created by his choice ; but that is merely of biographical importance and interest.

VII

The last point I wish to refer to is that intellectual processes are never merely intellectual. Distinct as thought, emotion, and striving are, as channels towards mental fulfilment, both in their course and in their issues, it is remarkable how in actual experience they betray the community of their source in spite of their distinctness. It is as if the integrity of the mind refused to be disintegrated by these abstractions, however firmly the abstraction tries to keep to its own groove. The whole life of the mind as a unity of intellect, emotion, and striving asserts its sway over them, and indeed permeates the separate avenues which it takes to attain completeness. Thus in the case of intellectual activity,

strenuousness of effort or striving is a fundamental condition of reaching an intellectual result, though such strenuousness is not in itself an intellectual quality, but a quality of volition in the strict sense. Intellectually such strenuousness is indispensable to the process, and yet is irrelevant to the logical value of the result attained. And with this volitional element are bound up many derivative conditions of intellectual success, conditions which we sometimes speak of as virtues of the intellectual attitude, *e.g.*, those of honesty, truthfulness, sincerity, seriousness, perseverance, courage, and the like. None of these strictly constitute an intellectual conception or arrangement of conceptions; but they most certainly affect the course of our intellectual activity. In some cases they may effectually determine the issue of our thinking, *e.g.*, by narrowing the outlook or by arresting thought in the interests of preconceived ideas, relevant or irrelevant. At any rate the neglect of these virtues does most certainly alter the value of the result which we reach. Similarly, the emotional element plays a vital part in the operations of the intellect. The bent of our intellect towards a certain type of inquiry or course of thought is settled, more than we often willingly admit, by the emotional attitude we take up to the object considered. How otherwise can we explain the indifference, and even revulsion, some minds feel towards history, mathematics or metaphysics? ¹ Surely, if the intellectual activity were in no way affected by emotions, individuals should be able to take a continuous intellectual interest in every object alike, though doubtless the degree of attainment would vary with intellectual capability. But this is not what in fact we find. To some minds the intellectual attitude is rendered impossible from the start by an emotional recoil from the object to be thought about. Those matters in which we take a keen intellectual interest make, either at the beginning or very quickly, an emotional appeal to the mind amounting in some cases to an intensity of passion which will carry even an inferior intellect over the most serious obstacles to understanding. We may generalise Shakespeare's maxim regarding education and say,

¹ It is noteworthy that the initial emotional attitude is, in most cases, an index and anticipation of the intellectual capacity to understand.

"No profit is where is no pleasure ta'en ; in brief, sir, study what you most affect." For, indeed, no mind can long sustain continuity of intellectual activity without the impulsion derived from a strong emotion of curiosity, or without the emotional elevation which is the better and larger part of the reward of unimpeded intellectual effort. The most impersonal scientific mind is far from being emotionally colourless ; or if it does become indifferent even to the emotional effect of successful achievement, it is curious to note how soon either ennui or depression seizes the mind. It has often been remarked that, in philosophical speculation, the most severely abstract and rigorously formal thinkers seem dominated by a kind of fanatical enthusiasm for logical order and dialectical display. Now this emotional accompaniment of intellectual activity has emphatically nothing to do with the constitution of the truth which the intellect seeks to secure. The truth is determined simply and solely by the canons and conditions of intellectual procedure. The emotion pervades the activity but it does not directly regulate the conduct of the understanding.

So profoundly does it affect the character of intellectual activity that it sometimes seems as if, at least for certain minds, the intellectual process were undertaken to secure a result which should be not merely an intellectual satisfaction but an æsthetic or emotional satisfaction at the same time. Every one with very strong intellectual interest in some field of thought must have felt the peculiar thrill which invariably follows the apprehension of an illuminating principle. Such a thrill is purely æsthetic in its quality, and yet may seem as important, sometimes even more important, for the mind than the abstract truth of the principle itself. Similarly, the sense of form is a most important factor in determining the intellectual result. The mere beauty of the arrangement of the conceptions involved in a specific sequence of thought gives a satisfaction all its own, and seems worth securing for its own sake. The intellectual labour seems to find its perfect consummation in the symmetry of the product of its activity. This holds of scientific thinking in the narrow sense, as any one acquainted with mathematical investigation is aware. But it holds as much, and even more, in philosophy, where

the idea of symmetrically arranged thought plays the part, for certain minds, of a kind of additional canon of intellectual truth. Systems of philosophy, as systems, are the outcome of an æsthetic interest in intellectual procedure. They are the products of the artistic imagination operating on the material provided by the conceptions of the intellect. They are designed to satisfy the æsthetic sense rather than the purely intellectual attitude, and illustrate by an extreme case the inseparable connection between emotional and intellectual processes of the mind.

We need not consider how, in the same way, intellect is involved in the fulfilment of the emotional attitude of the mind, or in that of volition: or, again, how the æsthetic element plays a part in the achievement of goodness. Analysis would reveal that, in the attainment of the end pursued by each of the abstract operations, the other factors of the mind are present as co-operating influences. But indeed no deep analysis is required to demonstrate a fact which experience is constantly bringing to light. On the one hand the condemnation of beauty in the name of goodness or of goodness in the name of beauty, on the other hand the term "beauty of holiness" or, again, the utterance of truth with the perfect grace of literary expression, are familiar illustrations of the indissoluble blending in actual experience of the distinctive attitudes assumed by the human mind in its process of self-fulfilment, however much the attitudes may claim specific independence of one another. The solid integrity of the whole life of mind will not allow itself to be set aside by any exclusive interest in one of its abstract functions. However much this insistence on its concrete entirety may spell inconsistency or hamper with irrelevance the abstract procedure of each distinctive attitude, apparently the mind as a whole prefers the inconsistency and the irrelevance to the impoverishment of its life by an over-emphasis on one of its functions. And some of the more open-minded of those who have sought supreme satisfaction along the intellectual channel of the mind's activity, frankly admit in the end that their special avenue does not give the whole truth they desire, does not even give the whole truth sought along that one channel. I recall in this connection the admissions made by the strenuously intellectualistic mind of Mr. Bradley that, in the long

run, as he paradoxically puts it, truth cannot be consistently and ultimately true, that truth is more than consistency and contains more than the criterion of non-contradiction can supply ; that our minds and our feelings must, at least in part, determine the composition of the final satisfaction we find in truth, and indeed that a man's philosophy is in a real sense a matter of personal choice.

VIII

It is partly because these three attitudes of the mental life emanate from the essential integrity of the mind, and partly because in actually fulfilling the demands of any one the others indirectly reveal their presence, that the mind is reduced at any rate to hope that in the long run the achievements of their several aims will converge or co-operate in the production of a supreme state of mental satisfaction. This would restore at the consummation of thought, of emotion, and of striving, the sense of unity from which their divergent operations start, and in the interest of which they prosecute their course towards completion. Such a hope is certainly warranted, and the realisation of it is the larger part of the best religious experience. The convergence of these aims, however, can never be more than an aspiration for any one of them. Each by itself is burdened with its imperfection, and even at times haunted by defeat, simply because by itself it is abstract and consciously abstract. The imperfection is expressly admitted in a curious way. It is held that for the fulfilment of the purposes of the intellect, as well as those of goodness, "faith" is required. This faith is brought in to give the assurance of final completeness, which each by itself never seems to reach. This supplementary faith at once removes or corrects the imperfection due to the abstract procedure of thinking and striving. It is the way in which the mind as a single unity asserts or reaffirms its hold over the abstract aims of thought (and striving), and keeps them in immediate and continuous contact with the integrity of its life. The faith is not an attitude of the intellect itself (or of volition), but an act of the whole mind. Properly speaking, it does not mean that in

time the intellect will create final satisfaction for the mind, for it will never do so, no matter how long it operates. Nor does it mean that the intellect might ultimately fail unless it were held up or kept going by faith; for the intellect is always attaining success wherever and whenever it fulfils the conditions of intellectual procedure, and the mind has never any honest doubt about the value of intellectual activity. This so-called faith is simply the attitude by which the whole mind lays claim to all the achievements of the intellect in the pursuit of its abstract career, gives them their place in the constitution of that supreme satisfaction wherein the mind is fulfilled and on the attainment of which its hopes are set. The faith so exercised is thus the correlative of that hope for final fulfilment to which reference was above made. That it should be found necessary is a complete confirmation of the position maintained throughout this argument, viz., that intellectual activity is an abstract operation of the human mind, and finds its entire significance in contributing to the fulfilment of a human individuality. The faith called in to supplement intellectual procedure is meaningless outside the interests and conditions of human life. It is irrelevant to the world of things whether organic or inorganic. So long as faith is thus necessary to give significance to the aims of the intellect, there is no escape from the essentially anthropomorphic character of intellectual procedure, even apart from the considerations already adduced to establish the same conclusion.

While the various ends pursued by the human mind in its process towards self-discovery or self-fulfilment are thus one and all—truth as well as goodness, and beauty as well as truth—anthropomorphic in origin and realisation, this conclusion must not be misunderstood. They are on this account neither purely subjective nor mere passing shadows on the surface of reality. In achieving these ends of its being, the mind is using its utmost powers to secure and maintain its place amidst the world of beings with which it is confronted, and in which its lot is cast—the endless variety of objects which make up what we embrace under nature, human nature and supernature. And this supreme aim dominates the mind's career from first to last. At its earliest stage of development it faces its world as a plastic but largely

undifferentiated unity, adapting itself as well as it can to the incessant challenge made upon it by other beings. At its latest stages it brings out all its resources separately and successively to meet the call of its world, and establish its unity in relation to its world. In fulfilling these demands it at once develops its own nature, and establishes its place in the realm of reality. By so doing, it achieves the highest of which its special order of being—that of an individual human mind—is capable, and therefore it expresses all that reality in the form of a human mind contains. If we call this supreme result, as we may, the “full truth” of mind, then the mind’s entire fulfilment is in very literalness a revelation of the real. If we say, as some do, that in the human mind the real world becomes articulately conscious, then we may put the same position in the form that the human mind is a conscious exponent of the nature of reality. But such a manner of expression adds nothing to the main contention, and is apt to be misleading, since it suggests that the processes of our mental life have a kind of inarticulate embodiment in the non-human domain of the real, whereas my contention is that the processes and their outcome have neither existence nor significance beyond the domain of the finite human mind whose peculiar nature they unfold or express. It is enough for us that our place in the world of the real is as well established and as much an embodiment of the nature of reality as any other being claiming to be real. Our place becomes established when our ends are completely fulfilled, and by realising our place our ends themselves are shown to be of the essence of reality. By assuming human shape, ultimate Reality thereby literally becomes human. We need not say, with Athanasius, that this was done *in order that* we might become like the ultimately real. For, in fact, we have neither the capacity nor the desire to be other than that part of ultimate Reality which we embody. To be this fully is to be both human and ultimately real at once. Only with our whole mind can this be accomplished ; but with this it is, not as an act of faith but as literal fact, attained.

II

THE REALISTIC CHARACTER OF KNOWLEDGE

"To us the Universe is a living whole which, apart from violence and partial death, refuses to divide itself into well-defined objects and clean-cut distinctions."—BRADLEY.

"Yes, sir, but a man is to guard himself against taking a thing in general."—JOHNSON.

"Thought's the slave of life."—HENRY IV, Part I.

I

IN ordinary intercourse, as also in psychological and logical analysis, it is taken for granted that the mind in knowing an object proceeds in a linear series of stages from a point which marks the beginning to a point which marks the termination of the process. It is also taken for granted that in knowledge we somehow deal with the surface of the object, whether the surface be regarded as an outside "form," an external "quality," or an "aspect" of the object in question. Even when we are supposed to penetrate into the interior of the object, and to know its essence, the process of doing so is viewed as a linear process, that of piercing into its inner nature, and the essence obtained is considered to be an "aspect" or "inner surface."

At first sight these ways of looking at the process of knowledge would seem very different or even inconsistent. A linear direction and a superficies are not the same, and a surface is not simply a combination of lines. The connexion, however, between these familiar assumptions is not difficult to trace. A succession of linear directions will cover the surface, though it will not give a surface; and the surface, whatever more it may be and however it may be derived, is at least partially a synthesis of lines. The two assumptions therefore work conveniently

together and co-operate sufficiently to keep up the specious accuracy of the assumptions themselves.

If they were merely metaphors, perhaps little harm could arise from accepting them, though metaphors tend all too readily to be accepted as facts when they are constantly employed without criticism. We find, however, they are more than metaphors.

Knowledge is supposed literally to consist in a succession of stages, in the last of which we have the "truth," the preceding stages being then set aside or superseded. This is seen when a judgment is regarded as an act of knowledge detachable from the mental complex of memory and imagination which preceded it, and without which it could not take place, but which none the less are supposed in no way to enter into the truth of the judgment. Judgment is the climax of the process, and, being the last stage in the attainment of the end in view, is separated off from what preceded it and alone contains the truth of knowledge merely because it is the last stage in the process. Similarly an inference or a system of judgments is only realised after a process of thought, and, when attained, is held to be a self-contained body of truth as it stands, apart from the process by which it was reached: the preceding process is a mere succession of "events" in the individual's mind. In a word, when the process of knowledge is regarded as a linear series, the truth comes to be identified with the final stage in the series. The end of knowledge is identified with the termination of the process. The form of sequence in which knowledge appears determines the very conception of truth itself. Temporal succession is represented as a line, and the linear flow of time shapes our view of the nature of knowledge, and of the relation of knowledge to reality.

Against this conception it seems important to urge that the influence of the temporal form of the process of knowledge is misleading, and when over-emphasised it is altogether mistaken. It would be easy to show in detail that it does not do justice to the facts of knowledge, and is inconsistent with its issue. Whatever meaning there may be in the statement that the truth must be the whole, at least it lays stress on what is vital in the operation of knowledge from first to last—the indivisible integrity of the individual mind. This must be our starting point in the inter-

pretation of the nature of human knowledge. Within the confines of this form of individuality all processes of mental experience whatever, and the knowing process in particular, take place. From this concrete reality they emanate ; its unity holds together, and is manifested in the various functions which constitute the several processes of experience. All temporal sequence takes place within some wider reality, is relative to that reality, and is not by itself ultimate. The flow of time is but the form of succession of events. The ultimate fact is not a mere succession, but a principle expressed in and through succession. The sequence is, in short, the appearance of the reality. It is the real, undivided and individual, which is both the point of departure and the final result expressed by the process. To take the process by itself is to misstate the situation. All this holds true of mental events as of all other events, whether they take place as a succession of changes in an organism or in a planetary system.

We must then start with the integral reality of the individual mind if we would understand knowledge—the special process by which the mind becomes aware of the meaning of the world of objects and in so doing establishes unity with its world.

Knowledge is, in the first instance, a specific expression of the vital energy of the individual. It subsumes within itself all the energies, organic, chemical and physical, which together compose the constitution of a human being. The individual is an organism sustaining its organic life with other organisms, interrelated with them through functions and processes which never enter into clear consciousness at all, which are as yet only obscurely known, but which none the less effectively determines its existence. It is under the control of chemical agencies and physical forces in ways even more obscure but quite unmistakable. As a physical body the individual is as much under the sway of gravitation as any particle of inanimate matter. It is on the basis of these non-conscious conditions that the operations of knowledge take place. Knowledge is a specific conscious concentration of the whole complex of energies—physical, chemical, organic—making up the concrete human individual.

When knowing, the mind does not merely utilise these energies to carry out its purpose, it contains them in its operation, gathers them into itself, and gives them a specific direction in the conscious interests of individuality. It is because mind involves in its energy the other modes of energy constituting the real, that mind can be regarded as at once the outcome and the fulfilment of the real. It is the apex of the pyramid, the nucleus of the entire complex system. Mind is continuous with and inseparable from nature, if we understand by nature the totality of organic and inorganic processes. For this reason it is alone in a position to give the "truth" about the world, for it sums up and brings to a conscious focus the various orders of facts which constitute the non-mental world.

Mind being so constituted, the operation of knowledge is in essence one way by which it seeks at once to articulate its continuity with its world, to realise in conscious form the energies it concentrates within itself, to establish its place as the final energy of the world, and to secure the independent integrity of the individual mind. These are but several phases of one and the same operation, and all involve one another. In carrying out this process, its life and activity are one and single throughout; it operates as a solid global whole. It brings all its resources to bear on the attainment of its end, for its end is in the long run the realisation of itself as a single individual. Some factors in the process are more relevant to the issue than others: and we may for purposes of abstract analysis treat the less relevant as irrelevant. But, in fact and in principle, the relevance is a matter of degree. Memory, sensation, imagination, and emotion are all implicated in the operations of judgment and inference, and are inseparable from their successful exercise. They are less relevant than conception, and more relevant than habits of will, or again than the circulation of the blood in the brain. But the difference is one of degree of remoteness from the final outcome of the process of knowledge: that is all. The whole complex of the energies of the individual is concentrated into the operation of knowledge, for that operation consists simply in the fulfilment of the life of mind in one of its various forms of expression.

II

The effort of knowing is, then, a centrally initiated and centrally controlled vital activity. The actual starting point of the process of knowledge is a state of "desire,"¹ a condition of mental tension with an implicit end shaping its direction. How this is instigated it seems impossible to say definitely. We may imagine the psychic energy of our mind in continuity with a kind of larger whole of psychic energy, and we may suppose that it is the want of equilibrium between the mental energy of an individual and this greater realm which creates the state of emotional tension.² Or we might imagine that the state is due to an effort of mentality to bring to a single conscious focus and give specific direction to the lower unco-ordinated energies of psychic life, just as the energy of life may consist in concentrating into a single channel of activity the unco-ordinated energies of inorganic nature—chemical and physical.³ Or, again, we can suppose that the activity of knowledge is due to the overplus of the energy of the mind in contrast to that of the objects about it—organic, physical, chemical—thus creating a sense of disjunction and separation within the real, which the mind seeks to remove by utilising its superior energy to establish harmony between the mind and the world of objects.⁴ Or, finally, it may be that the singleness of the mind has to be maintained by active effort in the face of the varied world of objects, so as to recover or retain its place as one reality amongst other real beings; and one of its ways of doing so is to realise itself by articulating the meaning of other things.⁵ All of these guesses are but hints at what must perhaps always remain one of the great mysteries of experience.

Whatever suggestion we make to account for the original

¹ Aristotle, *Metaphysics I*.

² It is this view that leads to the suggestion that through knowledge man communicates with the Divine Spirit.

³ This would account for the conception that knowledge is a creative synthesis.

⁴ Hence the familiar view which regards knowledge as a kind of necessary epiphenomenon, an over-consciousness of the "real" world, reproducing or "copying" the actual realm of things,—an elaborate work of supererogation.

⁵ This is the source of the so-called pragmatist interpretation of knowledge.

constitution of this fundamental desire towards the self-fulfilment of individuality in which knowledge begins and in which it essentially consists, the main point is that it is with the indivisible integrity of the mind that the effort is made and carried on. The individual mind is stimulated into the activity of knowledge as a plant or an animal is stimulated into exercising the energies of life which lead to growth and development, and which are the essential conditions of the maintenance of life. The realm of independent individual objects urges the mind, in ways unconscious as well as subconscious, to realise its own vitality to the utmost, and exert all its resources to secure itself as an independent self-directing individuality. Its obscure and inchoate unity is drawn out into ever completer manifestation by the appeal of the manifold and relatively complete independent individuals¹ whose ensemble constitutes its environing world. And in being so drawn out of its implicit unity the mind is assured all the while that it is proceeding towards its own fuller self-realisation. It is not, however, simply to imitate or reproduce in its own case the independence of other real beings that it undertakes the process. No doubt practical activity is satisfied by securing a relation of working independence, which puts the individual at least on a level with other beings. But this process has in many cases a much more restricted interest for the individual mind than that of knowledge: it is limited by the kind of beings with which the individual enters into practical relation. Some of these are so much lower in the scale of individuality than the mind that the maintenance of individuality at their level alone would, and in fact does, degrade the human mind.² Knowledge, however, aims at securing for the individual mind an independence adequate to its own level of individuality. The individuality of objects may be perfect in their order of being, without being equal to that of the individual mind. To

¹ "Relatively complete" because knowledge finds or takes for granted that the real object is completely individual before the process of knowledge is undertaken. It is significant that we never undertake the knowledge of anything which is either chaotic, formless, or in the flux of mere change. We either assume the object is completely real before we begin, or we wait till its reality is completed before we try to know it.

² Cf. the lowering mental effect of many forms of occupation.

obtain for itself complete individuality of its own order of being is the aim of the activity of mind in knowing. Hence it is that the mind, while stimulated into activity by objects, never takes their standard of reality as its own standard of truth. It always acts as if it were above them, superior to them, reduces them even to mere instances of more general and comprehensive forms of individuality. The limit of its process is not set by other objects but by itself alone. In knowing, the mind, to use a familiar though doubtful expression, "transcends" its object; it has an individuality to maintain which is higher in order of being than that of the object. In a sense its cognitive relation to the object is but a stepping stone to the attainment of its high level of realisation; and partly because of this, the object is invariably treated as inferior in quality of being to the mind which knows it.¹ In knowledge the object is a means not the end of the process; and, so far from being an end in itself, it is, to use the current phrase, but material for knowledge to deal with. The subject-object relation as it subsists in knowledge is not one of equality of nature, order of being, or value between the factors constituting the situation. Hence it is that when the being with which the individual stands in relation is of equal or higher order with that of the individual mind, the attitude of knowledge is either not adopted at all or is only partially adequate to the situation in which the individualities stand to one another.

This is seen in a peculiarly interesting way in the attitude of human individuals to one another in a society, and in the attitude of the human individual to a Divine Being. In both cases it is felt that to speak of another human being or of the Divine Being as a mere "object," is either a figure of speech or a degradation. And the issue of knowledge which attempts to treat them as mere objects seems to justify this feeling. On the one hand, we have the statistical view of human life, which by reducing human individuals to instances of general laws—*i.e.* larger individual wholes—lowers the sense of the value of the single individual; on

¹ This is one of the most interesting peculiarities of the attitude of knowledge, and distinguishes knowledge in a characteristic way from practice. It gives knowledge the quality of detachment and freedom found to some extent in the mood of play. In action the individual wrestles with his object as with an equal.

the other, we have the naturalistic interpretation of human beings, which leaves nothing but a difference of complexity to distinguish human life from that of sub-human animals and even inanimate things. The opposition felt to both of these is in the long run not strictly logical, but due to a revolt of the concrete individual mind against the attitude towards human beings implied in the attempt to exhaust human nature by purely cognitive processes, *i.e.* to regard human individuals as mere objects to be known. An appeal is made to the "heart" or to practical life to defend the individual against such seeming degradation; or it is insisted that knowledge is "unequal" to the task of knowing the human individual at all, because this would require that the agent knowing should in some way know himself and know his own knowledge as well. Indirectly the same objection is confirmed when, for the comprehension of the human individual, it is urged that we must adopt the attitude of "love" as well as "knowledge," and regard him as an end in himself, not as a mere object but as a subject. The subject being itself a cognitive agent, cannot be treated as a mere object, even when the subject is another person. In social life it is found that we do not merely "know" other human beings, we feel with them, are interested in them, in a word unite ourselves with them in ways different from and more than that of mere knowledge.¹

Similarly the attempt to treat the Divine Being as a *mere* object of knowledge has always been felt to be shadowed by defeat from the very first. This is not simply because the object is so vast relatively to the puny individual agent who undertakes the task. Size is irrelevant; and the human mind can grasp by knowledge objects immensely greater in extent than the finite individual, more durable in time and more comprehensive as individualities. It is rather that the individuality of the Divine Being is in quality and order of existence admittedly higher than the human individual, and the fulfilment of human individuality

¹ Hence it is that in historical theories of knowledge the discussion, as a rule, centres round the cognitive relation of the mind to objects of "nature"; the discussion of man's relation to man is relegated to another inquiry. No analysis is given of how man "knows" man, except in so far as man has a physical or organic embodiment.

through the process of knowledge does not require to be established in the face of such a Being. The attempt is unnecessary, and is futile from the start, for knowledge is but one channel through which the concrete individuality of man is realised and fulfilled. An absolute individuality, which in some way contains, and is in every sense superior to, that of man, must in order to enter into any relation with man at all, call forth all the sources of man's being simultaneously, and in undivided unity. Man's relation to God must be established in terms of feeling, will, and knowledge, in terms of beauty, love, and truth together, through all the channels of his mental life in short, and not by any one of them alone. Hence it is that men approach God through feeling, through practical action, and through cognitive processes alternately, or by arbitrarily selecting one as their primary channel; they never suppose that one by itself is enough for the fulfilment they seek through conscious communion with such a Being. Hence, too, the current use of "faith," either in addition to, or in distinction from, knowledge, as the principle of union with the Divine Being. And hence indirectly the failure of all attempts to interpret God's Being in terms of mere knowledge. When the attempt is made, and God is treated as a mere object of knowledge, it is commonly held that the object is an unknown, an unknowable, an unfathomable, an abstract "entity of reason," *i.e.* a God away from man altogether and without the complex richness characteristic of a concrete object of knowledge. God is *made* into an object at the price of losing the essential significance appropriate to a superior order of Being; and the issue of such knowledge is thus in plain discordance with the initial character of the Being which the thinker sets out to know. To be treated as an object is to be lowered beneath the level of the cognitive subject; and when the object in question admittedly transcends all other objects of knowledge it becomes a bare substratum of objects in general, less in actual content than a finite individual object. Hence the paradoxical result; the transformation of the Supreme Being into a mere object of knowledge turns this object into a lower order of being than that of any finite object whatever. It becomes a bare object, indistinguishable from nothing, a mere

abstract limit to knowledge itself, because it has the lowest limit of meaning of any object—mere Being. The attribute “supreme” remains, but only as an empty compliment passed by the knowing subject on the object in deference to the inquiry undertaken; the attribute is not justified by the results obtained. In point of fact such a Reality at the end of the process of knowledge tends to be supreme only in its significance beyond knowledge.

III

The undertaking of knowledge, then, engages the energies of the individual mind in the interests of self-fulfilment in the face of the equally independent objects with which it is environed. It is limited from first to last by this consideration. The mind has to realise its own special order of individuality, which is felt to be higher than that of the objects with which it deals. It always feels itself equal to its task precisely in consequence of this initial superiority which it possesses; and the result justifies its claim. The objects it knows are interpreted in terms which partially express its own constitution. The individual mind is in part a complex of physical, chemical, and organic factors, and these it shares with other beings. It is with objects of such a character that its knowledge is in the first instance concerned, and with these its efforts are in the main successful. As a mind, conscious of itself as mind, it is above their order of being; as an individual mind it consciously concentrates all their energies into a single individuality.

In realising its individuality through this process, it proceeds in a succession of stages, in each of which its individual life is expressed, and none of which can be dispensed with in its effort after complete satisfaction. The emotional attitude, which is the starting point of every process of knowledge, is the intermediary between the organic embodiment of the individual mind and the higher conscious life. The organism gathers into itself the inanimate energies of the individual, and carries with it all their reality. In an emotion the organic is transformed and concentrated into a conscious direction of the mind towards a fulfilment of individuality. Hence it is that in taking up the attitude

of knowledge the mind always feels itself rooted in reality from the first, and is never away from the real, never carries on a process which is over and above the real world or independent of it. Knowing is an actual function of the real, which is carried through by that form of individuality in which all the other energies of the actual world are summed up and unified. It is thus that in knowledge the mind is in communion with and communicates reality ; it communes with the real because it is through and through continuous with the substance of the world ; it communicates the real also because it expresses in one form the active energy of the individual mind, which is an epitome of all reality. It is not because the mind and the world are opposed that knowledge takes place or is demanded ;¹ it is because they are in continuity that knowledge is even possible. We may, indeed, draw a distinction between the mind and the rest of the real, or even between the mind and the body. And it is certainly true to say that knowledge is a mental process alone. But it is not *in virtue of* this distinction that knowledge takes place, but in spite of the distinction. The indivisible continuity of mind with the world about it is the very inspiration of knowledge and the guarantee of the success of the effort.

Hence it is meaningless to speak of the mind "copying" the nature of things through the process of knowledge, or "reproducing" the order of the world in intelligible terms. This precisely inverts the actual situation ; for it implies that the mind brings nothing new into the real, that the real is complete by itself without mind, and that mind can at best but duplicate in shadowy form a finished substantial reality. The real is not even known to be complete until mind gathers up all its substance into itself. It is impossible to "copy" until we know the original, and this means that the knowledge of the original cannot itself be a copy. It is equally impossible to copy until the original is fully present before us ; but if the mind is required to complete the real, the original is not in existence till the mind is there—or otherwise the so-called copy is itself a constituent factor in the original. Nor can we copy unless the transcriber is outside both the real and the material to which he transfers the original form ; the

¹ This view is entirely based on the perceptual aspect of the situation.

artist cannot himself be the copy and the transcriber in one. Nor again does the mind give us a "reproduction," in any other sense, of the real ; for the real must be ripe before it can be reproduced, and it is not ripe till mind has supervened upon and consciously focussed the non-mental levels of reality. And any reproduction must give us the real over again in a like independent substantial form. But transparently knowledge neither creates nor procreates a real independent of its own being. What knowledge reproduces is a mental product pure and simple, which may be incorporated in physical symbol, such as words or letters, but these are merely artificial aids to knowledge, not real beings by themselves. This mental result can certainly be reproduced time after time, by the same mind or in different minds ; but every time it is a mode of mental life, not an individual existence independent of mind. In general it seems absurd that reality should ever require to be "copied" or "reproduced" in any sense. The original is enough to constitute a part of the world ; nothing less will suffice to constitute a part, and the original is good enough for all purposes, we may be certain. A copy is a poor substitute for an original, and a needless addition to it. Of all individuality it may be said that once is enough. What the mind strives for in knowledge, what reality achieves by the process of knowledge, is fulfilment of being in conscious articulate form, a fulfilment which is an expression of the life of mind, a realisation of this highest order of individuality. Mind has laws and conditions peculiar to itself, and by these it carries on and carries out its own peculiar life. In realising itself through the process of knowledge it operates according to these laws and conditions and no other, and does so for its own sake and for nothing else. Physical beings as such, and organic beings as such, fulfil their order of individuality by laws and conditions peculiar to themselves. The activity of mind subsumes these other orders of reality ; they make possible the activity of the concrete individual as a conscious concentration of their energies. In fulfilling itself, the individual mind fulfils all that they contain and are ; and over and above fulfils its own level of energy as well. In that sense mental activity in general, and the activity of knowing in particular, is the fulfilment of the world

in which we are placed, is in a sense its final outcome, and thus its supreme end.

IV

In the execution of this undertaking, the concrete individual proceeds gradually. It meets other beings at their own plane as a first stage. Its effort is directed first towards establishing itself in relation to them in terms of their specialised embodiment. It becomes conscious of them on the outside and by way of spatially constituted physiological functions—the sense organs of the organised embodiment of the individual mind. They do not act of themselves; the mind operates through and in them as a concrete individual in the interest of its self-fulfilment. All its potencies—memory, feeling, imagination and emotion—are to some extent involved in the operation. Moreover, because the operation is a reaction of the individual on an independent individual object, the mind is conscious of the solid reality of the object from the first, though to begin this is only felt as a restraining limit to its own expansion and an incitement to its fulfilment, at once drawing the mind beyond its immediate state and compelling it to sustain itself in relation to the object independent of itself.

This mental operation through sense functions—sense-perception—is found, simply by the process of the experience of knowledge, to meet only the first demands of the mind and the outside or superficial character of the object; and these two go together. The mind certainly satisfies itself to a certain extent in the process; it arranges sense-qualities in an order of place and succession. It thus realises the meaning of the object, and in so doing realises its mental life at the same time. It maintains and secures more firmly its individuality as a real among reals. But the outcome of the process at this stage is merely to throw into still stronger relief the independence of the objects. Knowledge does not merely substantiate the individual mind, it substantiates the objects at the same time. They become more real for the mind the more the mind knows about them. The constituent factors of the objects become distinguished, and so related, in a

way that is not found at the earliest stage of emotional interest in the object. Their parts are differentiated from one another ; the reality of the object becomes a whole of such parts : the objects themselves as separate beings are found to have points of contact and connexion with each other, to share similar elements. This discovery of fuller knowledge, obtained on the completion of the first stage—the use of sense-organs—draws the mind on to a further reaction, to a further establishment of its being in relation to other beings, to a further fulfilment of itself as an individual. Just as practical action commits the individual to a more prolonged activity as soon as the first active step is taken, and in a manner creates the necessity to take further action simply because he has made the first venture ; so in the case of knowledge. Knowledge both allays activity and awakens new activity, finds solutions and sets problems, gives answers and raises questions. In the long run this is due to the incessant and inevitable interrelation between the individual beings constituting the real world : action and reaction, continuous interdependence, is the condition by which all independence is sustained.

The exhaustion, then, of the potencies of perception compels the mind to undertake a further stage in the process of knowledge. It can do so, seeing that the mind is a richer order of being than the object. And it must do so, because it has other ways of exercising its unity than through the organs of sense, and must function in these ways. Further, the very process of co-ordinating the meaning of the object in terms of sense-experience has put the object in a new setting altogether and thus necessitated a further effort of synthesis. The mind has no specific physiological organ for the function it now brings into play. It calls upon the deeper resources of its individuality, those which more directly express and manifest the central unity of its life, and in that sense seem to the conscious mind to be more nearly its very self. This distinctive function is the activity of thought, which, whether in the lower form of ideas or the higher form of conceptions, is the energy of unifying diverse elements in a manner which realises in specific form the pervasive single unity of the mind's individuality. It has the character of identity or constancy of function peculiar to this all-encompassing unity ; and hence the

functional exercise of this unity is the source of the generality and universality of thought.

The unity of individuality is certainly involved in perception, but it is implicit ; it is the unity of an organic function structurally determined and uniform in its operation. In conceptual activity, the highest form of thinking, the unity is explicitly and, indeed, deliberately brought to bear on the situation. Hence it is that thinking in the highest sense has all the character of purposive activity, an end set before the mind which it seeks to reach by an effort all its own. And since the thoughts evolved are the mind's self-devised functions for realising its own single unity, the mind invariably finds itself and feels itself freer in the exercise of the function of thinking than in the activity of perception ; so much so indeed that the mind even takes upon itself to choose not merely how and when but what it shall think. In perception there is always a certain measure of constraint and even compulsion imposed on the mind.¹

The eye it cannot choose but see ;
We cannot bid the ear be still ;
Our bodies feel, where'er they be,
Against or with our will.

In thought, however, the mind is liberated from this external thralldom and moves in a direction determined by its own inner, *i.e.* essential, nature.² Not that there is no joy in mere perception, no sense of fulfilment : but it is akin to the joy of healthy organic functioning, and is partial because localised in a certain region of the body. In thinking, the whole mind is suffused with a sense of being present as a single unity in the transaction, and hence successful thinking brings a fuller joy, a completer sense of fulfilment, and so of greater freedom.

¹ It is partly for this reason that most people have felt a certain reasonableness in the suggestion that our senses might well have been differently constituted, both in kind and power. No one is much impressed by a like suggestion in the case of the activity of thought.

² It would be interesting, though not perhaps very profitable, to ask why thinking should be a later stage of the knowing process than perception. One can imagine a mind which begins to know by conceptual activity, or even carries on the process of knowledge by conception alone. Probably *we* begin by perceiving because we are alive as organic beings before we become more alive through conscious effort of our own.

It must not be supposed that by this new reaction of the mind, this new advance of mental life, which takes place in thinking activity, that the mind in any way withdraws *into* itself. This is the familiar misinterpretation of the process of "reflective" knowledge. Such a view confuses the mental act of drawing upon the mind's fuller resources with an act of withdrawing from the realm of perception altogether. If the mind did so withdraw, the operation of reflective thinking would inevitably be in the end as incomplete and unsatisfying as that of perception, whose incompleteness demands the new effort of the mind.¹ In point of fact, however, the mind finds greater fulfilment, as a concrete individual, from the course knowledge takes after reflective activity than before it. This means that what perception supplied is not dispensed with but resumed and recast through the operation of thinking. The mind may for the moment when calling upon its greater resources detach itself from perception, but its action is that of *reculer pour mieux sauter*. Even those who take this abstract view of the nature of reflective activity have to admit that it is inaccurate; for they, at least generally, speak of the need of "testing" reflective thought by an "appeal" to perceived facts, *i.e.* they confess that the detachment does not really take place at all.² But the significance of the new step is not to be found in such an external relationship as that implied in the use of one to test the findings of the other. The reflective activity is a further and fuller expression of the same principle which operates in the perceptual phase of knowledge. This principle is the realisation of the individual mind through the process of apprehending the nature of the

¹ This can be abundantly illustrated from the history of logical theories, both those which treat perception as primary for knowledge and conception as secondary, and those which treat conception as primary and perception as secondary. The whole movement from Locke to Kant is permeated by this misinterpretation, and it still prevails in current logical theory, *e.g.* Bradley and Bosanquet, largely owing to Lotze's influence.

² The relation between conception and perception has to be expressed in this external way by those who look upon them as detached from the start. The absurdity of the view is further indicated by the very attempt to bring them together again in this external way; for the "test" is obviously reciprocal, perception "tests" conception, conception "tests" perception. But what tests the test, if they are, in fact, external to one other?

object, as an independent being. It is the unity of the individual mind which is manifested in each stage, and operates in both alike. Reflective activity gives a richer cognitive experience because it carries with it the acquired achievements of the earlier stage, because the mind brings to the focus of its single unity the specialised functions of perception, grasps by the conscious exercise of its unity the diverse results of the spatially constituted organs of perception in which the unity of the individual mind is least implicit. Reflective activity can only be a greater fulfilment of the cognitive process if the greater exercise of the mind's unity includes the less. To exclude the less is either to impoverish the mind when making the new advance, or to put the two on an equality of value. Both are impossible if it be the fact, as it is accepted to be the fact, that in reflection the mind does increase the mind's cognitive union with the object. The increase is an increment to the experience of knowledge, not a mere numerical addition to the previous stage of knowing. The object, as the result of reflective activity, assumes for the mind a more solid substantiality, a greater permanence and a more coherent individuality. The individual mind, on its side, establishes itself more firmly as a consciously independent real being, is more completely aware of its own existence, and has a more abiding sense of satisfaction and fulfilment. Subject and object, in short, become more reciprocally independent because of the increased conscious interdependence brought about by the later stages of knowledge. The fuller individuality of the mind deepens the sense of that of the objective real.

It must not be supposed that the advance in knowledge made by reflection transforms or even changes the qualitative distinctness of perceptual knowledge. However intimately they are connected on the basis of their common principle, the later does not alter the peculiar character of the earlier stage. Perception, in a word, does not grow into reflection, and in so doing lose its specific quality as a mode of knowledge; as a bud, for example, ceases to be a bud when it becomes a blossom. This is another familiar misinterpretation.¹ Perception makes its own unique

¹ It is found most usually in so-called idealistic views of knowledge: just as the supposition of an external relation between perception and reflection is the

and intransmutable contribution to the life of the process. There is no substitute for it, and no way of supplanting it or superseding it in its own kind. So much is this the case that it is possible in principle, and seems a fact of cognitive experience, that a mind can be confined to the level of perception, and never pass beyond it. This seems mainly the level of the purely animal mind. In human knowledge, reflection, we find, can also operate by itself, *e.g.* in abstract mathematical reasoning. But reflection can never give us precisely what we have in perception. The conceptual construction of a theory of light or sound, be it ever so accurate, cannot render to us the organic reality of a glowing colour or a thrilling note. The theory of art is not by itself a substitute for, or an improvement upon, the perception of the landscape on the canvas, or the ordered sequence of notes constituting the musical symphony. The latter is not to be had by analysis of the theory, either by way of derivation or illustration. We cannot hear a sonata better by knowing the theory of sound or even the theory of musical composition. No conceptual activity whatsoever can conjure a single perceived fact or perceptual act into existence as a form of knowledge. The two are qualitatively distinct as stages of knowledge, and each unique in kind in spite of, indeed because of, being in the long run specific expressions of the single activity of the one individual mind directed towards the end of realising itself through the apprehension of the meaning of the real objective world. They are neither superimposed on one another, the later on the earlier, the higher on the lower, nor abstracted from one another, nor does the greater grow out of the less. The deeper apprehension, the greater knowledge, is a new creation of the energy of the mind, as distinctive in its order as that of perception, and as distinct in kind as one organ of perception is from another.

Just as the individual mind operates in its undivided integrity

characteristic error of the mechanical theory of knowledge. The former looks on them as moments of growth—the latter as superimposed layers. Both are mistakes for the same reason : they treat the stages apart from the unity ; they both ignore the fact that it is the concrete individuality present in earlier stages which manifests itself in each, but with greater fullness.

in an act of perception, bringing to bear on the present its consciousness of the past—memory—its synthesising function of imagination, its conative force, and its feeling states, so in the operation of reflection the mind concentrates its undivided energy into the prosecution of this further stage of knowledge. Reflective activity is not carried on in abstraction from the other constituent functions of the mind. Its essence lies in a completer utilisation of these functions for the purpose of achieving an increased apprehension of the nature of the object. It calls upon the resources, and assumes in its process the concurrent exercise, of memory and imagination, conation, feeling, and always to some extent perception. The necessity of the last for reflection is seen in an interesting way in the operations of so-called pure conceptual activity such as we have in mathematical science and philosophy. For while the manipulation of pure concepts seems to take place independently of perception, so organic is perception to the process of conception that where direct reference to a given perceived object fails, the mind creates for its purpose such a reference and makes use of symbols which appeal to the eye or the ear. Conception cannot accomplish its task without the aid of written or spoken symbols, which hold entirely of the region peculiar to perception. It is a singularly interesting proof of the organic connexion of the operations of perception and conception; and an equally interesting confirmation of the view just indicated—that in reflection the mind takes up a higher and yet unique attitude of knowledge—to find the mind in “pure” conceptual activity creating for its own purposes perceptual symbols to effectuate the realisation of its larger sphere of knowledge. That the mind does so in the case of reflection is precisely due to its being a greater expression of the mind’s energy. The mind in reflection, so to say, overtops the limits of perception, finds perception inadequate to its demands for completer fulfilment: and, because perception is none the less organically necessary to its larger activity, the mind signals its transcendence of the limits of perceived natural fact by contriving mere perceptual symbols to correspond with and to assist the abstracter aims of reflection.

V

The mind never thinks with mere detached conceptions alone ; the individual mind is engaged as an integral unity in the operation of conceiving the object. Its aim is to establish itself as individual in conscious interdependence with individual objects ; and for this purpose it carries its concrete individuality into the process. The different conceptions it devises in the execution of this aim, and the different steps by which the operation of reflection is articulated—judgment and inference—are but several manifestations of the undivided unity of the mind's life in the process. They are never detached from one another, neither from the unity of the mind, nor from the unity of the aim it has in view, nor, again, from the singleness of the object it seeks to know ; and these are but distinct ways of looking at the same concrete experience. The various conceptions originated by the mind are called for by the variety of independent objects in relation to which the mind's unity has to be sustained. They cannot be known in advance of experience, but only in the experience of knowing the objects. In that sense they are always derived from experience. They are not, however, "discovered" by experience as if they were there waiting to be found out by the mind : that is once more a mechanical misinterpretation of the facts. They are operations of the mind's energy exercised in realising its unity in the face of individual objects ; and we can no more speak of them being "there" before these operations are performed than we can speak of leaves and branches being "there" before or until the living energy of the tree has elicited them into being. What the term discovery really means to convey is that the conceptions when devised are necessary, or are "objective," and not accidental. This is true ; but it is a truism. For it merely emphasises the fact that the conceptions are the vital and essential functions of the mind's unity, and that they do articulate for the mind the meaning of the object ; and this is but saying that they are conceptions or cognitive operations. The mind does not create conceptions for amusement or in play, but to sustain its consciousness of unity as the vital necessity of its life. The conceptions share this necessity which urges the mind

to maintain itself. But they are relative to the mind and its needs. In that sense they are constituent conditions of the process of self-fulfilment, not separate self-existing entities either primordially "innate" in the mind or externally and eternally immanent in the independent object. In a word, the object alone is independent of the individual mind, not the conceptions by which and through which the mind realises for itself the meaning of the object and in so doing fulfils its own peculiar order of being. The only independent mental reality is the individual mind itself as a concrete unity ; the conceptions are no more separable from or independent of the mind's unity than the beats of the heart are independent of or separable from the energy of the heart's single action. What shape the conceptions shall take, how many they shall be, and how comprehensively they shall express the unity of the mind—all this is not merely relative to the individual mind, but in a manner historically contingent on the character of the individuality engaged in the operation of knowledge. Hence it is that conceptions vary within limits from individual to individual, from race to race, and from society to society.

There is no historical or logical ground for the view that there is a self-closed final catalogue or scheme of categories. The construction of a system of categories is inspired partly by the misleading influence of mere language, which is an historical accompaniment of the human mind and varies with its needs ; partly by the application, or rather misapplication, of the artistic imagination to the special material of verbally embodied conceptions, in order to give the rounded arrangement of an artistically complete whole to the miscellaneous conceptions employed by the developed intelligence of a civilised people and expressed in their language ; and partly by a false interpretation of the ideal of knowledge and of the relation of the unity of the mind to the knowing process. The unity of the mind being undoubtedly that of a single individual, it is inferred that the ideal of knowledge must also be at the other end of the process an indivisible and independent unity ; and since the unity of the mind in knowledge is consciously at its highest when expressed in the form of conceptions connected or unified,

this *terminus ad quem* of the process of knowledge is imagined as a single compact system of such conceptions. The supposition that the end of knowledge must be found in the construction of such a system is little more than an elaborate illustration of the fallacy of composition. Because the unity of the mind is realised in definite and discrete conceptions, it is inferred that the supreme expression of its unity will take the form of a single conception containing all its conceptions: because each successive act of knowledge involves the unity of the mind, therefore the complete unity of the mind is a single act of knowledge in which its whole unity is realised all at once; or, again, because the mind is fulfilled in operations realising its unity, therefore its supreme unity is realised in a single operation containing all its functions simultaneously. As truly might we offer the authorised biography of a man as the equivalent of the man's life or as the ideal and fulfilment of his activity; a record of the beats of the heart for the vital energy of its existence. But for conceptions being stereotyped in language, the attempt to construct such a system would hardly have suggested itself to anyone. It is not the aim of the mind in framing conceptions to seek fulfilment in either a supreme single conception or system of conceptions. The individual mind is the one source and centre of its conceptions; and these but bring forth its unity in special cases to meet special situations. It could never secure final fulfilment in any one conception, however comprehensive, for the simple reason that the life of the mind, like that of any organism, consists in actual activity not in coming to an end of itself, in living not in having lived. The mind in energising in knowledge is constantly finding fulfilment and satisfaction; it does not seek to secure a single supreme state of satisfaction. The fact that the mind embodies its unity in conceptions does not, in a word, either imply or even suggest, still less require, that there should be a single and self-complete conception or system of such conceptions; for to attain such would be to extinguish the very fire it is meant to sustain. The end of knowledge is not an ideal conception, but mental satisfaction or fulfilment, and this is not one final state but a variety of states in which the single living individuality is realised, sometimes with more completeness, sometimes with less. For the

mind• a less' comprehensive conception is relatively just as necessary to the mind's life as a more comprehensive, for through both it sustains its individuality in the face of the world of objects. In the strict sense a conception is not the mind's unity at all but a function or operation of that unity. The unity of the mind is nothing less than the whole individuality of its being as a spatially organised embodiment of mental energy. Neither in the interests of knowledge nor in the nature of conception is there any ground therefore for constructing a system of conceptions. Conceptions only subsist in the operations of the individual mind, no matter how many there may be or what their character.¹

The difference in kind amongst conceptions presents an interesting parallel to the different kinds of perception; and the difference is certainly as real in the one case as in the other. At first sight it might seem possible to reduce (or, as it is sometimes said, deduce) one conception to another, *e.g.* quality to quantity, purpose to mechanism, or even all of them to one supreme conception, for example, unity or order. The attempt has often been made, and probably will always be made. The search for the philosopher's stone has all the fascination of an elusive phantom, and a phantom, which persists, gains through its very elusiveness some of the characteristics of an ideal. An obsession may assume the quality of a baffled instinct and be as difficult to eradicate. But in spite of all the efforts the mind has steadily refused to admit that one conception which it devises and requires to secure its sense of unity can be replaced or displaced by another. The long struggle for cognitive primacy between mechanism and end sufficiently demonstrates this; and it is typical of every other case. Every conception expresses the mind's function of unity; yet each conception is not its bare unity, but a different embodiment of its concrete individuality of action. The reason why the effort to reduce all forms of perception to

¹ The attempt to treat a system of conceptions as the objective totality of the mind's unity, as the completed utterance of the mind, and therefore as equivalent to the mind itself, is in the long run a purely mechanical view of knowledge. It treats the mind as a machine whose product is the mechanical equivalent of the energy exerted in the process of knowledge, just as the work done by an engine is mechanically equivalent to the energy exerted by the engine: so that the mind's energy just equals the system of the categories.

one form has not been so persistent is merely that the differences—*e.g.* between eye and ear—are so palpable that it seems folly to pursue the attempt. Touch, it is seen, may be common to both ; just as sensitive responsiveness is common to both ; but this community only throws into greater relief the irreducible difference between their operations. The modes of perception are separate channels of mental communion with other objects, and have their bounds and quality determined by the statutory framework of the constitution of the individual organism.

The conceptions, again, are not generalisations from other cognitive factors, whether percept or image. They are ways of grasping the meaning of the object as an individual reality ; and as expressing the unity of the mind's life they are universal operations of this unity, ways in which the single mind, the enduring agent in the process, invariably works to secure its sense of individuality. Generality is an attribute of a universal, but not its essence ; and a mere generalisation, where it is not simply an exaggeration due to the play of imagination, may give knowledge in "a general way," but not knowledge of anything in its individuality. All knowledge is directed upon and toward individual objects ; and to know a "thing in general" is not to know anything at all. Even if conceptions could be regarded as generalisations of percepts, this would still leave unexplained how the mind comes to take the step. A perception of an object is genuine knowledge, and *quid* perception needs nothing added to it to make it knowledge in its own kind. A generalisation of a percept is not demanded by perception ; but is due to some other function of the mind's life, and must therefore have another interest in view than that supplied by perception. A mere generalisation of a percept would add nothing new to knowledge at all. It would add nothing to the validity of the perception ; it would not be another kind of perception ; and since it would be tied to perception, it would not advance the mind's knowledge to a higher degree of fulfilment. It would be an unaccountable excrescence on the tree of knowledge.

VI

The advance which the mind makes at the conceptual level of knowledge is brought about by successive reactions of its unity on the increasing complexity of the object, which comes to light as each act is consciously made to grasp the object in its integrity. The complexity of the object increases as the mind finds more meaning in it, and the process can therefore only cease in either of two ways: either the object presents no further complexity to be grasped, or the mind has no further resources to meet the complexity of the object presented. The complexity presented by the object is always ahead of the effort of the mind to meet it; and generally not far ahead, otherwise the mind becomes temporarily overwhelmed, as indeed happens in familiar states of mental perplexity. To prevent perplexity from constantly recurring, the mind deliberately and artificially restricts the range of content in the object to its capacity to meet the situation. It abstracts objects from a larger whole, divides objects from one another, isolates its factors for purposes of investigation. The restriction within manageable proportions of the complexity of the objects dealt with, enables the mind to react gradually on each complex situation as it arises. The reaction takes the form of connecting the different portions so far unified by the functions of judgment and inference. These operations are acts of integration made by the mind to secure unity and order among conceptions, and as a result to give a completer consciousness of the individuality of the object than is possible by the use of separate conceptions. The form which this act of integration takes in the case of the judgment is that of holding conceptions together simultaneously, and in the case of inference that of a consequential arrangement of conceptions. It is convenient perhaps to speak of inference as a unity (or system) of judgments, and of judgment as a unity of conceptions, just as we sometimes speak of conceptions as a unity of "images." But this is only permissible if we keep in view that it is the same central unity of the individual mind which is operating in every case, and is realising itself in each case more fully as it becomes thus more

fully conscious of the individuality of its object. The unity of the judgment is not effected by the conceptions coming of themselves together, or by letting loose some secret spring in the mind. Judgment is an active operation of the mind as much and in the same general sense as conception. And it is a greater expression of the unity of the mind because it is a unification of conceptions which are themselves forms of unity. Hence it is that the mind feels in judgment that it has a greater hold over the object, is more fully aware of its individuality as a distinct and independent being. The mind's own individuality is more fully and consciously realised in the act of judgment, and the conscious substantiation of its own being implies a corresponding substantiation of the object. So again in inference, the mind's unity is more fully expressed by a still more comprehensive operation of unity; it is conscious of its individuality more completely, and the individuality of the object has for the mind a greater meaning; it is a consciously systematic whole of content.¹

The judgment, then, is not a mere development of the conception as such; it is a new distinctive act of the mind; nor is the inference a mere development of the judgment, but a new operation of the single individuality of the mind. The only development that is affected is that of the concrete living individual mind. To speak of judgment developing into inference is either a figure of speech or the substantiation of a mere function. And the suggestion that with inference judgment passes away altogether in the process of knowledge, and "gives place" to something higher, is again inaccurate or a figure of speech. The inference only has actuality as an effectual operation of unifying judgments, which are thus no more dissolved in the process than the organisation of the organs of the body implies that the organism "cancels" the organs. In inference judgments subsist in the same way that conceptions subsist in judgments. In a word, conception, judgment, and inference are

¹ The question whether conception precedes judgment or again whether judgment precedes inference must be carefully distinguished from the significance of each of these as mental operations. Which of them is prior in time depends largely on the state of an individual's knowledge. In actual experience a judgment may be summarised in a conception, just as an inference may be summarised in a judgment; and again a conception may be articulated into a judgment.

qualitatively distinct acts of the individual mind required, each and all, to secure its end.

Judgment, which takes the form of the subject-predicate relationship, is only possible after the stage of perception is passed. The subject is in general a relatively richer complex of content of the object grasped as a single unity; the predicate is a part of this same object at once consciously detached from and united to the subject. The mind grasps both in inseparable union, and in so doing consciously realises the meaning of the individuality of the object. The supposition that in some way the subject in judgment is outside the mind, and that the mind "applies" predicates to this subject is a confused misstatement of the actual situation, largely due to the mechanical interpretation of the relation of mind to object in knowledge. The subject in judgment is no less a part of the single process in which knowledge consists than the predicate. The object remains an independent real being through the whole process.¹ Knowledge is a mental operation pure and simple, the way in which the mind becomes conscious of the meaning of the object. The object as a real being has no more to do with our way of realising truth than it has to do with us making mistakes in the process. Truth and error are both mental, the one the result of fulfilling certain special laws of mentality, the other of failing to fulfil them. That the subject is only in general a richer complex than the predicate is seen in the fact that sometimes both subject and predicate have the same degree of complexity, and in that case it is a matter of indifference which is taken as subject and which as predicate. In other words, there is nothing in the nature of the judgment which compels us to take one conception as always and alone subject, and another as always and alone predicate. The stage of knowledge reached alone determines which is subject and which is predicate. In the imaginable limit, were we to know the whole universe, the relationships of predicate and subject might be completely reciprocal.²

¹ The treatment of subject and predicate in a judgment as in some way separate existences is probably due to a confusion of the subject-predicate relation in judgment with the subject-object relation in experience.

² That inference is only found at the level of conceptual activity seems generally

VII

The complex and detailed articulation of inference is required by the variety of ideas and conceptions which the mind evolves on its way to self-fulfilment. Inference more completely realises its sense of individuality than any of the other operations, and correspondingly the object assumes a definite individuality of meaning which is unattainable at an earlier stage. But the final operation of the mind in knowing is not inference, but a single concentration of the mind in which it grasps the individuality of its object as a single intelligible whole, without going through the detailed process of connecting its parts, and yet with all that detailed connection subsumed in the act of comprehension. This stage is intuition or mental vision, in-

to have been admitted. That judgment should not have been confined to the same sphere of the knowing process is due in large measure to a misinterpretation of the relation of perception to conception. We find writers speaking of "judgments of perception" in the sense not simply that judgments deal with results of perceptual activity, but that perception is itself a judgment. Some even go so far as to speak of the "perceptual judgment" as the ultimate judgment of knowledge. But for the influence of language the phrase "judgment of perception" would be seen at once to be unmeaning. Perception as such requires no words at all; it does not operate by the use of language, but through the physiological structure of the organisms, and is complete in its kind as a level of knowledge. We apprehend the things of sense about us by the exercise of our sense organs, and these need no other intervening agency to establish mental communion between the mind and its object. This can be seen on a great scale in listening to a piece of music or looking at a picture. Our apprehension can be complete: and speech seems even an intrusion or an irrelevance. Language is devised by the mind in the interests of conceptual activity alone, and not till it arises are words used. But so does it distort the actual character of knowledge that when we apply language to objects which we can also apprehend by perception, we tend straightway to identify the linguistic embodiment of a conception with the object as apprehended by perception. Hence the term "judgments of perception." It is due to a confusion between the conceptual recasting of the individual object by the mind and the perceptual apprehension of the same object; and the confusion is effected by the application of language to perceived objects in the interests solely of conceptual activity. Hence it is supposed that when we say "this tree is green" we are dealing with the object both from the conceptual and from the perceptual point of view at once. But the statement "this tree is green" is not a deliverance of perception: it is a complex of ideas alone. The perception of the tree is not utterable in speech because it needs no utterance: it is direct knowledge, immediate communion of the mind with the object through the exercise of sense organs. That is why animals who equally perceive objects use no language and need none for their knowledge.

separable from feeling and carrying the sense of completed mental activity or free self-fulfilment. In this form the mind finds its highest satisfaction, certainty with coherence, unity of individuality and conscious union with the individuality of its object; in a word, complete conscious independence through interdependence of subject and object.

This is more readily attained in the mind's relation with a small range of objects than in relation to a larger, with some kinds of objects more than with others. But wherever it is attained there the aim of the knowing process has been reached; in that it finds at once truth and self-realisation through the channel of knowledge. The goal of knowledge is not a system of thoughts outside the mind, but a state of mind. A system of knowledge itself only has being in and through the process of reacting or evolving it. The supposition that the aim of knowledge is to establish or find a system of thought holding independent of the mind, is due, as already said, to confusing the expression of knowledge in language with the realisation of knowledge as a mental process. The latter alone is the reality in the situation; the former is an artificially devised means for rendering permanent the results of actual knowledge. A system of knowledge means, strictly considered, a systematic way of knowing. To place the achievements of knowledge on record is not to put knowledge in some ideal realm beyond the mind. The embodiment of truth in a book is not the "objectification of truth"; we are mere victims of our own devices if we confuse these two. Knowledge only subsists as a mode in which the mind is realised; and it is only realised as it actually grasps its object, for in so doing it finds itself real and finds the meaning of the reality of the object. An organism does not live in what it has done, but in the actual exercise of its vital energy. To the mind that knows, the world of objects is pervaded by new meaning; it becomes a new world sustaining the living individual by a new vision which is also a new emotion. A poet does not subsist in his written poetry, but in his poetical outlook on the world. A religious individual does not live by constantly recalling and reformulating his creed, but by actual communion with God. A moral agent does not estimate his moral achievement

in terms of his past acts, most of which he has probably forgotten, but in the clearness of his actual insight into the moral situations of every day and his readiness of accurate response to the demands of the hour. So in the attainment of knowledge. The "ideal," which alone is effective and significant, is the possession of a power of reflection and insight which enables the agent to realise his place in relation to other beings, and to grasp their meaning by the free activity of his thought. This is to make knowledge "real"; this is to know the "truth"; this is to attain the concreteness of knowledge as a vital experience.

Hence the goal of knowledge is not a far-off ideal, but a realised experience. The truth is not the whole of reality, but a conscious realisation of a whole individuality.

III

CERTAIN NON-LOGICAL FACTORS IN THE PROCESS OF KNOWLEDGE

"What we really care for we have at first hand, the beginning of the feeling being within us or not at all. It is indeed almost impossible to justify a particular pursuit to some one else who has not got the sense of it."—SIR EDWARD GREY, *Fly-fishing*.

"Even in metaphysics it is difficult to say how far conclusions rest upon personal feeling."—F. H. BRADLEY, *Essays on Truth and Reality*.

IN theory of knowledge or logic, as usually understood, the procedure of thought is examined, so to say, in cross section and at different stages in its course, and each section is analysed into its constituent elements. Even where the attempt has been made to trace some development in the process, this has been confined to showing how the different stages form a necessary sequence of steps in the evolution of a single function of thought. No one studying such an analysis would gather that there is any end in view throughout the process except the interrelation of the elements of thought—conception, judgment, inference—when dealing with the different kinds of objects on which the function of thinking is exercised: or that thought had any essential connection with the living reality of the individual human mind. The result is that thought comes to be looked upon as a species of spiritual machinery which, if wound up and set going according to certain laws, will turn out a certain product. The thought machine comes to be regarded with a mixture of wonder and expectation, confidence and fear, as if the mind in committing itself to it did not know what would be likely to happen and might have to surrender cherished convictions in accepting its deliverances.

Such a view arouses suspicion. As well might we try to confine the whole interest of architecture to the laws of building construction and set aside as irrelevant the æsthetic value of the product. As well might we resolve a piece of music into the physical principles of acoustics and ignore the beauty of the composition ; or an act of kindness into the laws of physiology regardless of the human good, the act accomplished. The end achieved by a process of thought is at least of as much importance, in some respects of more importance, than the stages of thought through which the truth is reached. The end is certainly more than the process, however much the two are inseparable ; and our attitude to the end is not constituted or determined solely by the nature of the laws in obedience to which the end is attained. Our interest in the end is prior to our interest in the process, and even controls the course of the process throughout.

I

The interest in the end of knowledge seems the same in character as our interest in any of the other ends which make up what we call our ideal experience. This interest seems certainly emotional in its essence. Our attitude towards the good or the beautiful is from the first non-intellectual. It begins in a conscious craving which engages and concentrates our whole mentality, and contains a forefelt anticipation of a certain form of mental satisfaction which is to be secured by reaching the end in question. Sometimes the end in view is but vaguely present to the mind : the outgoing of the mind in an emotional direction seems what is most vividly before us. Sometimes the end is quite definite, at least in its general outline, and gives intensity and precision to the emotion. In either case the emotion and the consciousness of the unrealised end are inseparable ; and in either case the emotion sets the mind to work to find the means to secure the end. The search for the means is quite a distinct attitude from the initial state of emotion, so distinct that the emotional attitude continues, though with diminished vividness, during the search for the means, sustaining the process and surviving after interest

in the process is exhausted by the finding of the means. Hence it comes about that in the result attained there is always the emotional state of satisfaction as well as the consciousness of the accuracy of the process by which the result is reached. Indeed, in many cases the emotional state seems often more precious than the accuracy of the process, and seems to relegate the latter to a subordinate position, even though the vividness of the satisfaction is due to the success of the intermediate stages. The good achieved gives a thrill of feeling all the greater for the arduousness of the activity exercised in bringing it about; the beauty produced brings a glow of delight which is not mere relief from the strain of producing the result, but a positive sense of mental fulfilment in the end gained.

All this holds equally of the pursuit of the end and ideal of knowledge. At the basis of the search for knowledge lies the emotion of curiosity, which is but the elementary form of the higher and more complex emotional attitude towards the end of all knowledge. Curiosity may have its source in the instinct of self-conservation on the one hand, and the mere reaction of perceptual activity upon a novel element in the objective continuum of perception on the other. But the emotion is not a mere reflex action; it is an attitude in which the mind is concentrated upon the attainment of an anticipated form of satisfaction. This draws the mind onwards, and arouses its activity in the direction of the satisfaction sought, awakening interest in the object and stimulating the mind to find the means which will secure the satisfaction. The difference between curiosity and scientific interest is not in the presence of emotion in the one case and its absence in the other. There is emotion in both. In the latter the emotion is more continuous, stable, and permanent; in curiosity the emotion is temporary, variable, and transitory. This difference is reflected in the kind of knowledge sought and achieved. In the one case the knowledge is unsystematic and of value to the particular mind alone; and in the other it is coherent and leads to a result of universal concern for other minds as well.

The emotion present in the process of knowledge is, like every emotion, a single state of mind containing all the main

functions of mind—ideation, feeling, and conation—in inseparable union. The integrity of the mind is engaged in this attitude towards the object for one purpose only—the articulation of meaning with a view to mental satisfaction. In the long run doubtless the mental satisfaction may be said to be the attainment of man's mental synthesis with his objective world. But this is rather a later interpretation of what the satisfaction signifies than a description of that satisfaction itself. For the satisfaction is irreducible to anything further than just the fulfilment of the mind through the articulation of the meaning of the object. Such a condition seems unique, at least unique in the sense of being quite distinctive and not reducible to any other mental state. Hence it is a mistake in analysis, as well as in principle, to attempt to find the origin of the scientific attitude in an earlier "practical" interest in the world, as if man began by taking a practical interest in the world first and then, with leisure and opportunity, came later on to be interested in the world for "theoretical" reasons, for "truth's sake alone." There is no evidence in mental history or justification in principle for such a view. The emotional attitude of curiosity which develops into the scientific frame of mind is as fundamental and distinctive as the emotional attitude which leads man to alter his world to suit himself. It is mere confusion to take the absence of the scientific mood in the primitive or early mind to be the same as the absence of any cognitive interest in objects of the world. Cognitive interest in the world may exist in the lower form without the scientific frame of mind. Indeed, when the cognitive interest is at a low level the practical interest is equally at a low level. The practical interest is at no stage of man's life, so far as we know it, all-absorbing. And even where it is primary this does not exclude the presence of the other as a secondary interest. Nor is there any proof that cognitive interest is engaged at first solely on behalf of the practical. The truth rather is that from the first the practical and the cognitive interest play into each other's hands; they act and react on each other, and each maintains its own specific place in the economy of the human mind. This can be demonstrated from the study of early society quite as much as from the study of early child-

selected part of the objective world. In its normal form this relation between the object and the mind is perhaps best expressed by saying that the mind is drawn on as a lover to the object of love. It is as if the world of objects played upon the energy of the mind as a chord of sound awakens the response of the musical ear, the subject and the object making a single indissoluble experience of felt unity. The mind at this stage no more questions the certainty of its union with the object which arouses this attitude, than it questions its own existence. All doubts and questions come later, and even when they arise they are awakened in the interest of the unity which at first is merely felt. Indeed, one might say that but for the completeness of this emotional union with the object, the further course of analysis and interpretation, in which the process of knowledge consists, would hardly go on at all. Nothing stops an emotion except another and a contrary emotion ; and emotion is so much of a mere mental state or conscious fact that sceptical considerations or purely intellectual questions are powerless to affect its actuality or its certainty. It is perhaps just in the interests of the fuller realisation of the operation of knowledge that the cognitive attitude thus starts to an emotion. The emotional attitude may be the mental cause, in the order of man's spirit, of the further mental effort, which man exerts with such unvarying tenacity, to prosecute the progress of knowledge ; while, on the other hand, the fulfilment of the mind by this process may be the end or reason for the existence of the emotion. However this may be, the emotional attitude is the primal certainty of the mind's union with its object : it foreshadows and anticipates the more explicit form of unity which the articulate process of knowledge seeks to bring about ; it remains the measure of the unity which the mind seeks to establish ; and it is not abolished by the further process of knowledge, but merely developed into a complete state of mind. That is why we never find ourselves satisfied with any kind of knowledge which fails to give at least as great a sense of harmony of the mind with its object as was felt at the start of the process ; and we regard with distrust an issue of the process of knowledge which has no emotional value for us at all, or which fails entirely to give a sense of buoyancy and freedom to the spirit in its

relation to its world.¹ It is for this reason that the intellectual articulation of the relation of the mind to its object breaks off when the emotional attitude is no longer sustained, a result which may be brought about either by the incapacity of the mind to continue the process of articulation beyond a certain point, or by the articulative process failing to keep the emotional attitude alive. There is always a certain apparent arbitrariness or even caprice in the mind's relation to its object: the relationship is always vital and spontaneous, not mechanical and despotic. As the emotional attitude begins spontaneously and, in that sense, arbitrarily, so it may be arrested in the same way and at any point. And the reason is obvious. The mind's relation to its object is from the first for the sake of fulfilment; if this is not or does not seem likely to be secured beyond a certain point, the individual readily breaks off the connection. This is accepted in our experience as a familiar condition of knowledge. The prosecution of knowledge is not a matter of the momentum of the will: nor is it a matter of mere resolution. It is a matter of choice, as its very beginning involves the element of selection. An individual who holds on his course when all emotional value in the pursuit of his knowledge has ceased, we regard not as healthy-minded but as obsessed; his mind has become mechanised. Where and when the point of arrestment takes place, will depend on each individuality, and will vary from one individual to another. Sometimes it is due to reasons, sometimes to causes. An individual breaks off because he is no longer interested; another because he is exhausted; another for want of energy of character or of nature.²

We have already anticipated the second point. The emotion does not merely start the process of knowledge but controls it throughout its course. The realisation of the cognitive attitude to an object is in many respects like the realisation of the practical attitude to an object; and in particular closely resembles

¹ Mr. Bradley remarks: "I would not rest tranquilly in a truth if I were compelled to regard it as hateful."

² Towards the close of his life Huxley is said to have had in his grasp after long study the clue to the classification of fishes, but a species of intellectual ennui seemed to restrain or prevent him from working it out systematically. A similar experience is not uncommon amongst strenuous intellectual workers.

the process of artistic production which is perhaps the pre-eminent form of practical activity.¹ In the latter case the carrying out of the purpose in detail reacts at once on the emotional attitude towards the purpose itself, commits the mind more and more to the purpose, concentrates the mind further in that direction and intensifies interest in it far more deeply than is experienced at the outset. The emotion glows more vividly as the purpose grows towards realisation under the hands of the artist. So in the case of knowledge. No sooner is the articulation of the meaning of the object begun than the emotion becomes more accentuated; the mind thereby becomes more concentrated; anticipation of satisfaction is heightened, while this increased emotional union with the object carries the mind further forward along the process of articulation. The mind by becoming more fully aware of its unity with the object is committed more deeply to keeping up and realising what is involved in that relation with the object, which constitutes the experience of knowing. The more the individual mind is engaged the more does it bring all the powers in its possession to bear on the development of the relationship; and, on the other hand, the more does it selectively isolate the object under consideration. These two go together, and give rise to the rejection of what is irrelevant, the picking out of what is relevant, the discovery of resemblances and differences. The maintenance of the unity of the individual mind in the midst of the increased consciousness of the distinct elements in the object which concentration brings to light, leads to the gradual integration, by concept or law, of the distinct elements into a single unified object which is the counterpart of the individuality of the mind.

The questions how long the process goes on, how far the individual can proceed, and how fully the process can be realised—these vary from individual mind to individual mind. As we say, the mind will find in the world what the mind has the power to discover there. The resources and equipment of the mind determine in large measure the extent of its grasp of the object.

¹ Meaning by practical activity the moulding of the object by the individual in terms of an end drawn from the individual mind and not constitutive of the nature of the object itself.

In knowledge at any rate it is true, or rather it is a truism,¹ that the world is what thought can make it or make of it. The emotional union of some minds with an object is slight and superficial. That it is so is, however, only found out by experience. As the individual proceeds to articulate his union with the object, he often finds he has little power to keep up the relationship; the effort to do so is unsupported by innate mental equipment; failure to advance lowers the intensity of the initial emotion, and the cognitive attitude is arrested long before the full meaning of the object is obtained. The individual, moreover, admits the failure and gives up the search. The process of knowing is always in that sense a process of self-discovery, as indeed is also practical activity. We can see, too, from the foregoing that the labour of understanding requires for its success something more than enthusiasm for knowledge, and philosophy something more than the love of wisdom.

This influence of the emotional attitude on the course of articulate knowledge is seen in the most abstract as well as in the most concrete sciences. It does not merely show itself in the determination not to be defeated in the mental struggle with the object, which leads to resourcefulness in method of procedure and adaptability of mind to the varying character of the object considered. These are indeed important evidences of the operation of the non-rational element of emotion; and they are sometimes of greater significance in the development of the truth than merely logical rules.¹ Nor does it appear merely in the emotional energy of the moral nature of the individual agent seeking the truth. This is certainly an important factor, and inseparable from the pursuit of knowledge. In some cases, at any rate, the moral end may even "dictate to us the pursuit (of truth) and set limits to that pursuit . . . how far and how long it is right to follow truth, . . . to some extent the kind of truth . . . which I should ignore or should follow."² The emotional element is also seen in a peculiarly interesting manner in the mere love of form and symmetry, which plays such a large part

¹ "The straight line of pure logic has but meagre resources, and resourcefulness is the soul of all progress." Merz, *History of European Thought*, vol. ii. p. 732.

² Bradley, *Essays on Truth and Reality*, p. 88.

in mathematical investigation, in the enthusiasm for consistency in thinking, the joy in clear, transparent thought, and the sober delight in sound work. These are not logical conditions of accuracy of articulate intellectual procedure; they are emotional conditions of logical accuracy, and inseparable from its realisation. The mental activity of pursuing abstract knowledge is suffused with emotion, and becomes more efficient when the emotion is unimpeded in its flow, and less efficient if the emotion is impeded or arrested.¹

Without this emotional element the pursuit of articulate intellectual unity of the mind with its object would lose its mental value altogether. It is not that the desire for truth makes truth what we want it to be, but that without the desire for truth, without the emotional relation of the mind to its object, we should never want truth at all. The emotion does not dictate the rules for the intellectual articulation of the object; it energises the process of carrying out and fulfilling these rules. The emotion may be "disinterested" as regards the ultimate issue, but is none the less emotion on that account. When it is said that scientific minds seek to "observe coolly," "to analyse without emotion," and do not "view the world through the distorting medium of their own desires,"² it is evident that emotion is here confused with private passion. For the very term "coolly" obviously involves emotion in the strict sense: it is impossible to speak of the intellect as "cool" unless by giving the intellect an emotional non-rational mental quality. The same writer comes more closely in touch with actual experience, though at the cost of consistency with his own statement above quoted, when, speaking of metaphysical truth, he says that those will be more likely to discover it who "combine the hopefulness, patience, and open-mindedness of science with something of the Greek feeling for beauty in the abstract world of logic and for the ultimate intrinsic value in the contemplation of truth."³ Such a frame of mind is saturated with emotion: even "the intrinsic value in the contemplation of truth" means nothing but the realisation of a mental state in which the emotional attitude towards the object of knowledge is fulfilled.⁴

¹ Cf. Aristotle, *Ethics*, x. 5. ² Russell, *Scientific Method*, p. 20. ³ *Ibid.*, p. 29.

⁴ It has often been noted that the enthusiasm for logical analysis and logical

II

Important as the influence of emotion is on the direction and course of knowledge, there are other non-logical factors at work which as certainly control its operation. Of these, imagination and memory are the most prominent and familiarly recognised. The activity of the logical intellect is impossible without their co-operation in the process of knowledge, and yet they are in no way governed by the rules of logical procedure. Imagination in one or other of its forms seems to play a *rôle* in the knowledge of non-mental objects independent of us, similar to that which sympathy plays in our conscious communion with other minds. Without the capacity to "put ourselves at the point of view" of objects without us, no effective intellectual grasp of the object seems possible.¹ And the difference between one mind and another lies largely in the extent to which this power can be exercised. The imaginative synthesis of an object, the consciousness of it as an imagined whole, seems, indeed, mainly what we work with in carrying on the process of understanding it. The success with which we can make such a synthesis will govern the course of our knowledge. The degree of success varies greatly with different individuals, and even in the same individual at different stages in his mental development. Sometimes it is hardly distinguishable from a "fancy"; at other times it approximates to a vivid and accurate "intuition," when the object in its totality is as transparent to the mind as an illuminated object to the eye. Some men have this power of effective, constructive imagination to an extraordinary degree, others hardly have it at all. The difference between a mind "gifted" for understanding any type of objects, such as space and number, and a mind not so

construction has its roots in the highly emotional attitude of mysticism. One of the most prominent writers on philosophy at the present time once remarked that he had a "passion for logic." Curiously enough it did not seem to occur to him that such a personal factor as "passion" must qualify in important ways the value of his philosophical conclusions. It is also interesting to note that he is held to be a representative of "intellectualism."

¹ The remarkable success of Fabre's genius in interpreting insect life seems mainly due to this capacity.

gifted,¹ lies just in the possession of this highly specialised function. Most men of average intelligence can with effort follow a connected train of reasoning with tolerable success. But the leaders and pioneers in a field of investigation are those who seem to grasp imaginatively what the whole situation is before the process of logical connectedness is begun. The logical procedure seems little more than a form of translation into the language of symbol or of words, for the purpose of fixing in order and communicating to others, the context of what is fully grasped by the comprehensive sweep of the imagination. It seems as if there were, so to say, a mental affinity between the minds of some men and the objects in which they are cognitively interested, an affinity which enables them to commune with the object from the inside, to anticipate its procedure, and to reveal its inner secret. They are unable by any logical process to explain how they arrive at the centre of the object with which they are concerned; and by no merely logical procedure can any one not so endowed accomplish what they achieve by this intimate quasi-instinctive communion. They "see" the whole vividly and apparently with unerring assurance, and their process of reasoning seems mainly undertaken to elucidate and confirm this initial vision.¹

The imaginative grasp of the object anticipates, in one way, the slower and more detailed comprehension of the object which the logically connected system supplies; in another way, it operates as a guide to the gradual articulation of the object by purely intellectual procedure. In either case it controls the process of thought proper. This holds of all knowledge to some extent. But the more concrete the objects investigated, the more in short the object approximates to the complex solidity of spiritual life, the more is knowledge dependent on

¹ We have a closely analogous experience in the case of the natural or trained expert in practical life. He can "picture beforehand" exactly what will happen; or visualise precisely the whole situation with which he has to deal: and no reasoning for or against his view of the whole seems to affect the certainty or accuracy of his insight. All teachers must be familiar with the fact that the real difficulty in teaching is not to get a process of reasoning understood, but to engage the imagination of the pupil in the subject, and that the limit of effective instruction is reached when the imagination fails or is lacking altogether.

the effective use of the imagination. No mind can expect to cope with the richer realities of experience if it

“wants that glorious faculty assigned
To elevate the more than reasoning mind.

Imagination is that sacred power.”¹

Men differ far more in imaginative grasp than in capacity for reasoning; for reasoning is in essence a social creation or a socialising function. Both etymologically and in fact “logical” procedure is inseparably bound up with the intersubjective intercourse by which society is sustained, and which is carried on to such a large extent by the use of articulate speech—a purely social invention. The reasoning powers of individuals are developed by communicating ideas; and defects in one individual can by the same process be corrected or supplemented by another.²

Imagination is not thus socially constituted. It owes its quality to the natural endowment of the individual and its activity to its vital relationship with real beings.

In the process of knowledge imagination seems to perform a function within the realm of ideas similar to that performed by an organ of perception in the region of sense. In the perceptual grasp of the object, the apprehended object is kept steadily before the mind while reflective interest is concentrated upon it. This closely resembles the imaginative grasp of an object during the process of understanding. Indeed, a function of this kind seems certainly required, unless all reflective knowledge be limited to an analysis and interpretation of objects derived from mere sense perception; and the higher levels of the human mind cannot be said to be so limited. The higher realities of experience are in no way confined to the region of perception, and hardly seem in certain cases to hold of perception at all. The inter-relation of this function of imagining an object with that of reflective understanding of the same object is doubtless very close: but the distinction, nevertheless, between the two seems

¹ Wordsworth.

² Hence it is that “rational intelligibility” implies in practice a reference to an average or typical level of intelligence—a level established by social intercourse, and in fact, varying with social development.

clearly recognisable,¹ and appears in the course of the process of knowledge. This inter-relation is apparently the mental source of hypothesis, suggestion, and tentative connection in which the earlier stages of orderly connected knowledge consist. These seem, so to say, the intermediate stages in reducing the totality presented to imagination to the detailed articulate coherence of logical reflection.

Besides imagination, intellectual procedure has to reckon with memory, which is also non-logical in its operation. In a sense we may say that the intellect is at the mercy of memory, not merely in the general way that, without memory, knowledge could neither be accumulated nor carried on, but in the special way that accuracy and precision of retentiveness is the basis of sound judgment at any stage in the process of knowledge. In making the simplest scientific statement, the mind has to draw on the reservoir of memory for its terms, its images, and its "facts." When we bear in mind the extraordinary complexity of most scientific knowledge, we can see the importance of the rôle played by memory in carrying on its process. It is merely the ease and the familiarity with which the process as a whole takes place, which makes us normally unconscious of the operation of memory throughout. The process of our attention is engaged on the logical connection of thought to the exclusion of what is for this purpose irrelevant or subsidiary; and we are apt to suppose that what is not clearly before our minds is not affecting

¹ Thus, if we examine our actual experience we find that, in thinking about an object, whether the object be quite well understood or be given for the first time as an object for consideration, we must have an imaginative presentation of the object as a whole at least in relatively dim outline, before we can effectively begin to deal with it by way of reflective analysis. And the object so presented must be kept relatively steady before the mind while reflection goes on. The process is like that of a speaker who is addressing an audience on some topic. He sees before his mind what he wants to expound, and his words are arranged to convey in sequence what he pictures in its totality all the while he is speaking. We have an analogous experience in artistic production. The whole is grasped imaginatively before it is translated into sense form. Wagner remarked in a letter, "I see only internal images which try to realise themselves in sound. . . . My poetical conceptions have always been produced at such a distance from experience that I must consider the whole moral formation of my mind as caused by these conceptions. The *Flying Dutchman*, *Tannhauser*, *Lohengrin*, the *Nibelungen*, *Wotan*, all existed in my head before I saw them in experience." See Combarieu: *Music, its Laws and Evolution*.

the process. Only when a check occurs in the course of our thinking, when we cannot "find the right word," when we do not express what we "mean," or when we find we have overlooked an essential element in the case, are we reminded of the conjoint activity of such a function as memory in securing the success of our effort to understand. If we may employ metaphors, the operation of memory is to the logical procedure of the intellect what an instrument is to the operator, or an organised business concern to the head of the firm, or a general staff to the commander in the field. The formation of the memory—continuum, the power and accuracy of retention, the alertness and suggestibility of memory, owe nothing to the rules of logic, but are regulated by other mental laws and conditions.

The close connection of memory with intellectual procedure is seen very markedly in the different degrees of intellectual efficiency between different individuals. It is not want of logical capacity which prevents some minds advancing in knowledge, but defective capacity to retain what has come clearly before consciousness. While the range of one individual's memory will increase his power for effective reflection, another individual, through sheer defect in retentiveness, will proceed to give an intellectual construction which he would never have undertaken had he been endowed with a better memory; while others, again, will try to fill up by imagination the gaps "felt" to exist in the memory train.¹

III

Besides the non-logical functions already mentioned, it is worth noting that each logical intellect itself has a peculiar quality which greatly influences its procedure. An intellect has what I may call a certain calibre, which definitely affects its range and its penetration into what it deals with. We describe this peculiarity when we speak of the "subtlety," the "precision,"

¹ Other aspects of memory as they affect knowledge need not perhaps be mentioned here, e.g. how the "effort to remember" will diminish the effort to reflect. I wish in the above merely to call attention to the main point—the essential necessity of this non-logical function in the process of knowledge. I have dealt elsewhere with other problems in connection with memory. See Chap. IV.

the "teach," or again the "complexity" of a man's intellect. Some intellects seem incapable of making clear distinctions; some are incapable of holding distinctions together when made. This vitally affects their whole procedure. They will accept, as self-evident, statements which to another type of intellect seem obscure or unintelligible; and, again, statements will appear contradictory which are not so, or not contradictory which are so. Problems will thus arise which are not properly formulated; and problems will be created which to another intellect are not problems at all but are mere misunderstandings of the actual situation. This is particularly frequent in the case of philosophy, where, especially in the more complex realities of experience, the greatest difficulty just consists in correctly making and formulating a valid distinction. A wrong step at the outset will start a thinker in the pursuit of a problem which would not exist but for the initial mistake.¹ The history of science is similarly strewn with the wrecks of futile solutions of unnecessary problems due to the restricted powers of the intellect of individuals. From one point of view it may be said that scientific progress has largely been due to an intellect of later date drawing and holding firmly a distinction which to an intellect of an earlier date had no existence. Doubtless the advance was made possible by acquaintance with the errors into which the less capable intellect fell; but the advance was partly brought about by the increased concentration of the intellect on the subject which the inheritance of scientific knowledge fosters. Some of the greatest steps in the progress of science have been made by a later mind thus drawing a vital distinction which was unknown or unrecognised by an early investigator in the same domain.² But we need not appeal to the history of philosophy

¹ One need but recall the fundamental distinctions from which the speculations of Descartes, or again of Berkeley, started to illustrate this point.

² A good illustration of this is provided by the early history of mathematics. Pythagoras maintained that spatial position, a point, had a certain size. Later mathematicians evolved the conception of pure spatial position, and sharply distinguished position and magnitude. This step was formulated by Euclid in his definition of a point. The advance in itself and in its consequences was enormous. The logical puzzle over Achilles and the tortoise could have had no meaning for Pythagoras.

or of science to substantiate the contention that intellects differ qualitatively. The difference between the intellect of a child and an adult, of a pupil and a master, of a layman and an expert, of a savage and the highly civilised, does not consist simply in the amount which each respectively knows nor in their opportunity to know, but in their very power to know and understand. Nor can it be maintained that if all the different kinds of intellect were sufficiently mature, or sufficiently trained and educated, they would all think with the same degree of penetration and connectedness. For it is impossible to say what a "mature" intellect is, unless we arbitrarily define it as an intellect fully capable of grasping the subject considered, and in that case very few of even the best intellects would deserve the appellation, while some intellects are mature at a very early stage in life. As for education, one of the most familiar facts of education is that it is a process of differentiating intellects from one another, and that for the great majority of intellects a stage is reached beyond which the individual is incapable of making any further advance. Nor do we find that intellects of relatively equal training and knowledge either think in the same way or agree in their intellectual procedure. The disputes of contemporary philosophers and scientists have been and still are the jibe of the uninitiated. Men seem as if they possessed a different sense of contradiction. Propositions which seem palpably absurd to one intellect will seem luminously intelligible to another. All the rules of logical reasoning will fail to establish agreement where men differ in their use of the principle of contradiction; and will prove as useless as an appeal to the organ of vision to settle the difference between two individuals who see colours differently.

Not merely do intellects differ in penetration and precision, but in the scope of their comprehension and in their sense of logical continuity or connectedness. The compass of most men's understanding is pathetically limited, and even of the best intellects painfully restricted. If it were true, as is erroneously held, that the intellect has but to follow its rules and steer a straight course and the secrets of the world will be disclosed to human gaze, science and philosophy would have found their

America long ere now. What the individual finds, however, is that in his scientific activity there is a perpetual conflict between his aims and his intellectual limitations ; and in the issue the limitations triumph and his aims are but aspirations. We sometimes speak as if the main or only restrictions imposed on intellectual achievement were the brevity of years. We are not so fortunately endowed : if we were, a man could carry on where another left off, and in the long run the human intellect would arrive. In fact, we are circumscribed on every hand, and bounds seem set to the operation of each man's intellect beyond which he seems utterly unable to pass. The radius of each man's intellectual horizon differs from one to another ; but an horizon it remains in each case.¹ And within this scope his intellectual processes take place. He finds by experiment and experience that his intellect is incapable of grasping a certain kind of reality, a certain degree of complexity, a certain range of detail, either completely or at all.²

A similar diversity between individuals is found in their sense of logical cogency, or conceptual continuity. Even in the most abstract sciences men differ in their capacity to appreciate and formulate rigorously exact reasoning ; and in the more concrete

¹ This has led some philosophers to maintain that the human intellect as such is limited or conditioned ; and they proceed to discuss the conditions within which knowledge is possible, and beyond which it must make use of other powers to supplement these natural limitations. But if we discuss the absolute limitation of human intellect we are thereby claiming to be outside those very limitations. These philosophers are but generalising the experience which each man as a fact has of his own limitations.

² When we consider the great importance which men attach to the activity of the intellect, and the ceaselessly renewed efforts and failures to understand which recur generation after generation, it is most remarkable to find that the one function of the human soul which seems for ever destined to remain imperfectly adapted to the world is human thought. His organs of perception seem perfectly adjusted to the real. His emotional responses seem adequate to their purpose. In his moral life he can secure practical stability of will. In his religious experience, he can obtain an enduring peace of spirit. Even in art he can achieve consummate joy. But his intellect seems for ever haunted by the sense of defeat, harried by doubts and questions, restless in its pursuit of a truth which escapes his grasp. In terms of evolution it would appear as if the intellect were just sufficiently evolved to start problems, but not sufficiently evolved as yet to find solutions. Is it that the world is a riddle to the intellect, or that the intellect makes a riddle of the world ?

sciences the form of conceptual connection seems to vary from individual to individual. This diversity is not due solely to the limitations of language to express thought. The sense of evidence, the degree of credulity, the accessibility to rationally constituted conviction, differs from mind to mind. The power to give conceptions the unified order of an inevitable sequence of thought can only be described as a special gift, which few possess in any sphere of knowledge and none possess beyond a limited degree. One man can be satisfied by a chain of reasoning which to another seems utterly disconnected. As in optical illusions where a continuous circular line can apparently be formed by the rapid revolution of discrete sections ; so in thinking one man sees a continuity which to a finer insight is transparently discontinuous. The rules of logic are useless either to train the sense of evidence, or to establish agreement between different minds which differ in their power to connect ideas. Each seems to follow logical evidence in his own way and in the result to find satisfaction. Except on the assumption that in the very process of thought there lies this peculiar difference of quality in the intellect of individuals, it seems impossible to account for the apparently irreducible disagreement between intelligent minds regarding what is logically coherent, or for the assured satisfaction with which one man will accept as valid a train of reasoning which to another seems indefensible.

IV

This completer view of what is involved in the process of knowledge does justice to the factors to which current logic directs exclusive attention, and also to those equally important facts in the experience of knowing which current logic neglects or ignores. One of the most familiar characteristics of experience is the peculiar sense of mental elation which invariably accompanies the successful prosecution of knowledge in any form. Knowledge liberates the individual mind, and in this freedom the mind at once finds itself—its own constitution and composition—and its self-contained independence of the individual objects making up its world. It becomes conscious not merely

of how to act with reference to them, but conscious of what those objects mean in themselves. It thereby both detaches itself from its world and attaches itself to its world, finds its place in the totality of the real. It is perhaps not too much to say that the acquisition of this sense of freedom is a dominating interest in the whole process of knowledge. Certainly without the attainment of this mental condition, knowledge would hardly be worth the effort it entails. We do not undertake knowledge at the command of some external fate, nor out of consideration for the object. Fate is too impartial in its authority; but the pursuit of knowledge to its utmost is a matter of choice. The justification for knowing is that the attainment of it liberates our spirits along the ways of order and coherence, and in our liberty we find the joy of life. We need not be surprised, therefore, that the pursuit of knowledge becomes tedious, uninteresting, and valueless when it no longer creates the sense of fulfilment which we call satisfaction: nor that many, realising this, take the feeling co-efficient of the activity of knowing as a final test of truth itself. And when we contrast the early stages of the cognitive relation of the mind to its world with the last, the contention just put forward is amply confirmed. The earliest interest of man in the world about him is largely suffused with fear and misgiving and mere wonderment. Without the equipment or the capacity to advance further, his imagination tends to minister to his dread. Only when the articulating activity of the intellect is brought into operation, giving him a fuller realisation of the meaning of the object and a greater sense of mental freedom accordingly, does the primitive emotion of fear give way to a quickened enjoyment in the comprehension of the nature of things.¹ Thereafter knowledge can be willingly sought "for its own sake," *i.e.* as an avenue to the attainment of mental satisfaction and nothing further.

In the larger and more ambitious efforts of knowledge, the significance of emotion and imagination, and of the special mental composition of the individual, is not less but even more evident than it is in those cases where the mind is engaged with comparatively narrow spheres of fact. The greater the range of

¹ Cp. Humboldt, *Cosmos*, vol. i. p. 15 ff.

objects with which we seek to establish mental union, the more profoundly are our emotions concerned in the issue. "Our hearts are now more capacious, our thoughts more erected to the search and expectation of greatest and exactest things."¹ The questions set determine the kind of answers given, and the questions bear the imprint and quality of the personality which frames them. This is inevitable. The satisfaction sought concerns the whole cognitive attitude of the personality towards the world in which he is placed. In philosophy and science "it is for the heart to suggest our problems, it is for the intellect to solve them."² And the final solution is generally found to bear the stamp of the personality of the thinker. As Lotze remarks,³ "Except in rare cases, a prolonged philosophical labour is nothing else but the attempt to justify scientifically a fundamental view of things which has been adopted in early life."⁴ Elaborate and complicated arguments are brought into play whose selection and development are controlled by assumptions which are mainly emotional in origin and character. Reason in such cases is little more than the mailed champion of the passions. Failure to win satisfaction means nothing less than misery.⁵ Doubtless in general it is true that "logic rests on postulates which must be connected with the action of a will which affirms existence."⁶ But in philosophy in particular logical procedure is largely an affirmative of the will of a specific personality which resolves to secure its own individual existence. And this largely determines its final conclusions. "A distinction is sometimes made between those who are pessimists by temperament and those who are pessimists on purely theoretic grounds as the result of dispassionate inquiry and conviction: but in truth I doubt if there has ever been a pronounced pessimist who could be placed in the latter class alone."⁷ Most philosophers of the

¹ Milton, *Areopagitica*.

² Comte, *Politique positive*.

³ Cp. Merz, *History of European Thought*, vol. ii. p. 515.

⁴ This recalls with a new significance the aphorism of Goethe, "Was man in der Jugend wünscht hat man im Alter die Fülle."

⁵ Cp. Cournot : *Enchaînement des Idées fondamentales*, Liv. iv. 1.

⁶ Boutroux : "Certitude et Vérité," B.A. *Transactions*.

⁷ Ward, *Realm of Ends*, p. 320.

metaphysical type have been actuated either by the passion for intellectual symmetry on a great scale, which in its essence is closely akin to the artistic temperament, or by a craving for a completer realisation of the Divine Nature, which has the most intimate affinity with the mood and temperament of religion. Neither of these frames of mind is intellectual in its original composition, still less the product of rational reflection. They are emotional ; and the later development of an articulate scheme of reasoning is devised to satisfy the primary and constitutionally spontaneous emotional attitude to the world. This is frankly acknowledged in so many words by those philosophers who consider the influences which move them in the quest for the whole truth. "With certain persons the intellectual effort to understand the universe is a principal way of experiencing the Deity. No one, probably, who has not felt this, however differently he may describe it, has ever cared much for metaphysics. And wherever it has been felt strongly, it has been its own justification. The man whose nature is such that by one path alone his chief desire will reach consummation will try to find it on that path, whatever it may be, and whatever the world thinks of it ; and if he does not, he is contemptible."¹ The spectator of all time and all existence desires to have such a Pisgah vision because in the first instance he is an intoxicated lover of the world.² The imposing structure of an elaborately planned system of carefully chiselled categories is inspired by an emotional interest in symmetrical arrangement similar in kind to that which gives rise to the noblest monuments of architecture : instead of a cathedral in stone, hewn from the rocks of nature, there is constructed a temple of thoughts cut from the substance of the human mind, a building animated by the very spirit of the builder and all the more adapted on that account to be the habitation of the worshipper.

It need not be supposed that the pre-established harmony between the philosopher's initial attitude and the final deliverance destroys the value of the truth he seeks and finds. The course he follows in a sense takes the form of a circle ; but a circular

¹ Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, Introduction.

² Cp. Pater, *Plato and Platonism*, c. 6.

argument is the best because the strongest, if the circle is really complete. All knowledge, even that of the special sciences, aims at being circular, at finding a conclusion which is not merely in agreement with, but confirmatory of, the premises. The scientist who starts from facts of perception and proceeds towards an interpretation, becomes satisfied with his course of thought, if his conclusion, when "tested" by the "facts," is supported by what they reveal, if, in a word, he can link up the end of his thought with its beginning. The philosopher follows the same career on a larger scale. His initial emotional attitude to the world corresponds to the datum of the special scientist, and embodies the primary demands which his individual mind makes upon a world become intelligible. These demands have their roots in the very life of his mind, and expect to be sustained likewise in the atmosphere of a clarified intelligence. In a sense an emotional attitude to the world as a whole may be but a latent intuition of the complete truth in which the mind is always fulfilled and satisfied; and perhaps it may be that the higher intuition into the fullness of truth is but the mental prius, which itself awakens the initial emotional attitude and draws the mind on towards its fulfilment.

But the individual agent in knowing is not altogether left to himself in framing either his initial attitude in knowledge or the course of his knowledge. The emotional frame of his mind is checked, guided, and sustained by the social milieu in which he finds himself and by the social composition of his mind. The individual cannot help thinking as a representation of a collective social consciousness. The process of externalising his thought in language is under the control of the social spirit from the first. Indeed, the externalisation of mental processes in social institutions and in language is the main concern of social life, and perhaps the achievement of most interest in man's life on earth.¹ This interpenetration of mind by mind in society exerts the profoundest influence on the whole attitude of the individual, cognitive as well as practical. It is in large measure the source of the pre-judgments which affect every individual in the course of his knowledge. It decides largely what he shall be interested

¹ Cp. Merz, *History of European Thought*, ii. 525.

in and the way the object affects him. Certain objects of experience have an emotional quality assigned to them by the traditional or accepted modes of social beings towards them; and this emotional attitude the individual shares. Certain ways of viewing or thinking about objects have the sanction of a social group, and bias the individual mind accordingly. There are some objects which individuals, reflecting the temperament of their society, are unwilling even to submit to intellectual investigation at all. Their minds recoil from the attitude of knowledge, not because of the difficulty of carrying it out, but because of the reluctance to get closer to the real meaning and nature of the objects. Their attitude is expressed in the words: " Craignez bien plutôt de soumettre toutes ces grandes et belles choses au creuset de la raison, si vous ne voulez les voir d'abord se flétrir et se dessécher." ¹ Articulate reasoning plays such a comparatively small rôle in average social experience, that individuals come to trust their emotional reactions and their sentiments rather than their powers of thought, and to find in the former the main channel of communion with the environing world and the source of all that gives value and dignity to individual life. Such a frame of mind impedes the development of free knowledge, and checks it in its course when once it is started. Intolerance of liberating thought is not, as is so often supposed, the peculiar prerogative of religious institutions. Social institutions of every sort claim a privileged authority over the individual's mind, and having moulded his mind in a form which secures a specific mental attitude favourable to corporate life, they treat with suspicion and even hostility the effort of individual initiative to obtain a completer knowledge than the institution requires for its stability. The particular mental attitude acquired by membership in the institution becomes the enemy of the comprehending universality sought by the scientific spirit of free knowledge, and spontaneously carried through by the individual mind. In short, socially constituted beliefs, which draw their vitality largely from the life of emotion, supply in most cases the presuppositions and the prejudices, furnish the starting-points and main routes, of the individual's process of knowledge; and his cognitive effort is

¹ Cournot, *Enchaînement des idées fondamentales*, p. 373.

conducted in accordance with them or in resistance to them. Hence the difficulty constantly experienced in introducing a new intellectual synthesis. Truth arrived at by articulate processes of thought is not all that the mind aims at in knowledge: the truth must satisfy, must give the sense of mental fulfilment, must create a new emotional state in which conceptual connection passes into the conviction of mental vision. The truth must be believed before the mind becomes satisfied with the process of knowledge, and it is often easier to establish the connected sequence of thought, without which many truths cannot be obtained, than to create the frame of mind in which conviction consists.¹ This last stage in the process of knowledge is always the most difficult to obtain, just because it is the most important for the individual's mind. The history of science, and of human knowledge generally, abounds in illustrations of the conflict between the newer findings of articulate reflection and emotionally constituted anterior beliefs. We may take one example of the many which make up so large a part of the half-tragic, half-comic spectacle of man's struggle for enlightenment. The objections urged against the theory of evolution in the middle of last century were not in the first instance drawn from an impartial examination of the facts or from considerations of logical consistency. They had their source in the emotional attitude towards human nature on the one hand and non-human organic and inorganic nature on the other. "Spirit and matter have ever been presented to us in rudest contrast, the one as all-noble, the other as all-vile."² The suggestion of continuity between the spirit of man and physical nature was a challenge to the security of a whole frame of mind, and not merely to a particular opinion or an abstract intellectual conception. To prepare the mind of the generality of people even to consider the suggested new interpretation of facts, it was necessary to use the arts of the mental physician rather than the resources of pure logic. An appeal was made to the wider emotions which actuate all pursuit of knowledge, to the desire for truth in

¹ "It is not difficult to tell the truth; the difficulty is to get the truth believed" (Sir Edward Grey, in the House of Commons, 1912).

² Tyndall, *Fragments of Science*, p. 159 (1872).

general, to the assurance that all truth will ultimately lead to mental satisfaction, to the mood of toleration in which all truth must be received. The language employed sometimes by the most distinguished scientists to create the appropriate receptive attitude seems nowadays ridiculously apologetic, and would, indeed, be unintelligible if the pursuit of knowledge concerned the logical procedure of the intellect alone. It betrays a sensitive insight into the actual workings of the human mind, but is none the less a pathetic commentary on man's interest in the truth when a scientist of repute felt constrained to say to his audience, "Surely these notions (contained in the evolution hypothesis) represent an absurdity too monstrous to be entertained by any sane mind. Let us, however, give them fair play. Let us steady ourselves in front of the hypothesis, and, dismissing all terror and excitement from our minds, let us look firmly into it with the hard sharp eye of intellect alone. . . . I do not think this evolution hypothesis is to be flouted away contemptuously. I do not think it is to be denounced as wicked. . . . Fear not the evolution hypothesis. Steady yourselves in its presence upon the faith in the ultimate triumph of truth."¹ In the light of the foregoing analysis of the process and conditions of human knowledge such an appeal to a group of presumably trained minds finds its explanation and justification. But if justified and necessary, it indirectly condemns as inadequate the interpretation of the nature of knowledge offered by those who restrict knowledge to purely conceptual activity, and ignore its completer significance as an avenue to the attainment of that mental satisfaction of which the formal procedure of logical articulate thought is but an essential condition.²

The issue of a process of knowledge must qualify the entire

¹ Tyndall, *Fragments of Science*, p. 159 (1872).

² In some cases the processes of reasoning are so conflicting that the issue of the inquiry has to be left, or at any rate is often settled by an appeal, to feeling. A good illustration of this is the problem of the immortality of the individual soul. The reasons for and against immortality are so evenly balanced that few will be prepared to decide the case on grounds of reason. The failure of reason to establish a result becomes the opportunity of feeling to insist on its claims to determine the issue. And for most people their emotional interest in the result does settle the question; and with this procedure reason, at any rate, can find no fault.

composition of the individual's mind, if its purpose as a realisation of vital mental energy is to be fulfilled. In this contention lies the truth of the sensationalist view of knowledge. Knowledge in one of its aspects may be said to be a process from sensation to sensation ; its aim is to secure a more vivid and intense sensation of the world. There is a " sane state of feeling that arises out of thought," just as certainly as articulate thought arises out of an emotional (or sensational) attitude towards an object. For the scientist no less than for the poet the emotional coefficient of his activity is an indispensable factor in the evolution of the mind's cognitive relation to its object. Truth does not consist simply in the agreement of conceptual thought with reality : for the mind and the reality are not in disagreement to start with. Truth lies in the attainment of a conscious state in which the energy of the mind is raised to a level of individual conscious freedom, realised at once as mental vision, enjoyment, and self-completeness of individuality.

IV

THE NATURE OF MEMORY-KNOWLEDGE

"Our knowledge is founded on inexperience : it is converted into experience by memory."—S. BUTLER.

γίγνεται δ' ἐκ τῆς μνήμης ἐμπειρία τοῖς ἀνθρώποις.

ARISTOTLE.

I

THE problem I wish to consider is the character of the contribution which memory makes to the series of judgments constituting human knowledge. For the purpose of the analysis we must presuppose the psychic development of the so-called memory-continuum, which is obviously a gradual and a complex product of psychic activity. We shall also regard as subordinate to our primary interest the various forms of our memory experience, recollection, reminiscence, remembrance, and reverie, to name only the most familiar. Of still less importance from our point of view is the discussion of the question, in itself rather futile, whether the exercise of memory implies an innate or an acquired function of mental life. And we shall not deal with the psychic conditions of the memory process, retention, reproduction, persistence of images or ideas, and the like. Our problem is logical, not psychological, and starts from the assumption that the judgment "I remember this or that" has a definite meaning and conveys a specific amount of knowledge, whatever be the psychic processes and conditions involved in the statement.

This judgment is specifically different from any other kind of knowledge, however closely allied to it certain other forms of knowledge, *e.g.* recognition, or again re-knowing, may be. The

main point of difference is that in a memory-judgment the object to which direct reference is made is always and solely the past. Every other judgment deals directly either with the present, the future, or, as in the case of abstract reasoning, has no time reference at all.¹

The problem seems important on general grounds. It has been long held that the analysis of knowledge is concerned in the first instance, or even exclusively, with the judgments which refer to the world as it is about us in the living present and as it may be expected to be in the near or just remote future. So much has this view prevailed that some have taken judgments of perception to be prior both in time and logical importance to all other kinds and stages of knowledge. Emphasis on the present leads half-unconsciously to over-emphasis on the knowledge which is peculiarly present knowledge,—viz. perception, and more particularly perception of the external world. This to some extent accounts for the place which discussion of the nature of external perception has occupied and still occupies in British philosophy. But it seems clear that unless this primary or exclusive emphasis on the judgments which concern the living present is the result of a reasoned theory, the assumption of their prior importance for knowledge can only be regarded as a prejudice or personal conviction. When we observe that we are constantly referring to the larger and, as life proceeds, the ever-increasing domain of the past with as much relative assurance as we refer to our present situation, the acceptance of the judgments concerning the present as our only starting point for the study of knowledge seems more than questionable. If, again, we admit that judgments concerning the past have at least *prima facie* equal validity with those concerning the present, and are certainly distinct in form or kind from the latter—more especially if the judgments referring to the present are identified with external perception,—then we are compelled to broaden the basis of our

¹ I take it for granted that the difference between a past object and a present object will be accepted as fundamental, and that knowledge in the present and knowledge about the present are also clearly distinguishable. Assuming these distinctions no one will confuse the analysis of an actual experience, *e.g.* a toothache, with the analysis of an experience known by memory, *e.g.* the toothache as located in the past.

investigation into the nature of knowledge, and cannot accept any theory which regards judgments of external perception as the model, still less as the standard, of all true knowledge. It is, doubtless, obvious that a judgment regarding the past takes place in the present, as indeed do our judgments regarding the future. But a judgment in the present is not necessarily a judgment of or referring to the present. If there is no distinction between these two statements then knowledge must always be an affair of the passing moment; and if this were true, there can be no escape from either solipsism or intellectual scepticism. That it cannot be true seems evident from the fact that we cannot even speak of a judgment in the present, much less of the present, without thereby distinguishing sharply between present and past, and thus giving some independent existence to the past and independent validity to judgments referring to the past. If this be granted, it is at least an assumption requiring special proof that judgments referring to the present have a more secure validity than those referring to the past. Such an assumption is certainly not made by common sense, which takes judgments regarding the past to be as much a basis of reasoning as judgments regarding the present; and the fallibility, which undoubtedly affects judgments regarding the past, can be equally found in the case of judgments regarding the present.

We start, then, from this position which common sense seems in point of fact to accept. Our questions regarding memory-judgments may be reduced to three. What is the specific nature of the object to which these judgments refer? What is the character of these judgments? And lastly we shall ask, What kind of value and certainty have these judgments?

We shall keep in view throughout the parallelism which seems to exist at many points, though certainly not at all points, between the judgments of memory and those of external perception. This amounts to no more than a common-sense admission that in some way we may take the past to be as real as the present, and that a reference to our way or ways of knowing the present may by analogy assist us in an inquiry into our knowledge of the past.

II

The object of memory-judgments is summarily described as the past. But this is indefinite and requires analysis. We do not in memory know the mere flow of past time, but a specific point or part of the past. Past time as a whole, or the past as a whole, may, by contrast to memory-knowledge, be called an ideal construction, of which memory may supply some of the pieces but does not give the whole composition. It is the past of physics and cosmology. Nor do we pretend to know by memory the past which every one understands and accepts in the same sense and with the same complex of events—the past of the historian or the evolutionist. This is built up without any reference to any specific individual's direct experience; rather the aim of the historian is to get rid of the individual point of view as such, or only to make use of it so far as it corroborates or is corroborated by the experience and points of view of others. History, in fact, is to memory what a scientific statement is to a private opinion. The past to which memory refers is the individual's own past and nothing further: the past of history does not directly deal with that of any particular individual at all. But even the individual's own past is not in every sense the object of memory. Some of his past operates upon his life effectively but is unknown to memory. The residual influences of previous experience, the acquired habits of thought and action, the colour of previous feeling, and the complex texture of the previous events of his life, not to speak of the heritage or ancestry which links his individuality to a previous generation or generations—all these are in a strict sense his past as an individual, but they are not the past he remembers. For they all have the characteristics of being at once indefinite in their operation, unconscious to his thought, and incapable of being identified by him as facts which he ascribes to himself or consciously places in some part of his previous experience. Only when he affirms what has been as his own, as being what it was because he made it so, does he form the judgment "I remember this or that." It is the past in this sense that we are concerned with when speaking of the object of memory.

It may be noted, in passing, that the reality or existence which we ascribe to the past of memory raises no difficulties which are not equally found when we speak of the reality of the past in any of the other senses. Whatever meaning the reality of the past of history or physics or cosmology may have, we must be equally justified in describing the past of memory as real: for the latter is only a particular kind of past. We do regard the events of history as real and not fictitious creations of the human mind. It is true that the lower strata of a geological formation were in existence before the upper strata: it is true that the Romans occupied Britain before the Normans appeared. And what is true implies a reference to reality. When we say the past is no longer real, all we mean is that the past is no longer present: and that is tautology. If we say the past was never real, because it no longer exists as it once was, we are either begging a serious question or perhaps talking nonsense. The reason why common sense regards the past as a reality is that reality is held to be continuous in its process, and all parts of that process are necessary to make reality what it fully is. If this be denied, there is no choice between illusion and solipsism,—if that be a choice at all. If change is not a character of the real, the word “past” has literally no meaning. If change is real, then all the stages of change are states of reality whether they appear at one time or another, be past or present. What science and history do, is to build up gradually by an effort of interpretation the connection between the discrete parts or stages by which the reality considered has gone through its process. That this interpretation refers to reality is never questioned, and cannot be doubted without denying the fact of change. The same must apply to the past of memory. The changes through which the individual mind passes are as real as the individuality which passes through and holds together these changes. And it is the course or series of these changes which is referred to by the successive memory-judgments.

The general character of the object of memory is, then, individual experience as a process of changes which have occurred, to which we can consciously refer, and which we claim as peculiarly our own. The reality to which we ultimately refer

in such judgments, the ultimate "subject," to use the familiar logical term, is our one individual experience, which is identical throughout the changes and which unites them all. Reality is everywhere individual, identity through diversity, whether the diversities appear simultaneously or successively. In our judgment of a present reality, its constituent elements are in general simultaneous; in memory-judgments the elements are always successive. The actual way in which these two factors (identity and change) of our individual experience are blended, is that of continuity. This continuity of individual experience I take to be the essential nature of the specific object dealt with and referred to in memory-judgments. Every time I judge that this or that happened in my experience, I am affirming the continuity of my individual experience, and point to certain parts of it which have made up its content. Behind continuity no doubt there lies the more ultimate fact of the activity of the individual life which has reacted on its environment and, in so doing, has built up its concrete reality. But with this point, which is rather metaphysical than logical, we are not here directly concerned. It is only after this activity has operated through a considerable variety of changes and has fused these changes together, that the continuity to which memory specifically refers is effectively secured and established.

The continuity in question is never abstract, but is filled in with perfectly definite elements, each with a character of its own. Hence it is inaccurate to say that memory-judgments prove the fact of the continuity of the individual life, as if continuity were an abstract principle deducible from the acts of remembering. Memory-judgments are operations of the mind by which we express in the present our awareness of the continuity of our past with our present. In the same way it is equally inaccurate to say that memory assumes the fact of continuity of our experience. Memory-judgments no more assume the existence of their object than external perception assumes the existence of the world about us. The world about us, so far as perception goes, is just the object perceived: perception is one way in which the externally real becomes an object, *i.e.* enters into the sphere of what we call our knowledge. Similarly continuity of our

experience is primarily the object known in memory, and therefore is not postulated as being before it is known. What that continuity may be apart from memory, it is not for memory to consider, any more than it is the business of the acts of perception to decide what the world about us may be independent of our specific perception. In memory-judgments we become aware of the continuity of our individual experience; and this is almost a tautology; for being aware of our continuity is just what memory-judgments consist in.

We need not, however, maintain that only in memory-judgments do we become aware of our continuity. It seems certainly true that we do have to some degree—a degree varying from individual to individual and from time to time in the same individual—a kind of sense or feeling of our continuity, an indefinite and inarticulate mental state in which different factors co-operate and coalesce, and to which therefore we may assign the term “feeling” of continuity. The more stable our individual mind, the more uniform its operations and responses to its environment, especially its emotional responses, the more likely are we to have a clear consciousness of this feeling of continuity. But while some might attach very great importance to this feeling in their consciousness of continuity, it does not conflict with but, on the contrary, may often support the memory-judgments. And in any case it does not take the place of memory, for its peculiar character lies just in being a general feeling,¹ and not a judgment at all, which is articulate and definite in its reference to some part of our experience.²

While the object of memory, then, is the continuity of our experience, memory-judgments always have a specific object as their content. This is selected by attention from the variety of content making up the continuity of our experience. This operation is closely analogous to what takes place in our perception of the external world. We do not perceive, *e.g.* by sight, the whole region that is visible, but select a specific object in the *totum visibile* and concentrate our attention on that. We perceive, in short, a visible object: the rest of the visible region

¹ Comparable to mere sensation in relation to judgments of perception.

² We shall refer to this again in the second stage of the analysis.

lies round that with varying degrees of clearness and distinctness. We are aware that there is no gap between what we do perceive and the remainder: but the reality of the visible world is focussed for the time being at a particular point, the object perceived. So in memory-judgments. We do not know by memory the whole continuity of our previous experience at once, but a particular part of it, which we, owing to our special interest in it for the time being, know as belonging to our experience. The fact that though thus selected, and therefore partially isolated, the object is still affirmed as part of our continuity often without our linking it to other adjacent objects in the series, shows how closely our continuity enters into the very life of our individuality. It might seem at first sight that, to remember any bit of the past, we should have to go through a succession of stages connecting the object remembered with what preceded and what followed. Sometimes we find we do this, but not always; and in principle it is not necessary, any more than it is necessary, in order to perceive an object in the external world, that we should perceive this object as being alongside many others. The conscious reference to other objects may be very indirect indeed, and hardly present to the mind. And, in fact, it would be paradoxical if it were always necessary to relate an object to other objects before the object perceived could actually be perceived; for then we should either have to do the same in the case of those other objects, and thus proceed *ad infinitum*, or else we should never perceive an object at all. We may be and often are so vividly aware of a particular object as not to perceive any other objects. They may be felt or sensed as being there; but that is not perception. So in the case of memory. The object remembered can be judged as having fallen within my experience without necessarily connecting it with a predecessor or successor. Indeed, this is requisite in many operations of memory, when the quick recall of a specific object is for the time our sole interest in our past.¹ And even when our interest in the past is not confined to a single selected object, but to a series of objects, as in the case of reverie where we dwell on the

¹ I admit that the implication of other objects in the continuity is a matter of degree: but the degree may vary from vague indefiniteness upwards.

past for its own sake, our memory of these objects consists in a succession of discrete judgments, acts of remembering particular objects. Memory, in short, is not a blurred apprehension of the past, but an articulate judgment regarding its contents.

Such contents may be any aspect of psychic experience which has definitely engaged our activity for a time and so modified our individuality as a whole. Thus it is that we remember not only acts of will in the strict sense, but phases of feeling and emotion, and forms of knowledge. We remember that we paid our debts or failed to pay them; we can with the poetess "indulge in memory's rapturous pain;" we can remember past apprehension or perception or judgments; we can even remember that we remembered, or again that we did not remember. Individuals differ from one another in the way and in the degree to which they can remember these different contents; some can remember past acts better than thoughts or feelings. But such variation is characteristic of all operations of consciousness, as we familiarly recognise in the "specialist's memory," or in describing one person as having a good verbal memory, another a memory for ideas, a third as having an auditory memory, a fourth a visual memory, and so on.

While all these contents must belong to the past as continuous with our present, it is not necessary that in all cases there should be a precise reference to a specific time. The past, of course, involves the element of time: but continuity with the present is the fundamental fact, not the continuity of a definite time series. This last is a highly abstract element with a uniform and invariable direction of its own. We partly build up the idea of this uninterrupted flow of time from our memory-judgments. The latter do not depend for their operation on the accurate reproduction of the abstractly uniform time series. All that we require for memory-judgments is that they should refer to the past as a continuity which runs into our present and is different from it.¹ Hence it is that we remember many things

¹ It is interesting to note in confirmation of this point that each individual tends to have a memory series peculiar to himself: much indeed as each tends to estimate time in a way of his own.

which we cannot place anywhere specifically in the time series, but which, we are sure, fell within our experience somewhere. Hence, too, we remember some facts accurately but not in their exact order, the order which they must have taken in the single time series. The time order is something over and above the content we remember. The remembrance in a certain order no doubt may help to give cogency and certainty to our judgment of each object remembered. But so far from this being regarded as a necessity for accurate memory of particular objects, we rather consider it a sign of a defective, or at least primitive, mind if an individual cannot be sure of a particular occurrence without going over the whole record of events which preceded, or if, when interrupted in the recital, he has to begin all over again. When we remember a verse of poetry, or a passage in a book, or a place we have seen, we do not generally, and certainly need not for accuracy, locate the object remembered at some specific time in our past life. Indeed for many objects remembered this may be altogether impossible, as *e.g.* when we have met the object remembered very often, and it has thus become completely dissociated or detached from any specific time position. But we do locate the object in our past as an object which has entered into our experience, and which we affirm to have some place in the continuity of our individual life. The time series of the past, then, is one thing, the content of the past is another. The latter is the primary and ultimate object of memory, and is not in the first instance directly bound up with the former, so far at least as the precision of the object of memory-judgment is concerned.

There remains a last point of some importance. What distinguishes past from present, and where does the past, to which memory refers, begin? The operations of sense-perception form the primary region of the present, and with these are inseparably associated actual bodily movements of all kinds, whether of the body as a whole or of its various organs, and certain feelings characterised by novelty or freshness. The typical or standard judgment of the present, the judgment of external perception, combines these features. The sphere of free ideas or images is distinct from perception mainly through the absence in the former and the presence in the latter of organic movements.

These free ideas and images may be of two kinds: those which are allied with incipient, unfamiliar, and arrested activity—mainly bodily activity,—and those which are allied with consciously realised, or fulfilled, activity which suggests no further movement of any kind. The former belong to what we call our future, the latter to what we call our past. Hence it is that all that belongs to our past invariably has the aspect of familiarity and of attainment, and is accepted without any attempt at alteration. Alteration pertains to the future, not the past. So much is this the case that memory seems to reflect as in a still mirror an unchangeable realm of images or ideas. Whenever we seek to change what is presented to us, or see what is presented change before us, we know we are no longer in the region of memory pure and simple. Distinct from both perception and the free ideas associated with movement is, *e.g.*, the realm of concepts, with which are allied no bodily movements of any kind: and hence we rightly regard these as not belonging in a real sense to the present, past, or future of concrete experience, and as having no time qualification at all. Further than these distinctions which common sense uses to mark off the past from the present and both from the future, we do not require to go in our analysis here. We can, however, easily see how, even apart from abnormalities of experience, the border line between what we reproduce and what we imaginatively construct may in some cases be very fine, and how it is often very difficult in practice to determine whether we are actually remembering or merely imagining a part of our experience. These are often mixed up even in the case of people with good memories. But however this may take place, the general principle holds good and is admitted: for we never seek to alter what memory supplies, and we can always try to alter when imagination constructs. As a rule the sense of familiarity, the consciousness that our activity has once been fulfilled in a certain direction, increases or decreases as attention is concentrated on the object before us; and this is generally sufficient to make us aware whether we are remembering or imagining.

III

We come now to the next stage of the analysis—What sort of judgment is a memory-judgment? Round this point there has been much controversy. We shall not discuss the different theories. All the different views which have been put forward in connection with our knowledge of objects of the external world, have played their part in the discussion of the object of memory, mainly because perception has been taken as the type of all knowledge and memory interpreted on the same lines as perception.

The difficulty in deciding the character of the judgment of memory seems to be largely due to the apparent absence, in the case of the object of memory, of many or most of those features of the enviroing world which supply much of the material of thought and the usual model of what we call an object. We are accustomed constantly to supplement our own apprehension of the world of objects about us by intercourse with our fellows, and this both acts as a check on our own particular apprehension and helps to give the object the quality of detachment from the individual. In other words, social intercourse creates what we call universal or common experience; and this carries with it the consequence that the object of such experience is independent of any given individual, and is thus in a sense universal likewise. Hence universality of experience and objectivity have been by some thinkers literally identified. But when we are dealing with memory-knowledge, our object is altogether dependent on, or at least directly bound up with, our individual mind. No one can remember for us, or in the long run deny the validity of another's memory. We may correct our own memory by the help of others; but in the last resort the truth of our memory-judgments is final for ourselves. To surrender it absolutely is to give up the fact of the conscious continuity of our own individual life; and this we never do nor can do without loss of conscious individuality altogether. It would be like giving up our own emotions or private opinions or feelings, which constitute so large a part of our distinctive individual existence. The object of memory does not transcend individual experience, and yet it is none the less an object on that account. For it transcends our

conscious present, and that of itself is perhaps enough to constitute an object. But when to this is added the characteristic that the object of memory remains the same, and is found to be the same, after repeated changes in our individual experience and successive variations in our history, then it seems indeed absurd to deny to the object of memory the quality of objective reality, which all matters of fact possess.

The neglect of this wider significance of the term object is a serious defect in certain well-known theories of knowledge. It is overlooked that the repetition by an individual of his own experience is even in principle not really different from the process of constituting an object by intercourse between several minds, on which the sole stress is laid by these theories. In certain forms of knowledge of the higher order, *e.g.* some of the higher developments of science, the objects dealt with are not arrived at or experienced through intercourse with other minds of equal ability, still less with other minds of average capacity, but are known only to the investigator himself. His assurance of the truth of his knowledge is obtained simply by repeating his own experiences, retracing his course of reasoning, and in other ways. There is therefore nothing unique in the character of the object of memory, when we say that its object never transcends individual experience, for the same is true of many other objects that fall within experience—feelings, ideas, and even certain objects of science.

Admitting this, we have to ask in what way the object in the memory-judgment is apprehended? The judgment seems to consist in the ascription to oneself in the present of a part of the content falling within the continuity which connects past and present in the individual life. The judgment takes effect in the present; it refers to the past; and the identity or unity which holds these different elements (present and past state) together is the continuity of the individual. We may put it otherwise by saying that the reality underlying the judgment is the individual mind as a single unity. The memory-judgment makes this unity explicit in a special way, *viz.*, by an act which unites a part of its continuity which belongs to the past with another part which is in the present. In this sense it is perhaps correct to describe

the memory-judgment (as Mr. Bradley does) "as an enlargement by ideal content of reality beyond the present."¹ But when this is given apparently as an alternative to the statement that "memory is an ideal construction of the past by which present reality is qualified," there are both difficulties and even obscurities in such a proposition. These, however, we need not pause to consider.

We may also say that the part of my continuity which is past is predicated or affirmed of the self which is in the present. My present, for purposes of this judgment, is not a particular feeling or idea or act, but simply the concrete state of the self for the time being, which is both feeling, idea and act, and is more especially centred in the perceptual world which, as we saw, peculiarly constitutes our present state. The two factors in the judgment, subject and predicate, are not external to one another here any more than they are in other forms of judgment. They are aspects or elements in the one ultimate reality involved, namely, our continuity as a single individual mind. In language, therefore, we might even say that our present belongs to our past quite as much as our past belongs to our present, since both fall within the same continuity of the individual life.

In this act of judgment we do not derive the past state from the present by analysis; for the past is an element of our reality just as much as the present, and, for the reasons already given, is essentially different from it in quality. If, in knowledge, we can properly distinguish what is given from what is known, we should be bound to say that the object of memory is given to us in the same general sense that any other object can be said to be given. The psychical processes which in time precede and always condition the protrusion before our present consciousness of an object which we identify with ourselves in the act of memory-judgment, lie outside of our immediate attention, are governed by special laws of their own, are beyond our choice or power to alter, and to them and their product we submit. These are all characteristics of what we describe as "given to knowledge," and not created by its purpose. We have the same situation in the case of an object which we know by way of the perceptive judgment: for here certain psychical or psycho-physical processes

¹ *Essays on Truth and Reality*, p. 354.

pursue their course beyond the pale of our knowledge, and only after these are completed do we by an act of selective attention operate in the form of a judgment of perception. I presume it is because of these processes antecedent to our conscious act of judgment that we speak both in practice and in theory of objects, or again of elements, being "given" to us before knowledge can perform its work. With the psychical processes and conditions underlying the object of memory—persistence, retentiveness, association and the like—we are not concerned in the memory-judgment; for this presupposes their operation, and supervenes as an act of knowledge after that operation is carried through. In memory-judgment we say simply, "I remember that fact," *i.e.* I predicate as true of me now a state or an event which has fallen within the continuity constituting my individual life. The fact, as a fact, cannot—so we insist in practice—be altered by me now, and is not altered by my judgment of it as belonging to my whole experience; any more than we can alter an object of perception. We simply accept it once it is there before us, and build or rebuild it into the structure of our lives by affirming it to be part of ourselves.

Hence the distinction between some free ideas or images as remembered and as new. We have to make our account with all as they enter the field of consciousness, and if we cannot regard any as having belonged to us before, we proceed to put them into a setting of another kind.

What brings into existence a given fact remembered, depends in the first instance on what we are doing in the present, on the content of our present state of mind. Our interest in this may awaken and, because of the continuity of our past with our present, does awaken into life other parts of our individual life by means of the process which we call association. But this interest is not all powerful in the situation where memory-judgments are formed. In many cases it does no more than exercise a very slight control over the course memory takes. In other cases the object of memory shoots into prominence without any apparent control by our present interest at all. In other cases, again, our interest in the present may be so all-absorbing as to shut off the direct reference to the past altogether; while in still other cases,

e.g. those of reverie, we may surrender ourselves to the past so completely as to lose all interest in, or even any vivid sense of, what is present, and wake up later "with a start," as we often say, to discover we are in the present and not living in the past after all. It is a mistake in fact and in principle, therefore, to ascribe to the interest in the present the whole of what we may know by memory-judgments. And the richer and the longer our past experience, the less does this interest in the present dominate memory-judgment. Our past is as real for us and as much our own as our present, and can be in itself quite as interesting, sometimes, indeed, even more interesting.

The judgment of memory has, again, a peculiarity not found in many other forms of knowledge. While it is true to say that in every judgment whatsoever the self of the individual is implied, or, as it has been put, the "I think" underlies all knowledge, this reference to the self is not put forward in every case of judgment. We do not say usually "I know"—or "I think"—"the grass is green"; we say simply "The grass is green." The subject is looked upon as articulating its own content, as if we, as minds, need not be present at all. Hence in such a judgment, which is typical of an immense range of knowledge, we come to treat the self as something that can be left out of account. And for many purposes we can rightly leave it out of account, since a factor that is present in all cases makes no difference between the various cases. The constant is not so interesting as the variable, and it is the variable which concerns us in the progress of knowledge.¹

But in the case of memory this reference to the self is never implicit, but always consciously explicit. The predicate is asserted solely of the self and by the self which owns the past state. Our judgment is not "that took place," but "I remember it taking place." When we refer to the past without this explicit

¹ This elimination of the self, which is thus a matter of mere practical convenience, has been absurdly construed by certain philosophers as if it implied that the self is not in fact operative in knowledge at all, that knowledge goes on of itself like a wound-up mechanism of thought, its owner, the artificer, merely looking on as it turns out its products—an absurdity which amounts to maintaining that because a principle is present everywhere, it is for that very reason not present anywhere at all.

reference to ourself, our statement is not a memory-judgment, but a judgment of history in the strict sense. For this reason memory-judgments presuppose, and indeed in a manner express, consciousness of self. They are perhaps amongst our earliest realisations of self-consciousness. Psychologists are accustomed to ascribe self-consciousness to social experience almost exclusively: and doubtless this has much to do with its full development. But there has always seemed to me a *petitio principii* in the argument which explains self-consciousness solely by social intercourse, since social intercourse is only possible if there is first a self in some form which can enter into social relations with others. Memory-judgments make possible such a consciousness of self as precedes full social recognition, and seems an earlier stage in the development of full self-consciousness.

It is because of this character that memory-judgments seem peculiarly confined to the higher human level of mind. Mr. Bradley has remarked that "the animal mind has neither past nor future," and regards memory as the dividing line between the animal and the human mind.¹ His statement is dogmatic, but seems on the whole true if we recognise that the supreme distinction between human and other mentality is to be found in consciousness of self, that all the peculiar characteristics of human experience—the pursuit of ideals and the construction of a social order responding to individual initiative—are traceable in the long run to this principle, and that memory is a specific way in which self-consciousness is realised and expressed.

We need not, of course, suppose that it is through memory-judgments that we create our self-identity—except in the wide sense that repeated operations of memory make more and more clear to us what our identity consists in or contains. Our self-identity is the basis of memory-judgments; these but make it explicit and express it in a specific way—by the act of judgment. But it is always a self that is remembered, and by which, from another point of view, the memory-judgment is made, and for which alone it has significance. In this way memory has all the value for an individual mind which we ascribe to feeling or emotion, in which some have sought to find the essence of the consciousness

¹ *Essays on Truth and Reality*, p. 356.

of individual selfhood. We do not as a matter of fact depend solely on feeling for the consciousness of our distinctive individual existence. To have through memory a consciousness that certain states have been peculiarly our own, gives quite as vivid a sense of individual existence as any feeling.

IV

While it is true that memory-judgments cannot in the nature of the case arise till a highly complex process of mental development has taken place, it would be erroneous to suppose that the complexity of the process preceding their development implies a corresponding complexity in the acts of memory-judgment. The judgment is complex in the sense that it consists of distinct elements, one of which is the predicate which is attributed to the self of the present, and the other the subject, the self, which consciously assigns to itself the state or event in the continuity of its past. But the image or idea which constitutes the predicate does not intervene between the subject and a kind of static past which is outside it. This does not hold true even of the idea which we predicate of external reality beyond the individual subject. For if so, this reality would for ever remain unknown ; it would be a thing in itself outside all knowledge. Still less can such a view hold of the reality dealt with in memory-judgments, for here reality is just the mind of the individual in its aspect of continuity. The idea or image predicated in the memory-judgment is precisely this aspect of continuity at a particular part of its entirety ; for the idea has or is mental content, and carries within it all that has entered into the activity of the self at the stage to which it refers. This idea does not arouse the feeling of pleasure or pain which was mine when the state first appeared, as if this pleasure or pain were something extra to its nature : it contains that feeling as part of its meaning. It does not, again, suggest the time at which the state appeared (when the element of time is involved in a memory-judgment), as if that time element were something added to the idea ; the time element, when involved, is itself part of the meaning or content of the idea. And so

of the other elements involved in the predicate of a memory-judgment.

The act which affirms "I remember this or that" is ultimate for knowledge. Its truth, if derived, could only be derived from a similar act involving exactly the same presuppositions. This, of course, does not necessarily imply the validity of every particular memory-judgment as it is made,¹ but merely that there is no way of knowing our individual past at all except by way of a memory-judgment, which, even if proved false, can only be proved so by another memory-judgment. There is nothing more remarkable in considering memory-judgments as ultimate in this sense, than in treating our judgments of the present as ultimate, *e.g.* those of perception. These are often erroneous, just as memory-judgments are at times in error. But in the long run we have no way of refuting the validity of a judgment of perception except by another judgment of perception. We cannot deduce the truth of a judgment of immediate perception from any other form of knowledge whatsoever, any more than we can derive the act of perceiving from any non-perceptual source of mentality. This seems beyond all dispute; it would be impossible to be aware of our present at all if this were untenable. But the past is qualitatively distinct from our present, though continuous with it as belonging to our one individual experience. If, then, we can take up the position that our knowledge of the present is direct and in the long run ultimate, there is nothing unique in affirming that our knowledge of the past is equally direct and ultimate. The view which maintains that our knowledge of the past must always be indirect, seems due either to confusing our knowledge in the present with knowledge of the present, the latter being treated as primary; or to regarding our knowledge of a particular area of the past as derivable from our knowledge of the whole past, which is taken to be, and rightly taken to be, a construction of a very complex kind.² The former position

¹ Otherwise a memory-judgment would be, like a mere psychic event, incapable of being described as true or false. When there is judgment in any form there is always liability to error.

² It may also be due to confusing an actual experience as we were consciously

need not be discussed after what has been said. The latter makes any construction of the whole past impossible; for we can only construct out of simpler elements, and these must be obtained directly. There is no source from which they can be secured except that of particular memory-judgments regarding particular areas or parts of our past.¹ When it is said, therefore, that an "immediate knowledge of the past is a miracle,"² or that "we can only know the past mediately through the present,"³ we must reply that the only miracle lies in the long run in being able to remember at all, and that it would be a greater miracle to derive the past from a knowledge of the present than to know it directly.

It is no doubt true that beneath the discrete knowledge of past events, which memory-judgments give, there lies a vague and diffused feeling of our continuity,⁴ which may even be psychically prior to the development of memory-judgment, and which certainly remains a factor in our mental life even after memory-judgments have arisen. But this does not make memory-judgments less direct or final as judgments. The relation, indeed, between this diffused feeling of continuity and the definiteness characteristic of the memory-judgment is closely analogous to that between the level of mere sensation and the act of perception. Perception is not different in degree of clearness or complication from sensation; it is different in kind, and involves a new and unique operation of the mind, that, namely, of selective synthesis. And only by this act can perception be

aware of it when it happened, *e.g.* a toothache, with our present consciousness of it as a past event. Clearly a toothache as it is, is not a past event: and as a past event it is not an actual toothache. If to know the past event means to have the actual toothache, there is no past at all, and therefore no knowledge of it as past is possible. The knowledge of it as past means *inter alia* that there is no actual toothache. The identification of these two objects makes the problem of memory-knowledge meaningless. The doctrine that the present is immediately known and the past mediately, is in principle the same as the theory of representative perception.

¹ That memory-judgments are not final in the sense of systematically complete may be admitted. Only the truth is final in this sense. They are, however, final in the sense that they are an irreducible type of knowledge, which has its own peculiar conditions and makes its own peculiar contribution to the whole of knowledge.

² Bradley.

³ Hamilton.

⁴ *V.* p. III, *sup.*

regarded as a judgment conveying knowledge. Relatively to perception, mere sensation is barely knowledge; it is psychic existence. Similarly, in the case of memory: only through the specific judgment "I remember this or that" does the past become definitely known in the sense in which all knowledge implies articulate selection.

The various forms of memory-knowledge—expressed by the terms recollection, reverie, reminiscence, remembering—indicate that while our judgment of the past must in the long run be direct and final, memory-judgments can become interrelated. They can support and correct one another, form a body of knowledge about the past which may vary in range and connectedness in many ways and degrees of completeness; while again they can approach the past from different directions. In recollection, our judgment of the past refers to a specific event in its time order; and this implication of time sequence acts as a corrective and guide to the course taken by the judgments. In reverie, the mind is carried along in a sequence of memory-judgments in which one leads to another not in any logical order or even necessarily in their original temporal order, but merely as the mind might drift over the field of immediate perception at a given time and find each part interesting as it occurs. While the sequence in perception is determined by the juxtaposition of objects, it is determined in reverie by suggestion from point to point in the series of memories. In reminiscence, again, we have a connected temporal sequence of groups of events, each of which contains events temporally associated, but as groups there is no continuous temporal connection, and there is no rigorous control over the sequence of judgments by temporal continuity. In remembering there is not any necessary reference to time sequence at all. Facts and events are referred to the past, but the *tempo* of the events is not required or emphasised. Typical cases of this form of memory are found in the remembrance of a verse of poetry or an isolated fact of knowledge. Our hold over such parts of our experience is only to be secured by memory-judgments. In the more complicated cases, as, for example, in remembering a long poem, the memory-judgments, in which each element is known, are built into one

another largely by the help of association on the one hand and a memory of the general structure of the whole piece remembered on the other. In this process undoubtedly judgment, of another kind than that of memory, and inference as well, have an important rôle to play.

V

We come to the last point—the value and certainty of memory-knowledge. That memory plays an important part in the composition and the progress of knowledge is evident. Even the simplest processes of scientific knowledge—those of observation—involve the operation of memory. The mere transference to paper of what is seen through a microscope is only possible if we remember during the second stage what we have seen in the first. The highly complicated processes of constructing an elaborate theory are only carried through by a constant appeal to memory. But memory never gives organised knowledge, and never has the security of inference. The only kind of connection of which it admits is the external connection of mere collocation, or mere sequence, of independent judgments. We can never give a reason why certain separately remembered facts are put side by side. We can at best only assign a cause—that the facts referred to in the memory-judgments must have been created by the activity of the individual, and thus form part of its continuity. Whenever we seek to show that the content of a judgment is such that it is essentially connected with another either by implication or extension of its identical substance, we have inference in the strict sense, and the beginning of a system of knowledge. Thus, if I say that I must have had a ticket for the railway journey because the ticket collector entered the carriage as usual and allowed me to proceed on my journey without remark, this is inference pure and simple, based on the inherent connection between the stages of the system constituting a railway journey. But if I say I remember buying the ticket and remember giving it up, we have a mere arrangement of memory-judgments. None of these in particular guarantees its own *necessary* truth, for necessity implies inherent relation to

a system. The more numerous the memory-judgments which relate to a single arrangement of events, the more likely each is to be accepted as true; for this tends to give the series of judgments that close connection characteristic of a rational system. Hence it is that, when the memory-judgments are numerous, we almost involuntarily commingle or even confuse memory-sequence with inference, so much so that we will invent a link in the chain which memory cannot restore, and come to imagine as having happened what is not really remembered. Commonly the greater the breaks between the memory-judgments, or the fewer the memory-judgments, the less likely are we to fall into this confusion. And we are the more sure that we are remembering simply when we are aware that the several judgments stand isolated from one another.

Thus the truth of a memory-judgment is always a particular truth, and has all the limitations in value which such truth possesses. It is unsupported, and unverified, sometimes even unverifiable; if we care to say so, it is altogether contingent. And no increase in the number of adjacent parts of the continuity of the past remembered will alter this character or turn it into a truth of a higher order—the truth characteristic of a systematically connected whole. We increase the probability of its truth, we lessen the weakness of its contingency, by the number of adjacent parts of the continuity we can remember; but that is all. This is inherent in the situation. Our memory-judgments are formed for and by individual minds as such, and have no source or support, *quâ* memory, except from the individual mind. Hence it is that we are always ready, or at least the highly socialised mind is ready, to admit the frailty of memory-judgments; and experience too painfully justifies the modesty of the confession. In many cases the best support for a particular memory-judgment is only to be found in the negative and weak assistance to be derived from not remembering anything that contradicts the judgment made. When such contradiction does occur, as when we “think we remember” that we took the three o’clock train, and also think we remember being at our destination at two o’clock, we refuse to accept either deliverance and refuse to rely in this case on our memory at all. But this

does not disturb our mental security, any more than when we make a mistake regarding the realm of perception and call a camellia a rose.

The judgment of memory is none the less true because disconnected from other judgments. Its truth is in this respect similar to that of judgments of perception, each of which, as far as it is mere perception, stands by itself as a judgment of a particular matter of fact. From the point of view of perception, there is no reply possible to Hume's statement that we can find no inherent connection between two perceived facts or events; "the impulse of one billiard ball is attended with motion in the second; this is the whole that appears to the outward senses." But we do not question our judgment of each fact by itself. There is thus nothing peculiar in the truth of a memory-judgment which might raise doubts about admitting that disconnected judgments can convey a truth. Only in the interests of a theory, *e.g.* that the whole, or completely systematic truth, can alone be called truth at all, is it possible to raise objections to the view that a memory-judgment conveys a truth. But such a theory either ignores the plain deliverances of knowledge, or else it must be consistent with the admission that isolated judgments convey truth. If the latter, then memory will be admitted to have at least a certain degree of truth. This is all, in fact, that memory-judgments claim to have. But such truth as they individually possess cannot in the long run be set aside except in the interest of other memory-judgments. Their truth cannot be cancelled or revised by any mind or collection of minds except that of the individual who exercises the act of memory-judgment. For they only hold for him and are, *quâ* memory, of no final value to any one else, though for him they are supremely important. It is useless, therefore, to try to degrade the truth of memory-judgment by pointing out that it is so much lower than inference, and that in fact it requires to be revised in order to enter the realm of truth at all. Memory-judgments do not claim to rival the coherence of inferential truth, and it is a mere irrelevance to criticise memory-judgments from that point of view. The mind is not convinced that its memory-judgments are not true because it cannot give a reason

for their inherent relation to other judgments, like in kind or different in kind: any more than the mind is convinced that it does not see a stone because it cannot give a reason for seeing the stone to be where it is. It is equally useless to say that memory-judgments cannot as such convey truth of their own because they are often in error, and therefore must have a criterion for their truth beyond their own deliverance. It is true that memory-judgments are often in error, but the correction of the error *quâd* memory, can only be made by another appeal to memory: and this is generally what is done and is found satisfactory. Indeed, how otherwise could we admit that memory had been mistaken except by convincing the mind by an appeal, a further appeal, to memory? If this is meaningless, how are we to account for the fact that perception is often mistaken, and yet we correct an erroneous perception by another perception, thus admitting that perception as such is the final criterion in its own sphere? By no amount of conceptual deduction or inference can we create, or destroy, or even verify a truth derived from perceptual judgment. Perception is a level of knowledge for which no other process of knowledge can be, or provide, a substitute. The formulæ for gravitation will never give us the sense of weight; the laws of light will never supply us with the perception of colour. Each type or level of knowledge is a unique function of the mind operating under its own conditions and carrying within its own order its own warranty for its truth. And this holds for memory as for every other type of knowledge. The intermittent fallibility of memory, therefore, is no proof of the general incapacity of memory to supply truth, and is not to be overcome by appealing to truth of another order of knowledge.

The truth of a memory-judgment is thus in the first instance an isolated truth, capable no doubt of entering into a larger body of truth, but certain and valid as it stands. Because of its isolated character it provides in general the material for completer knowledge of reality; for this larger knowledge comes by way of inference, and thus passes out of the range of memory and equally out of the domain of merely individual experience. But it is only in certain cases that this advance in the knowledge

of the past can be made. It appears, for instance, when the facts to which our memory refers have a wider significance than our own individual experience requires or possesses; for the facts referred to are often facts which have entered into other people's experience as well, and thus our knowledge of these facts may become common knowledge. Our judgments, therefore, may be a contribution to a common stock, and are on that account liable to, and capable of, correction by others. This process of criticism and correction prepares the way for the wider knowledge of them which appears as universal judgment or inference. But many facts of the past can never be so supplemented and corrected by the knowledge which others possess. They remain peculiarly and always within a single individual's cognisance. Here the truth of a memory-judgment must be accepted as final till it is contradicted.

The individual may, indeed, not merely feel convinced of its truth but support his conviction by additional memory-judgments. But he can never by memory have the security of inference or systematic truth, for this at once carries him beyond memory to the region of universal experience.

VI

This investigation leads to certain important conclusions. If the field of memory-judgments is that described, no theory of knowledge can be adequate which takes its start primarily or solely from our knowledge of the external world. It is equally inadmissible to regard, as Mr. Bradley and others do, the knowledge of the present as providing the final criterion for the truth which knowledge supplies. This view, which seems to lead directly to scepticism, rests partly on a confusion between knowledge in the present, where certainly all knowledge takes place, and knowledge of the present, which as certainly all knowledge is not; and partly it rests on the prejudice, which at least requires justification and has received none, that the present has greater importance for knowledge because it seems more important for life and practice.

Again, if we thus broaden the basis of knowledge to include

the past as well as the present, it is impossible to accept a theory of thought, or knowledge in general, which asserts, almost as a self-evident axiom, that knowledge is an ideal extension through judgment and inference of an immediate which is focussed in the present, or more narrowly still, in present sensation.¹ Apart from other objections to this logical theory, it ignores altogether the peculiar character of our knowledge of ourselves which we have through direct acquaintance with our past.

The admission of the independent validity of memory-judgments will react on our theory of knowledge in another direction. It will tend to emphasise the essentially anthropocentric character of all our knowledge. For memory-knowledge as such finds its primary value in the individual life which it subserves. There is no "external world" to which such knowledge refers. If this be true of parts of knowledge, may not all knowledge find its significance simply within the purposive processes of the human mind, which at the best is but one kind of individual reality in the totality of the real world with which it stands in relation? Instead, therefore, of saying, in the language of a familiar school of logicians, that the world is sustained by a continuous effort of the intellect, may it not rather be that our intellect is sustained in its activity by the world of real beings which the individual mind encounters, and, in its active relation therewith, carries through the processes of the intellect as one special way of realising its own supreme purpose of self-maintenance when face to face with other beings?

It also follows that objectivity cannot be interpreted solely in terms of universal, *i.e.* common, experience. There is an object which is only found in individual experience, and is not the less real though confined to the region of individual experience. We may, indeed, say that even here its essential character is universality, since the repetition by the individual of an experience the same in kind is equivalent to universality within the sphere of his experience. But this is certainly not universality in the sense accepted by current theories of logic. The latter is

¹ Bosanquet, *Logic*, i. p. 90. "Judgment is primarily the intellectual act which extends a given perception by attaching the content of an idea to the fact presented in the perception"

always socially constituted. A truth is held to be true, an object is regarded as an object, because it holds for a plurality of minds concurrently and not for an individual mind exclusively.

But if objectivity is accepted in this wider sense, then the current view that the final guarantee of truth is systematic connection must also be modified or abandoned. Such a test is inseparably bound up with the doctrine of the inter-relation of finite minds in a social system, ultimately perhaps the system of human minds as a whole, or humanity as an organised whole of mentality. If we extend the meaning of objectivity in the way described, we must give a distinctive and independent place in the economy of knowledge to uniqueness of individual judgment as a mode in which truth is apprehended. Generalised, this implies the acceptance of intuition, in some sense, as an avenue to truth equally with, and yet independent of, reflective systematic connectedness or inference.

Finally, if we assign an independent place to intuition in the sphere of human experience, we cannot literally dissolve the individuality of the mind into a larger comprehensive universal mind, and regard the latter as "taking up" or even fulfilling the whole purpose and nature of the former. The individual with his intuitions, as likewise with his emotions and even opinions, is an irreducible centre of mentality, with a reality and claims uniquely his own, whatever contribution he may make to the stock of common mental life which he shares with others. Whether the individual mind is to be assigned a larger or a subordinate or an equal reality with the universal mind is a problem which only a metaphysical inquiry can attempt to answer.

V

THE FUNCTION OF EMOTION IN THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE REAL

“Le cœur a ses raisons que la raison ne connaît pas.”—PASCAL.

“Think you, 'mid all this mighty sum
Of things for ever speaking,
That nothing of itself will come,
But we must still be seeking?”

WORDSWORTH.

MOST philosophers would lead us to suppose that man's only channel of approach to reality is through reflective knowledge. This carries with it the assumption that reality must in the long run mean the same for every one; for truth, it is held, is one, and truth is the goal of knowledge, which seeks to interpret reality. Plain experience does not seem to support such positions. There is no single reality for all human beings. Reality has a different meaning for different individuals; and both the sense of reality and the capacity for reality vary enormously between human beings even of the same society and race. The range of reality for most people is extraordinarily limited. Their consciousness of reality differs immensely in degree and even in kind. The child's sense of reality is certainly not the same and never can be the same as that of the adult, and hardly seems to have much affinity with that of our reflective philosophers. Indeed, it cannot be said that philosophers have established amongst themselves a common consciousness of reality. Nor can it be maintained that in fact there is only one way of becoming conscious of reality. We can certainly get in touch with reality by way of reflective processes, by the pathway

of ideas. But equally will we find reality through action, or again by perception. We can approach reality by processes primarily mental, and by processes primarily organic. Through perception we are mortised to the real about us in a way which makes us almost one with the external world. Through the physical constitution of our bodies we are in very literalness continuous with physical nature. Are these not ways in which reality comes home to us with all its insistence? Some individuals select one channel of approach to the real, others another. The primitive man, the schoolboy, the scientist, the poet and the man of affairs have each their own way of finding reality. The philosopher is entitled to take his own way: he is not entitled to maintain it is the only way, or even that his is the best way for every one.

Nor, again, is the human individual so poor that he must rely on the one way of reflection to attain the full consciousness of reality. All his activities carry him beyond himself, and it requires all his resources to do justice to his own reality and the reality of the world in which he lives and moves and has his being. One of his resources lies in that state of his individuality in which is concentrated in inseparable union his mental and organic (or physical) energies, which is at once body and mind. That state is emotion. In view of the range and the importance of emotion in human life, we are justified in asking what contribution emotion makes to our consciousness of reality.

I

There are those who regard emotion as a frame of mind which should be distrusted, or controlled, or even suppressed altogether. Emotion, it is held, gives a misleading direction to the individual's life, turning him away from the "truth about" the real or the "true nature" of the real. These views rest on a prejudice on the one hand, and on an incorrect conception of the operation of emotion on the other. The prejudice is that of intellectualism. It is maintained that man's nature is at its best, is fully human, when he brings into play his reasoning powers. Emotion being non-rational is held to be irrational, or to lead to

paths which are irrational. The explicitly intelligent or intelligible is considered the highest, and emotion but a hindrance to the attainment of the intelligible. Even when emotion is admitted to a place in the economy of human nature, it is looked on as a lower level of human nature, only permissible in default of the guidance of thought, to be transcended or transmuted if and when the level of thought is attained. This intellectualistic prejudice is fostered and encouraged by the whole trend of academic culture, and is probably traceable in the long run to the influence of Greek ideals of human life on Western scholastic institutions. Schools and universities are exclusively concerned with the development of intellectual interest in and control over the real world. For them knowledge and only knowledge is power, meaning by knowledge the intellectual articulation of the real.

Such a prejudice runs directly counter to the history and the essential conditions of man's life. It ignores the patent fact that both the pursuit of knowledge and the accomplishment of the end of knowledge are themselves inseparable from states of emotion.¹ Apart from this, there are domains of experience where not merely does emotion exclusively dominate the situation, but where intellectual activity as such is not accepted as a guide at all and where its intrusion is admitted to be irrelevant and unreliable. The joy in beauty, the horror of tumultuous ruin, are not the outcome and do not require the assistance or intervention of a calculated intellectual analysis. The man who would resolve into a process of reasoning the insistent calls of his being to charity and affection would hardly be considered the best type of friend or a model representative of the domestic virtues. The power of reverence in the soul overmasters the claims of reason to a voice in the experience. In these spheres of experience Hume's remark holds true that "reason is the slave of the passions." The most that processes of reasoning can accomplish in such cases is to contrive the means to the better fulfilment of the emotional life. The intellect can neither supplant these kinds of emotion, nor reproduce by ways of its own the peculiar quality of experience realised in the

¹ *V.* Chap. III.

emotion. We may completely understand the physical nature of sounds constituting a sonata or even the theory of its composition as a piece of music, without thereby experiencing or being able to experience the peculiar emotional satisfaction which its harmonies can create. Except in rare cases it is certain that the artist's joy in creation is in no essential respect connected with the intellectual comprehension of the nature and conditions of what he produces. In short, just as in the case of perception we have an attitude generically distinct from that of the intellect, so in the case of emotion. Emotion like perception gives us a qualitatively unique form of experience, neither derivable from, nor replaceable by, nor subordinate to any other.

But apart from this intellectualistic prejudice, those who would regard emotion as a state to be repressed or suppressed, mistake the nature of emotion. There can be no doubt that in some cases emotion misleads the individual, and in other cases emotion has to be controlled. But it seems an elementary fallacy to suppose that because emotion sometimes misleads it is essentially unreliable; or, because it has at times to be controlled, that therefore it is essentially inferior or subordinate to the end or the process by reference to which it is controlled. It is transparent that both perception and the intellect often mislead, and the aberrations of reason are as frequent as its successes. But we do not on that account consider that perception is fundamentally untrustworthy, or that intellectual activity is the pathway of error, or that reason should be abandoned.¹ Emotion like intellect or perception has its own peculiar conditions or laws of efficiency. There are emotions which are reliable, there are others which are unreliable; some which take us to the heart of reality, others which are the source of illusion. Only the discipline of actual experience can guide us to find and to follow those emotions which are to be trusted with complete confidence, and to reject those which are unreliable. But this discipline of experience is equally necessary in the case of intellect and of perception.

How, then, does emotion contribute to our consciousness of the real? Emotion seems to be the most direct, as it is in some

¹ It is surely begging the question to say that perception is only perception when it does not err, or that reasoning which is fallacious is not reasoning at all.

respects the most complete, way in which the individual discovers his organic unity with the world. Whether it be fear or joy, hate or love, the individual becomes vividly alive to his inseparable connection with a reality which furthers and sustains, or hinders, his whole being. The emotional response is not deliberately created. It comes upon him without premeditation; it is inevitable or, what is the same thing from another point of view, is entirely spontaneous. Its basis lies partly in his inheritance, partly in his constitutional endowment, and from these there is no escape. The past from which he has come has already built him into the substance of the real world. The maintenance of his individuality in the face of other individuals is but an effort to conserve what of reality is peculiarly his own. His emotions are the response of the real in himself to the real independent of himself and yet continuous with his own being. In his emotional life he raises no questions concerning whether his nature is higher or lower, of the same kind or of another kind, than that of other beings. He finds other beings in the same world as himself and he thrills at their presence, responding to each in a distinctive way; and that is all. In emotion the individual lives in a condition of certainty both of himself and of the real, a certainty which is at once rooted in the very consciousness of individuality, and helps to establish more definitely the sense of individual existence over against other beings. Doubts and questions have relevance only in the realm of knowledge, and can only be allayed by a process of knowledge.

Through emotion, then, the individual discovers that his whole being is sustained or imperilled. He discovers this through his fundamental continuity with the real world in which he lives and has a place. Emotion is not the effect of other beings, but the response he makes to their presence. It is not the consequence of any prior interpretation of their nature: it springs spontaneously into consciousness through the uncontrolled operation of a complex of congenital or acquired dispositions inherent in his constitution. He only becomes aware of the response after it has occurred: he can neither direct its origin nor determine its quality. It is in every sense a literal discovery of himself in his inseparable unity with the real.

At the same time it is not a mere attribute of his individuality which does not concern and is not concerned with the nature of other beings. If so, it would be indistinguishable from an illusion. It would be a mere occurrence within his own life history and of no permanent interest even to himself. It is, on the contrary, a state of his experience, and therefore one in which the nature of the real is involved. By the emotion he discovers that other beings give rise in himself to vital responses intimately affecting his whole nature, and modifying the level of his life. They are found to have what we may describe as varying degrees of kinship with his own being, of union with his reality, of identity of action with his activity, in short, of continuity of being with his being.¹ This consciousness of the nature of other beings which is given in and inseparable from an emotion, must not be confused with any kind of intellectual insight into, or interpretation of, or a judgment upon the real beings which are involved in the experience of an emotion. In the sense that knowledge is an understanding of the real world, the emotion implies no understanding whatsoever. So much is this the case that understanding in some instances comes after emotion, and in other cases may alter or destroy the emotion altogether.²

The only significance which things have or acquire through emotion is their particular kinship with the individual's life, with which they are indissolubly interdependent as parts of the same real world. That kinship is given in and with the emotion. The emotion thus intensifies and heightens the sense of interdependence with other beings, which is the fundamental structure of the real world. Hence the fateful character of all emotions. They reveal how completely and inevitably the individual is bound up with other beings. Human emotion more than almost any other experience is the sphere of the dramatic necessity which

¹ I prefer not to use the term "value," for this implies that one thing is a means to another which is its end. The relation of things to one another as found in emotion is not exhaustively or accurately expressed by that of means and ends, otherwise all emotion would be purely self-centred, which it is not. Further, value is an afterthought, while emotion is a direct experience.

² Perception is doubtless involved in many emotions, though not in all. But in any case it does not create the emotion; it is at best an occasion or basis for it in certain instances, not the source of it.

is inseparable from human life. Where there is emotion, there this conscious kinship stands revealed: and because this intimate relationship with the real is fundamental to his nature, emotional experience is inevitable. Thus we discover in this experience not merely a state of the individual's life but a characteristic of the real world. And there seems no other way than that of emotion through which this quality becomes manifested. If it be said that such a characteristic is very vague and indefinite, it must be noted, first, that clearness of definition can only be secured through the function of knowledge, and, emotion not being a form of knowledge, the tests of knowledge are irrelevant to emotion. (2) The peculiar power of emotion on the individual lies in its immediate certainty, not in its detailed articulation of the object to which he responds. (3) Emotions are in general precise and definite as each occurs, and they correspond in general to actual and definite objects. This in fact is the only definiteness that is required. The individual never mistakes his own emotions. To mistake an emotion is only possible by passing a judgment upon it; and passing a judgment is a form of knowledge, not an emotion. Even in the case of "mixed emotions" we have no confusion of emotions; what we have is rapidly alternating emotions. (4) From the point of view of knowledge an object may be extremely vague in outline, or extremely general in character, *e.g.* God, and yet awaken a deep emotion of an enduring and definite kind. To say that the experience embodied in an emotion must be vague because not reducible to the precision required for knowledge, is merely another illustration of the prejudice of intellectualism.

II

From what has been said it will be evident that human emotion is essentially anthropomorphic in character. But this cannot be regarded as a defect. It is merely a qualification. Knowledge is likewise anthropomorphic in a very important sense, as is urged elsewhere.¹ Doubtless emotion is not peculiar

¹ See Chap. I.

to man; and every animal capable of emotion will respond emotionally for the same reason, though in a manner different from that found in the case of man. Even all races of mankind do not display emotion in the same manner.¹ But the emotional life of each individual is none the less valid and significant for him, though it differs in intensity and sometimes in form from that of another. The response is in all cases similarly constituted. And if the emotion depends for its constitution on the peculiar physiological and mental structure of the human individual, the emotion is none the less real and none the less important on that account. If it cannot be otherwise than relative to his peculiar type of individuality, it becomes in itself as necessary as any other manifestation of his activity. If he cannot display emotion otherwise than under these conditions, it cannot be a defect of emotion that it is determined by these conditions. Moreover, emotions do arise similarly in similar situations in the same individual and in different individuals. In this sense there is a certain universality and a necessity in the life of emotion as much as in the case of knowledge, whether it be perceptual or intellectual. As a fact men do have like emotions in like circumstances. They rejoice over the same things; they grieve in the same situation; they are angry and are glad together; they even share the same fears. Further, men are expected to be emotionally affected in the same way in given cases, and this calculation is justified by events. Works of art and literature are constructed on this assumption. Many conventions and institutions of social life are maintained, and successfully maintained, by presupposing this similarity of emotional response in given situations. So much is this true that in certain cases it is held that men *ought* to feel certain emotions towards certain objects, and surprise, or even condemnation, is expressed if they do not feel such emotions. The man whose anger is not stirred when the honour of his country is attacked, and whose pity is not aroused at the sight of human suffering, is judged as an alien to his country or his kind. All this proves that emotional life is

¹ It is mentioned by Sir J. G. Frazer, *Folk Lore in the Old Testament*, that a certain tribe displays its emotion on welcoming friends by tears and not by smiles, as is more common amongst other orders of mankind.

generic and not particular, is characterised by a kind of universality and is not a peculiarity incidental to an individual. Anthropomorphic though it must be, because bound up with the structure and constitution of human individuality, emotion is not more so than any other form in which human life, whether knowledge or action, is expressed.

For this reason it is impossible to maintain that the emotional response to the real affords no clue to the nature of reality, and that knowledge alone is in a position to convey to man what reality is. Articulate rationality certainly supplies an avenue of approach to the real, but it is not the only channel through which man communes with the reality. Aristotle, it will be remembered, maintained, with that singular belief in the potency of thought which was characteristic of Greek thinking, that human emotion should be excluded from all consideration of the Divine nature, and that only through the function of man's thought does man approach or apprehend the Divine being. It seems evident that even this selective prepossession in favour of thought is itself but an expression of the very anthropomorphism he is apparently at pains to eliminate from the Divine. To pick out thought from the whole composition of man's individuality, and ascribe that alone to the Divine, is in its very essence an anthropomorphic procedure adopted in the interests of a philosopher's predilection for the life and work of reason. Even so, he cannot entirely eliminate the life of emotion from the Divine, for it is held that God "enjoys" the contemplation of his own thought. The truth seems to be that emotion is one form in which, in a unique manner, the nature of the real is revealed in man's life. And when we bear in mind that only through all the powers of man's individuality is it possible to discover what the whole of reality is for man, we can readily see that to dispense with any of his fundamental functions in the effort to establish complete communication with reality, is to decrease his chances of finding reality, is to limit his interest in reality and cut him off from his full heritage in the real world. Even with all his powers working in perfect condition it is difficult enough for any individual to cope with the immeasurable riches of the world. It is certainly not justifiable that, for the sake of abstract

simplicity or because of selective interest, he should artificially restrict his powers of communion to one special function of the mind.

No doubt an individual must, because of the limitations of his powers of attention, concentrate effort now in one direction and now in another, and may find it easier to work along one line of approach than another. But these are incidents and conditions of individuality ; they are not reasons for either excluding entirely from consideration any form of approach to the real, or for taking one form as more reliable than another. It seems nearer the truth to maintain that we lay hold on reality by employing all our powers and functions, and each supplies us with a specifically distinct consciousness of the real world which cannot be attained by any other functions. This seems the reason that defeat or disappointment with the efforts of one function to satisfy our complete consciousness of the real not only does not leave us in absolute despair in our search for reality, but compels us to seek a further consciousness of the real in another direction. When we are persuaded the intellect cannot meet all our wants we appeal to our will or to our emotions. We do not require to call upon our intellect to supply or to justify the satisfaction which emotional experience can provide. We are compelled in certain cases to admit that our intellect has its limitations and is not adequate to the task of grasping all reality. In short, each attitude of the individual towards reality gives a different contribution to our total sense of the real. Hence our individuality by using all its resources never feels utterly lost in the complexity of the world, but feels its life rooted immovably in reality. For the reality which sustains our specific type of individuality must sustain it as a whole, and in its entirety ; and only by the exercise of all its activity can it be at once fully real and thus adequately maintain its place as one real in a complex of reality.

III

It seems possible, in the light of what has been said, to account for the great importance which seems almost universally attached to emotional experience as a clue to the nature of

reality. In all emotion the individual is aware at once of his distinction from, and of his inseparable union with, real objects. Emotion does not give a mere consciousness of their existence. Knowledge can give as much as that.¹ Emotion conveys the extent to which other beings promote or retard our own individuality; in other words, the extent of their kinship with our type of individuality. And this we can discover by experiment and experience, by trial and error, in which emotion follows its own laws and applies its own tests independently of other forms of experience. The diversity of emotions is the outcome of this experience. The range of emotional experience varies from individual to individual, from race to race, and also varies as between one stage of civilisation and another. Emotions differ in degree, *e.g.* joy seems but a higher degree of which contentment is a lower level; they differ in kind, *e.g.* surprise and reverence; they differ in intensity, *e.g.* anger and fury, the more intense being so-called passions. Some lead to action, *e.g.* fear; others are, by contrast, passive, *e.g.* admiration. Some refer to the past, *e.g.* regret; others to the future, *e.g.* hope; others are concentrated on the present, *e.g.* love. With such a complexity of

¹ It is important to remark in passing that the existence of the objects, to which an emotion is a response, is always implied in the emotional attitude, but is an entirely subordinate element. In an emotion we never doubt or raise any question regarding the existence of an object; existence is implicated from the first. In an emotion we are simply assured of the existence of what stirs the emotion. Hence the problem, if it be a problem, of the existence of the objects independent of us, is one that has no meaning whatever in the life of emotion. The problem is raised, or has been raised, in the interests of knowledge, because there we are interested in the "relation of thought to reality," or in the relation of "perception to external things." The very problem shows how one-sided and abstract a function knowledge by itself is, and proves, indirectly, how impossible it is to regard conscious life as purely cognitive. Fear and love, anger and hate, are moods in which the existence of an object is all too acutely experienced to make a question regarding existence relevant or possible. Yet, indirectly, they proclaim in the most vivid manner the existence of their objects; and through emotion the existence of real objects is revealed with unmistakable certainty in a form which defies all knowledge to prove or disprove. A man does not require to prove the existence of his friend before showing him affection; and any question of his existence is so irrelevant as to be quite meaningless. In his affection the reality of his friend is given, with as much substantiality as his own; and in that reality so subordinate an element as existence is implied.

The significance of emotion in relation to this problem of existence has been invariably ignored by those who have considered the question.

emotions, and such an endless variety of objects to awaken emotion, it is inevitable that the emotional experience of most individuals is anything but balanced or consistent. The discipline of experience in the sphere of emotion consists in learning how to secure permanence and uniformity of emotions towards the same object under similar circumstances. An undisciplined emotional life is primarily one in which the individual does not have the same emotional responses towards the same objects, but, instead, has incongruous emotions, in which the individual cannot rely on his emotional experience from time to time.

It is beyond the scope of this essay to consider in detail the various emotions, or to determine, if that be possible, which are fundamental and which derivative, or to trace the evolution of emotional life. Our interest in emotion is confined to one point, the kind of contribution emotion makes to our consciousness of reality, the clue it gives to the nature of the real world in which man has his place.

IV

In the attitude of emotion the inmost life of individuality is concentrated into a single psycho-physical state which permeates its entire substance. Through emotion the individual discovers his interdependence with other beings equally real and equally individual. He discovers his own independence, for every emotion which he experiences throws into ever greater relief the inalienable distinctiveness of his own life, and emphasises still further its central unity. The independent reality of his own being is given in the emotion ; and, while emotion lasts, it is never surrendered but is ever deepened and intensified. He communicates with other real beings by his emotion ; but his emotion remains his own, is himself ; it is not transferable, is incommunicable. The more he can respond to other beings emotionally, the more he realises his distinction from them as a real among other reals. They do not display his emotion, even if in certain cases they display emotions like his own. They cannot occupy his centre of existence ; for the maintenance of that centre

with its special psycho-physical contour and its specific position in the world of real beings, is partly what calls emotion into exercise.¹ Even where other beings are so far of the same order as himself that he can convey his emotions to them in speech, it is always found that he does not hand over to another the emotions he possesses, as he might share a thought or a course of action : he communicates certain aspects of his state through language for the purpose of awakening in the other individual emotions like his own. Emotions do not permit of being experienced in any other way than as states. They have their own form of expression in physical terms ; they need no other, and no other is adequate to them.² Emotion thus establishes and confirms the consciousness of the individual's distinctive independence as a real among reals. It does not do so by demonstration, for emotion involves no train of reasoning. It does so simply by being a manifestation of the living energy of the individual, indistinguishable from, and possessed of, the direct conscious assurance of being a living individual.

In the emotional attitude there is also involved the consciousness of other equally real individuals consistent with, yet separable from, his own individuality. It is in relation to other beings that the individual realises himself in the form of emotion. An emotion carries the individual beyond the circle of his individuality. It is a state of his life, and life is adjustment to an environment as real as the living agent. In certain cases, doubtless, it is found that an individual's emotion is directed upon the individual agent himself. This is possible because one condition of an individuality may, as the result of self-consciousness, be distinguished from another. But it is to be noted that such

¹ This characteristic sharply distinguishes the life of ideas from that of emotion. Ideas, especially true or "valid" ideas, may, as we say, belong to every one alike ; they are not the property of any one, and may proceed from any individual and have the same sense in a variety of individual minds. Emotions, on the other hand, are inseparable from the individual centre which experiences them, because in them the individual emphasises and maintains his own individual life.

² Hence it is that language (the physical expression of thought) is always found to be so utterly inadequate to convey an emotion as to make the attempt futile. It is a *καταβάσις εἰς ἀλλογένοσ*. Any one who reads the explanatory letterpress of a piece of music finds it as irrelevant to the music as would be the reduction of the composition to a mathematical formula.

cases are not representative of emotional life. They are either transitory, or are deliberately repressed in a healthy nature ; if such emotions continue, they are considered symptomatic of disturbed equilibrium or even of an unhealthy individuality.¹ Paradoxical as it may seem, the individual life is not maintained if it lives to itself ; it lives by action and re-action with other beings. Life is always protrusive when it is healthy, and literally grows by what it feeds on in every sense of the word. And emotion is one state of the life of individuality. The equal reality of other beings is therefore implied in the exercise of emotion, and is inseparable from its operation. This is never omitted in the emotional consciousness, and no amount of questioning or doubt raised by the intellect would ever disturb its assurance of the independent reality of other beings, for the simple reason that life is essentially assertive and expressive. It is not that an individual infers from an emotion that there are other real beings, or concludes by a process of reasoning that other beings are the cause of his emotion. Reasons and causes are beyond the scope of emotion : they belong to the sphere of the intellect and are irrelevant to emotional life. Real beings are simply given in the experience of the emotion.

In some respects more of reality is, as a fact, given to us by emotional experience than by any other channel, probably for the reason that in emotion so much more of individuality is engaged, namely, both the physical and the psychic, than is brought into play through other attitudes which the individual

¹ In this connection it is worth while calling attention to the remarkable and significant fact that emotional self-alienation is more dangerous to the stability of the individual life than intellectual confusion, and that radical incongruity of emotions is symptomatic of more serious alteration of individuality than intellectual inconsistency. When a man's emotions are turned against himself or turned upon himself, he is distraught, for he is making of himself a reality independent of himself—an impossible and an untenable condition. Emotional self-alienation means alienation from reality. Similarly when his emotional attitude towards another real being (human or otherwise) is unstable, when he hates what he formerly loved, his individuality may be far more perturbed than when he merely changes his opinions. A man may be a fool intellectually, or intellectually unbalanced, without any serious disturbance to his individuality or to his neighbours, provided his emotional responses are healthy, *i.e.* directed outwards and are uniform ; but no man can be emotionally unbalanced with safety to himself or others. Hence it is that in social life, where emotion plays such a large part, it is far more important to be virtuous than to be intelligent.

may take up towards the real world. Nature with all its forces plays upon, and is intertwined with, our physical substance long before we begin to think connectedly about nature, and even before we begin to act upon it. Our active disposal of nature is indeed very limited in its scope, largely because of the small amount of physical energy we possess relatively to the vast complex of the forces of the natural world. As for our intellectual grasp of nature, that is in many ways more restricted than our active control, not merely in the sense that very few human beings are really capable of any profitable intellectual activity at all, but in the sense that the energy of our intellect has to be narrowly selective to be effectively engaged even for the short interval of time that we can use it. But in emotion the individual responds to the concrete world as fully and as continuously as the life of the individual makes possible. It is not restricted by the conditions of nature or of thought. The individual can revere and admire where he cannot comprehend; he can hope and long for what he cannot achieve; he can fear where he cannot control; he can love where intellect and action are alike impotent to achieve their ends.¹ Emotion in short, because it is a fuller realisation of the living individual than either action or thinking, can meet the real at more points, can adjust the individual to his world in a greater variety of ways than is possible for these other functions. It is not merely fuller in the sense that it embraces in its state both the psychic and physical, mind and body, but also in the equally important

¹ It does not seem fanciful and it may be worth while to suggest a comparison between the variety of emotions of which the individual is capable and the variety of conceptions or categories by which the intellect of man has sought to interpret or to grasp reality in the sphere of knowledge. These categories of the intellect are ultimately different expressions of the one principle or function of mental unity by which and in relation to which the intellect seeks to render the world intelligible. The various emotions similarly may be said to be the endlessly varied ways in which the living individual seeks to maintain its single life in face of and in co-existence with the endlessly complex realm of real beings making up the world of which he is a part. They are so many kinds of adjustments of the psycho-physical constituted individual to his total environment. They each express a distinct attitude towards the real, because the real in each case, being distinctive in nature, calls for a distinctive emotional attitude. And all of them maintain the individual in his independent reality and give him a new or distinct sense of his own independence.

sense that it carries within its operation, in a way which knowledge and action cannot do, the dormant but none the less potent heritage of the past from which the individual physically and psychically has come, and which so very largely makes him what he is. By inheritance the individual is rooted in a real world which he has personally never known, in which personally he has had no direct share, and of the existence of which he only becomes aware in the spontaneous and irresistible welling up of an emotion out of the instinctive operations and subconscious or unconscious depths of his individuality. The conditions which give rise to an emotion are largely prepared before the emotion is displayed. They were formed by circumstances and situations of which he has no memory; and they link his life to that of his family, his race, and the powers of organic and inorganic nature operating in the dateless darkness of the past history of the world. In fresh emotions the individual is invariably surprised into the consciousness of the resources of his own individuality; a new emotion is literally a discovery of himself. This is what gives the emotional life its interest, its influence, and sometimes its terror. The individual does not know beforehand how he will emotionally respond, and he moves about in a world which is emotionally unrealised, and which may at any time startle him by its presence and startle him into a new sense of himself.¹ This incalculable character of the emotions, and their complete independence of his will or his thought or his choice, is precisely what gives him at once the consciousness of his own independent reality, and the consciousness of the independent reality of the other beings to which his emotions are a response. For inevitableness, incalculability and independence are of the very essence of reality wherever found, even by the intellect.

There is no such connection between the past and the present in the operations of the intellect or deliberate action. These, we say, are in our power, under our control. They deal with

¹ This seems one reason why many individuals are reluctant to place themselves in novel or unfamiliar situations. They dislike to discover a new emotional response in themselves. They are in doubt whether the response created may not be unpleasant or call for powers of "self-control," *i.e.* control in terms of their normal self, to which they may not be equal.

the "truth as it is" or with the situation as it is found, and seek to interpret or to control it by ends or ideas which owe no allegiance to or derive no authority from the past. It is for that reason that thinking and action give us a sense of liberty, which we do not experience in the life of emotion. And it is for the same reason that the sense of reality which they can give seems more restricted both in range and vividness than that supplied by emotion.

But emotion does more than give a sense of our own distinctive individuality and of the independent reality of other beings. Important as this is for our experience of the world, it is the less important part of the contribution of emotion to our consciousness of reality. Through the response of emotion the individual discovers his organic connection with other beings in a form which promotes or represses his sense of distinctive individuality. This organic union varies in extent and in degree conformably to the kind of beings with which he is confronted, and the emotion varies accordingly. Some beings challenge the existence of his individuality, and these he meets with the emotion of resentment, dislike, fear, anger, hate, etc. Others increase or sustain his individual life, and towards these he experiences the emotions of sympathy, affection, love, etc. In general those which do not imperil his individuality are held to accept it, and in that sense to support it, and to these correspond such emotions as curiosity, admiration, wonder, hope, etc. It cannot justly be said that in all cases he first judges other beings to have an import for his individuality, and then responds emotionally according to such import. The emotional state is autonomous and self-complete. In the emotion the individual is conscious of the character of the object. The emotion conveys the quality of the real, and is not merely inseparable from that quality but indistinguishable from it. For the emotion is an experience of the organic relationship which the individual occupies to the real world, and is irreducible to further elements. It is only by analysis, and not in fact, that the distinction we have above drawn can be formulated. To have a certain emotion is to be conscious of the real as being of a certain quality which concerns the maintenance of the individual life.

It is only through the growth and development of experience that the varying extent of organic kinship with other beings is discovered by the individual. But this development is largely aided by other non-emotional functions, such as reflection, action, social intercourse, and also by the personal discipline supplied by experiment, trial, and error. To begin with, it appears, for example, that there is no distinction drawn in terms of the emotions between living and non-living beings. The emotions towards both are in all essentials the same at first, and only in later experience do they call forth specifically distinct emotions. Even in later life we find, at least in undisciplined natures, that the emotions towards living and non-living beings are often the same: relatively civilised adults will be found, for example, to be angry with or to curse a badly working machine as much as the maker. Similarly, little distinction in emotion is experienced at first towards the various forms of living beings, which in later experience give rise to different emotions. An individual will be as frightened of a plant as of an animal. And here, too, we find survivals in what is normally considered developed experience: for we find adults who spend on cats and dogs the emotions which are, as we say, more appropriate towards human beings. All this serves to show the more vividly the essential character of emotion as a conscious state in which the individual becomes aware of his organic union or kinship with the real. For emotion as a state of the psycho-physical individual is a function of his whole life, and operates with the intensity of life much earlier and more persistently than reflective knowledge. At the uncritical stage of experience, the organic relationship with the real, found in emotion, is felt, so to say, as a relation of organisms equally real and equally organic to each other.¹ So much does emotion give the sense of organic union with the real, that in later experience individuals will be found who

¹ This in part, perhaps, may account for primitive animism. But it can hardly be true to say either that primitive animism is the result of the conscious projection of soul life into other non-living beings or that it is the attempt at an interpretation of the world in terms of man's soul life. Both of these views imply powers of imagination and intellect which cannot be ascribed to a primitive or undeveloped mind. A mind that could do so much as that is either not primitive or would be able to do very much more than primitive minds actually accomplish.

imaginatively represent even material things as alive in order all the more closely to realise their organic relationship with the object of emotion.

But as the result of disciplined emotional experience other beings are found to vary in their degree of nearness or intimate union with the individual, and the emotions come to vary accordingly. Physical objects are found to have a different emotional interest from living beings; and to impede or assist our sense of individuality less than living creatures. Where the individual at first felt fear at the sight of a curiously shaped stone or a falling star, he comes to experience curiosity or wonder or delight, while living beings still retain their mysterious "influence" over his own life. The former are found by experience to have a lower degree of affinity with his own reality than the latter. The affinity of physical beings is, in fact, as he discovers, limited to community of physical reality—spatial and material or energetic mainly—which he shares with physical objects, but which, he finds, do not exhaust his own individuality. His emotions towards physical objects vary accordingly.¹ Similarly living beings come to be differentiated from one another according to the varying degree of intimacy of organic relationship with his being which he discovers each to have. With living beings of his own kind his emotional union is greatest, for these possess the highest degree of organic kinship with himself. They affect him more deeply, and in more varied ways, and to a greater extent than other living beings. Amongst human beings again there is emotional differentiation both in degree and in extent according to the character of the organic kinship. Towards human beings of his own family and tribe he has one kind of emotional relationship, another to human beings belonging to other tribes, another towards human beings belonging simply to the human race.

¹ The discovery of this differentiation between physical and living beings must have been one of the most momentous in the history of the human race. It marks the dividing line between science and religion, the economic order and the moral order.

V

The emotional education of human beings, of which this differentiation of real objects is the counterpart, is a long process, and a difficult process. The earlier emotional attitudes do not disappear easily, and survivals of them are constantly re-appearing even in the latest stages of individual development. The obstinate persistence of superstition is a familiar illustration of the continuance of earlier emotional states. Such superstitions sometimes affect whole peoples, sometimes tribes, sometimes individuals. They indicate how deeply emotion enters into the varied structure and constitution of the individual's being, body and soul, and how it can concentrate into its operation even the instinctive racial inheritance from a forgotten past. In like manner we find peculiar instances of emotional survival in what may be called emotional obsessions affecting particular individuals. Individuals are found, for example, who have an emotional disturbance amounting even to horror of certain purely physical objects, others in the presence of certain living non-human objects.¹ And in all individuals it may be said the development of emotional adjustment is only partially completed. A large part of the education of individuals in a civilised community consists in the articulation and co-ordination of their emotions, so as to secure the most satisfying and satisfactory organic union with real objects; and this education is rarely finished even under the most favourable circumstances.

It must be noted that the differentiation of the real in the interests of the organic relationship to the real experienced in emotion, does not eliminate emotion; it merely changes its character. Real beings of whatever kind, however slight their affinity with the individual life, always give rise to an emotion of some sort, for the simple reason that they form part of reality with ourselves, and so concern our consciousness of individuality. If it be only in the emotion of boredom, we make an emotional adjustment to them. Hence it is that even in the scientific

¹ One distinguished British general, now dead, had a horror of the sea; another, equally distinguished, was disturbed beyond self-control at the presence of a cat in the room, and felt the disturbance before he saw the cat.

attitude towards an object there is an emotional aura. It may at first sight appear that the scientific mood is hostile to the emotional attitude towards the real object. This view is often advanced as an essential characteristic of science. The elimination of the emotional attitude towards an object is even said to be one of the aims of science. But this view arises from a confusion, or a misunderstanding, of the facts. The detachment of the mind from a certain emotional attitude towards an object is undoubtedly necessary for the purposes of a scientific understanding of it. But this means no more than that science is incompatible with the simultaneous presence of certain emotions. This indeed is obvious: we cannot strive to understand an object of which we are at the same time afraid. But to conclude from the necessity of eliminating certain emotions towards an object in the interest of science, that science requires the elimination of all emotions towards the object, is a transparent logical fallacy. What actually happens is, on the one hand, that scientific interest in the object implies the operation of an emotional attitude towards the object peculiar to and compatible with science—the emotions, *e.g.*, of wonder, curiosity, power; and on the other, that the scientific comprehension of the real gives rise in its course and at its termination to new emotions towards the object. Why should science be supposed to be external to the whole life of the individual? If action requires and implies emotion, why should science dispense with emotion? To alter or to correct an emotional attitude towards an object is not to do away with the emotional attitude, and involves no derogation from the importance of emotion for the individual life, any more than altering or correcting our ideas of an object implies that we need have no ideas of an object or that ideas have no value.

VI

The emotional differentiation of real objects is necessitated by the finite individual life so as to establish a co-ordinated, regular, and calculable organic relationship with the plurality of real beings with which the individual is confronted and with which he co-exists. It is not undertaken for theoretical or

cognitive purposes. Knowledge has its own way of differentiating the real world, for its ends are different from those of emotion. A variety of emotions is required in the long run because of the variety of real beings on the one hand, and the need for continuous organic union with every form of reality, if the individual is to preserve his sense of individuality amongst and in contradiction from other individual beings. To have one emotion towards all finite beings is the same as to have no emotion, or sense of individuality, at all. Doubtless social intercourse, tradition, common inheritance and other influences play their part in facilitating and developing the various emotional attitudes to different real beings. And doubtless intelligence as such plays an active co-operating part in the process of development, just, as conversely, the emotional development reacts upon and facilitates the work of intelligence in generalising and co-ordinating knowledge of the real. Again, some real beings are found to make greater, more complex, more constant and deeper demands on the emotional responsiveness of the individual life than other beings, and with such realities the individual's organic relationship is more permanent, more intimate and more complete than with others. Relatively to the former, the latter are further removed from his inmost life, and may be treated as subordinate and even incidental or external. Hence with the former he may, for purposes of keeping up and regulating the relationship, establish conditions of interdependence which are impossible in the latter case. Thus with human beings the individual's organic relationship is far more intimate, complex, and complete than with sub-human living beings or with the non-living things of nature. Out of and because of this deeper emotional consciousness between the individual and other human beings there arises that peculiar organisation of the emotional life of man which we have in human society. Human society is a condition of existence created to keep up and cultivate this complete organic relationship between individual human beings, a relationship which is discovered to be a fact of experience in the course of emotional development. The intimacy, the intensity, or again the "preciousness" of human society, has its roots in the emotional experience of individuals or in the organic relationship to the real which emotion expresses.

It is no accident in individual life ; it is not the creation of deliberate reflection, and is certainly not the outcome of cognitive experience. Beings capable of exercising reflection or knowledge sufficient to create so complex and intimate a fact as society, could go much further along the path of knowledge than as a fact primitive peoples are found to do. Society is closer to the existence of the individual life than knowledge ; it arises out of emotional responses which concentrate the whole life of individuality, body and soul. The greater part of the operations by which society is maintained, consist accordingly in the management and cultivation of emotional responses between the component individuals of a society. Hence it is that the laws of a society are for the most part rules for controlling and directing emotional responses between individuals. Virtues are habits of adjusting the emotions in specific circumstances of social life. Character is a permanent disposition of the emotional life of the individual established in the interests of his organic relationship to his fellows. The highest expression for the creed of human society has generally been formulated in terms of the emotions—love, benevolence, kindness. Because society has thus arisen out of the deep organic relationship between the individual life and other real beings so close in nature to his own individuality, society has always been maintained with so much passionate enthusiasm and intensity. The individual, as we say, cannot even imagine himself apart from society with his fellows ; it is as enduring as his very life.

But however important the part which social existence plays in the individual's life, we are not justified in adopting a view which has become so very prevalent as to be accepted as a fundamental truth. It is inaccurate to say that society is "prior to the individual," as if society were a reality of its own which created individuals. The only real life in a society is the individual life. Society is a construction elaborated by individuals in the interest of that more fundamental organic relationship to the real which emotional experience establishes. The emotional experience out of which society springs is a specific case of the individual's emotional communion with the real beings comprising his environing world. And the essential character of his

emotional life remains when society has been constructed, and no matter how elaborate the society. That character, as we have seen, lies in the consciousness of distinctive individuality as a real among reals. Emotion expresses this and sustains it. Be the organic relationship with other real beings as deep and complete as even society can supply, that distinctiveness of individual being is never lost or lost sight of. It may, by the regulations of society, be repressed or even suppressed, but it is never extinguished. It constantly asserts and reasserts itself, not merely in the behaviour of the selfish will, but in the demands of the reformer, in the aspirations and claims of the higher life, and, it may be, in an ideal of "individual freedom" which looks on society as mere condition of realising this distinctive individuality. By no manipulation of the resources of human society is it possible to merge individuals into one another completely. For the emotional origin of society requires that the distinctive life of individuality, of which emotion is the conscious expression, must be maintained in and through the operations of a society, which is devised to intensify, enrich, and sustain the consciousness of individuality and not to destroy it. If society were to obliterate this distinctiveness of being which emotion emphasises, it would thereby defeat its own purposes, for it would destroy the foundation of its own structure. But apart from this, such a result can never be accomplished for one simple and obvious reason. The whole of an individual's emotional life is not exhausted in the emotions which express his organic relationship to human individuals. He is organically related to other beings in the real world besides human beings, and towards these he exhibits other and different but equally potent emotions. These emotions also maintain and sustain his consciousness of distinctive individual life in his interdependence with other beings. In relation to these other beings, *e.g.* the realities of environing nature, he does not lose but constantly asserts, and is conscious of successfully asserting, his distinctive reality. The sense of distinctive being which he thus possesses is not lost when he stands in intimate relation with his fellows, and is not obliterated by any degree of social communion. It is not in the least affected by his emotional union with human beings in a society. And just on that account

it renders absolutely impossible the complete or even partial merging of his individuality in a society of human individuals. The sense of individuality which he has in certain of his emotional attitudes towards non-human beings, will always resist and will of itself defeat any of the devices of society to diminish or cancel his sense of individuality within society. In a word, the organic relationship with other human beings expressed in the emotions from which society springs, constitutes but one part of his single indivisible individual life, which is emotionally directed towards many other beings besides human individuals, and is conscious through emotion of its distinctiveness from each and all alike.¹ The sense of individuality which he possesses in his organic relationship to other non-human beings is neither lost nor diminished by social experience ; on the contrary, it may be said to be strengthened and intensified, for in social processes the organic relationship is or tends to be as nearly as possible reciprocal. Each individual in the organisation of society sustains his own emotional distinctiveness from every other and indirectly assists others in maintaining theirs. The reciprocal organic relationship between individuals constituting a society involves action and reaction, attraction and repulsion of individuals.

Beings other than man do not arouse the emotional responses of the individual to the same extent or degree of complexity and intimacy. The organic communion with non-human beings is sustained by other emotions than those constituting a society of human individuals. We may speak of men having fellowship with sub-human animals and plants. But language of this character is an exaggeration of the power of the emotional life.

¹ If the view against which I am contending—that society is prior, or that the individual merges his individuality in some social unity—were true, then the individual would literally have no life or existence or interests outside his actual society, for there would be no “individuality” left to face and deal with beings other than social beings. Such a consequence is transparent nonsense.

It is unfortunate that the successful work done by Sociology and social psychology should have led writers into exaggeration and error. There is no ground, *e.g.*, for maintaining that the consciousness of self is solely and altogether a social product. Given an individual's relation to nature (even physical nature), and given memory, a human individual would surely arrive at a consciousness of self.

A social self can, of course, only be arrived at through society ; but a social self is only one kind of consciousness of self.

However close and real our organic relationship with other non-human individuals may be, it always falls short of being what human association is, viz. mutual, correlative, and reciprocal. Individuals other than human give rise to emotions which even at the best always imply a certain degree of remoteness or estrangement from us, and a certain limit to the range of possible emotional intimacy with us.¹ This does not mean that they are more than we : it seems rather to imply that they are less. Our organic relationship with our world is realised through varying degrees of kinship and communion ; and only through the most varied emotional responses can we reach our full sense of individuality in a world of real beings. Thus love and hate are reserved for that organic relationship with other individuals where possible communion is greatest and most complete.² Desire and dislike can be felt both towards beings who are at our own level of individuality and towards beings lower than and relatively remote from our plane of individuality ; while the emotion of curiosity is experienced where the reality we confront is far removed from and almost external to our own being.³ Beings at the circumference of our organic relationship to the world are beyond our hate or our sympathy. It seems to developed experience merely incongruous and absurd, for example, to hate or love purely physical things. Our emotional attitude towards these takes on a different complexion. In short, while the whole range and complex of our emotional life may be displayed towards beings whose organic relationship to ourselves is greatest,—we may be intellectually curious even regarding our

¹ It is an interesting speculation to picture imaginatively what the emotional life of human beings would be if all individual beings other than human disappeared and only human individualities constituted the world.

² See Wordsworth's verses on *Loving and Liking*.

³ This throws an interesting light on the character and purpose of mere knowledge in human experience. It is remarkable that knowledge seems to be at its best and to be most readily undertaken when the real seems quite external to or indifferent towards human individuals, e.g. spatial realities and spatially constituted material beings. Bergson has made much of this point. It is worth noting also that the difference between the Western and the Eastern mind seems to turn on the natural capacity of the former and the innate incapacity of the latter for emotional detachment from material beings.

neighbours—the extent and variety of our emotions diminish the further real beings are from our own level of individuality.

It is interesting to observe that the further removed other real objects are from our plane of being, the more the awakening of the emotional response is initiated by the operation of sub-conscious instincts and the adjustments of mere sense experience.¹ This is inevitable, for our senses and organic instincts are the only organs of our union with real beings which are remotest from our level of individuality. Our emotional responses to human beings, on the other hand, are not, at least in developed experience, called forth solely or mainly by sense perception. Human beings affect us emotionally, as we say, by their very presence, by their whole "personality," and this goes deeper into our life and into theirs than sense can penetrate.²

VII

The emotional differentiation of individual things falling within the individual's environing world is only carried as far as the demands of self-maintenance require. It varies from race to race, from society to society, and from individual to individual. It is a differentiation of individual beings within a relative totality whose extent surpasses and embraces the plurality of reals falling within it. With this larger realm of the real the individual has likewise to lay his account, for with this larger realm he is, and seeks to maintain his individuality, in organic relationship. It contains human and other beings, and therefore

¹ As is remarked by a well-known writer, "It is the way of some places with some men. The senses perceive a hostility for which the mind has no proof, and in my experience the senses are right."

² This is illustrated in an interesting way by the subtle "sensitiveness" in the emotional response of certain persons in the presence of others. To some individuals they will feel an "instinctive dislike," to others an "instinctive sympathy"; in the presence of certain individuals a "sense of elevation," in other cases a "sense of depression." These emotional states do not originate from perception, or from ideas communicated or from any action; and no reason can be assigned for the form the emotions take. They are emotional reactions expressing the concord or discordance of the underlying psycho-physical composition of one person in the presence of the other. The reactions may so seriously affect the individual's mental and nervous structure as to disturb his self-control.

the emotions from which society springs are not the emotions called forth by this larger Reality. It encounters him always, and encompasses him everywhere. It engages his senses to their fullest extent, but is more than any particular sense can reach or all the particular senses together can exhaust ; and even the unconscious and sub-conscious instincts of his being are not adequate to it. It appeals to his sensuous and non-sensuous energies alike and simultaneously. It is a presence and a power at once, disturbing him "with the joy of elevated thoughts," or with the "fear that kills, the hope that is unwilling to be fed." It has in a peculiar degree the characteristics of reality : permanence, independence of any thought or action of our own, irresistibility. From particular real beings, even from our fellows, we can escape ; but from this all encompassing Reality there is no escape. Towards individual real beings our emotions vary indefinitely, and some emotions can be altered profoundly. But towards this persistent Reality our emotions are restricted in range and only modifiable within narrow limits, if at all. Our emotional attitude towards this domain of reality takes on special forms which reflect the nature of the reality with which we are here concerned.

On the one hand, our organic union with this Reality is the completest possible. The Reality both contains ourselves and transcends us : it is within us and beyond us. It is thus utterly outside our control for any finite purpose of our own, and yet so intimately one with us that there is no escape from it at any time. On the other hand, in virtue of our emotional attitude towards this Reality, we are aware of our distinctiveness of being within it. But the emotions awakened are stirred within us by this Reality which contains us ; they are felt to be as much its expressions through us as our emotions towards it ; its realisation within us as much as our sense of its Reality ; its incorporation of us in its nature as our organic union with its being. Hence, whereas emotional experience towards particular beings tends to emphasise or even overemphasise our distinction from them so that with many of them our difficulty is to feel our union to be sufficiently complete, our emotional experience towards the larger encompassing Reality tends to emphasise our union with

this Reality so much that our difficulty often is to feel our sense of real distinctiveness from it.¹

These characteristics are clearly apparent in the emotions which this Reality calls forth. They are of two kinds. The inclusive Reality is all we are and is more than ourselves. It is in that sense impersonal. The emotions stirred within us by this impersonal character of the Reality are the emotions of beauty, and the kindred emotions of sublimity. Through these we realise the very presence within us of an abiding and an eternal Reality, which blends our souls with itself, and at the same time fulfils our being with the sense of joy which beauty brings, or the sense of elevation which sublimity supplies. These emotions are a supreme expression of our complete organic union with our whole world. They betray the underlying continuity of structure between our individuality and the nature of Reality, a continuity so complete that it penetrates our very organs of perception as well as the innermost recesses of our souls. The emotions of beauty stirred within us seem inseparable from, or even indistinguishable from, the Reality without us; seem as much its expression as our own life. So complete is the union, that it seems indifferent whether the emotions of beauty are initiated within and identified with what is without, or are initiated without and identified with what is within. In both cases the emotions are equally spontaneous and equally compelling. So sure are we of our oneness with the world in the experience of beauty that when we produce it for ourselves we still regard it as the outcome of the nature of the world. Indeed, so profoundly can our emotional union with this Reality control us that it can shut off the influences of the organic senses, and we are impelled to embody this deep emotional kinship in forms which will convey, interpret, or express "outwardly" the union we thus experience.² We can create beauty as well as find it, so fully

¹ It is, perhaps, for this reason amongst others that the emotional experience of the all inclusive Reality is required to supplement and counteract the effect of our emotional attitude towards finite beings.

² Cf. Wagner's remark: "There ought to be in us an internal sense which becomes clear and active when all the other senses, directed outward, sleep or dream. It is precisely when I no longer see or hear anything distinctly that this sense is the most active and appears before me as the producer of calm. I can give it no other

does the emotion of beauty blend us with that ultimate Reality which is also creative.¹ It is in a sense indifferent what form the expression takes—whether poetry, painting, or music. The choice of the form of artistic expression is a matter of individuality; one form appeals more directly to one individual, another to another. It is the same emotional union which is expressed whether the expression be through sound or colour or any other medium. In all cases the impulse to create and embody beauty in the real world has its source in the fundamental emotional union with the world. For, by works of beauty created by human energy to fill our world, we but make this world more intimately and explicitly our own and fuse it with our lives. We, so to say, proclaim that we are one with the real by utilising the physical and other resources of the world to embody and confirm our sense of oneness with it in a manner which awakens the emotion of beauty.

It is remarkable, too, that the emotion of beauty is not dependent on time or place or size or any other specific character which finite things may possess. The emotional union may come through any channel and be realised at any point. For the Reality we here experience is present in all and at all times, and the sense of its presence may be awakened within us by any element falling within it. Each element, in fact, becomes in a manner a symbol of the presence of this all-containing Reality, and its presence shines through each and all alike. The grass of the field may be enough to stir an emotion of beauty, which touches the individual to the finest issues of his being, and transports him with a sense of his union with a perfected Reality. To the heart which "watches and receives" the meanest flower that blows may give the "thoughts that do often lie too deep for tears." At any time there may be given

"To one brief moment caught from fleeting time
The appropriate calm of blest eternity."

So complete is the union with this inclusive Reality established

term. It acts from within to without and through it I feel myself to be at the centre of the world." *Letters*, quoted by Combarieu, *Music: its Laws and Evolution*.

¹ Cf. "So o'er that art which you say adds to nature,
Is an art which nature makes."

As you like it,

by the emotions of beauty that these emotions become channels of communion between the individual and the real. The beauty is both within and without and the emotions are shared by and with the real. This is no metaphor ; for the experience we are considering, it holds in very literality. To the individual capable of this experience, the moment comes when

“ Love, now a universal birth,
From heart to heart is stealing,
From earth to man, from man to earth :
It is the hour of feeling ; ”

and the mind drinks at every pore “ the spirit of the season.” The union is not only felt on one side. The finite real is equally and in the same sense at one with its containing world.

“ The summer flower is to the summer sweet,
Though to itself it only bloom and die.” ¹

The emotion need not necessarily be awakened by some particular object from without. The emotion need not be concentrated on a special area of the real. It may be a comprehensive mood in which the encompassing Reality is felt as a living presence inseparably continuous with the individual, disturbing him with the “ joy of elevated thoughts : ”

“ that serene and blessed mood
In which the affections gently lead us on,
Until, the breath of this corporeal flame
And even the motion of our human blood
Almost suspended, we are laid asleep
In body, and become a living soul.”

It is in these deeper and more comprehensive moods that the fuller union and communion with the real is felt from which spring the emotions expressed in the highest flights of Art.

The emotional life we are here concerned with is veritable experience ; it fulfils and sustains the individual life, and it expresses the nature of the real. It is no more possible for the individual to dispute the claims of these emotions to a place in his experience than to dispute the emotions in which, as we have indicated, social existence rests. Criticism in the interests of

¹ Cp. also

“ ’Tis my faith that every flower
Enjoys the air it breathes.”

knowledge is irrelevant ; for such emotions have no essential connection with, or dependence on, reflection. They are as self-contained as knowledge in its sphere claims to be, and have laws and conditions of their own for which the laws and conditions of knowledge are no substitute. We have here, in short, an experience as distinctive in its kind from reflective knowledge, as reflective knowledge is from action or perception. Just as perception conveys a consciousness of the real world which reflection cannot supply or set aside ; so the emotions of beauty bring us into union with the real in a manner which brooks no interference from reflective knowledge. Indeed, these emotions may give us a sense of union with the encompassing Reality which is more complete and satisfying than the best efforts of knowledge can achieve. This is perhaps because the emotions demand no definition of the reality with which union is felt, whereas definition is of the essence of reflective knowledge.¹ The spontaneity, the insistence, and the fullness of individuality which the emotions supply, are their sole and sufficient guarantee of their certainty and of the sincerity of the experience. The defeat of the intellect in its search for rounded definiteness of comprehension does not disturb the security of the emotional life. On the contrary, the consciousness of the defeat of the intellect may prove the opportunity for the emotional union.

“ Peace settles where the intellect is meek.”

In spite of the failure of the intellect we may be possessed by the mood

“ In which the burthen of the mystery,
In which the heavy and the weary weight
Of all this unintelligible world
Is lightened.”

¹ There is, in fact, no clear-cut conception of the encompassing Reality involved in that experience of it which we have through the emotions of beauty. On the basis of these emotions we may, of course, seek to interpret the Reality, and may, reflectively, interpret it in intellectual terms ; but this is after-reflection not direct experience.

VIII

In addition to the emotions of beauty, the organic union of the individual with the all-inclusive Reality takes on a completely personal form which assumes distinctive emotional expression, quite as certain and quite as spontaneous as the emotions of beauty. It is not merely because the all-inclusive Reality contains human beings, and thus is only more than human in the sense of being superhuman ; it is also because the organic union of the individual with this Reality is so complete that the intimacy of personal relationship is essential in order to experience as fully as possible the closeness of the union which the individual has with it. For the peculiarity of personal relationship at its best is thoroughgoing reciprocity of communion on both sides.¹

It must be carefully noted that this way of experiencing the union is not the result of argument or of reasoned convictions of any kind. The individual who responds emotionally to this Reality as personal, never begins by explaining or demonstrating that this Reality is a person or is personal, and never imagines that such a demonstration is necessary for the purpose of justifying his experience. Demonstration and reasoning are purely intellectual processes. The emotional attitude is non-intellectual, and carries its own assurance in its own state, and its warrant in the complete satisfaction which the emotion supplies. At best, reasoning about the personal character of this Reality is an afterthought ; it may support, it cannot supplant, and in the long run cannot disturb, the security of the emotional attitude. It is simply because the organic union with this Reality is absolute and irresistible in its insistence, that the individual is impelled to respond to the Reality in terms of reciprocal personal emotion. And his experience is its own justification, for in fact he does find that the Reality responds to him emotionally.

The kinds of emotion experienced in this case range from

¹ The emotions of beauty are defective primarily and perhaps solely in this respect. It is true that not all individuals feel this defect very acutely. Hence some individuals find all the satisfaction which their union with the all-inclusive Reality can supply through the channel of the emotions of beauty alone. Those who find the completest satisfaction through a personal relationship tend to subordinate the emotions of beauty to this personal relationship.

the fear which separation from this super-personal Reality invariably brings, to the love in which perfected and complete reciprocal personal relationship is found. The communion is so intimate and is so assured, that the individual adopts, and successfully adopts, some of the fundamental processes and forms of finite personal relationship to sustain, to cultivate, and to establish ever more firmly the organic personal union with this Reality. By such means he seeks, for example, to escape from the state of fear or to reach the attitude of love. The individual speaks to this superpersonal Reality, he seeks to appease this Reality, makes sacrifice to this Reality, offers gifts, and so on. Such means are more or less external, and are rather evidences of the sincerity of the actual union than conditions of creating it. The individual, in fact, never does feel the organic union give way. It is rooted in his emotional life, and if not felt in one way it is felt in another. If not felt in the emotion of reverence, or hope or security, it is felt in the pain and agony of fear. For fear is but an indirect assurance of how vital the union is; we are never afraid of what does not intimately concern the very life of our individuality.

On the other side, this super-personal Reality responds with the same intimacy to the individual. The desire at any time for a complete union is in fact met by an access of fuller life in the individual, an increase of confidence, a security of spirit, a peace that defies the disturbances of finite things and "passes understanding," because the understanding of finite things can neither produce it nor remove it. In maintaining the communion with this Reality the individual finds, simply as a fact of his experience, that his sense of security is increased, that he is pervaded by a sense of joy, spontaneous in its appearance and beyond his power to create by his own effort or by relationship to finite things. He finds that such emotions are not accidents in his experience; for he discovers that they are and can be repeated and relied upon, when the appropriate emotional attitude towards the super-personal Reality is adopted. In short, as the result of experience the individual finds that this super-personal Reality is as completely in union with himself as he is or cares to be, or desires to be, with that Reality, and that he

is never betrayed or disappointed. The emotions he thus experiences cannot deceive, for there is no deception about satisfaction or dissatisfaction, joy or fear; they carry in themselves their own guarantee of their significance for his individuality.

Between fear at the one extreme and love at the other there are many intermediate emotional states in which the organic relationship is sustained;¹ for there are various degrees of emotional realisation of the union owing to the fact that the individual is subject to finite conditions, finite limitations, and the restrictions imposed by space and time. There is, for example, the emotional attitude of confident assurance of union, which always implies a certain degree of detachment, due to the fact that the attitude is primarily assumed in the face of finite events and finite things. It is an emotional attitude which opposes and overcomes the power which finite reals have to separate, or interfere with, the individual's sense of complete union with the all-inclusive Reality in and by which his individuality is most of all secured. There is the emotional attitude of reverence and, again, of quietude and acquiescence, both of which are far removed from fear and yet are short of the highest emotion. There is, again, the emotion of hope, with which the individual faces the future course of events and feels his union with the all-containing Reality to be unchanged in spite of and through all coming changes. These and some others are positive emotions in which the individual experiences the vital union of himself with the inclusive personal Reality, but in different ways according to the situations of his life. In the attitude of love the union reaches its consummate and most vivid expression.² Love is at once the supreme emotional form

¹ It is interesting to notice that many emotional states which are relevant in dealing with finite personal beings are irrelevant and impossible towards the all-inclusive Reality. Thus hatred is possible towards a definite being, generally a finite person. But hatred is meaningless as applied to the relationship of the individual to the super-personal Reality; for this Reality cannot be excluded from the individual life. In Spinoza's phrase "No man can hate God."

² I do not wish to suggest that every one has, or is even capable of having, this level of emotional experience. That, however, does not affect the importance of the experience itself. To most people this "love of God" is at best a mere aspiration;

of organic union between persons and the supremely personal form of union. For in this attitude each is conscious of fulfilment and of reality to the utmost extent of which each is capable. No element of individuality is sacrificed. The very details of individuality, its specific qualities, are sustained and substantiated, since without them the individual would be the poorer, and love would be impoverished by their absence. The individual cannot give too much to achieve this love completely, and feels, indeed, that all resources are barely enough for the purpose. The very weaknesses of the individual become instrumental to the attainment of full interdependence with the other, and are treasured on that account. Thus in this emotional state he feels his individuality sustained and preserved without diminution or suppression. And on the other side, love secures the equal independence and substantiality of the super-personal Reality. The love, to be complete, must be reciprocal, and is only felt by each to be complete when and because it is mutual. The desire of the individual for complete union with the all-inclusive Reality is answered by the love which fulfils the desire.¹ Each feels in and through the other the love which is the basis of communion between both. Each is loved for the sake of the love which each possesses for the other. There is, therefore, no separation of interests, there is merely distinction of personal attitude, enough distinction to sustain each in reciprocal interdependence. There is complete identity of nature consistently with, and through, the diversity of persons holding communion one with the other. The persons are thus in as complete organic union as persons can be. No such love is possible between finite persons; for it is not subject to change or limitation. The

to some it is probably a real experience occasionally; a few may have had this experience continuously. So far as my observation goes, I have known very few whose attitude towards life showed unmistakably that they had reached and could maintain this level. One has no doubt about those who sustain this attitude; they reveal their experience by certain signs quickly recognisable by those competent to detect them. There is equally no doubt about those who have not this experience. The great majority of people may be prepared to believe in the experience; but they go no further. In effect, the sense of reality of most human beings is singularly limited; and the only way most people feel the presence of complete Reality in their lives is by being afraid of it.

¹ Cp. Aristotle's phrase, *κινεῖ ὡς ἐρώμενον*, *Metaphysics*, λ, 1072.

super-personal Reality includes all change and excludes all limitation. This love, therefore, endures and gives permanent subsistence to those who are possessed of it. It is a love which makes the individual one with the supreme Reality which shares the love. That such love is experienced requires no proof or justification; it is its own guarantee, and doubt and distrust are alien to its composition. It is "felt"; those possessed of it need no titles to their possession; and those not possessed of it are not in a position even to dispute it.

It is also the supremely personal form of union. No beings except persons can feel this attitude of emotional union. It cannot subsist between a person and what is either impersonal or less than personal. It requires personality at its utmost and at its best to achieve it. This again is a matter of experience, not a subject for disputation. Moreover, the union is felt to be complete only as a union between one person and another person. Supreme love is unique and undivided, and thus implies and requires singleness of personality on both sides. Thus the organic union with the super-personal Reality is always felt as a union with one supreme personality. It is not experienced in any other way.¹ Love is thus the final emotional attitude of the religious life. It is not to be created at will. Like every other emotion it is spontaneous, and inevitable at the same time; and like every emotion it at once sustains the individual being and carries him beyond himself. It contains within it the assurance of the reality of its object. But unlike every other religious emotion it has within it no opposition, expressed or implied. The assurance of faith or the confidence of hope always implies a certain element of resistance from finite things; and in the struggle with finite things they may prevail or they may not. But in the case of love opposition of every kind has finally disappeared. Love has no enemies in the realm of finitude. It has overcome finitude with the strength of the

¹ It is interesting to note how the highest type of religious life thus finds its way, as it were by instinct, to a position which in intellectual language is described as monotheism. The healthy religious life requires as little assistance from theoretical or intellectual processes to carry on its experience, as the healthy moral individual requires a theory of ethics to enable him to be a good citizen. The discipline of suffering and joy may dispense with theory altogether.

infinite love which includes all finite beings within itself. It is unperturbed even by the loss of finite existence. It is thus stronger than death, and on that account is a form of immortal life.

Note (a) It is common to suppose that emotion is a kind of consequence or effect or product of an act of knowledge. It is difficult to attach any meaning to such language. The utmost that we can say is that sometimes an act of apprehension, perceptual or ideal, precedes the full realisation of a state of emotion. But such antecedence is neither the ground nor the cause of the emotion itself, any more than the whistle of an engine, antecedent to the movement of a train, has any causal or logical connection with the subsequent alteration in the position of the train. If the statement were true it should follow that our emotion should increase with our knowledge, that the same kind and degree of knowledge would always produce the same sort of emotion, and that, as our knowledge increased, the same sort of emotion which we had at first would be intensified. In actual experience none of these results ensue. An increase in knowledge of an object may be accompanied by an entirely different emotion from that experienced in the first instance; the same amount of knowledge is sometimes associated with quite different emotions; and with an increase in knowledge there may go a diminished intensity of emotion. Illustrations of these facts will at once occur to any one acquainted with emotional experience. So far is it from being true that knowledge always precedes an emotion, an emotion may on the contrary precede knowledge, and may distort knowledge, or may make it impossible to sustain the cognitive attitude at all. What is, however, universally true is that in all emotions there is involved a consciousness of an object which in some way we apprehend. But this apprehension is merely one constituent factor in the state of emotion, and does not of itself determine the quality or character of the emotion, which is a reaction of the whole individuality, body and soul, upon the real, for the sake of and in the interest of the individual itself. It is not even correct to say that the emotion merely attaches or gives a sense of value to the real. This would identify an emotion with a judgment—a judgment of value. The judgment is a thought and an afterthought. The emotion is a specific state in which the individual is realised, a state in which his reality is fulfilled, which is created by his interdependence with the real, and by which not so much the value as the very nature of the real is brought home to him through the form of a condition of his whole being. The kind of emotion he has, arises out of the living relation to the real world which constitutes his experience. That emotion expresses what the real is for him.

Note (b) If it is inaccurate to ascribe the emotion to an antecedent act of knowledge, still more inaccurate is it to regard the emotion as starting from the body and passing to the mind, or *vice versâ*. Either view would be unintelligible, but for the assumption of a kind of qualitative gap between body and mind. It is difficult, perhaps, to get rid of this crude image of the relation of body and mind. Metaphors, drawn from sense experience, and the spatial character of most thinking in philosophy, account for the persistence of naive Cartesian dualism. Apart altogether from the familiar objections to such a view of emotion, which may be raised from the side of psychology, modern physical theories seem to render the view hardly intelligible. If matter and energy are to one another as an ion to an electric charge, the conception of the body as a separate spatially extended substance seems to disappear altogether.

We have to think of it as a concentration of the impalpable, unextended and imponderable "ether," having a contour which maintains its form only to the partially reliable operation of perceptual experience. Since mind is but one of the highest kinds, probably the highest kind, of energy, the separation of body and mind, on which the above view of emotion turns, has no substantial justification. But apart from these objections, direct analysis of the actual experience of an emotion shows that we cannot at any moment in the life of our emotion distinguish the bodily manifestations from the processes of the soul which are involved. An emotion is only an emotion when the single individual, body and soul, is suffused and permeated by this state of his being. The bodily manifestation and the mental process combine to form a single attitude of the individual's life.

VI

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PHILOSOPHICAL SCEPTICISM

"Though our first studies and junior endeavours may style us Peripatetics, Stoics, or Academics, yet I perceive the wisest heads prove, at last, almost all Sceptics and stand like Janus in the field of Knowledge. I have, therefore, one common and authentic philosophy I learned in the schools, whereby I discourse and satisfy the reason of other men; another more reserved and drawn from experience, whereby I content mine own."—*Religio Medici*.

"I am bound to suppose that for many persons metaphysics would issue . . . in theoretical scepticism."—BRADLEY, *Truth and Reality*.

I

THE late Professor Adamson once remarked in conversation with the writer that the great difficulty in philosophy is to draw a valid distinction at the outset. A detached student of the history of philosophy would not find it easy to say how many philosophers have surmounted the difficulty. The haunting doubt which hovers over the beginning as well as the end, the promises as well as the issues of philosophical reflection, is partly the source of the sceptical attitude and of theoretical scepticism. The constant recurrence of scepticism in the main channels of philosophical speculation is a clear indication of the inherent vitality of the sceptical mood in the human mind, and seems to show that it is no mere incidental phase of intellectual activity, but is probably due to the operation of elements inseparable from the very spirit of philosophy.

In many cases it is doubtless true to say that scepticism has historically originated as a recoil from some form of intellectual dogmatism. But this is by no means universally true. Nor can it be held that in principle scepticism draws its life from hostility to positive statements professing to embody human knowledge.

It may arise out of a desire for positive truth of a deeper kind than has yet been attained ; and where such hostility does exist, the scepticism may be very restricted in its scope, and be employed as a fighting force on the ramparts of another kind of dogmatism.¹ It is again inaccurate to maintain that final scepticism, even regarding ultimate things, necessarily creates a sense of despair or mental depression. When this does happen the result is temperamental : it implicitly assumes that positive knowledge is the normal, or "natural," mould in which human thought should be cast. This assumption, however, may itself be questioned ; for it is not difficult to imagine a type of mind which would find a sense of relief or satisfaction in the rejection of such an assumption and in the utter and complete freedom from intellectual restraint which is thereby gained. We can imagine a mind which would gladly be sceptical of scepticism and dogmatism alike and rejoice in its unchartered intellectual liberty. If this be so, we cannot regard as either proved or self-evident the position so often put forward that "the negations of scepticism rest ultimately on some positive basis."

It is impossible to analyse the sceptical attitude profitably until we observe that, while scepticism is in general an intellectual rejection of finality of thought in some form or other, it differs from both doubt and denial. It may be directed upon many aspects of the experience we call knowledge, and it may be carried out with very different degrees of thoroughness.

Scepticism is not simply doubt regarding a given proposition, whether the doubt be permanent or momentary. Doubt implies hesitation to accept, and therefore willingness to do so, if the proposition can be shown to be true. It is an attitude of the believing type of mind, or again of the scientific investigator, neither of whom can be rightly accused of scepticism. Scepticism takes up an attitude of assurance regarding a proposition ; it holds that the statement in its actual form cannot be really defended, and that any similarly positive statement regarding the object in question will find itself in the same position.

Scepticism, again, is not mere denial. Negation is a specific

¹ This was the case, for instance, with the early Italian sceptics of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.

exclusion from a given region of truth and implies a whole of some sort in reference to which, and indeed in the interests of which, a negation is put forward. It is a normal condition of securing definiteness in the pursuit and formulation of a true judgment or arrangement of judgments. If the course of our ideas has to be regulated and restricted in order to convey accurately the meaning of things, this involves the rejection of ideas which turn us from our purpose. Scepticism goes much further. It does not necessarily imply any acceptance of a sphere of truth, however small; its business rather is to challenge finality in every shape. For scepticism, any acceptance of positive truth can at best be no more than provisional. It is in principle quite prepared to accept intellectual chaos, if its procedure should issue in such a result.

Similarly it is inaccurate to identify scepticism with mental hesitation, misgiving, or incapacity to make up our minds. If this were the case every intelligence would be essentially sceptical, for no truth of any kind can be definitely arrived at without our passing through one or other of these states. If any mind remains permanently in any of these states, this is of purely biographical interest, and may be due to intellectual or even moral defects. To confuse such a frame of mind with a sceptical attitude, is much the same as to refute a scientific doctrine by asserting our incompetence to understand it. Scepticism is a special attitude which men are prepared to defend by conscious use of ideas and argument.

II

Scepticism may be directed upon any aspect of our knowledge. In one of its forms it is concerned more especially with the knowledge we have through perception. In another it deals with ideas in general. It may consider the connections between ideas, or again, the value of the reference to reality which ideas in certain cases claim to make. It may also turn its attention to scientific truth, or to philosophical truth, to knowledge of finite objects, or to knowledge of ultimate reality. In all these cases we have the same essential features, and these are that scepticism

is directed solely against knowledge, and that it is concerned to show that the human intellect cannot claim to go beyond psychic states of consciousness, or cannot express through them the actual nature of objects in relation to which the mind stands.

It is a significant fact that scepticism does not concern itself with emotional forms of experience, no matter how elaborate, nor even with instincts however complex. Only in so far as emotional life professes to use or to be based on knowledge has it been challenged by sceptical criticism. Thus the finely developed sceptical mind of Hume maintained that any one who proceeded sceptically against moral distinctions was a "disingenuous disputant." In religious experience, similarly, scepticism was, in his view, irrelevant except in so far as religion used demonstration to find or defend its beliefs, *i.e.* fell back on knowledge instead of keeping within its proper realm of religious emotion or religious faith. It is only when we deal with intellectual processes that scepticism can appear; action or emotion are beyond its reach or interest.

It is not at first sight very obvious why this should be the case. On the contrary, the transparent uncertainty and irregularity, the varieties and the mutability of the facts in morality and religion, would seem to render them a peculiarly congenial topic for sceptical analysis. The explanation, however, is found when we note that only when the claim is made by the human mind to reveal in its own processes the nature of objects outside the ambit of its own being, or of its states at the moment they are experienced, does any call for question arise. Within the mind, consciousness is its own first and last evidence; its states simply are; and their value lies in themselves. The claim to transcend mental states by conveying within their process the objective content of what lies outside them is openly made by knowledge. This claim scepticism challenges, in whatever form the claim may be made.

In all forms of scepticism the actuality of the mental state is never called in question. Without the existence of such a state, even scepticism could not arise. But, in knowledge, the peculiarity of the mental process is that it is at once an operation of mental life and a vehicle of communication regarding the nature of

an extra-mental reality. The mind claims not merely to give such information, but to be certain of what it communicates. That is to say, the truth is not only about an object, but affects the very character of the mental state in and through which consciousness exists ; for to be certain is to be in a specific state of mind. It is because of this assumed dualism in the attitude of knowledge that scepticism joins issue with its claims. Scepticism always postulates a radical discontinuity between the mind and its world, and generally in the form of a crude dualism of mind-substance and a thing-substance. The ultimate purpose of scepticism is to dispute the capacity of mind at once to maintain the incongruity or discontinuity between its own nature and that of its object, and also to convey with certainty to itself what the object is. The procedure of scepticism consists essentially in pitting these two factors in the cognitive situation against one another, and proving, so to say, out of the mouth of knowledge itself, the impossibility of its own claims. On the face of it the challenge seems justified, and scepticism seems on this view to lie in the very heart of the problem of knowledge. For if there were a radical discontinuity between the mind and its world of objects, and if, in spite of this, the mind claimed by knowledge to find the very nature of the object in and through mental processes, then, certainly, one or other of these positions would have to be abandoned in the interests of consistency ; for the retention of both would be exposed to the charge of mental incoherence which it is the pleasure of scepticism to establish.

The simplest and easiest form of scepticism is that which seeks to show that in the region of perception the mind has no assurance of being conscious of the actual objective nature of the real which is perceived. Since our knowing is assumed not to affect the object known, the object should always reveal the same nature if known properly. It should, therefore, always mean the same to the same mind, and mean the same to different minds similarly constituted. In other words, the knowledge possessed in perception, whatever else it may be, must have the character of universality, if it is to express the nature of the objects outside the mind. The aim of scepticism is to show that such universality

is not and cannot be found by perception. The way to the nature of the object as independent is barred from the start by the simple fact that we do use special instruments (*i.e.* different special senses) to get *en rapport* with the object. These cannot bring out the peculiar nature of the object if they are special to our minds. Unless they are really instruments of our own minds, the mind could not go out to meet an object outside itself; and it could not have knowledge of its own if the instruments were not its own functions. Any way and every way we care to proceed in such a case, we remain cut off from the independent object. This is not so much proved as confirmed by the experience, which we constantly have, of being misled in our perceptions, of the real divergence between our own perceptions and those of other human beings, and still more those of other animals. The dissipation of the claim put forward by perception to convey truth (*i.e.* a universal meaning) regarding the object perceived, thus either reduces perception to silence, or else strips its knowledge of all the qualitative content in which it professedly consists (colours, etc.).¹ Perception is forced to limit itself merely to hinting that some object is present to the mind, a hint conveyed, say, by the mute act of pointing out with the finger; and this merely amounts to reaffirming the abstract assumption underlying all knowledge—that the mind is face to face with an external object.

When we turn from perception to the process of ideas, a similar result is reached by scepticism. Our ideas are in fact states of our own mind, whatever their qualitative differences and operations may be. The object to which they claim to refer exists apart from and independent of them, and has a nature of its own. Our ideas certainly have the characteristic feature of generality; they have a kind of permanence and they can and do recur in our minds. The object, too, remains the same in itself. So far it would seem that ideas might be able to convey the nature of the objects. But this similarity is of no avail. For if our ideas of the object are such as to express with complete accuracy the nature of the object, then we abandon the primary assumption of knowledge, *viz.* that the object is really different in its existence, in its nature, from the mind which also has a

¹ Both these alternatives were adopted by the later Greek sceptics.

peculiar existence and nature of its own. If, on the other hand, we keep to this essential difference in nature between mind and object, and their consequent existential independence, the process of ideas cannot give us the nature of the object with literal exactness. The mind can only tell us in its own terms how it reacts upon and in relation to our object, which remains from first to last discontinuous with it. This is, in fact, almost more evident in the case of ideas than it is in the case of perception. For ideas grow in the mind, they imply memory and a certain amount of imagination. From these conditions they are inseparable ; yet no one would ever dream of regarding such factors as constitutive of an external object, or indeed of any object really discontinuous with the nature of mind. We cannot detach ideas from the mental life of which they are mere functions ; and even if we could, we cannot suppose that a detached element of mental life can possibly express the whole nature of the object which is independent of mind. If the whole mind cannot convey the peculiar character of the object, it is less than likely that a fragment of it can.

The difficulties into which the process of ideas leads us when we attempt to regard them as adequate to the nature of the object, illustrate and confirm the fundamental incongruity referred to. Thus ideas, scepticism notes, have the quality of generality. But no generality can exactly express or convey to our minds the actual individual object, which we assume from the first we are dealing with. The individual object has a punctual singleness of being that cuts it off not merely from the individual mind, but from all other objects, no matter how like it they may be, and no matter how much it shows with them an identity of structure. Indeed, the more the generality holds good, the more necessary it is to insist on some quite special difference in the object, in order to retain its individual independence of being from which knowledge starts. It is not simply (as is so often held) that this factor, which gives the individual object atomic singleness, defies all generalisation. The point rather is that the mind instinctively declines to generalise it, refuses to sacrifice its claim to be as much an integral element in the constitution of the real nature of the object as the element of generality on which ideas profess to

lay hold. And it is fairly evident why this instinct should be so strong and persistent. The mind itself is an individual reality ; and if it gave up its own element of distinction from other real beings, its own reality would disappear and with that the whole problem of knowledge. If there were no discernible difference between itself and its object, knowledge would never arise ; the "identity of indiscernibles" in this as in other cases would make the process of knowledge unnecessary. The mind therefore clings to this ineradicable factor in individual things that keeps them apart despite all the powers of generalisation, and clings to it not merely in the interest of the individuality of objects but in its own interest. Rather than give it up the mind will surrender the claim of ideas to be fully adequate to the real nature of objects. Even though the factor in question be whittled away till it is little more than the unknowable, a surd, a "formless matter" or the like ; and even though all the knowledge we have of objects may be admitted to come to us by way of ideas, still, the total abandonment of that unintelligible remainder is felt to be impossible as long as mind and objects are to maintain their independent reality. Rather than admit that ideas do wholly express the individual being of objects, the mind is prepared even to allow that the real is not completely intelligible at all. So impossible is it for the mind to abandon its initial assumption of the discontinuity between its own reality and that of objects independent of itself.

That this is not a mere prejudice of unsophisticated minds or of naïve thinkers, is evident from the makeshifts instinctively adopted by philosophers to meet the difficulty involved in using ideas as the adequate expression of the real nature of objects. Two such methods may be noted in passing. Admitting that ideas may give general aspects of the individual object, and that its particular separate existence is not thus accounted for, one solution of the difficulty is found by calling in the help of another function of mind to deal with the element that escapes the grasp of ideas. This function is sometimes perception, sometimes sensation, sometimes feeling, or even intuition. In this way the mind is supposed to establish a happy union with the whole of the individual object ; for what will not prove amenable to the

persuasion of general ideas must yield to the *force majeure* of immediate and complete possession. The chief point of interest here is the indirect admission that ideas are not of themselves adequate to give us the real nature of the object : otherwise why supplement their process by that of perception or sensation ?

Even with this addition, however, the sceptical criticism is not turned aside. For if the sceptical objections to the process of perception and of ideas hold good when each is considered separately, they do not disappear because both are taken together in one and the same operation of knowing the object. On the contrary, we have added to the difficulties, which each has to face, the further difficulty of showing that the relation between perceiving and the process of ideas, which are mental functions, is one which exactly reveals the whole nature of the object as an independent reality. Whether we say with some philosophers that perception and ideas are stages in the growth of mental life, or, with others, that perception gives the fact which ideas work up into a form which is general, in either case we cannot suppose that the object is both independent and self-contained throughout the process of knowledge, and yet goes through stages dictated only by the exigencies of our mind in its endeavour to know the independent object. We may maintain that this complicated process of knowledge is essential if our mind is to be an independent reality when dealing with its object ; and we may maintain that the object must remain independent and the same in its separate reality, if we are to know it at all. But we cannot at once make the nature and process of the one in any sense dependent or contingent upon those of the other, and also insist on their discontinuous existence.

A second method of meeting the situation created by the inadequacy of general ideas to convey the whole nature of the individual object, is adopted by those who are prepared to take seriously the view that ideas, and ideas alone, give us the entrée into the nature of the object. To apprehend the singleness of the object, it is insisted, we do not require to make use of perception or any of the additional operations of the mind, for the object is but the "meeting place" of universals, the system of ideas focussed in a special way at a particular centre of reality.

The individual is such a system or arrangement, and in this closed system lies its singleness. Even perceived facts can be no more than a concentration of ideas related in a special way, if they are to be known.

This insistence on the connection of ideas in order to do justice to the individual nature of the object, seems at first to satisfy the need for grasping the singleness of the object without sacrificing the principle that only through ideas is the object revealed. But here, too, scepticism arrests conviction. For either this system, or unified arrangement, in which the singleness consists, is another idea or it is not. If it is another idea, different doubtless from the variety of ideas into which the object is resolved, then it too has the quality of generality which scepticism maintains cannot give the precise singleness of the object as an independent reality. If it is not an idea, then ideas once again are admitted to be an inaccurate expression of the nature of the real.

This failure of ideas to give us the object as it is in its independent existence, which scepticism holds to be inevitable, is thus confirmed even by the procedure of these philosophers who seek to approach the real by exercising this function of the mind. Whether we take ideas in the narrow sense as merely mental generalisations produced consciously or unconsciously in the mind, or use this term to cover both such quasi-psychological products and the conceptions or notions (*a priori* or otherwise) which specialise the function of unity in which the intellect consists, in either case the result, so far as scepticism is concerned, is the same. By that way the object is not and cannot be reached, if the object is, as we assume in knowledge it is, discontinuous with and independent of the mind: and the knowledge which claims by that means to convey the true nature of such real objects is doubtful at the best, abortive at the worst.

The success of scepticism in dealing with perception and the process of ideas as separate avenues to the knowledge of the real nature of the object, is not lessened when it turns its attention to the comparison of the deliverances which these commonly accepted forms of knowledge severally give regarding reality. Perception left to itself shows us a world of objects with tangible,

visible, audible qualities; and with these we endow objects or find objects endowed. It is thus we derive all the joy in the refulgent glory of colour, in the entrancing beauty of sound, the charm of spatially embodied form. All these we ascribe to the world "revealed" to our senses. The same realm of objects when submitted to the analysis of ideas alone—freely manipulated, untrammelled by the aid of the senses, following their own course, obeying their own laws—becomes so utterly and completely transformed as to leave not merely no likeness to what perception furnishes, but frankly opposed to all that it reveals. To the mind that works on the plane of ideas, *e.g.* to the physical scientist, the final substance of the physical world (*i.e.* its real nature) is impalpable, imponderable, invisible, inaudible; the articulated manifold forms of objects are but combinations and arrangements of this primordial stuff, with no difference between them but those of quantity and position. The ultimate constituent of all things—of mind itself as well as objects—is a uniform continuum as devoid of qualities as pure space. All the transcendent glory of a summer day, when its true nature stands revealed in the medium of ideas, melts away into the homogeneous fluid which finally holds all reality in solution.

It is transparent that the world of sense is thus unrecognisable when translated into the language of ideas; and the world as it is for ideas gives no stable existence to the realm of sense. Each, if taken as true, is not only not justified by the other; each is illusion to the other.¹

Not only does the scheme of thought developed in physical science dissipate the world of sense into insubstantial illusion and thus dissolve into nothingness the palatial glories of art, which draws all its material from the region of sense, but the thought schemes of the different sciences when dealing with the same object lead to divergent and even contradictory results. In this connection reference need only be made to the perennial

¹ No one has brought out this contrast with greater felicity and impressiveness than Mr. Balfour in his *Foundations of Belief*. The same point, it need hardly be said, was made long ago by Hume in a somewhat different way.

controversies regarding the essential nature of organic existence, which seem no nearer a conclusion now than ever they were.

The radical disagreements between the deliverance of perception and that of ideas, and again between different trains of ideas concerning the same finite objects, support the contention of sceptical criticism that, in the process of knowing, the mind does not and cannot give the nature of the object as it is in its independent existence. The road to finality or certainty in cognitive activity is blocked by the initial discontinuity between mind and its object. Yet unless such certainty be secured, knowledge has failed in its purpose.

Scepticism has a still easier task in showing that the case of knowledge is the very worst when the mind attempts to deal not with finite objects, but with the whole realm of finitude, with absolute reality, with God, or with such a transcendent form of existence as that of an immortal individual. For here the discontinuity between the human mind and its object is so immense that the mind seems to scepticism to lack the equipment even to begin the process of knowledge ; nothing but contradiction seems the reward of its efforts. A universal truth regarding the whole universe of reality would not be a truth for the human mind nor intelligible in terms of the human intellect. If it were intelligible to us who are parts of the world, to that extent it would not hold of the universe in its totality, or for a mind grasping the universe *en bloc*, so to say. Similarly, regarding immortal existence : the demand to know this object merely shows the need for another mind than ours.

III

Such, then, is the procedure and outcome of scepticism. It will be seen that throughout it is not aimless, and not in principle hostile to the demands of the mind for knowledge. Were it either of these, it would be frivolous. It would have its source in the character of the sceptic instead of in the nature of the intellect ; and its procedure would then not be, as it claims to be, logical and detached from personal interests. It would be haphazard and

temperamental.¹ Its aim is serious, and consists in an unwavering attempt to find whether the claim which the mind makes to convey through knowledge the permanent and universal nature of the object, is strictly tenable. In the arraignment of knowledge at the bar of experience, to which knowledge must always come for the title deeds of truth, scepticism states the case for the object against the claims of the mind. Scepticism never rises till knowledge has appeared. In that sense it is not a way to knowledge. At the same time its intention and purpose imply a strong consciousness of the importance of the issue at stake, and often reveal a deeper appreciation of the significance of knowledge than is sometimes shown by science or constructive philosophy. Science is jealous of error ; scepticism is jealous, at times even envious, of the truth. In order to carry out its purpose it is bound to take an opposite course, and to emphasise an opposite factor in the cognitive situation, from that in which knowledge takes primary interest. Knowledge is absorbed in the desire to achieve universality : that is the *terminus ad quem* of its activity. Its tendency is in consequence to overlook the equally essential factor of the particular, the unique singleness of individual existence. Scepticism takes its stand on this element and insists on its supreme importance. It assumes from the start an attitude of complete distrust of universals. It never questions the reality or the value of single states of mind, single states of being, whether in the mind or in the object. Hence it is that scepticism always takes the form of emphasising the psychological process as distinct from the expansion of the mind beyond its passing states ; of insisting on the finality of individual atomic "elements," instead of general connections ; of favouring absolute discreteness at the expense of continuity ; of delighting in disintegration instead of coherence or construction. Such a position is inevitable on its own terms : for the vitalising force of its activity is its intense consciousness that the particular is the ineradicable element in knowledge and reality. This is its

¹ There is doubtless such a frame of mind, and it is often called scepticism. It is, however, a mere mood, the mood of mental despair, or, again, that of the intellectual *gamin*, whose only use for the intellect is to enable him to be impertinent.

starting point, its main interest, and naturally, therefore, its final achievement.

Without such a definite and unquestioned basis, it is evident that scepticism would not so much fail to carry out its attack on knowledge ; it would have no *raison d'être* at all. It could at best be no more than a non-rational and quasi-pathological condition of the intellect, and would be merely of biographical significance. It is, however, an intellectual attitude, persistently pursued according to intellectual conditions, and capable of making itself understood and intelligible to the non-sceptical. It must therefore have its roots in the nature of intellectual activity, and not in the caprice or character of a chance individual's mind. Only so could we account for the assurance with which the sceptical critic carries forward the course of his arguments, or the conviction which he seems able to infuse in the minds of those whom he addresses. Since it is against the universal element in knowledge that sceptical criticism is directed, there is only one factor left which will provide the sceptical critic with the foothold he requires to carry on his intellectual activity. That factor is the element of insular singleness with which the intellect has somehow to deal, and which has at least the advantage of being more certain to the mind, and therefore the less assailable element in the cognitive situation ; for without this element knowledge, which seeks to go beyond it, could not begin at all. Scepticism is thus a critical examination of acquired knowledge on the basis of the particularity which characterises every object of knowledge. From this point of view we can see that it is not merely a justifiable, but an inevitable type of investigation ; and, indeed, indispensable in the interests of the highest demands of knowledge. It is not surprising, therefore, that it has constantly recurred in the history of philosophy, and is still irrepressible.

IV

One may fairly ask, however, why should such an assault be made against acquired knowledge ? Why does not scepticism break out in other spheres of experience, as well as knowledge ?

Why should the *atra cura* of scepticism always ride behind the knights of the intellect ?

It is perhaps neither fanciful nor unfruitful to suggest that we have in scepticism a special case of an attitude of mind, which seems quite general throughout all the purposive activity of man's life. In man's desire to achieve his purpose he finds himself always opposed by an element in his nature which has to be controlled and regulated, which by itself seems to resist his striving towards his ends, and which at times seems able to take its stand in open rebellion against all constraint. Restraint indeed, seems from this side of our nature merely external. Without this factor there would be no striving to an end at all. But, if accepted, justice must be done to it : and the time comes when it stands forth and claims to be recognised, claims even to question the laws of restraint imposed upon it, and demands satisfaction on its own terms. Thus, in moral experience we have the self of self-will, of private feeling and interest, which has to be directed towards higher ends, has to be reckoned with in the moral struggle, and somehow must be satisfied. It may break out on its own account and seek to use all possible strength in the maintenance of its isolation, and then it becomes the evil will pure and simple, which involves the destruction and negation of the will towards the good. This is the worst manifestation of the element of the private or atomic will. But it has always to assert itself in some form, for it is an essential aspect of personality ; and no universal good can be really a good which ignores or crushes the interest of the particular individual. There can be no doubt that the tendency of moral purposes is to suppress that interest, simply because moral purposes, the higher they are, lay so much stress on the universal elements in the good. As against this tendency individual self-regard can make and always will make a fight and a justifiable protest, even though the struggle takes the form of defying, for the time being, the universal standard set up. And in principle it is not without justification. For the endeavour to attain the good is an effort to secure not simply "a good on the whole," but a good of the whole personality with all its specific interests and aims. A good achieved which is not my good in particular is not in the long run a real good. An ultimate

good of personality must be one in which self-love is satisfied as well as one which finds its consummation in the love of others. True self-love is as sound a test of a moral life as balanced altruism.

Similarly in the case of the religious life. The surrender of the finite will to the Supreme, the devoted abandonment of the finite soul to God, is only possible because of the initial contrast of the individual spirit to the Highest, and is only worth while if in the experience of its union it attains the peace of soul which enables it to confront all finitude in perfect confidence that its purposes as a whole are secure. That contrast, however, while it is the source of the experience, is the standing peril to its realisation. For the abandonment in question must be free and spontaneous on the part of the individual, if the result is to satisfy his own soul in particular and bring out fully the unique source of security which is his alone when "in losing himself he really finds himself." But a spontaneous attitude of the individual implies that he can also refuse to take the step, that he can demand satisfaction on his own terms, that he may even rebel against the Reality which can bring him to his peace. He may decline peace on certain terms, or on any terms. When the individual takes up this attitude, especially in its extreme form, we have the "rebellion against God," which is the essence of the "sinful nature." But the insistence on the individual requirements of the finite soul and the demand that these should be satisfactorily met, form an essential condition not merely of all religious sincerity but of all progress in the religious life.

We have a closely analogous situation in the case of the pursuit of the beautiful and the harmonious in art. For here, too, unless the particular element receives its due, the result is not artistically satisfying; if the part claims to stand out on its own account it becomes the ugly, the discordant, the chaotic, the capricious. If, for example, in the dramatic situation there is no free play for the individual wills, the necessity, which a drama should unfold and reveal, becomes a brute fate undistinguishable from the crude inevitableness of events in nature. That is why the ruin produced by an earthquake is not a tragedy but a catastrophe; and that explains why the mere operation of human

wills regardless of any ultimate plan constitutes neither tragedy nor comedy, but simply history.

Reflection on these different forms of purposive activity throws an interesting light on the peculiar phenomenon of scepticism in the case of knowledge. Looked at from this point of view, scepticism may be said to have its source in an outspoken deliberate revolt against the enchainment of the individual intellect by the forms and conditions of universality, which regulate its function so as to secure the order demanded by knowledge, and which restrain its freedom to manipulate its isolated ideas at its own pleasure. The revolt generally takes the direction of a thoroughgoing criticism of the claim to universality made by knowledge, and an examination of knowledge to see if it really does do justice to the particular uniqueness of individual objects, which is so indispensable a factor in their constitution and regarding which consciousness has never any doubt at all. When scepticism assumes this form it is a serious philosophical attitude of great historical significance. If, however, as sometimes happens, it adopts the Mephistophelian position of unqualified and wholesale denial, for the sheer delight in rejecting all the professed universal conclusions of science and ordinary knowledge, then it is the spirit of intellectual revolt for the sake of revolt, it is the principle of intellectual anarchy pure and simple. This it may very well become ; for the joy in destruction is to some intellects quite as keen as the joy in construction is to others ; and the joy in either case is obtained if the issue is successful.¹ But it cannot be anarchical and at the same time claim the support of intelligence, any more than anarchy in morality can be consistently adopted in the name of a moral standard. Intelligence cannot dethrone itself. And scepticism generally makes its appeal to intelligent understanding, because it accepts at least one condition of intellectual procedure—that of the impossibility of holding positions that are mutually and finally contradictory—and also because, as we have seen, it starts from an assured consciousness of the particular. Without the first it could not be a thinking process at all. It

¹ Hence, it is inaccurate to suppose that complete scepticism necessarily creates the emotion of despair.

could gain no victory over knowledge, for a contest implies some common ground, however slight, between the combatants ; and its interest in the criticism of knowledge would be gone if its result could not be accepted by the defeated opponent. Without the second, again, it would have nothing definite to start from. The only factors in the cognitive situation are these twin aspects of the real, its universal element and its particular uniqueness. Scepticism contests the nature of the former, and has therefore to start assured of the latter.

That scepticism, however, can within these limits raise a revolt against knowledge, is undoubted. It has its source in a kind of instinctive protest which the mind makes against the restraints with which the universalising tendency of the intellect imposes on the unconstrained flow of mental life. The very necessity with which the intellect insists that ideas must go this way and not that, that things must have this meaning and not that, is felt at times, even by the trained mind, to be irritating, oppressive and wearisome. The more abstract thinking is, the more does it tend to treat with chilling indifference the glowing life which animates the crudest particular facts, giving intensity of interest to the stream of consciousness. With increased abstractness the authority of the universal element becomes more exigent and is felt to be more external ; in short, it becomes the ruthless gaoler of spontaneous discrete mental occurrences, instead of their freely adopted guide and director. It is when this state of slumbering mutiny breaks out into open opposition that the attitude of scepticism is created. It directly and frankly challenges the claim to "universality and necessity" put forward by the knowledge embodied in science and dogmatic philosophical thinking. The critical examination and rejection of the claim constitutes theoretical scepticism, whatever be the precise historical form it assumes. The frame of mind from which it arises, however, is not peculiar to sceptics, but is experienced by most intelligent individuals at some time or other in their intellectual life.

Thus the sources of scepticism in knowledge lie near to those of the allied attitudes in the moral and religious life referred to above. It is interesting in this way to find that

scepticism is not an eccentric or isolated condition of mind, but a specific form of a more general attitude of the human spirit towards its higher ends. There can be little doubt that the process of moulding the individual will to social issues, which constitutes the moralisation of human nature, reacts profoundly on the whole structure and composition of the mind ; and may readily suggest and even encourage an attitude in his intellectual life which in all essentials resembles the opposition of his individual will to the social system. Historically we find a close connection between the two forms of revolt. Sometimes scepticism accompanies a social upheaval, sometimes the one follows upon the other. Or, again, we find that the dormant instinct of resistance to the restraints of universal conditions may be satisfied by breaking out in the sphere of the intellect alone, and may leave the social order with full control over the individual will,—as if, so to say, an attack upon knowledge were a sufficient outlet for the latent instinct of opposition to constraint which lies in the individual. The moral life in such a case is left untouched, and may even be considered to be beyond the reach of scepticism.¹ Morality and practice generally are accepted as a secure retreat for the mind from the bewilderment and confusion which are the final outcome of the criticism of knowledge. Total scepticism thus cannot lead to total spiritual ruin, so long as the stronghold of the moral life endures. Scepticism may be complete and may leave no positive intellectual basis at all ; and yet this one domain of experience can supply the mind with a sufficient area of certainty in which to be at peace, despite confusion elsewhere. In the same way, the overthrow of the claims of knowledge often leaves the religious mind unmoved, and may even be brought about in the interests of religion. The religious attitude in that case supplies the individual with ample security for his mental life, a security which may indeed more than compensate him for the loss of all the certainty offered by knowledge.²

¹ This was Hume's position.

² In this connection we may recall the position of Pascal, and in more recent times that of Mr. Balfour, whose critical attack on knowledge is treated as "an introduction to the study of theology."

V

An attitude which has its roots so deep in the instincts of the human mind is not one that can be regarded as irrelevant or transitional in the history of thought. There seems no reason to suppose that scepticism will ever disappear from philosophy, or indeed can ever be dispensed with. The particular form it may assume will vary from time to time according to the historical circumstances in which it arises, and the kind of positive knowledge against which its criticism is directed. This variation is inevitable. The nature of the "uniqueness" or "singleness" of the individual object or fact, in which scepticism finds the positive starting point for its criticism, is not one which always has the same meaning, and is not one regarding which all sceptics are agreed. They are content rather to take the point as common-sense and the requirements of the argument dictate; and common-sense has no uniformity of view on the matter. Further, it is evident that the kind of knowledge against which the sceptic concentrates his attack must vary with the history of science and philosophy; for the positive statements of science and philosophy supply the material on which the sceptic directs his analysis of knowledge, and these statements alter with the progress of knowledge.

But however much the form assumed by scepticism may change, its principle and its purpose remain the same, and will inevitably give rise to the demand for sceptical criticism from time to time. Nor is this deplorable. There must always be some intellects which find satisfaction in giving good reasons for the spirit of denial. There is no doubt, too, that science and much philosophy tend to become more and more dogmatic when even comparative success attends their efforts; and positive dogmatism easily becomes a fetish or a pretence of knowledge, if the ambitions of the intellect are left unchallenged. Scepticism, on the other hand, always introduces the freshness of free individual life into the museum of desiccated "universal and necessary conceptions." If scepticism is the evil genius of philosophy, it at least brings the qualities and advantages of genius to further the enduring purpose of philosophical reflection.

The Mephistophelean spirit of scepticism is often the only means of bringing the self-complacency of the intellect to a sense of reality. Metaphysics will always be required as long as man seeks to rise to the greatness of his intellect; but he will not escape the discipline of intellectual humility as long as scepticism is ever ready to restore the balance by showing him how little his intellect can accomplish.

It seems a mistake, then, in principle to suppose that the first business of philosophy is to lay the spirit of scepticism. Doubtless scepticism, as Kant said, "cannot be an abiding dwelling-place for the human intellect." But the history of philosophy seems to give sufficient evidence for asserting that the human intellect has found no continuing city in any system that has yet been propounded. Indeed, if philosophy is an aspect of life it must retain its vitality even at the price of constant change of point of view: for a "permanent resting-place" for philosophy, as for all life, will prove to be a tomb. To get rid of scepticism altogether various expedients are from time to time adopted. Some philosophers take refuge in intuition, or instinct, or feeling, which, by their very inarticulateness and the absence of conceptual universality, seem to escape the assaults of scepticism and to take advantage of the elements in which scepticism itself finds its positive basis and the assurance of its own procedure. But this is, in fact, such a complete admission of the success of sceptical criticism, when directed on the universal element in knowledge, that it amounts to absolute surrender to scepticism in advance: a result which, indeed, is brought out clearly by the critical attitude which those philosophers take up to the claims of conceptual thinking.¹ Perhaps, however, the most desperate expedient of all is that adopted by Hegel, who seeks to overcome the efforts of scepticism to undermine the citadel of knowledge, by incorporating scepticism itself into the absolute system of truth. It is possible, doubtless, in some cases to appease an enemy by granting him hospitality or by giving the invader a share of the territory assailed. But when the enemy's purpose is to lay waste utterly and without restraint, such conciliatory generosity may be no better than treacherous betrayal, and may

¹ Cp. Bergson's suggestion of "other intellectual concepts than ours."

prove as disastrous as annihilation. It seems plainly impossible to meet the demands of scepticism by a grant of knowledge, when its aim is to show that all such grants are valueless and without substantial security. It is a misunderstanding of scepticism to try to satisfy it with knowledge of a certain kind when it questions the assumption that the claims of any kind of knowledge, more especially "absolute knowledge," can be justified. Scepticism does not seek to increase positive knowledge, but to examine critically the knowledge offered by the intellect. Scepticism is certainly a philosophical attitude, but it makes no pretensions to supply a positive or dogmatic contribution to philosophy. That would clearly be a self-contradiction; and scepticism is acutely alive to contradiction. To suppose as Hegel does,¹ that scepticism cannot be turned against philosophy without being either unphilosophical or dogmatic in its turn, is to assume that philosophy must be always in essence dogmatic or positive—an assumption which is not true historically, and which in any case scepticism is bound to call in question. Hegel's interpretation of scepticism is, in fact, adapted to his purpose of placing all philosophical views within the perspective of his own system. Scepticism becomes merely the "negative side" of absolute or rational knowledge, which is a process of making specific dogmatic truths run fluid, of breaking down their fixity and separation by the instrument of contradiction. Since reason contains all relations and opposites within itself, and has in itself no opposite (being all embracing and self-contained), scepticism thus must either take its place as a special operation of reason or become a mere mental peculiarity, a psychological phenomenon of some individual. Such an interpretation, however, obviously confuses the method of scepticism with its purpose. Scepticism, like all philosophy, avails itself of the principle that the intellect cannot admit contradictions; for the intellect cannot proceed in logical form without this condition, whether in scepticism or in science or in philosophy. But the purpose of scepticism is, as we have seen, very different from the mere application of this elementary principle; and part of its purpose is precisely to call in question the claim that reason is an all-

¹ Hegel, *Vermischte Schriften*, I.

sufficient avenue to the nature of reality. So far is a self-closed system of absolute truth from being impervious to the assaults of scepticism, that such a system puts less strain on the resources of sceptical strategy than almost any other philosophy. It would, indeed, appear that the serried ranks of the categories moving in close formation to the capture of the kingdoms of this world and the next, offer the easiest of all targets to the enfilading batteries of scepticism. For a system which professedly requires negation as the very principle and life of its movement is not one that can ever claim to be complete at all. Nor, in fact, is the system ever completed either in its parts or in its totality. Its essence is admittedly restless movement from a "first" to a "last," and again from "last" to "first." But a cycle which from the start is confessedly "closed," makes impossible either a real beginning or a real ending. In short, an absolute system which claims to carry scepticism within its heart, is in reality under the control of scepticism throughout its entire scope. Scepticism may even with characteristic irony claim such a system for its own, and Phoenix-like rise triumphant from its ashes.

VII

THE PLACE OF PHILOSOPHY IN HUMAN NATURE

“There is no such source of error as the pursuit of absolute truth.”—S. BUTLER.

I

IF recent discussions have done nothing more than to compel a reconsideration of the nature of the philosophic attitude to experience, and to press for some statement of its object and method, they will have been of real service. It is impossible, however, to attempt answers to these questions unless we keep in view what philosophy has done in the past, and unless we admit its connection with the texture of human experience, in much the same way that science and art take their place there, because somehow they are woven out of the substance of human life. If we ask for philosophy out of the clouds, we must not be surprised if we are given merely vapour.

Nothing seems plainer on a survey of the facts than that philosophy is a serious mental concern of a very small number of human individuals. There may be many who at intervals have an incidental interest in subjects to which the philosopher gives his whole mind. But such transitory interest is not philosophy, any more than stonebreaking is sculpture, or gossip history. The vast hordes of mankind who cross the fields of space and time allotted to humanity know nothing of philosophy, care nothing for its problems, and have not the slightest desire for its solutions. Races of men rise and pass on, whose ideas never go beyond the degree of generality that is required to link one day with the next, and are composed to their inmost fibre of the material drawn from immediate sensuous experience. For the majority, the barren hours of abundant leisure are not even

occupied with those dreamy imaginings of the unseen which for a small minority sometimes act as a substitute for the meditations of the philosopher.

The very language of vast masses of mankind makes continuous conceptual thinking impossible, and the communication to them of philosophical ideas from another nation an insuperable task. With the utmost industry and ingenuity at his disposal, it may be safely said that no one could succeed in translating the reflections of the *Critique of Pure Reason* into the language of the Fiji Islanders, even if benevolent enthusiasm should make any one think the undertaking desirable. With the complacent self-centredness characteristic of European civilisation, we divide mankind into East and West, and maintain that the philosophical spirit has found no dwelling-place east of the Grecian Archipelago.

We do not so readily draw the inference that philosophy is thus historically shown to be a peculiar outcrop of a specific type of mind inhabiting a particular geographical area of the globe, and that the critical temperament which cherishes philosophical discussion is incompatible with the mental attitude of mankind in other regions of the Earth. We may go further, and say that in a matter of this kind the facts justify the conclusion that where philosophy has not been cultivated by peoples whose history goes back to untold ages, it has simply not been a mental necessity of their lives. It meets no need of their nature ; its puzzles and solutions, its postulates and demonstrations, would mean nothing for them, would raise neither curiosity nor admiration, but would be merely as the voice of the skylark in the ear of a sparrow. Even when we restrict our attention to those civilised nations of the West among which philosophy has been cultivated to any extent, we cannot for a moment maintain that a reasoned intelligible answer to any philosophical problem would gratify the curiosity, or would meet a real mental want, of more than a comparatively insignificant number of individuals.

Considerations like these should suggest some sobering reflections to the select company of the philosophers. Preoccupation with their necessary or self-allotted task is apt to distort the perspective of the undertaking. They are readily affected by the fallacy of over-concentration, and tend to suffer from philosopher's

blindness. Claiming to think out for themselves important human problems, they come to regard themselves as representatives of humanity ; and from this the step seems easy to the assumption that the intellectual fate of humanity hangs in the balance of their mental scales. They forget that what are problems for themselves are either instinctive possessions of humanity at large or do not exist as vital interests for humanity in general. On the first alternative, humanity requires no representative who at best can but reaffirm primary human convictions, can but give reasons (good or bad) for what is believed on instinct : on the second, the fate of humanity cannot be affected by the solution, or the failure of a solution, of a question in which it is in general not interested. Moreover, from the position that philosophical problems are genuine human problems we cannot draw the inference that they are of universal human significance. They are only of import to those human individuals who are capable of seeing them, and are compelled by their mental history to raise and to try to solve them. They are the outgrowth of the mentality of certain human units or a certain type of human individual. They do not concern those whose mental constitution does not contain this peculiar form of intellectual sensitiveness or irritability. The problems are doubtless none the less real problems arising out of the situation of human beings on the globe ; for the human beings who are awake to their meaning have as much right to fulfil their human life in raising these questions as others in ignoring them. So long as this is all that is meant by the phrase " problems of human interest," there can be no objection to treating the problems of philosophy as of this kind. There can be no doubt, however, that the phrase as generally used means much more. We have merely to recall the familiar appeal to the principle of " universality " as a test of truth, the idea of " universal law " for all mankind as a test of moral duty, the conception of " universal consciousness " or " consciousness in general " as a ground of real experience—to see at once that the intention of the philosopher is to deal with problems as if they existed for all mankind, and to speak for all humanity when he offers a solution. But it is plain on the facts that the position of a philosopher relatively to humanity is at the

best purely hypothetical. What he can maintain at most is that if a human being were to raise such problems as he raises, the solution should take the form he offers. The genesis of an ultimate question is the origin of philosophy ; and behind that question lies the peculiar mental constitution, endowment, and development of a specific type of human mind. The answer is co-relative to the mind that appreciates the question. Historically speaking, it cannot be asserted that the question is a necessary one ; all that can be said is that it happens to be raised by a certain number of human minds. In that sense philosophy is an incident, an event (no doubt an important event) in the history of mankind. Philosophers may regard the question as necessary, but not for a better reason than any other question is necessary. The only reason is that the mental development and type of conscious existence of the philosopher take the form and direction which raise the ultimate question. The mental life of millions of other human beings does not take that direction, and that is the only reason these do not raise the question. In other words, the sole reason for considering the philosophical question inevitable for one type of mind, equally explains why it is not inevitable for others, viz. the special constitution of their mental life. The philosophical mood has no better justification than any special instinct, or than any rare intuition ; it forces itself on some minds, and these minds must follow it if they are to fulfil their peculiar mental needs. When philosophers try to prove the problem of philosophy to be necessary in the sense that the very nature of humanity involves it, they are merely accentuating the importance of philosophy to themselves by saying that this is the special way a human mind works in their special case. They are not justified in history or in logic in maintaining that the human mind in general does not work out its destiny, or cannot fulfil its purpose, unless it tries to solve philosophical questions. A philosophical justification of the problem of philosophy is either a repetition instead of a solution of the point at issue, or else is an obvious *petitio principii*. If philosophers undertake their task, as many have done, "in the interests of humanity," "to support or justify the great postulates of human life," this is no doubt an excellent motive for their

endeavours, and gives a moral impetus to their industry. But except as showing the intimate connection between their own type of human mind and the questions they raise, such meritorious benevolence is either misplaced or philosophically inadequate. It is misplaced if it implies that the postulates are unsafe without such justification, and that the majority of mankind await in anxiety the fate of their postulates at the hands of philosophers ; it is philosophically inadequate if it implies that philosophy is restricted to such an interest in its problems, and is not warranted in raising, should some philosophical mind feel called upon to do so, the further question whether there are such postulates at all, or the question whether humanity's postulates have any ultimate place in the nature of things.

II

There can be no doubt, then, that the claim of the philosopher to be a representative of humanity as a whole, when he engages in the task of philosophy, is due to a false perspective and the exaggeration of over-concentration. If he could point to a body of doctrine agreed upon by all who have pursued the business of philosophy, and could, again, show that such a body of doctrine has raised the mental level of mankind, there would be some historical, if not logical, foundation for his claim to speak for and to humanity. It is just the existence of such an accepted range of common knowledge which gives a certain strength to the claims of science, or at least of some sciences, to speak in the name of the higher interests of humanity, and to be a great civilising agency in the higher evolution of the race. We may grant that the agreement amongst scientists is restricted within certain, perhaps narrow, limits. Still within these limits it is relatively constant and unambiguous over a long period of time. Moreover, even when the alteration of conceptions can be historically ascertained, the change of view is in many cases continuous, and in all cases leads, in spite of temporary opposition to new ideas, to an ultimate stability of scientific opinion. Except in the interests of a particular philosophical theory, the same cannot be said to be true of philosophy. Philosophical doctrine changes,

but does not change continuously in a definite uniform direction. It changes mainly by way of opposition between theories, each of which in turn claims to be a final answer to the same fundamental problems, and therefore to be true at the expense of and by negation of the preceding. At no time can any theory be held to express a common clearly reasoned conviction on the part even of the best philosophical minds of a given epoch, no matter how short the epoch may be. What is more remarkable is that when a philosophical theory does hold sway over a fair number of minds for a considerable time, the philosophical spirit seems to decline: authority takes the place of understanding, inquiry gives way to exegesis, and criticism to commentary. It would seem, therefore, that what is a sign of life in science is a symptom of decay in philosophy; for common agreement is the healthy atmosphere in which science flourishes and comes to maturity, while the uniformity of opinion which creates a philosophical school checks the growth of the spirit of philosophical criticism. Or, from the other side, individuality in science is a restriction on the value of the truths enunciated, but in philosophy it is the life and energy of the whole attitude. In some respects the position of the philosopher resembles that of the poet; his synoptic outlook on the world is inseparable from the focus of his individual perspective. The greater and more comprehensive his individuality, the more of humanity it contains within itself, the more will his deliverances meet with some response from certain of his fellowmen, of equal or less spiritual compass than himself. But in no case is the elimination of his individuality possible, consistently with his claim to gather the scattered rays of the world's reason into the perspective of his own mind. He cannot begin by assuming that his mind is representative of all humanity, or even of the humanity of his own epoch and race. He can only discover that he is representative of other minds after the event, if his thoughts meet their thoughts, if his deliverances are acknowledged by others. Indeed, most philosophers seek in the first instance to satisfy their own mental demands by carrying their thoughts to the limit of their own capacity and mind. Having done this to their own satisfaction, the result is left to the "judgment of the world," which in this case is the

judgment of the like-minded. This being so, direct continuity of thought on the ultimate issues of philosophy cannot be expected in the same way as it is expected and aimed at by science. There may be much overlapping or intersecting of the regions of thought explored and delineated by the several philosophers; but complete identity of synoptic vision is in the nature of the case impossible. As long as human individuality counts as an essential factor in the constitution of the philosophical problem, this conclusion is inevitable, whatever be the corollaries to which it leads when we seek to estimate the nature and value of the work of philosophy. For to each individuality the world is a different world; and the more intense and definite the individuality, the more clearly is this seen. The interest in "the world-problem" arises from the special way in which the world appeals to a given individual. The elimination of his individuality in the make-up of the problem would involve the elimination of his interest in it. Hence it is that we never find any philosopher accepting *en bloc* the system of another; the agreement wherever it exists is always partial and qualified, or covers particular points; and even the ideas agreed upon are recast in order to fit into the central point of view at which each stands. It may be said that the general concepts adopted are so framed as to form a common meeting ground for the different minds engaged with the same problem, and that the use of such general concepts is intended to establish agreement, not to express difference. But this is not altogether the correct statement of the situation. The general concepts are due to the generality and extent of the objects which the sweep of the philosopher's vision covers at a single *coup d'œil*; and the inter-communication of these concepts by different minds is an important but an indirect consequence of their generality. The orbit of one mind intersects that of another, because the range of the field contemplated by each is sufficiently wide to cover partially that of another. They are both in the same world, although it is a different world for each; and the generality of the objects considered makes overlapping of interests in part possible, and is the way in which community in the same world is established. The concepts are not devised for purposes of human intercourse between philosophers; intercourse

is rather the result of the character of the concepts in question. In very few cases can the ultimate concepts of different philosophers be completely coincident in meaning ; in most cases they merely intersect with varying extent of area ; in every case the coincidence, partial or complete, neither destroys nor dispenses with the individuality of the outlook which constitutes the philosophical attitude of each towards the world. The very fact that the philosopher A's position in the world is itself part of the content of the world as viewed by the philosopher B, and *vice versa*, ought to make it sufficiently clear that no complete transmutation or superposition of synoptic visions is possible for the two thinkers. This accounts for the difficulty philosophers have in understanding each other, an understanding which may vary from sceptical distrust to "general agreement."¹ It also lets us see that the attempt to identify conceptual thought with a transfinite point of view and to eliminate individual vision by a traffic with abstractions, is to confuse similarity of purpose with identity of interests, community of object with coincidence of mental outlook, the angularity of perspective with the parallel rays.

III

There are many reasons why the majority of mankind seem to find no mental necessity in the pursuit of philosophy. Philosophy, it has been said, requires leisure, and most people have not the requisite detachment from pressing everyday practical concerns to enable them to give themselves to contemplation. There is a strange *naïveté* or self-satisfied illusion in this reflection, in which Aristotle sums up the condition distinguishing practical and theoretical life. If the taper of a man's intellect kindles at the touch of the fire of knowledge, doubtless it will require the retreat of protected silence in which to burn aright. But the plain fact is that most men do not want this kind or amount of knowledge which philosophy seeks to obtain. Their intellects do not respond to the call of "truth for

¹ "General agreement" in many cases is due to courtesy or good nature. The social instinct is so much stronger than intellectual energy.

truth's sake," or "truth to the uttermost," which is said to be the prevailing note of philosophy. Give them ever so much leisure, and they will fill it anyhow rather than with contemplation. There are and have been thousands who have no lack of leisure, but they prefer to fill it with fighting or fox-hunting instead of philosophy. And, on the other hand, any one pressed hard by practical affairs can, if he choose, either make room for meditation or decrease his interest in practice in order to increase his interest in theoretic life. Diogenes and Plato had both leisure enough for philosophy; but their relation to the practical goods of life was very different—all the difference between neglect and control. Leisure can be made for whatever ends a man seriously cares to pursue. It requires leisure to be a useful practical man, as well as to be a philosopher; and a man must be undisturbed by the misgivings and pre-occupations of the thinker if he is to accomplish anything practical. What each requires is not so much detachment as concentration on his selected purpose, and this quality presupposes the necessary mental endowment and interest for the task he has in view. In our own day there is more truth, or at least more of what passes for knowledge, than most men care about. If it be said that philosophy is the best way to use the leisure which a man has, this is by no means obvious to any one except the philosopher by disposition, whose predilection does not make him an altogether impartial judge.

The truth, in short, is that philosophy seeks to secure a special kind of mental satisfaction, and the pursuit of this satisfaction is in the long run literally a matter of selective choice on the part of the individual. Philosophy at its best seeks to supply a connected intellectual grasp of the world which will satisfy a man's capacity for thinking out the nature of things. When attained, it brings a peculiar consciousness of intellectual repose in face of the changing course of events and the endless array of finite phenomena, which is unlike any other state of mind, which is incommunal, and which is unmistakable by anyone who has been even partially aware of it. No one who has had the glowing consciousness of an illuminating idea ever doubts that he has arrived at the satisfaction he was in search of;

but because it can neither be described nor shared, he never regards it as anything but the reward of his own individual choice. There is, indeed, no substitute for this satisfaction, and so no substitute for philosophy. But there are other ways of attaining mental satisfaction, completely adequate to other types of mentality; and these may be selected for their own sake with as much justification as the pursuit of philosophy. In some cases they are as enduring and as valuable as philosophy; for there are other attitudes even to the world as a whole than that of philosophy. A connected conceptional scheme of the world is not the only way to be mentally at peace with it.

It should not be supposed, however, that the activity of conceptual thought is necessarily at its best in philosophy, or that philosophy has the privilege of realising thought processes at their highest level. Apart from the fact that the history of philosophy would be but an ironical commentary on this pretension, and apart from the insoluble difficulty of establishing the proper method of philosophy, we find the contrast familiarly made between philosophical thinking and scientific thinking, a contrast accepted apparently by philosophers as a sound distinction. Thinking that goes beyond the wants or limits of science is said to be philosophical thinking. But since science claims to have a complete and rigorous regard for all verifiable truth, the thinking that trespasses beyond this area is not merely unscientific in the neutral sense, but untrue in every sense. It is a strange flattery that science pays to philosophy when it thus hands over to philosophy its own unsolved or insoluble problems; and it shows a singular *naïveté* of mind if philosophers accept as a compliment what can only be a thinly veiled satire. If we consider, not the problems dealt with by science and philosophy respectively, but the procedure of thought in the two cases, a similar contrast is drawn between the two. For while science aims at supplying all "exact" knowledge, the handling of all knowledge which is incapable of exact treatment is generously conceded to philosophers.¹ It need hardly be said that, if these contrasts are tenable, philosophy cannot claim to occupy a peculiarly privileged position as an exponent of the highest form

¹ Cf. Merz, *History of European thought*, ii. 550.

of conceptual activity. And when it is added that many of the strongest intellects in science deliberately avoid all association with philosophy on pain of losing caste with the scientific world, there is *prima facie* more occasion for humility than exaltation in the attempt to find complete satisfaction for intellectual needs along the line of philosophical reflection.

A further consideration suggests itself. Even intellectual activity at its best is not necessarily found by way of argument and inference, which are so steadily pursued by science and philosophy. These are often but lengthy processes of articulating a swift and consummate intellectual insight, which is as sure in its grasp of the nature of the object dealt with as any long series of inferences, and which at any rate is not rendered more certain of its comprehension at the end of the sorites than it is at the stage of initial insight. The process of inference may, in a great many cases, only articulate a concentrated direct vision, which is not less but often more satisfying intellectually than the lumbering pedantry of circuitous syllogisms. Indeed, it is admitted by some logicians that the longer the process of argument the greater the danger of error in the conclusion. If it is sometimes true that reasoning may be sound in spite of the deliverance of insight, it is as often equally true that an intuition is sure despite the process of reasoning. It is with intellectual activity in science as with the operation of intellect in daily life which we call practical wisdom. A wise man may be able to give reasons for a line of conduct; a wiser man can feel sure of himself and his insight without reasons, or even in spite of them. A penetrating aphorism is not the result of detailed logical articulation of thought, and goes home none the less swiftly. Logic is the minister not the prince of intelligence; and wit is the master of wisdom, none the less so because it can stoop to be the servant of folly. If an error can be successfully assailed by a witticism, we but make ourselves ridiculous if we painfully circumvent it by a syllogism: just as an overwhelming *coup de main* renders all elaborate strategy unnecessary.

It should not be forgotten, again, that the satisfaction to the cravings of the intellect which philosophy aspires to give, is one which can only be sought because of a peculiar forceful energy of

mind. It seems inseparably associated not simply with unusual curiosity, and uncommon intellectual disquiet, but with a kind of indomitable resolution of will, that refuses to give way before obstacles and must see things to the end. It is a mood that has invariably been supported by singular powers of passion, of solitary self-reliance, and resistless intellectual courage. In some cases we feel that results have been achieved and systems established by sheer determination to get to an end somehow, rather than give in for want of inspiration. It is plain that the qualities that make for such a purpose, while certainly not found in many men, are especially attributes of the masculine form of the human mind. Systems of philosophy are created by men for men, and where they are not a matter of sheer indifference or contempt to the feminine mind, they form the subject of detached curiosity, critical amusement, or feminine wonderment at this singular display of masculine activity. In the face of these facts, evident to any student of human nature, and known to most teachers of philosophical literature, there can be no claim on the part of philosophy to be the only way by which even complete intellectual satisfaction is to be found by humanity.

IV

If philosophy, then, on the evidence suggested by its history and by the actual facts of experience, is not and cannot claim to be a universally necessary process of the human mind ; if it is a peculiar attitude adopted by a specific type of mind and associated with geographical situation, racial character, individual endowment, and even the climatic conditions of human life ; if it seems by its very nature incapable of establishing uniformity of result or continuity of development amongst those who do prosecute its problems—what kind of contribution does it make to human achievement ?

It need hardly be said that the smallness of the company of philosophical minds, relatively to the whole of mankind, is not of itself a consideration which determines the significance of philosophy in the scheme of human life. However much the fact may modify the ambitions of the enthusiastic, and qualify

the pretensions even of the most confident to speak for all mankind, still the value is not decreased by the mere admission that few are concerned in its maintenance. Nor is that value necessarily increased by the same admission. Doubtless, rarity is an element determining the nature of value ; the best things are often few in number. But a minority may consist of fools, as well as of wise men. The fact of number, in short, is irrelevant when we are considering the true place of a type of mind in the scheme of experience. A whole nation of men might find the proof of the law of gravitation meaningless, and thereby proclaim the limitations of their intellect. The few amongst mankind who claim to have seen ghosts have never been able to convict the remainder of defective vision.

Philosophers have often traded on the connection between value and numerical limitation, much to the annoyance of the excluded majority, never to the ultimate triumph of their ideas, and rarely without preparing the way for their own discomfiture. Supremacy of character is only realised by having overcome the pride that goes before the fall ; and superiority of intellect is only obtained by the self-negation which knows no detachment from its object, and finds its highest achievement in the modesty of self-oblivion. This is particularly the case in philosophy where the intellect goes out to meet so vast an object, and where both the magnitude of the task as well as the extremely limited success hitherto attained in fulfilling it, leaves so little time or room for intellectual self-complacency. Even if the philosophers were successful to any degree in carrying out their undertaking, the result achieved, so far as it is true, ceases at once to be a private possession, it becomes a truth for other minds, and obtains its human value on that account. To turn the result of thought into private gain or glory, has always in the long run given it the appearance of being a mere private opinion ; and what pretends to be sublime truth thus becomes at a single step the object of ridicule and contempt. What gains respect for philosophers is not so much the result achieved by their thinking, as the supreme importance to all mankind of the object they seek to understand ; and in the presence of this object there is no place for vain glory.

The importance of philosophy, then, is not to be decided one way or another by the restricted range of individuals who are interested in the solution of its problems. This must be determined by the peculiar character of the mental activity it involves, and, simultaneously, by the kind of end it seeks to attain.

In order to bring into clear relief what the philosopher aims at, one must first of all recognise the significance of the elementary fact that philosophy is a specific attitude or mood of a human individual whose mental life is permeated from its earliest to its latest stages by social influences. He is not merely socially conditioned ; his whole being is socially constituted. Moreover, the mood of philosophy, if it appears at all, does not arise till his experience as a social being has matured. By that time the structure and composition of his mind are saturated with the substance of the social consciousness in which he has been nurtured and which has made him what he is. What he means by his individual mind is largely obtained through intercourse with his society.¹

¹ The most characteristic forms of social intercourse appear in the interchange of ideas through language, and in sharing duties, rights and institutions. These media of inter-communication constitute the substance of the social order which the individual finds awaiting him when he enters the historical society into which he is born. They are given to him as material for his nurture and upbuilding into conscious membership in the community. In the early stages he has no choice but to accept and assimilate, and only later does he venture to modify or reject ; and to the last his individuality is sustained through ever deeper intercourse with his social heritage. Its value to him and its power over him remain overwhelming. The individuality he acquires, therefore, and thinks of as his own, is the outgrowth of social agencies, which have endowed him with his substance. One may say that in the normal healthy individual, the sense of distinction within the social communion is never carried to the breaking point of separation ; it is always maintained consistently with continued social intercourse. Complete mental insulation is the last agony of the human mind. The individuality in which any one consists, is, then, largely social in origin, social in composition, social in its forms of self-maintenance.

This fact might be a matter of indifference to the problem of philosophy, if the mind which philosophy seeks to satisfy had a kind of abstract unitary self, detachable from the conditions of its origin, in much the same way as a kernel may be isolated from its shell. In this case the social system would be merely the historical medium of its development, and could be cast off as soon as the self was consciously established. But in reality the individual mind is utterly inseparable from what it contains, and its self is its whole mind, not any element within it however central in

Society has moulded the individual mind of the philosopher before he adopts the philosophical mood. Before he can think "for himself," he must have acquired the distinctive individuality which only social influence can create ; and the mind that thinks philosophically is already a mind with a specific constitution. His individual activity may be directed to satisfy his own mind ; but the mind that is to be satisfied is not an abstraction ; it has, from the first, a definite organisation and is saturated with social influences. It is commonly said that a philosopher's problems are set by his historical situation ; and this is true. But it is even more important to observe that the philosopher's own mind is itself moulded under the pressure of specific historical agencies, and takes on the shape determined by its social origin and constitution. It may think abstract things in abstract ways ; but it is naïve confusion to suppose that a mind which thinks abstractly is itself a pure abstraction, that a mind which thinks about universal objects is a universal mind.

Given an individual mind of this nature, the philosopher's peculiar interest may be said to be a consequence and an

importance. The mind is what and how it thinks, what and how it acts, what and how it feels. And the "what" and the "how" in every case reflect and involve its social origin and connection. Not to speak of the language which embodies his thought and conditions his reflection, his ideas of the world, of nature, and of human life, are, in the first instance, those that prevail in the social order to which the individual belongs, so far as the individual has assimilated the religion, the knowledge, and the moral judgments of his tribe or nation. His further modification and criticism of these ideas are carried on by constant reference to standards of intelligibility which will keep him in touch with his immediate social environment. He thinks in order to be understood, *i.e.* to develop intellectual communion with his fellows. His character and behaviour will be tolerated and accepted only if they reveal the type of social life of which he is a member. His very feelings, instincts, and emotions take their form from the racial constitution of his people. From his highest aspirations to the half-unconscious suggestions which come like shadowy recollections from an unremembered past, his mental processes betray his racial and ancestral heritage. It is such a mind, so constituted, and no other, that seeks satisfaction in the mood of philosophy. The unity which it possesses is, in the first instance, largely an ethical unity, the unity of a personality with mental tendencies of its own and with claims and with duties in a social group. It is in this sense that the individual attaches reality to his own particular existence as distinct from others. And his unity is not that of a focal point but of an organised system of functions ; for this alone can justify the claim to be regarded as a distinctive member of a social order.

accentuation of his specific individuality. Like every one else he selects his special function because he is individual, and by selection consolidates individuality still further. In this selection alone lies the abstract character of his task ; and in the same sense every individual by specialising becomes abstract. He is giving up the whole or the most of his activity to what is admittedly but an element of his concrete nature. Neither the philosopher's mind nor his occupation is abstract merely because he is concerned with thought and thinking ; for every one thinks, and thought is not necessarily abstract. His peculiarity lies in seeking to satisfy his individuality to the completest extent that the special function of thinking makes possible ; or, what comes to the same thing, he tries to carry out the mental activity of thought to its uttermost and fulfil its highest demands. To get the utmost satisfaction for his individual nature which thinking can give him, is by no means an abstract achievement. It is regarded as such only by those who identify concreteness and reality with what belongs to the senses to the exclusion of thought, which by contrast is abstract. But in truth the essence of the abstraction here lies precisely in the process of exclusion ; and if thought when excluded from sense-perception is abstract, equally so is sense-perception when cast off from thought. The only concrete mental reality is the continuity or diffusion of the two. And it requires very little experience of life to learn that over-concentration on the satisfaction which sense can give, will prove as one-sided as any other one-sided exaggeration.

V

What starts the philosopher on the pursuit of his special form of satisfaction is the influence exerted on his mind by the development of general ideas embodied in language. These are at once the creation and the condition of complex social intercourse, and symbolise continuous community of mind with mind. The use of language helps to substantiate ideas till they appear to the mind as real as things outside. When handed about from one individual to another they assume an

independence which resembles the objects of nature. They are so intimately associated with the operations of the individual mind using them, that they seem to be his own, and yet they expand his mental range indefinitely beyond himself. There is no sphere of his mental life where he feels more at liberty, and none where he feels so much at home. It is not surprising that the discovery of the existence of this socially created realm of ideas should thrill to intoxication a certain type of mind, and suggest the possibility of finding in the life of thought alone the very heart's desire. It is only after the stage of free ideas has been attained by the mind that the pursuit of ideas for their own sake can be undertaken; and this is the selective interest of the philosopher.

The philosophical mood, then, consists in seeking the maximum of satisfaction which the function of thinking can afford the individual. It is thus distinct from all restricted ways of thinking, whether the limitations are determined by practical considerations, by the artificial boundaries of the special sciences, or, it may be, by intellectual indifference. The only restriction imposed on the philosopher's form of thinking arises from the special quality of his mind and his capacity to follow wherever thought leads him. This will affect the range of his philosophical inquiry, and the degree of success with which he will be able to prosecute it.

The "maximum of satisfaction" to be had from thinking, might be interpreted in different senses. It might mean the satisfaction obtained by thinking as much, and about as many things, as possible. This is often spoken of as philosophy; philosophy is then identified with unusual intellectual curiosity. There is, however, in such a case, no maximum secured or obtainable; we have an indefinite series, or perhaps an unlimited continuity, of pleasant states of mind, but neither internal coherence nor finality in the results acquired. Interest in all objects of all thought is doubtless an important characteristic of the mood of one who claims to be a "spectator of all time and all existence." But the philosopher in thinking seeks finality rather than extent: it is in a certain quality of thought and not in quantity that the maximum of satisfaction lies. This is found

in the end by which and in which thinking is fulfilled ; for thinking, being a mental activity, is directed upon, and is realised in an end of its own. When attained, we have all that thought can accomplish and the mind rests satisfied in the result. Here we have the kind of satisfaction which philosophy specially and properly seeks to supply.

But at this point philosophers begin at once to diverge. They have understood, or they have sought, this end of the thinking activity in several ways. Certainly they all agree that finality must at least be assumed or demanded, otherwise there would be no peculiar task for philosophy to carry out ; for to start any undertaking implies not only that we have something definite in view, but that the object dealt with has a circumscribed nature of its own. But some have taken philosophy to be the search for certain ultimate irreducible forms or elements of thought, each of which is final and the total number of which is fixed, presumably by the nature of thought itself.¹ Others, again, have looked upon the end of thinking as a kind of goal towards which it works. The end guides the direction of its activity and at the same time determines the frontiers within which it can operate legitimately, and beyond which, indeed, it becomes a trespasser or worse—an aimless vagrant.² Still others consider the finality sought for to be that of a self-closed system or world of thought, which contains explicitly and implicitly all that thinking can accomplish, and in the construction of which it at once exhausts itself completely and fulfils its activity.³

Such divergent views are doubtless in part to be traced to the manifest ambiguity that lies hidden in words like “final,” “ultimate,” “complete.” This explains, if it does not justify, a

¹ This is one of the commonest views of the thinking philosophy has to do with. It controls formal logic and much psychology. Many special sciences are said to be conducted philosophically in this sense. Aristotle's *Metaphysics* is almost exclusively dominated by this conception.

² This is the view of all those who regard philosophy as the search for the limits of thought. Allied to this is the inquiry into the criterion of truth ; here all thinking can be brought to its end at once by applying this touchstone. Kant is one of the most conspicuous examples of this type of philosopher ; but the type has many varied representatives.

³ All metaphysical systems and cosmic theories belong to this type. Spencer and Hegel may be considered conspicuous representatives.

one-sided interpretation, often adopted for historical reasons or even quite uncritically. They all, however, seem to imply that in "thinking to the end" philosophy is concerned with a kind of *terminus ad quem* which is somehow to arrest thought and prevent it from going any further. The crudest form in which this appears is where the object of thought is always looked upon as a barrier impeding the free exercise of thinking, and the "ultimate object" is a last obstacle which thought by no effort can surmount. But the same idea is involved when we seek the end of thought in a "supreme unity" which is the highest object to which thought can aspire. The former of these views needs no serious consideration: it is due to an elementary confusion between an object of thought and an external existence outside the individual. The other view merits some attention, if only in order to bring out more precisely the general nature of the thinking process.

VI

We cannot remind ourselves too often that articulate thinking is a function, and but one specialised function, of the individual mind. It arises late in mental evolution, and plays its distinctive part alongside various other mental functions, such as perceiving, desiring, remembering. The activity of thinking consists in that operation by which the individual mind concerned unites elements presented as different, and thereby constitutes a single whole, a mental unity in difference, a thought, which in its highest form is the concept. We cannot, except for purposes of abstract analysis, separate the thinking from the thought, the conceiving from the concept. The only reality in the case is the individual mind exercising the function of thinking so as to produce or evolve thought. But for the influence of language, which has the effect of externalising the thought and cutting it off from the activity of thinking, we should never in theory, as we do not in experience, dissociate the function from its fulfilment,¹ any more than we can separate the function of thinking

¹ When the mental process is entirely separated from the result of thinking we arrive at the singular position adopted, *l.e.g.* by Mr. Bradley, that the process is purely

from the mind which realises itself by exercising such a function. We do not treat the functions of an organism as if they existed and operated of themselves ; it is the organism as an individual body which functions in different ways. We do not look upon the action of a physical mass as independent of the thing which acts ; the action is the action of the thing. Even a man's acts are not separated from the man, no matter how much they seem outside him ; we look on them as expressions of character and continuous in quality with his motives and intentions. The same holds true of a man's thinking and his thought. Thinking has its being only as a function of an individual mind, and thoughts are but the culmination of the process of thinking, the process of consciously unifying discrete differences.

It is necessary to lay stress on this point not merely on general grounds, but in order to make clear the special nature of philosophical thinking. When thinking in its highest form is detached from the concrete individuality in whom alone thinking is found, two effects generally appear. Thinking is regarded as a sort of self-acting mental mechanism which works according to certain laws of its own, turns out results of an impersonal character, *i.e.* neither of peculiar value for, nor derived from, the individual, and may turn out results that put the individual mind to sheer confusion and dismay. The other effect is seen in the supposition that a supreme unity of thought subsists independently of thinking, and is either its precondition or its goal

"symbolic," a mental sign, the result alone being "significant." This is curiously reminiscent of Berkeley's theory of Natural Law. If the process is merely a symbol the result cannot be anything more ; if it is a significant symbol we do not isolate it from the result. Such a view is as abstract and inadequate as the opposite theory, that the mental process is alone real and the result a mere symbol. And, indeed, if we insist on isolating the process from the result, it is irrelevant which we treat as symbol and which as reality.

When the reality of the process is transformed into a symbol, the result becomes a floating adjective, a world of ideal meanings, and thinking loses touch with the reality of mental life altogether.

It is curious to note the entanglement to which this paradoxical view leads when it is accepted with all its consequences. Mr. Bosanquet, who follows Mr. Bradley, provides a good illustration of this in a discussion in his *Logic*, vol. i., Introduction, § 7. There seems nothing gained and much lost by reading an intelligible phrase backwards. "The meaning of the world" has a straightforward significance : "the world of meaning" is not even a good metaphor.

and consummation. These effects are in a manner inevitable : for if we eliminate the individual mind from the thinking function, thinking must work like a self-acting machine ;¹ and if the thinking be a self-complete mechanism, it may very well have a corresponding independent self-complete object upon which it is directed.

When thinking is thus mechanised, concepts assume an almost spatial precision of outline, and arrange themselves one beside another in a sort of intellectual mosaic called a scheme of thought. The thinking agent is turned into a quasi-external spectator of his own processes, watching the revolutions of his intellect as it produces concept, hypothesis, and inference, and having neither the power nor the interest to participate in its operations. At its best the work of thinking seems to go on with a severe rigour of logical necessity that rivals the inevitableness of fate itself, and the helpless beholder feels himself in the grasp of his innermost destiny, all the more irresistible because it is not without him. So far from turning from such conditions of thinking, the mechanised intellect sometimes regards such necessity as an ideal :² in science it becomes an indwelling prejudice,³ and in philosophy it may be even an obsession. In other minds, however, when this view of thinking prevails, there is an instinctive recoil. Thinking which is thus fateful and irresistible seems after a time fatuous, wearisome, depressing.⁴ The very monotony of the click-clack of the logical machine as it works out successfully its syllogisms and inferences dulls the mind to the vitality of truth. There is felt to be an element of pathos and even tragedy in a human mind possessing within itself a piece of mechanism that operates regardless of the interests and the choice of the individual, nay, so completely indifferent that it

¹ Cf. Bergson's view that the intellect can only deal successfully with spatial and mechanical aspects of the world—probably on the old principle that like only knows like.

² Cf. the well-known passage in Mill's *Autobiography*, where he describes the effect of science on the sense of beauty.

³ Cf. Huxley's strangely expressed desire to have an intellect that would turn out truth with automatic and unerring precision.

⁴ *E.g.* when the mind is controlled by the bias towards scientific demonstration and certainty in the form supplied by the mechanical and mathematical sciences.

may produce results which spell ruin to his dearest hopes. To be carried along by the irresistible force of a sequence of thought while the individual mind watches the process as from the deck of a ship, may well seem to the mind much the same as being swept away on a high tide of passion ; for if in the latter case we lose ourselves in chaos, in the other case we never find ourselves at all. The impersonal character of the result, which is secured by "eliminating the individual," must be a defect and not a merit, if what is independent of the individual is no better than indifferent to him. Indeed, the impersonal closely resembles the non-human, and what lies outside humanity may be beneath a man's regard and not an object inspiring his devotion. Thus the ambition to secure impersonal thought by dispensing with the individual mind overreaches itself ; a result is obtained which the individual mind can cheerfully dispense with altogether. And against this judgment of the individual there can be no appeal, for this alone can determine whether the product is worthy of pursuit and possession. The worship of a mental mechanism and its product is the worship of an idol of our own devising ; it degrades because it terrifies, and it terrifies because it is external to human individuality as a whole. Like many other superstitions it disappears as soon as it is replaced in the context of the individual life from which it should never have been detached. Thinking is nothing more than a specific function exercised by the individual mind. From this it draws its vitality. The individual effort involved in all thinking is inseparable from its very nature, conditioning its process, and in large measure determining its results. While the procedure of thinking has its own peculiar laws and aims, as the laws of seeing are different from those of hearing, the function is fulfilled in connection with the whole scheme of the individual life, separation from which leads not to healthy development but towards disease and dissolution.

VII

The assumption of an independent supreme unity, forming the culminating point towards which thinking strives, seems quite unnecessary for the exercise of this function in the

case of philosophy. Such an assumption is, in fact, nothing but a substantiation of the function of unifying in which, as already stated, thinking consists. The only concrete reality in thinking is the individual mind that thinks; this alone "unifies." The unity of thought is not an objective quasi-external entity subsisting independently of the mind; it is that in which the process of thinking terminates and is focussed. The completion of the function, however, is inseparable from and in no sense independent of the function itself.

The supposition of an independent supreme unity is of no assistance to the thinking process. If thinking succeeds in securing unity in any given case, that is all the unity it requires or is capable of, in the situation before it. A supreme unity placed outside all thinking in order to guide its direction, remains for ever outside, and can never be attained at all. Moreover, if it could be attained it would arrest all thinking. Thus a unity apparently designed in the best interests of the function can only be reached at the price of the cessation of thought altogether. Lurking behind such an assumption there seems a half-acknowledged feeling that the process of thinking may be but a kind of mental defect, a species of intellectual disquiet that should be and will ultimately be allayed: much in the same way as desires are considered by certain ascetics to be little better than disturbances or troublesome eruptions on the surface of the soul, the satisfaction of them being but the state in which the disturbance is got rid of. If the supreme unity of thinking involves the cessation of the process, the attainment of it may well seem a doubtful boon to those whose highest sense of well-being is achieved in the exercise of this activity.¹ The supreme unity of knowledge is at best but an imaginatively presented idea of unity which is used practically as a regulative principle to guide the process of knowledge.

It is not difficult to see how the supreme unity comes to be regarded as an objective independent entity. In science and in

¹ This is doubtless the root of the objection so often made against any philosophical system claiming to be or to give the whole truth.

On the other hand, the preference of the "pursuit of truth" to the "possession of it," is an extreme and less defensible form of the same attitude of mind.

everyday life our thinking is circumscribed by the boundaries, deliberately and often arbitrarily fixed, of a specific object or field of objects. On this our activity is directed, and our function of unifying the different elements presented is kept within definite limits. The unity when attained is a definite and a systematically connected result, the achievement of which arrests the course of our thinking in that direction. If this familiar experience is generalised, we have the notion that ultimately and in the end all our thinking issues in a supreme form of unification which completes, and in that sense terminates, the operation of thinking. The circumscribed limitation which characterises the result of the operation of thinking in specific selected cases, is held to apply also to thinking in general, thinking which is non-selective. The former issues in a specific unifying principle or specific system of thought, the latter in a complete system of thoughts: in the former we have a "finite" object, in the latter an "infinite" object.

It is easy to show that such a generalisation of the activity of thinking is logically unsound. The fallacy is threefold. It assumes that, because our interpretation of a given object issues in a specific constructive system of thoughts, a body of truth, the mere construction of a system of thought will give us an interpretation of an object. It also assumes that because in the interpretation of a particular range of fact we proceed by constructing a connected system of its elements, for the interpretation of an absolute whole we must proceed by way of systematic connection. The third fallacy consists in supposing that because a systematic connection of thoughts about a given object furnishes the intelligible truth of that object, the systematic connection of the totality of thought will furnish the intelligible meaning of a whole which is never given as an object at all. It may be possible to construct a system of thoughts, and call this the supreme outcome of thought or philosophy. But we certainly cannot conclude from the nature of thinking that there is such a system, and therefore cannot dogmatically maintain that philosophy consists simply and solely in the construction of a system.

That our knowledge of finite reality proceeds by way of

systematic connection, is no proof that our knowledge of the whole of reality must proceed in the same way. On the contrary, the logical difference between part and whole would rather suggest that our way of grasping the whole must follow some other course. Nor is there any proof possible that the ultimate issue of knowledge is a system of thought. Why should knowledge come to rest at all? Why should it not find itself satisfied in the very activity of unifying the variety of detail presented to the mind, regardless of any final consummation in which thought would be completed at the price of cessation? In other words, why should the supreme unity of thought not be a guiding ideal purpose instead of a realised termination of its activity?

If we take the analogous cases of art and morality we can see that this conception of a final system of thought, a completed truth, is not the satisfaction thought requires. The final aim of art is not the construction of a system of beautiful objects. There is no such system imaginable. The ideal of beauty may be said in a sense to be one, whatever be the forms in which it is embodied.¹ But this does not imply that the aim of art is to realise a single supreme object of beauty, or that the unity of art is satisfied best in the attainment of one consummate expression of the whole of beauty. On the contrary, the aim of art is to concentrate the beautiful into separate creations, in each of which the ideal of beauty may be as fully satisfied as the medium employed permits. The medium varies in quality and in amount, whether it belong to the domain of sight and sound or touch. We do not expect a landscape to satisfy the sense of beauty in sound. Nor do we even imagine that there is but one supreme archetypal combination of colour and form that will alone perfectly delight the eye. A sonnet may be no less beautiful than a drama; and again one sonnet may be as beautiful as another, and both may be "perfectly beautiful" though perfectly different.

Similarly in the case of the good. The ideal of goodness is not a single scheme of personal life, even if such a scheme were compatible with the transitory quality of all good action, which is no sooner done than it recedes into the past of our lives, and its very goodness remains a mere memory. We do not imagine that

¹ Cf. Wallace, Gifford Lectures, p. 53.

the whole of goodness is to be concentrated into one supremely good act, or one supremely good person ; nor is it the realisation of one system of good will into which our separate expressions of will must fit if the whole of goodness is to be attained. An act, a desire, a feeling may be "as good as it can be," and that is the only goodness we have to consider. A system of acts or habits may be good, just as an isolated act may be good ; and sometimes a system is better than an act, sometimes an act is better than a system of acts. But we do not require to wait for the completion of a system of goodness before we can satisfy the demands of the moral ideal. Nor if such a system were the ideal could it satisfy our desire to attain it ; for the whole system would not be realised by any one act, and every part would be felt to be less than the ideal requires and thus in a sense a wrong. But in the moral life we can only proceed step by step. Our efforts and our acts are discrete pulses of activity ; and at each step we seek to embody the utmost that the morally best requires. Only so is our sense of the ideal satisfied. In other words, the moral ideal is regarded as capable of being found with us at each moment of our moral life, concentrated and fully felt in every beat and rhythm of desire and action.¹

Why should the satisfaction of the ideal of intellectual activity, which in its highest form we call philosophy, be attained in any other way than that followed in the case of the ideal of beauty or the ideal of goodness? In exercising the function of thought upon any specific object it may certainly be allowed that the function of unity is satisfied when the object is resolved into a system of conceptions. But to suppose that this function of unity which creates the system is itself a system, is not warranted either by logic or by an analysis of the mental operation. Moreover, to maintain that the highest unity of thought must be expressed as a complete or final system of conceptions, is to assume that ultimate reality—that in which thinking finally secures satisfaction—is on the same footing as any finite object presented to thought. But ultimate reality, the whole, is strictly speaking not a single object at all ; and this for the simple reason that it includes at once "all objects of all thought," and

¹ This is the essential element of truth in the pleasure theory of the moral end.

also thought itself which deals with objects. If the whole is really the whole without qualification, then the thinker and his thought fall within it as truly as any finite element whatsoever. The thinker's thought about the whole is itself a part of the whole from which by hypothesis it professes to be detached in order to make the whole its object. Those who ignore this in the interests of constructing a final system do so by the simple process of identifying the essential nature of thought as a function of unifying difference, with the supreme object of thought; and this carries with it the corollary that this unity is a self-evolving organism which, as it develops, assumes the form of a systematic whole of conceptions.

Apart, however, from these objections it is to be noted that the construction of a complete system of conceptions is not carried out simply in the interests of knowledge. Its underlying motive is æsthetic.¹ It is the work of the creative artist using as his material the abstract results of conceptional activity. His aim is to secure the æsthetic satisfaction of producing a rounded symmetrical whole. There is art as well as artifice required to achieve his end. He selects and rejects, adjusts and arranges his material, in much the same way as any other artist working in a different medium must do. There can be no objection to presenting truth in this way; and it is obviously impossible to suppress the artistic aspiration when giving free reign to the constructive imagination, just as it is inevitable that the orator when seeking to persuade should support his cause by using the resources of rhythm and sound which language contains. At the same time it would be misleading to ignore the presence of this æsthetic element in the construction of philosophical system, and erroneous to suppose that the only way to satisfy the mind's demand for complete intellectual unity is by a finished system of conception. Even if such a system were important, the fact that historically many kinds of systems have been devised and offered in order to satisfy the mind, should give us pause before accepting the view that system is really essential for the purpose.

¹ Graham Wallas makes a similar remark, *The Great Society*, p. 107.

VIII

Setting aside this view, then, we return to the primary fact that while in thought the mind consciously exercises the function of uniting a given manifold, drawn from any of the possible fields of experience, sensation, perception, or ideas, in philosophy the mind seeks to frame such a conception, or connection of conceptions, as will give the completest consciousness of the real which the intellect can supply. Unifying is an operation of the mind ; a conception is the outcome of the operation. These are strictly inseparable and both subserve the one supreme purpose of the individual's mental life, its self-maintenance as a reality amongst realities. In the exercise of this function the whole mind is engaged, and in the fulfilment of it the whole mind is satisfied. The result, therefore, is not expressible in, so to say, one dimension of the mind's reality : this would indeed be the pale shade, the lifeless form, which thought is so often held to be. On the contrary, the result is as solidly rounded as the mind that has created it ; it is diffused with feeling, it consummates activity, and also concentrates the intellectual process of the mind. When the completest unity is attained by the intellect, it thrills the mind with a sense of fulfilment which raises its tone of feeling, gives it the consciousness of expanded activity, and deepens its appreciation of the meaning of reality. It is impossible to separate these effects in the final result ; they are transparent to any analysis of the concrete mental situation created by the process of knowledge.

This throws the necessary light on the nature of philosophy which claims to be the supreme form of the operation of knowledge. Philosophy is the way by which we gain the deepest consciousness of reality to which the process of conception can attain. It is not the only approach to consciousness of the ultimately real. It is but one amongst these. It is, however, supreme in its domain, the region of knowledge, and follows there its own conditions and laws. It is a way of communing with the supremely real which appeals to and satisfies a certain type of mind, though it by no means meets

the needs of all minds who desire the highest sense of reality. Some individuals find in poetry or again in music, the most vivid consciousness of the real that their minds crave for. To these science and philosophy are but factors which are subordinated, and minister, to this consummate appreciation of the world's meaning. To such minds "poetry is the breath and finer spirit of all knowledge; . . . it is the first and last of all knowledge."¹ Other individuals again discover the completest sense of the real through the experience of religion, the region of mental life where "the human spirit lays aside the burdens of finite existence and attains the completest satisfaction and the largest sense of freedom . . . For there its consciousness is absolutely free and is consciousness in truth because it is consciousness of absolute truth. In terms of feeling its state is one of enjoyment, the joy of blessedness; in terms of activity it spends itself in making manifest the honour of God and showing forth His excellent glory."²

It is useless to set aside such ways of gaining the intensest consciousness of real, which are in method and form so different from philosophy.³ Nor can the philosopher successfully show them to be either inadequate to their claims or inferior to his own. For no one but a philosopher would be convinced by reasoning on such a subject, even though his reasons were apparently unanswerable. Poetry asks no question about its own merits, and is therefore unconcerned about the answer. It merely smiles at the critic "who lacks the glorious faculty assigned to elevate the more than reasoning mind." Religion is never tired of saying that the wisdom of this world is little else

¹ Wordsworth, *Preface to the Lyrical Ballads*. Cf. also Keats' *Sleep and Poetry*.

² Hegel, *Philosophie d. Religion*, Einleitung.

³ There are those to whom the spiritualised fulfilment of the love of man and woman gives a consciousness of the real which dissolves the mystery of things seen and unseen into the clear daylight of a perfect and completely luminous experience. Here vision and reality are so deeply interfused that even the most impervious of all distinctions—the distinction of personalities—disappears in a unity of spiritual life which claims to be the final disclosure of the meaning of the world. Beside it science and philosophy seem halting and obsequious pedantry, art no better than a bridal veil, and religious doctrine an imperfect symbol of this triumphant reconciliation of the endeavours of nature and the purposes of the human spirit. This experience finds some of its best expression in the literature of the East.

than foolishness ; and in nothing more so, perhaps, than in trying to prove itself divine. No argument will give a man his religious peace, and none can take it away. Doubtless the philosopher is entitled in the interests of philosophy to examine and determine the nature of all objects of all thought, and to consider the significance of all forms of experience. This is his way of discerning the meaning of the world and satisfying his supreme mental need. Religion and art also in their highest interests avail themselves of whatever experience and reflection can contribute to further their ends. But just as philosophy refuses to give way to them, so they refuse to surrender to philosophy their claim to be supremely satisfying. And in the face of the long history of the varied spiritual achievement of humanity, the time is surely past for considering science or philosophy the only royal road to an absolute experience. Philosophers may have maintained this right to possess the "crown of the life of mind ;" and those who could dispute the right have rarely done so, partly because they did not profess to understand the achievement of the philosophers, and partly perhaps because of an instinctive disinclination to associate themselves with philosophers.

Philosophy, therefore, is but one way of meeting the demand of the mind for final satisfaction, the way that is open through the avenue of purely intellectual activity. The choice of this way is determined by individual capacity, and is a matter of selective interest and chance. "The giving of reasons for what we believe an instinct" is itself, as it has been put, "also an instinct." Instincts we happen to find, or do not happen to find, ourselves endowed with. Doubtless "all men have by nature a desire to know," but all men have not the desire to philosophise. This is confined to those few whose intellectual instincts are developed to the pitch of seeking final answers to final questions, forced upon the intellect by the activity of the mind as a reality amongst realities.

Philosophy is then a process of creating through the form of thinking a completely satisfying consciousness of reality. It may be said to be at once an exhaustive fulfilment of our utmost capacity to think or conceive, and also the attainment of a heightened consciousness of the world. These two are in-

separable ultimately, no doubt because thought and the sense of reality develop *pari passu* in experience.¹ We only think when we have a content or object to deal with, and the complete attainment of what thought pursues, involves at the same time the final realisation of the world in terms of thought. We do not require to go "outside our thought" to get at the world. Our thought evolves in the presence of the world, and the world becomes more real to us as it unfolds in terms of thought. The individual carries the consciousness of reality with him throughout the process of thought ; and if the thinking is satisfied, the real *ipso facto* has yielded up to him all that it means for thought. The final result is a single experience, which may be expressed either as the highest intellectual consciousness of the world, or the complete satisfaction of what the mind demands from its intellectual activity.

In this way philosophy occupies a peculiar and unique place in the realm of human experience. It meets a special spiritual need, and the struggle of the philosopher to satisfy this need is justified by the result : the human spirit does secure satisfaction from this form of activity. Only so is the effort really worth while. The spirit has a firm sense of its own reality, and a fuller consciousness of the world in which it lives and strives.

The business of philosophy is not to "copy" or "reproduce" reality. Reality is quite sufficient for itself without the superfluous addition of a copy, however accurate ; and a reproduction²

¹ No doubt the "relation of thought to reality" may be made a special problem of philosophy, just as any other experience may start a problem of philosophy. But this is not a problem logically prior to others, for the simple reason that it is a particular case of the very problem philosophy seeks to deal with.

² The only reproduction which nature admits is one that involves an advance to a further stage of being ; it is a reproduction which at the same time brings about a new product. If the human mind, whether in science or philosophy, has nothing better to do than furnish an abbreviated summary of the world, a variety of shorthand "conceptual formulæ" of the real, it is, indeed, no better than the accidental epiphenomenon which crude materialism has taken it to be. Such an unnecessary function might well be a fitting occupation for a fortuitous by-product of cosmic evolution. Whether the copy is a single conception or assumes the imposing proportions of a system of conceptions, it can only appear an irrelevancy by contrast with the grim struggle of the forces of the world. To spend days and nights in the production of such copies, which leave the mind and the real exactly where

which merely repeats in another language what is good enough as it stands seems an obvious waste of time.

If we are to do justice to the facts, we must regard the human mind as having a substantial being of its own, and its activities as a fulfilment of its individual life. Philosophy is one way through which that life is unfolded and in the result satisfied. The achievement of such satisfaction is the attainment of truth so far as intellectual activity is concerned. In that sense truth is merely the completed outgrowth of the intellectual activity of the mind. Truth so understood is certainly not all that the mind in its varied life strives after; by itself truth does not fill the cup of life to the full. The mind feels and perceives, it acts and it adores; and for such activities, truth, in the sense just stated, is neither relevant nor satisfying. None the less the truth which is the outcome of intellectual activity does give the mind, on one side of its nature, rest and satisfaction.¹

IX

From this point of view philosophy is a self-contained attitude of the mind with a process and end of its own. And the endeavour to obtain such satisfaction is actuated by the same kind of force which urges the mind onward in every direction which leads to the fulfilment of its individual nature. That force is desire.² Philosophy is one form of the mind's desire for reality, the desire to make itself real or, what comes to the same

they were to begin with, would be the crowning irony of human experience instead of its divine consummation.

The plausibility of the interpretation of knowledge as a process of copying reality seems due to the powerful influence of metaphors drawn from visual perception. We certainly use language which conveys the impression that in knowing we "see" and "observe" reality; and philosophy itself is spoken of as a "contemplation" of the real. The erroneous theory that in sight-perception we receive impressions or copies of external objects is all that is required to complete the train of reflection which leads to the above view of knowledge in general.

¹ We may, if we choose, regard conceptual activity as reaching only one "form" of truth, and treat every state in which the mind is satisfied as a truth of mind. In that case there will be truth for perception, truth for volition, and for other activities as well.

Such a use of the term has its advantages, and its obvious disadvantages.

² Cp. Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, A980^a., πάντες ἄνθρωποι τοῦ εἰδέναι ὀρέγονται φύσει: also λ 1072 26.

thing, to produce the most vivid consciousness of reality of which it is capable. The medium in which it gratifies this passion in the case of philosophy is that of thought.

What form a given philosophy assumes is determined, much as in the case of the artist, by the individual interest of the philosopher on the one hand, and his social or historical position on the other. These two act and react on one another. Particular conceptions are in large measure the creation of the social order characteristic of mankind; they are general conditions of the intercourse of man dealing with the seen and unseen environment of their common lives. The individual thinks as a social being, and always has a kind of typical mind in view with which, in his reflections he imagines himself in communication. In a sense, it may be said, a whole society or a whole civilisation thinks through the mind of the philosopher as its representative.¹ At the same time the individual has his own peculiar perspective in the social system, and this is not strictly transferable to or interchangeable with any other. As the result of such a perspective each philosopher seeks to satisfy his mind in a distinctive way. Hence the variety of philosophical problems and philosophical theories.² Some philosophers are content to arrive at a single intuition, or a kind of key conception; others can rest in nothing short of a rounded system which may be little more than an intellectual *tour de force*. One thinker may concentrate all his efforts on the problem of human knowledge; another on the foundations of science; others are constantly fascinated by the somewhat eccentric question regarding the "reality of the external world"; while others again endeavour to slake their thirst for intellectual finality by drinking from the inexhaustible wells of mental introspection, the

¹ Thus the philosophical views of J. S. Mill, Herbert Spencer, and more recently those of Mr. Bosanquet, may fairly be said to express certain tendencies of thought and common ideas current in their time. Philosophical theories require a certain spiritual climate. This does not prevent, rather it accounts for, each thinker developing his special theory with intense conviction of its truth, and indeed of its being the whole truth.

² The subject matter of philosophical reflection may owe more to individual interest in certain cases, in other cases to social life, as *e.g.* modern psychology, which is a peculiar outgrowth of the high self-consciousness of modern societies.

Tantalus cup of philosophy. Any aspect of reality can create the philosophical mood, and give material to the philosopher.¹ Most philosophers have an unexplored hinterland of reality, which remains in many cases a land of promise, of which they are content to take possession by faith rather than by knowledge. Moreover, the direction, as well as the limit, of a philosopher's reflection is fixed as much by social considerations as by individual interest. In the abstract, doubtless, a philosopher's thinking is and must be "free," that is, he must follow where thought leads if he is to satisfy thinking to the uttermost. But in fact no philosopher can afford completely to ignore the obligations and influences of his fellowship with his kind in the society to which he belongs, whose working conceptions he shares, and whose language and conceptions he utilises for his ends. This social reference guides him, in ways partly conscious partly unconscious, not merely in the choice of his subject but in the extent to which he pursues it, as well as in the manner in which he clothes what he takes to be the truth.²

X

It may be said, perhaps, that these considerations seem destructive of the unity of thought, on which philosophers have from time to time insisted and which they have sometimes endeavoured to express as their common ideal and their collective aim. The unity of thought, however, as already stated, is not an objective entity working itself into articulate form through the mind of the philosopher; it is a mental function inseparable from the personality of the thinker and operating within him in the interests of his individual fulfilment. If this seems to imperil the historical continuity of philosophical thought, it has at least the advantage of securing continual freshness and vitality in the pursuit of philosophical truth. It is more important to man that

¹ Hence there can in the nature of the case be no single "method" of philosophy. There are only two ways of thinking; and these are intuition and articulate reflection.

² It is significant to note that thinking seems to have been most free on great subjects at times of social upheaval and transition.

the product of his efforts should enrich and fulfil his personality than that the individual should be a mere channel through which an impersonal unity of thought may make itself articulate. It is better to make mistakes in finding out the truth for ourselves than to be a conscious automatic register of unerring wisdom. The reality we seek would lose its fascination if there were no chance of error in the search. And the very intensity of our interest in the result is in large measure due to the individual selection of the way we pursue and the free decision to follow it at all costs. Philosophy is no man's duty ; it is something better, it is any man's prerogative. The individual point of view certainly involves a specific perspective, and therefore is necessarily a partial outlook on the whole. But no wise man would sacrifice the charm of a perspective even for the sake of a minuter appreciation of the details. The "spectator of all time and all existence" must accept his limitations. He cannot at once see his world from the circumference of his vision and from the focus of his perspective ; he cannot enjoy his horizon and at the same time wander along its shores. The need for the whole truth, for finality in the search for truth, would not arise but for our individual interest in finding satisfaction in it.

Hence not merely because of the variety of ways in which this supreme form of satisfaction may be sought, but because the very purpose of the philosopher is to gain a fresh and a complete consciousness of the nature of the real, it is impossible to look for positive progress in philosophy.¹ Each philosopher has to face anew for himself the problem or problems of philosophy as they appeal to him. He can take nothing for granted or as a gift from others who have gone before him, even if he wished to do so. The philosopher must keep his intellect as detached from the achievements of the past as from the assumptions of the present. The history of philosophy provides material which he uses, not instruction which he follows. The problems of former days have to be reconsidered, and the solutions reinterpreted. The philosopher certainly learns from his predecessors, but

¹ In a similar way we need not look for progress in poetry. The idea of progress seems in fact irrelevant to the nature of poetry.

mainly by way of suggestion and by discovering how to avoid mistaken courses of thought. The absence of real progress in the attainment of philosophical truth need be no condemnation of philosophy. On the contrary, it may give all the more vitality to the spirit of philosophy, and inexhaustible interest in its enduring purpose to those to whom philosophy is a mental necessity.

VIII

SCIENCE AND THE HUMANITIES

“Volk und Knecht und Ueberwinder,
Sie gestehen zu jeder Zeit
Höchstes Glück der Erdenkinder
Sei nur die Persönlichkeit.”

GOETHE.

I

THE current controversy regarding the claims of Science and those of the Humanities in a scheme of education rests in the long-run on a deep-rooted prejudice or conviction, which both parties to the controversy share, that in some way or other the aims of science and the aims of humanity are essentially opposed. Such a conviction arises from an opposition deeper still, one which is as old as Western civilisation—the opposition between the course of nature and the interests of human life. For the sciences, in the ordinarily accepted sense of the term, are devoted to the study of outer nature, and their results are held to bear the character of the realm to which they refer. Nature is outside man, careless of his peculiar concerns, always apparently indifferent, sometimes openly hostile, to his ideals and his welfare. Science in explaining or interpreting the processes of nature seems merely to give good reasons for regarding as irremovable the opposition which in practical life is in so many ways all too evident. Man is by instinct half afraid of nature. The sciences of nature amply confirm his fears. Science shows man to be a puppet under the control of forces alien to himself. Man can be pitiful; nature is ruthless in undeviating obedience to laws which take no account of man's pity or man's purposes. Man claims to be the lord of nature, in a sense its most admired and consummate achievement; science

recognises no pride of place among the components factors of nature, and dissolves prestige into a system of complex elements and interrelated aimless agencies. Man's spirit is finely touched to the fine issues of beauty and of goodness. In the alembic of science beauty is distilled into an arrangement of atoms whose outer form, however intoxicating to the human eye, is in every sense superficial and of no more significance than the interior structure of the composing substance ; while goodness is found to be but the last and subtlest expression of the guileful instinct of self-preservation which equally, though with unequal success, guides the wasp to its victim and the saint to the Holy Grail.

The question at issue between the Sciences and the Humanities seems indeed a serious one if in the light of the former man is viewed as the most prominent marionette in the mechanism of nature, while the latter regard him as the chief hero in the drama of the world. Science, doubtless, may claim to be the crowning glory of the life of man, the most triumphant fulfilment of the powers of his mind. But if humanity must give up its hopes and aspirations at the bidding of science, if it draws its inspiration from ideals which science either cannot justify or can only explain away, the triumphs of science are no compensation for the loss of so much that gives vitality to human life ; the truths of science become themselves but dust and ashes.

Unless the outcome of science is the enrichment and fulfilment of human life, the diadem which science would place on the brows of humanity may be but a mockery, and the crown of man's life but a crown of thorns. On the other hand, it seems equally evident that, however important man's place may be in the scheme of things, unless man pursues his ends along the paths of intelligent order, rigorous coherence, and consistent rationality, such as science alone can claim to secure, he may find himself among the waste places of the world alongside the ape and the tiger.

Is it possible to reconcile these conflicting interests and opposing claims of "science" and "humanity"? I think it will be found on analysis that the opposition arises from a misconception of the meaning of nature and of the procedure of science ; that there is no solid ground for supposing that

science is anything more than a special channel through which the human mind seeks to express its activity ; and that in origin character, and aim science is essentially anthropomorphic.

II

The apparent opposition between the interests of science and those of humanity is due to an initial mistake in the scientist's conception of nature. Nature is the general term used to designate the object or objects dealt with by the physicist, the mathematician, the chemist, and the biologist ; and, for historical reasons, the meaning of the term has been mainly influenced by the peculiar nuance it receives from the physicist and the mathematician. Nature is that which is beyond and independent of the individual mind, occupying the outer realm of space, and apprehended by the senses of sight, touch, and hearing. The aim of science is to investigate and interpret this independent realm of existence in such a way that the laws discovered, and the scientific truths obtained, will bear the same character of independence of the individual mind, and hold good regardless of human interests or desires. Man has to "learn from nature," must bow before its laws, appear before nature as a vassal or servant to hear the commands of a master.

It is evident, however, that man himself is part of this very realm of nature. He occupies space as much as does a grain of sand ; every breath he draws proves him to be a part of the physical world ; he is an organism amongst other organisms. But, if so, he is not independent of nature ; and nature cannot be what is independent of him, since he is a part of nature and he cannot be independent of himself. Nature cannot be outside man, if man is himself one of the beings constituting nature. The initial view of nature with which the scientist starts is thus transparently absurd. The misconception, or confusion in the conception, is so obvious that one can only wonder how it ever came to be adopted by a scientist, as it unquestionably has been and is still adopted.

The origin of the error is not difficult to explain. Nature as something given to the individual mind is certainly external

to the individual, and is rightly regarded as outside him : it is outside in space. This character of externality to the individual is entirely relative to the individual mind ; and nature in this sense does not contain the individual mind, for by hypothesis nature is outside the individual. When, however, nature in this sense is generalised, this relation to the individual is omitted, and the limitation in its meaning—that nature here does not include the individual—is forgotten. Nature thus becomes what is independent of all individuals whatsoever. The next step is simple : since human individuals are also independent of one another, nature is said to contain all individuals within its sweep. Thus the generalisation of the term nature so as to include human individuals, gives the term a meaning precisely the opposite of what the term connoted in the first instance. For there is no sense in speaking of nature being outside unless by contrast to an inside. If nature is both inside and outside at once, it is neither the one nor the other exclusively.

If this procedure is illogical and absurd, we must give up the view that nature is something before which man must bow in submission, and that the science of nature compels us to accept truths which are independent of and indifferent to ourselves as human beings. For if we are part of nature, in accepting these truths we are admitting truths about ourselves ; and it is meaningless to say that we bow and submit to ourselves. If, on the other hand, we draw a distinction between human nature and outer nature, then this again involves no fateful submission on our side ; for the human mind will thus be interpreting another form of nature, which is indeed distinct from human nature but not necessarily either opposed to man or indifferent to his interests.

Passing next to the procedure of the scientist *pur sang*, the usual view of how science conducts its operations and interprets its results is equally indefensible. In the investigation of nature scientifically, the human mind is commonly regarded as a kind of still mirror in which the processes of nature are merely reflected, and the function of which is just to keep itself clear and steady while these processes pass before it. If it fulfils this condition, nature will, as the phrase runs, reveal its own

secrets, and the individual mind will have nothing to do but note them carefully and write them down. The scientist, in short, is to be a peculiarly made reflector endowed with the powers of a stenographer. This is no caricature of the accepted scientific procedure in dealing with nature : it has been and still is seriously maintained.

A moment's consideration will suffice to expose the error of such a naïve and uncritical view. We do not find the laws of nature by simply opening our eyes. They are not given to us as a gift ; and even in using our eyes we have deliberately to exercise the whole mind if we are to make something intelligible of outer nature. As Mach puts it in his *Science of Mechanics*, "A competent view of the world can never be got as a gift ; we must acquire it by hard work." What does this mean ? Simply that, from the beginning of our investigation of outer nature to the very end, the whole energies of the individual mind must be engaged to secure what we call the truths of science. These truths are products of mental activity and of mental activity alone. There is no still mirror set to watch outer nature : the mirror is alive, a concentrated focus of spiritual energy, directing itself by its own ends and in its own interests. Nature does not tell its own story to us : we construct the story of nature in terms of our own thought. We build up the truth about nature in the sweat of our brow. If necessary we win the kingdom of truth by violence ; we dissect, we experiment, we twist and turn the forces of nature rather than allow their meaning to escape our grasp. Outer nature is certainly in a sense, as we have seen, indifferent to our minds ; but it is the business of science to overcome this indifference, to woo and win nature into harmony with our thoughts. If we have to stoop to nature in the course of our investigation, we do not stoop in order to submit and subject our minds to it—we stoop to conquer.

This is seen in the very earliest stages of scientific investigation. We begin by drawing distinctions amongst the facts of outer nature—distinctions which mark off range of fact from range of fact, and mark off also different elements within the same sphere of fact, *e.g.* atom from molecule, lines from points. In actual reality nature contains all its parts and elements

in inextricable interdependence with one another. The position of every grain of sand helps to determine the centre of gravity of the earth ; and the mists that gather on the icefields of Greenland are in part determined by the vegetation of the Tropics. The distinctions and separations we make in the world of nature are made for purposes of scientific investigation, *i.e.* in the interests of our own thought and in order to facilitate the effective working of our own minds. In that sense they are artificial relatively to nature, though they are inevitable and necessary for our peculiar kind of intellect. The very fact that our own thought compels us later to give up these separations in order to acquire a completer view of nature, shows how temporary and provisional they are. In thinking out the processes of nature, or interpreting nature, it is our thought and its ends which determine our procedure from first to last. The mind in science works with thoughts ; and it is about as true to say that nature dictates to us what our thoughts are to be, as to say that the printed page of a book makes our ideas what they are. ¹

Not merely do scientists begin their investigations by making artificial distinctions to suit the ends of their own thought, but the conceptions by which they proceed and the laws at which they arrive are equally constructions of their own minds. This can be illustrated by any chapter from the history of science. I do not refer to the obviously animistic and theological views which affected and infected early scientific thought, even that of the ablest scientific minds ; nor need I refer to the residual influences of such primitive thought which survive in the formulation of laws of outer nature up to the present time. The term "attraction" of particles of matter, employed in the formulation of the law of gravitation, and the term "affinity" employed in formulating chemical processes,

¹ Not all scientists can accept this, as I know. I once made the above observation to a distinguished chemist ; I tried to assure him that in dealing with his elements, resolving and combining them, he was really seeking to satisfy the demand of his thought all the while. His reply was, " But, how so ? We can photograph them." The *naïveté* of the remark affords matter for some astonishment : he apparently seemed to suppose that somehow he had his elements actually inside his thought, or perhaps his thought inside his elements.

sufficiently indicate the anthropomorphic or human origin of these ideas. But in all science, even the most abstract, the operation of the specifically human intellect is plainly evident. The conceptions of quantity, force, mass, weight, etc., are not given to the mind by outer things, and they do not come out of the skies or by special revelation. They are won by toil and are deliberately created by the scientific intellect to grasp the character of the facts presented to its notice. They are manipulated so freely by the same intellect just because they are defined for its use according to the laws and conditions of intellectual activity. If our intellect were moulded on a different plan we should use different concepts, just as, if we had more or different senses, we should apprehend the outer world in other ways than we do at present. That not even all human intellects have the same structure is seen from the fact that not all human intellects are capable of grasping the concepts employed by science; and in some sciences only a very few intellects can develop the concepts to the highest degree of their articulation. It is impossible for some minds to grasp a complex differential equation, or even to understand what quaternions are all about. Nature does not provide us with such knowledge. It is a creation of a certain kind of human energy as much as a work of art or a steam-engine. Such knowledge, it is said, can be tested and proved by an appeal to the outer world. In certain cases it can; but even so, the very fact that it is, or has to be, "tested," shows that it is a human device to begin with. What Poincaré says of science in general is unquestionably true, and obviously so in the more abstract sciences. "We can only think our thoughts," he says, "all the words we use to speak of things only express thoughts."

The logical necessity with which the intellect develops its concepts, exerts indeed all the apparent compulsion on the mind which outer things possess. But this merely means that the human intellect has a definite structure with a definite kind of function all its own; and it is in pursuance of the laws of this structure, with its corresponding function, that its method of procedure secures the necessity characteristic of scientific abstract thought. Our minds are so made that they work in one way

towards logical coherence, and in one way only ; and hence we are compelled to accept the result. The concepts of science are our mental ways of working ; their laws of connection are the method of our mental procedure. Neither the concepts nor their logical connection is arbitrary ; but they are both relative to the human mind.

We can put the same view in another way. The processes of scientific thinking are to begin with tentative and experimental. Whether we seek to explain a fact of outer nature or to solve a mathematical problem, we try now this direction and now that, to see, as we say, how it turns out, or how it "works out." Many of our lines of thought lead nowhere ; many are inaccurate and have to be discarded ; some are entirely untrue. We go from hypothesis or suggestion till we strike the true theory. Now, all these tentative efforts surely and without question take place within our minds. There are no hypotheses in outer nature. Nature works no experiments for us and contains none of our errors.

III

If the process of carrying on our thoughts in this manner is entirely our own, if it is guided by the laws of our own intellect and directed towards satisfying our minds, we cannot possibly maintain that at a certain stage it ceases to be ours and suddenly becomes something independent of our minds. If the process belongs to our mental procedure, the result must likewise be our own achievement. When the result is false or inaccurate we never hesitate to ascribe it to our own thought. But equally, if the result is true, it must be the outcome of our thought ; otherwise the specific function of the human intellect would be to make mistakes. Why should the result of an erroneous process of thought fall entirely within our mind, and that of a true process of reasoning fall outside it ? Since the condition in both cases is the same, the effect must be the same. Once again, therefore, it is evident that the concepts and the connections of scientific concepts are from first to last nothing but the operations of our human intellect, and do not come to us from without. Scientific truth is the creation of the scientific mind and not of outer nature.

This is still further confirmed by the fact that much that has been discovered in science has been due to the effort of what can only be called individual genius, whether it be the genius which consists in a stubborn attempt to master the facts, or that which consists in a successful and inspired intuition. For such discoveries the outer world clearly gives no direct assistance whatever. Their source and origin are solely the individual human agent.

The supposition that mathematical science is an exception to this general character of all science—its relativity to the human mind—is a mere superstition. The argument usually put forward to support this contention is that mathematical truth compels such absolute assent from the intellect, and is so universally true for all space and all time, that it must be considered independent of every individual human mind altogether. The argument involves a fallacy. It asserts that, because a truth holds for every mind, it is therefore independent of all minds. But if a truth holds for every mind, this just means that it cannot be independent of all minds: it must be the way all minds work when they think logically and coherently on the subject. To suppose that, because it should hold for every mind, it is therefore independent of any given mind, is indeed an accurate statement, for a given mind may not yet have understood it; but what we imply is that, if it did understand the truth, the truth would be admitted. The supposition that, when a truth holds good independently of a given mind, this truth is true independently of all minds whatsoever, is like saying that though Jones is absent from a dinner-party, the dinner is none the less good, and indeed is good though nobody eats it at all. The peculiar convincingness of mathematical truth is due to the peculiar character of mathematical concepts. They are so abstract, and deal with such universal aspects of human experience, that all must accept them. But this, so far from proving them to be more than human, only shows how completely they are bound up with the very structure and life of the human mind.

The more concrete the objects are with which a science deals, the less difficult is it to see how entirely our thinking about such objects bears the stamp of our humanity. Thus in biological

science, which is admittedly one of the most concrete and difficult of all the sciences of outer nature, the very clue to the mystery of living process has to be sought in what, as human beings, we find life to be in our own case. We cannot even imagine what the mental life of animals is except from what we are pleased to call the analogy of our own mentality. All the language used in describing the ways and doings of animals is drawn directly from the habits and modes of action of human individuals. The conception of evolution arises from, and depends ultimately for its meaning on, the idea of human progress. The conception of adaptation to environment, so familiar in the interpretation of living beings, is partly ethical, partly artistic in its origin ; that of division and co-operation of functional activity is drawn from the economic order of human society. As every one knows, Darwin derived from Malthus' study of the relation of population to food supply, the suggestion that the whole course of evolution was determined by the struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest, both the terms, "struggle" and "fittest," being clearly anthropomorphic in character. Further illustration of the same human origin of the main biological concepts need not be given.

Again let it be said there is no ground for supposing, because these conceptions are derived from human life, that they are on that account invalid or even inaccurate. On the contrary, it seems self-evident that if we are to interpret life we must start from life at its highest, and, for human beings, human life is the highest form of life we know. If we wish to understand what the human individual really is, we must look at him from the point of view of society, where we find human life fully expressed. If we wish to know all that a rose may be, we shall find what we want in the La France of our gardens better than in the dog-rose of the hedgerows. So, to understand the elementary forms of life, we rightly take as our clue the more complex type of life which man presents. But the point of interest for our argument is that the procedure of biological science illustrates in a peculiarly striking and unmistakable manner the human origin of all scientific concepts, on which we have been laying stress. In biological

science the source from which they come can not only not be outside us, but is even frankly acknowledged to be that of human life. I would urge that, just because this procedure is thus inevitable when we are dealing with the most concrete order of natural objects, the procedure is the same in the case of the other sciences. This is merely concealed by the abstractness of their method, but becomes patent to the eye of impartial analysis.

IV

The analysis of the character of the concepts of science leads us, then, to but one conclusion: science is through and through anthropomorphic. It is, if we care to put it so, a human invention. Another and entirely different line of thought leads us to the same conclusion. Its importance cannot be sufficiently emphasised. We find that the scientific attitude to the world is historically but a specific expression of the life of humanity as a whole. Science, as we understand it, is an historical phenomenon like Mohammedanism or the French Revolution. It is only found in certain races of mankind, and is indigenous to peoples inhabiting certain circumscribed geographical areas of the globe. It is in a very real sense dependent on climatic conditions, as well as on racial qualities; and these two are inseparable. It surely gives cause for reflection that the scientific spirit was planted and has grown to maturity on European soil—and indeed only in certain portions of Europe. Its domicile seems as much restricted to specific localities as a botanical or an animal species. The native habitat of the modern scientific spirit has been primarily the middle region of Europe, extending from the north-west to the south-east, and forming a kind of rough triangle whose apex lies in Italy and whose base stretches from the southern shore of the Baltic Sea across Scandinavia to Scotland. There are regions outside this area in which occasionally science has been in some degree found; but these are either exceptional, or are traceable, directly or indirectly, to the influence of the central region of Europe. The mood of science finds its peculiar climate in this

region,¹ meaning by science the deliberate and continuous prosecution of the study of the world for the purpose of attaining a coherent logical interpretation of facts. The vast continents of Asia and Africa and non-Europeanised America have no scientific areas. The inhabitants of these non-scientific regions have indeed knowledge of their own, and a wisdom of their own ; but it is not science. Asia and Africa, especially the former, are mainly religious and ethical in their frame of mind, not scientific. Science is a creation of the European West.

This geographical limitation of science is indeed a remarkable fact, the importance of which our familiarity with the scientific mood and our insularity of mind constantly tend to obscure. We talk glibly of science uniting all mankind in the bonds of truth. This is a mere academic superstition. Laughter will hold people together better than logic. We should not forget that millions of human beings have no interest in the scientific mood at all, and seem by constitution to have no capacity for it. Scientific truth is not their way of truth. It merely seems to them a matter of astonishment, a curious manifestation of the life of a race strangely different from their own. Some individuals among these non-scientific peoples may, and do, assimilate the science of the West. But experience seems to show that such acquisition is at best a mere accomplishment, and leaves the racial structure and composition of their minds unaffected.² In other words, it does not create in them the scientific mood. There is as much difference between this assimilation of science and the scientific frame of mind as there is between learning the technique of dancing on a tight-rope and learning to walk. The non-scientific peoples take up science as they put on Western clothes. One may change one's clothes, but there is no changing the skin. The fact is that the scientific mood arises from a peculiar attitude of the mind to the world found amongst certain peoples of the globe ; and without this attitude science will always appear a curiosity or an irrelevance. The attitude

¹ For a remarkable array of facts to establish this proposition, see De Candolle, *Histoire des Sciences et des Savants*.

² Whether Japan will prove an exception to this statement remains to be seen.

may be shortly described as due to a sense of the detachment of man from the world as something alien and external, to a sense of the supremacy of his aims over the processes of outer nature. This is quite peculiar to certain peoples, and is not found in all. In the East, for example, man seems to feel no sense of alienation. He seems to feel himself as much a part of the universe as a plant is inseparable from its environment. So much is this the case, that man's life is felt to be part of the very current of the stream of the vaster life of the world. He realises his state best when he is absorbed in the larger being of the universe. His individual life is literally to him no better than a flower of the field. His mind is as a shadow produced by his finite substance intercepting the light of the world. This profound difference between West and East is probably ineradicable; it is constitutional and climatic, and not accidental. It is the cause of the emphasis or over-emphasis upon, and predilection for, science in the one case and religion in the other. Science is thus but the consequence of a peculiar frame of mind which characterises certain Western peoples. It is neither universal to humanity nor essential to all mankind.

It is in a sense but an historical incident in the vaster history of the human race. It is a factor, but no more than one factor, in the complex system of aims and forces which make up human civilisation. Greater than any science or any number of sciences, is the stupendous and awe-inspiring spectacle of human life on the planet. So limited is science in significance that it even requires a certain level of temperature for its successful prosecution. It is not for want of leisure that the peoples of very warm or very cold climates have not the scientific mind. They have leisure in abundance, the leisure of the timeless forests or the timeless wastes. It is rather that the mental energies will only undertake the peculiar labour of impartial investigation of science for its own sake either where the equilibrium between man and nature is fairly steady, or where the advantage is preponderantly in favour of man's supremacy. Where the powers of nature, heat and cold, seasonal changes, and the resurgence of nature's forces, overwhelm man's life, science is not a possible mood for man at all.

The human mind merely accepts the situation and becomes acclimatised in every sense.

Science must keep to its peculiar geographical region of the globe, if it is to be carried on and if its ends are to be realised. Nor need we wonder or complain at this state of affairs. There is indeed, we may say, a division of labour amongst the races of mankind as there is a division of labour amongst the individuals of a society. One race takes over one task, another race takes over a different task ; and all combine, more or less unconsciously it is true, to fulfil the whole purpose of human life on the earth.

We but exaggerate the importance of our own interests and point of view when we imagine that our peculiarly scientific turn of mind is the best, or the standard to which all human life should aspire. Such an exaggeration is little better than the vanity and conceit of insular self-satisfaction. The scientific mood is important ; it is not all-important. Even where it is prosecuted, it is primarily an attribute of the masculine mind rather than of the feminine intelligence. Ordinarily speaking, a woman regards the scientific mind with a mixture of good-humoured consideration and detached indifference. But no sane person would consider or desire the feminine intelligence to be merely a duplicate of the male mind : each is radically different from the other, and each is extremely important for the realisation of human life as a whole. Nor need we suppose that the scientific mind has all the advantages on its side, and the non-scientific all the disadvantages. There are advantages and disadvantages in the possession of the scientific mood and in the prosecution of scientific interests. I need but recall in this connection the pathetic regret of Darwin that his over-cultivation of the scientific attitude destroyed his power of appreciation of beauty in art and literature. In the same connection it is worth observing how the over-indulgence in the luxuries of science seems to destroy a man's balance of judgment in other realms of experience, practical and religious. So much is this recognised, that the very name "scientific expert" is almost a by-word for general intellectual incompetence. Specialisation, so essential to science, distorts the mind to the

verge of indiscretion and unreliability ; it produces cloistered lives that have lost touch with the complex richness of full humanity.

V

This brings us to the last question I should like to consider : how are we to connect the claims of science with those of humanity, so as to do justice to both ? I have indicated some reasons for maintaining that they cannot be really opposed. From these it should be evident that since science is itself one of the activities of mankind, the so-called opposition of science to humanity as such is in principle absurd. What part, then, does science play amongst the activities that make up human life ? What, in a word, is the relation of the end of science to other ends which man pursues ?

We are accustomed to distinguish three primary ends in human life, under which all its various aims can be grouped. These are truth, beauty, and goodness. The distinction is convenient and useful, if it does not lead us to cut these ends off from one another. We shall avoid this mistake if we look upon them as but different ways in which man seeks to realise the unity of his individual life, the primary colours which make up the divine light which illumines his experience, the main avenues of approach to supreme self-fulfilment and to supreme reality. They refer to the three component factors of his mental constitution. The fulfilment of the claims of his intellect is the attainment of "truth" ; the fulfilment of the life of feeling is attainment of "beauty" ; the fulfilment of will is the accomplishment of "goodness." They deal with the three aspects of the world with which he is concerned—the aspect of order, the aspect of sensibility (including sensation and emotion), and the aspect of sociality. The articulate consciousness of unity in the form of order is what we mean by truth ; the articulate consciousness of unity in the form of sensibility is beauty ; that of unity in the form of sociality is goodness. The deliberate and exclusive pursuit of truth creates Science and Philosophy ; the deliberate and exclusive pursuit of beauty creates Art and Literature ; the

deliberate and exclusive pursuit of goodness creates Morality and Social Institutions.

The important point to grasp is that these ends, separately and together, are ways in which the individual spirit of man realises itself, and thus maintains its place in the universe. In Wordsworth's language, they are ways in which man discovers—

“How exquisitely the individual Mind
(And the progressive powers perhaps no less
Of the whole species) to the external World
Is fitted :—and how exquisitely too—
Theme this but little heard of among men—
The external World is fitted to the Mind.”

They are none of them merely accidental expressions of his life ; they are all necessary if he is to be himself and become aware of what his life consists in. They are pursued for his own sake in the first instance, because man in the first instance lives to himself. But this does not mean that he makes the world what he likes. The life of man is as much a part of the constitution of things as the existence of beings independent of and different from him. Human nature is as real as any other kind of nature, and has laws and conditions of its own. Man's business is to fulfil human nature and to follow the ends by which that is realised. The ends which regulate his life dictate the course he has to take. In obeying them he is thus realising his place in the world ; and in living to himself in this way he finds he is living for the whole world at the same time. To be himself completely he has to become conscious of the order of the world, conscious of its beauty, conscious of goodness. He undertakes the journey of his life pursuing his own ends, follows whither they lead him, and, in following them, finds, like Saul, that he has gone out apparently on a casual errand and is led by his destiny into his kingdom—a kingdom which is his own and is more than his own, a kingdom whose foundations were laid at the dawn of time and whose towers catch the white radiance of eternity.

These ends are all necessary if man is to rise to the full measure of his stature ; and they are all inseparable from one another and from the integral life of the individual. We get

the richest form of human life where all are pursued in perfect freedom, and where one is not allowed to interfere with the other. We do not find all peoples and nations on the earth cultivating these ends. Most peoples lay greatest stress on the requirements of social fellowship, and treat with comparative or complete neglect one or both of the other two. The one most generally ignored, as we have said, is that of truth for truth's sake, the cultivation of the scientific spirit. There are, perhaps, few communities of men in which we do not find a certain development of artistic interest, sometimes indeed to a high degree, though the conditions of their social life may be very simple. In other words, in most communities we find two of these human ends pursued; a very few pursue all three; in fewer still are all three ends pursued with equal disinterestedness and freedom. We may with justice find here, perhaps, the best criterion by which to arrange the various civilisations amongst mankind on a scale of value. Those communities in which these ends have found freest expression seem to be the highest; those in which any one is hampered or excluded will be lower according to the extent to which this takes place. Hence it is that the excessive development of science is not an effective criterion of a high civilisation. The cultivation of the scientific spirit is not alone a guarantee of a high level of humanity—a conclusion which has been painfully brought home to us at the present stage of human history. In the same way the intensive cultivation of the arts is not enough to bring human life to fruition. It is found, indeed, to be consistent with ignorance, narrowness, and even the degradation of humanity. Ancient Greek society is not an unfair illustration of this type of civilisation. Similarly, exclusive emphasis on mere goodness does not bring out all the resources which make man's existence precious, powerful, and secure. It too often leads to the impoverishment of life physically and mentally; it encourages obscurantism and ignorance; while the neglect of the cultivation of beauty commits the spirit of man to the acceptance of ugliness, gloom, and joylessness. The ancient Hebrew society is an historical illustration of this type. The adoption of the point of view of this society by many of the inhabitants of Europe has

in the past produced, as every one knows, results which can only be regarded as baneful and disastrous to their intercourse with their fellow-countrymen.

What we cannot too carefully observe is that the cultivation of all three, even to a slight degree, tends not only to their mutual furtherance of each other, but to the enrichment of human life in its entirety. The cultivation of goodness is intensified if the intellect is liberated into the ways of truth; the cultivation of truth becomes deeper, more inspired and inspiring, when it increases the sense of community and fellowship between human beings—when, in other words, it goes hand in hand with goodness. In Bacon's princely language, "It is heaven upon earth when the mind moves in charity, trusts in Providence, and turns upon the poles of truth." Similarly, the pursuit of the beautiful in art, whether it be poetry and music, painting, or sculpture, acquires an added value when it adorns, refines, and dignifies the life of a community; and conversely, goodness becomes gracious and winsome, richer in substance and dearer to men, when human life is arrayed in the garment of joy which is woven at the loom of art.

We need not therefore suppose that these three ends are in principle independent, though not necessarily of equal importance. Neither in practice nor in principle is their independence defensible. When these ends are pursued in independence, the result invariably is that one is taken as the only real end; the others become looked on as secondary or of no account at all. We find such exaggerations constantly made in practice, and they are in every case the mere mental consequence of special predilection and excessive interest. Thus many scientists and some philosophers say that truth is all in all, and everything else a mere means or a mere incident in life. In the light of facts, and after what has been said, this will be seen to be the contention of the mere partisan. The artist, again, is apt to hold that beauty is all in all—that, in Keats's language, "beauty is truth, truth beauty—that is all ye know on earth and all ye need to know"; or, in Wordsworth's more carefully formulated statement, "poetry is the breath and finer spirit of all knowledge, the impassioned expression which is in the counte-

nance of all science." These are intelligible but obvious accentuations of a special bias. Neither Keats nor Wordsworth knew much about science. Similarly, the enthusiast for human welfare declares that mere goodness is everything, that the only end of life is to love one's neighbour. Here, once more, we have another form of exaggeration. For love to be at its best, men must have the best kind of neighbours.

In principle, however, there is no room for such extreme views. Each is not independent of the other. Nor are all of the same value. What seems first in importance (though again let me say not *exclusively* important) is sociality whose controlling end is goodness. This is first because all the ends which man pursues are in the long run for the sake of man, and man's fellowship with his kind is the governing interest of the human species. From this all his interests proceed, to this they must ultimately converge. The human species is more concerned with its own maintenance and furtherance than with anything else whatsoever. This is not merely an instinct; it is in the nature of the case; for all other kinds of beings exist by the same condition, whether they be planets or plants or protozoa.

This complete socialisation of human life should not be conceived in any narrow sense. It must not be interpreted in a form which makes so-called practice and practical considerations predominant over so-called theoretical or ideal considerations. Practice and ideal aims, whether in science or art, both lead and contribute to the same result, as indeed is plain to any careful observation of the facts of life. Human beings are brought into fellowship, not merely on the basis of practical action, but on the basis of community of thought and feeling. Indeed, as history shows, even erroneous theories and convictions can hold people together and intensify their living interest in one another. The earlier theories of the origin of man's life and of the central position of the earth in the planetary system, sufficiently illustrate this point. Similarly, mistaken practical enthusiasms can bind human beings into a common fellowship which seems to magnify human welfare, as the pathetic history of the Crusades well shows. If false theory and mistaken practical aims accomplish

so much, how much more is it certain that the pursuit of verifiable truth, of ideal beauty, and genuinely real practical ends will further and increase the fellowship of man with his kind. All men's ends whatsoever, practical and ideal—if we must make this questionable distinction,—contribute in the long run to the socialisation of human life. In the realisation of this result they may find their highest fruition; in this achievement all the efforts of individuals find their amplest reward. If we may recast the somewhat ornate language of an earlier epoch we might say that man's chief end is to make human life glorious through beauty, truth, and love, and to enjoy this consummation all his days—an end which is great without being imposing, and accessible without being any the less magnificent.

VI

It may be worth while to note the bearing of the ideas which have been sketched on certain practical problems which confront us at the present time.

For one thing, we can see at once the error of making an opposition between the requirements of practical social life and the interests and aims of science. It is as false to take immediate practical social needs as a standard to test the value of science to human life as it would be to try to determine the truth of a biological law or a proposition in geometry by an appeal to the sense of justice between man and man. If we say it is ridiculous to make goodness a criterion of scientific truth, it is equally absurd to regard immediate social welfare as a test of the worth of science to humanity. If we take long views, and maintain a wider outlook on human life, we cannot fail to see that all science in the long run conduces to human welfare in the full sense. Indeed, the history of the relation of scientific discovery to the betterment of social conditions amply shows how inseparably social life and science are connected, how closely even immediate practical needs and scientific pursuits are bound up. It is safe to say that some of the most difficult problems which face the social reformer at the present time would be in a great measure solved if we could intellectually penetrate further

into the secrets of electro-magnetism, the life of the cell, or chemical energy.

The supposed cleavage between so-called practical social needs on the one hand, and scientific pursuits unfettered by considerations of pence or prejudice on the other, has been one of the most painful misunderstandings from which human life has suffered in the past and still suffers to some extent.

It is an opposition which has produced very futile opinions and most frequent quarrels. And the quarrel has not been all on one side. For it takes two to make a quarrel as it takes two to make love; and scientists have often stated their case as wrongly as the so-called practical people. Scientists sometimes speak as if the improvement of society depended on the attainment of correct scientific conclusions, as if society should be controlled by scientific experts, and as if life existed mainly or solely for the advancement of the ideal interests of science. Such claims are quite extravagant. They provide a curious parallel to the mediæval conception of human society, according to which society was held to exist solely to further the ideal interests of religion. Science does not by itself improve man as a social being; this can only be done by the cultivation of good-will between man and man. And why should society be directed or controlled by scientists any more than by artists? Society no more exists simply to produce the means for scientific research and to establish a corporation of scientific bureaucrats, than science can only be justified if it gives us more or better food supplies, or brings us quicker from one place to another. Truth must be pursued for its own sake, and untrammelled by social prejudice or social ambition, if its full human value is to be secured; and until we are prepared to pay for it and to pursue it in this sense, we are traitors to our own best interests and depriving ourselves of the full heritage of humanity. Both to scientists and to those who care for practical social welfare we would offer Plato's counsel, "let each pursue his own business if he would seek the best interests of all."

Similarly again, the supposed opposition between the Sciences and the Humanities is one of the most obstinate of popular fallacies. Science, as we have seen, is itself a creation of humanity

alone, and exists solely for humanity. Science properly understood is literally one of the Humanities, one of the factors that express, raise, and enrich human life. We too narrowly use the term "Humanities" when we restrict its application to the literatures which have been created by the artistic imagination ; and to apply the term solely to the literatures of Greece and Rome is largely an abuse of language. Literature alone does not give all that is best in the arts which have dignified and adorned humanity. Sculpture, music, and painting have expressed man's sense of the beautiful quite as much as, and to some peoples even more than, literature. It is one of the great defects of our higher education that this has not been properly realised and appreciated. In few universities is there instruction in Music and Fine Art. Certainly literature and the other arts, along with history, in a peculiar way deal with human life : they are in a sense all about man primarily or entirely, and moreover about man at his best as well as at his worst. The cultivation of the Humanities in this wide sense is thus in a special way humanising, *i.e.* it expands our acquaintance with human beings, their peculiar aims and their peculiar interests. But they deal with only certain phases of the life of humanity. Literature, *e.g.*, uses as its material, and seeks to articulate, man's emotional responses to nature and to his fellows ; history, the forms and course of his political and social life. These, however, do not exhaust man's human nature or his human concerns. The cultivation of these studies is therefore not all that man requires if he is to know himself, and if he is to be himself. Exclusive devotion to them, or excessive emphasis upon them, narrows the outlook on man, and narrows human life ; and these two go together. Man has more to think about than himself. He has to think about the world around him. Doubtless the "proper study of mankind is man," or at any rate the study of man is a very proper study. But man is only man in the full sense when he knows something more than himself ; for he only finds himself when he becomes conscious of the world in which he lives and moves and has his being. In science he becomes aware of the resources of his *own* nature quite as much as of the objects he investigates. He finds the rationality for which his spirit craves.

In a word, the scientific study of the world and of man himself draws out his humanity—humanises him. To speak of a conflict between the Sciences and the Humanities is thus as ridiculous as to speak of a conflict between the earth and the moon. Both are parts of the same stellar system, both are creatures of the same solar body.

It follows that an education which is solely indebted to the Humanities, or solely indebted to science, is neither complete nor satisfactory. For education is surely the realisation of the potencies of human life to the fullest extent of which the individual is capable. An individual may have taken all science to be his province, and still be an uneducated man. He may have absorbed the literature and the history of mankind, and still feel himself a stranger in a world which should be his home and not his hiding-place. A scientific mind unilluminated with the light of art is little better than an intellectual factory; an artistic mind unenlightened by scientific thought may be an articulate picture-gallery. Neither the one nor the other alone can produce a truly educated mind. Nor indeed, for that matter, can the two together bring out all that the spirit of man requires. Science and art, truth and beauty, detached from the cultivation of man's living relation to his fellows, are the wine of life without the guests at the feast. We have probably all known, or known about, first-class scientists and scholars who were little better than social curiosities; or men of first-rate artistic sensibilities who were undesirable aliens in their own community. Unless art gives grace and refinement to the human character, it has failed of its complete purpose: unless science makes the whole life intelligent and tolerant, it has not succeeded in its aim: unless the one adds sweetness and the other adds light to the spirit of goodness, neither has fully justified its existence.

IX

LAUGHTER AND TEARS : THE SENSE OF INCONGRUITY

"The size of a man's understanding might always be justly measured by his mirth."—*Johnson*.

"To weep is to make less the depth of grief."—*Henry VI*.

WHEN we reflect that laughter and tears have accompanied the life of man from the remotest date of his recorded history, it seems curious that observers of mankind have given so little attention to these twin eruptions of human emotion. Doubtless this is partly due to their transitory and apparently incidental character. They are so capricious in their occurrence that they seem hardly to call for analysis. They seem also so individual and variable as to make analysis into general terms impossible. Laughter has, indeed, secured a certain amount of interest. Aristotle and Hobbes made passing reference to it, and Bain brought his acute mind to bear on the topic, while in more recent times there can be found a modest list of writers who have dealt with the subject. But tearful emotion has been almost totally neglected. And no one seems to have treated the two together as complementary emotional expressions, which they obviously are. In what follows an attempt will be made to bring out the real meaning of each in the light of their mutual contrasts.

I shall deal with these emotions as conscious states which are at once body and mind. Mind is strictly inseparable from the bodily aspects which are the "expression of the emotions,"¹ in Darwin's sense of the term. But their significance and certainly their main interest in the economy of human nature lie primarily in the mental process which they involve.

¹ On the nature of the physical expression, see note at end.

I

Regarding the mental process, the question is: Into what conscious factors can we resolve the consciousness of the laughable on the one hand, and the tearful on the other?

The most general characteristic of the normal consciousness of the ludicrous is that there is always some situation presented before the mind; and on this situation some judgment is formed, in consequence of which a laugh ensues. We must be aware of something to laugh at, before laughter can arise. If laughter arises which, on analysis, does not reveal this most general of all conditions, we say the laughter is meaningless, absurd, hysterical, and so forth. All such laughter we condemn or pity. We condemn it because it does not fit into the context of anyone's experience, not even that of the person laughing, and therefore cannot be tolerated; or we pity it because such laughter has the appearance of the unconsciously irrational, the person laughing is under the sway of non-voluntary forces beyond his own control, and no one can enjoy when there is no object of enjoyment. This condition is all-important and most significant. Laughter does not normally arise like the feeling of high spirits, or like a vague desire or craving, or again, like a fit of nervousness. In the laugh of the child, or the grown-up, we have a distinct, though it may be a very short, interval between the consciousness of a certain kind of situation and the judgment passed upon it, as the result of which the laugh takes place. These factors are so complicated, and imply such a relatively high level of consciousness, that it is not surprising to find many thinkers maintaining that we only find laughter in the proper sense when there are evidences of marked conscious rationality of behaviour.

When a given situation is presented to us, the first attitude, which we adopt towards it is simply to apprehend what it contains. It is so much matter-of-fact, and, to begin with, nothing more than this. Our initial interest in it is, as indeed we often say, a "matter-of-fact interest." At this stage there is no difference between our apprehension of a situation which turns out to be amusing, and our way of apprehending any other fact whatsoever, *e.g.* a flower, the size of a house, or the law of gravitation.

Whether we merely take note of an isolated fact or develop our first view of it into an elaborate system of connected thought which we call "understanding" it, the general mental attitude towards it is essentially the same—we are merely concerned to grasp the meaning of what is before us, the internal connection of its parts, and its external connections with other facts.

Now, when our interest in a situation is solely of this character laughter never arises. We merely understand, and this attitude is complete in itself, so complete that it even brings a pleasure all its own. Hence people whose interest in things is limited to understanding them, proverbially display no sense of the ludicrous. By contrast we call them "serious-minded" or "over-serious." Excessive concentration on this attitude tends indeed to destroy the spirit of laughter altogether. This is in part the explanation of the unmerited jibe at the Scotchman's incapacity to see a joke: he seems too anxious to understand. For the like reason it is both difficult and dangerous, as every one has learned, to "explain" a joke: for, what we try to explain to the dull-witted is the nature of the situation, and the very process of explaining tends to turn his attention upon the mere understanding of the object before him; and this has in itself no place for laughter at all. Often the fun of the situation lies in a side issue suggested by the situation; and to explain the case may blot out all suggestion of side issues, or take the edge off all interest in them. The malicious, the stupid, and the laughter-hating are fully alive to this effect of mere understanding, and well know how to turn the tables on the jester and spoil his fun by demanding a fuller explanation. When this deeper explanation is seriously given, the basis of laughter is often undermined in the process and the jester humiliated by the general collapse of the laughable situation.¹

¹ This effect of the mere understanding of a situation has given rise to the curious view that laughter is due to imperfect or partial understanding of things, and hence that the more we understand the less we are able to laugh. Goethe, betraying perhaps a national defect of mind, held this opinion, and expressed it in the somewhat pedantic form "the man of 'understanding' finds almost everything laughable, the man of 'reason' almost nothing." No doubt it is true that the better we understand the less superficial our laughter, and perhaps on that account the more rarely we laugh. But it is obvious from experience that superficial laughter is but the

Apprehending a situation, then, does not by itself create laughter, but is, in general, a precondition of it. Apprehending, in fact, prepares the ground for another way of looking at the situation. This further interest, as distinct from understanding, we call appreciation. The peculiar character of this mental attitude towards the situation is that we look at it in the light of an end which it seeks to fulfil. Both in principle and in everyday experience we draw a sharp distinction between apprehending a thing and appreciating it, whether the object be a man's action, a poem, or a picture. We "understand" it if we know how its parts are connected and the laws that control its being: we "appreciate" it when we relate it to some end, and we express this appreciation when we judge its value. Now it may be said with fair accuracy that all our ways of looking at things fall under one or other of these two classes: apprehending, or understanding, and appreciating. Since laughter, as we have seen, does not issue upon mere understanding, it may be due to an operation of the process of appreciation. And this, we shall try to show, seems actually the mental cause of the state of laughter.

II

The points to consider are : (1) What kind of end is involved in the constitution of a laughable situation ? (2) In what sort of relation to the end do the facts in the situation stand when laughter is created ?

As regards the first point the answer is fairly simple. Whether we take the ceaseless varying ends of everyday life, the ends pursued in morality and social life, the ends pursued by the scientist, the religious man, the artist—in all these domains alike, laughter can be, and is, created. The spirit of laughter is

correlation of superficial understanding, and that profound understanding fortunately is often accompanied by a keener appreciation of the ludicrous. The wisest minds have in most cases a sombre awareness of the pathos underlying the ludicrous in the world ; and their laughter may be as the ebullition of a well of tears. As the poet puts it—

" Our sincerest laughter
With some pain is fraught."

no respecter of places, persons, or things. The very gods are supposed to indulge in this display of emotion, both when they have dealings with one another, and more especially in their dealings with mankind. The highest moods of experience, indeed, like the pursuit of the ends of religion, have perhaps been responsible for adding more to the fund of human laughter than any other form of experience. For there we find a play of imagination and a free manipulation of human purposes, which constantly put us into the hands of the imp of laughter, and place us at its mercy. As we are accustomed to say, everything has its humorous as well as its serious side, and even in the direst situations and most sombre occasions we find men breaking the bounds of their constraint in a chuckle of spiritual freedom. Every one must have felt at times a difficulty in strangling a laugh at some part of the procedure of a solemn public festival ; and even the pomp and circumstance of deace seems singularly fertile in provoking a smile.

Thus the range of ends in connection with which laughter may be invoked, is strictly unlimited. There is no single end which peculiarly calls forth laughter. But the same end may or may not produce laughter according to circumstances. What, then, are the circumstances ? In other words, in what relation must things stand to an end, in order to give rise to a situation which we appreciate as laughable ? Formulated in this way the question is not so difficult as it appears on a first look.

There are two ways in which facts may stand in relation to an end in view. They may be so carefully planned, and arranged in such an order, that the end is successfully reached, and reached even with a kind of steady necessity from step to step in the process. When this happens, even though the success be only approximate, we never laugh. We praise or admire, or just accept the achievement. We may feel happy in the result, but this happiness does not provoke laughter ; it is rather akin to the sense of well-being, and may provoke an articulate outburst like a shout, hurrah, etc. Or, again, we may feel angry or disappointed, and may blame or denounce the result, if the end thus successfully achieved is one which destroys some previously accepted scheme of good. This resentment or disappointment

is inconsistent with laughter ; and such resentment would only be called forth if the result had been planned and to some extent actually achieved. If no such result were attained, if no such plan were accomplished, we should not feel resentment justified.

But, on the other hand, the end may be neither attained nor renounced. The relation between things and the end in view may be incoherent, disconnected, in all degrees from sheer irrelevance up to partial but more or less haphazard co-ordination with a view to the result ; and this relation may be temporary or permanent. In these cases, no praise or blame is attached, for an end is neither accomplished nor defeated. The end remains secure and safe despite the incoherence of the process ; the incoherence throws the end into relief and even emphasises its importance. We are, therefore, neither happy nor miserable. Since, however, the facts and the end stand in an objective, real, relation to one another and constitute a single situation, we must, and do, take up some mental attitude towards it. We can and do appreciate the situation as it stands. Now, it is in such cases that we laugh. And here, it seems to me, we have the essential nature of the situation which causes laughter, as illustration will abundantly show.

Laughter arises when the character or process of an object, which is considered to refer to an end, real or supposed, is judged to be partially or wholly incongruent or incoherent with the end in view. It is important to note that the end must not be given up but must still hold good in spite of the incongruity ; and also that the object laughed at must not give way and must be none the worse for its incoherence with the end. The relation of the object or its process to the end must in fact subsist without either factor disappearing or being overthrown ; the object must point in the direction of the end, the end must continue to claim a control over the object. If, for any reason, we lose sight of either of these factors, the laughter is at once dissipated.

A situation, we thus see, is rendered laughable not simply in virtue of incongruity, as so many have said. It is a specific kind of incongruity, the persistent incongruity between an object or its process and the end at which it certainly but vainly aims, or

seems to aim. Every kind of incongruity does not give rise to laughter, as Bain long ago pointed out, and as in fact is fairly obvious on reflection. When two ideas contradict one another, we have incongruity; but that does not cause laughter, but irritation or disappointment. When two billiard balls collide, we have contrariety of motion and incongruity of position; but here again there is no laughter. When a man is overwhelmed by disaster after struggling against great odds, we have also incongruity; but this is the reverse of laughable, as we shall see.

Mere contrast, again, is not the essence of the situation, as others have supposed. Contrast undoubtedly there is. But the world is full of contrasts which evoke no laughter—day and night, light and darkness; and many contrasts lead to tears. It is the particular kind of contrast between the incongruous process and the end sought, which starts the laughter. The element of contrast is partly the source of the surprise which is felt in many kinds of laughable situations, though not in all. The contrast may suddenly appear at a certain point in the incongruous relation of the process to the end, and the recognition of this startles us, so to say, into the consciousness of the situation which we feel to be laughable. The contrast need not be sudden, and laughter still results; or we may watch the contrast and continue to laugh. But the abrupt realisation of the contrast of the kind described gives a vivid interest to the laughter; though no doubt in some cases the very suddenness of it may tend to check laughter until we have made quite sure it is the sort of contrast which we appreciate as laughable. Mere suddenness of contrast may take us unawares and call out laughter which jars, or makes us ashamed of ourselves, when we find out that the relation has not been properly appreciated.

III

Let us take some typical illustrations to give concreteness to this statement of the nature of laughter. Almost every child seems moved to laughter at the spectacle of a malicious wind playing havoc with a dandy's dignity and carrying his hat by leaps and bounds far down the street, with its owner in hasty

pursuit. Here the orderly connection between the object and the wearer, which is required to maintain the dandy's dignity, has been ruthlessly broken; the object makes off on its own account, regardless of its place in the purposes of his life; the dandy insists on the relation between himself and his hat being kept up, while the hat as obviously disowns the relationship. Neither can get rid of the other, and yet both are for the time being incongruent with each other, the dandy's dignity with the present position and doings of the hat, the hat with the present feelings of the dandy. Observe, again, that the important agent in the situation—the dandy—is not really injured in the process, he is only temporarily discomfited. Substitute a frail old man for the dandy, and the situation ceases to be laughable to all but the ill-disposed, and calls forth other emotions, such as pity.

Acts unintentionally incongruous with the end in view afford excellent illustrations of the laughable. A beginner's efforts to perform any feat of skill, or any task requiring delicacy of adjustment and long training, whether it be golf, swimming, skating, making a first speech in public, exercising social *savoir faire*, or talking a foreign language—these afford subjects of laughter to all, and they illustrate so clearly this incongruity of the details of the process with the end aimed at that we need hardly stop to deal with them.

But not merely do the incongruities that arise from want of skill in its many forms produce laughter. The possession of skill may be directed to the creation of situations which cause laughter; and, in fact, the capacity to do so is often a sign of real mastery, as we all know. Here we have an end in mind, and create incongruous material to stand in relation to it. The incongruity can be, and because invented generally is, quite as startling, unexpected and novel as in the unintentionally laughable acts of the unskilled. Such skill is most frequently exercised in the manipulation of ideas and in the manipulation of words which symbolise ideas. These are doubtless not strictly separable, and sometimes are consciously combined. The most familiar and best type of the former (the manipulation of ideas) is what we call wit, and consists in suggesting a truth either by bringing out a similarity between incongruous ideas or

incongruous differences within the same general idea. When Sydney Smith remarked to his vestry, who were finding difficulties in the way of paving with wood the streets round a certain church, that the thing could be quite well done if the members of the vestry would only put their heads together,—we have a good illustration of the first form of wit. The most frequent and best known type of the use of words to create laughter is what is called the “pun,” which is a legitimate enough source of laughter, especially if well done, and should not be condemned as bad wit, since it does not profess to be wit at all. The setting of amusing conundrums is a common form of this artificial creation of laughter out of ideas and words. Incongruous ideas may also be used to bring about a definite practical result, and then we have neither wit nor pun but a form of practical joke. This may be malicious; or it may be agreeable. Dean Swift, being annoyed by a crowd of his admiring parishioners collected on his doorstep to watch an eclipse, sent out his servant with a handbell to announce that by the order of the Dean of St. Patrick’s the eclipse was postponed: the crowd dispersed in laughter.

Again, we have a notable case of laughter in pompous pretentiousness and affectation of speech and behaviour. The behaviour of the gentleman bourgeois or the awe-inspiring office-boy creates laughter because the end to be attained stands confronted with an agent whose mental and physical structure or attainments are totally incongruous with the demands made upon him. He therefore does not merely come short of what is wanted, which might be merely dull; he does the inconsequent act and the irrelevant thing, which frustrates the attainment of the end to which he nevertheless clings so strongly as even to imagine that it is really embodied in his incongruous action.¹

¹ Take, again, a very different case: that of the laughter which sometimes accompanies joy. The joy is due to a sudden and unusually heightened sense of well-being, a “sudden glory,” arising from the attainment of an end either altogether unexpected or preceded by a period of restraint and mental tension. The laughter, which sometimes accompanies the mood, arises not from the mere removal of restraint, but from our becoming aware, almost simultaneously, of the discontinuity, often the sheer irrelevance, between the preceding experience and the end which has suddenly been made our own, and which, therefore, must have been waiting securely all the

Of all kinds of situations those of social life afford the richest field of the permanently laughable. The reason is that here we have on the one hand well-known and well-established ends towards which human life not merely is directed, but ought to be directed, and on the other hand an extremely complex range of detail which is drawn from nature and human nature, and is placed in subordination to those social ends. The possibility of the laughter here is in consequence almost endless, so much so that it often seems to many from first to last a long jest. The laughter may be directed upon isolated momentary situations and actions, such as the compromising position of a Mr. Pickwick ; or the complexity of a situation may be so very great that it takes days, months, and even years to reveal itself in all the extent of its laughable character. We sometimes use the word comedy to cover both the isolated instances and the long sequence of events in which the situation is realised : sometimes we use the word comedy for the second alone. This, however, is a mere matter of words. There is no difference in principle between the two as laughter-producing situations ; for obviously the time it takes to develop the incongruity, from which the laugh arises, does not in the least affect the nature of the situation itself. Moreover, the long sequence of events comprising a single laughable situation may, and generally does, give rise in its course to a succession of laughable situations ; the parts may be in themselves laughable, as well as the whole. Whether, then, the situation is isolated and momentary, or drawn out over a long time, the same principle operates in the emotion of the laughter to which the situation gives rise. We have a social end of some sort on the one side, and, on the other, human actions performed which are incongruous with the ends accepted as standards of these actions.

The incongruity arises from three chief sources, in the case of the socially comic, and these largely determine the different kinds of comedy. It may arise from nature itself ; it may arise through the designed or undesigned acts of individuals ; and it may also arise from the free inter-play of many persons living together,

while. The laughter of children on regaining their liberty after school hours is a simple case of this kind.

each following his or her own individual purposes, which inevitably intersect and thwart each other at some points, since the individuals coexist in the same field of social life and yet are all separate. How nature upsets the calculations of the cleverest of men we all know ; how its laws and processes capriciously hold sway over men's purposes and their fulfilment is only too evident, whether it be the winds and the waves that bring Ferdinand on his way to his Miranda, or Falstaff's struggle with the overgrown proportions on which nature planned his structure. The complicated interplay of human purposes in every Comedy of Errors makes merry havoc with the best intentions of the actors. When each of these sources of incongruity operates alone it is quite enough to thwart the efforts of the agent to reach his ends ; when all work together, the wonder is not that comedy arises so often, but that any purpose is ever seriously and successfully carried out at all in social life.

It must be carefully observed that in all comic situations the end must never be abandoned or overthrown if the situation is to be, and to remain, laughable ; nor must the effort to reach it through incongruous or incoherent acts be given up ; nor, finally, must the person of the agent or agents be really disabled in the process. If any of those qualifications is absent, laughter ceases. There is always in the best comedy a deferred triumph of the end in view and of the person pursuing the end. The immediate realisation of the end and the indefinite postponement of its realisation (which is practically equivalent to defeat) are both hostile to the spirit of laughter. For the end *is* important, at least to the individual, and generally to social life as a whole. It will, therefore, not be set aside merely because the process of reaching it is so inadequate and confused. On the other hand, should the end be carried out with uninterrupted success, there is no room for laughter. Time and entanglement must intervene between the end and the details in which fulfilment is sought, if a situation for laughter is to be created. Sometimes the entanglement may be so serious for the agent that he can laugh only when the end has triumphed, and when on looking backwards he sees the end standing out in contrast to the incongruity of the process. Joyous laughter is a case of this kind, as is also

the laughter that arises after a state of long tension or restraint.

The social purposes controlling individual lives have varying degrees of importance ; some are trivial or accidental, some fundamental or essential to human well-being. Hence we have comic situations which are merely on the surface of social life, others which go down to its very depths. These last give rise to the higher dramatic forms of comedy ; the former are the source of farce of every description. The characteristic of higher comic drama is that it seizes on vital ends of social welfare, the maintenance of family greatness, the love of social power and glory, the deep passions of sex affinity, and similar factors. It shows them controlling the acts and thoughts of individuals, sometimes half consciously, sometimes with clear intention, and yet frustrated by the inadequacy of judgment, the complexity of circumstances, the diversities of personal interest in the issues involved. The whole dramatic scheme seems a contest of fate with chance for the mastery of social ends ; fate consisting of purposes which are, or should be, or must be somehow, realised ; chance consisting of the incalculable succession of isolated events without which there is no realisation possible or worth pursuing. We watch the conflict with lively expectation of the happy issue, and are amused at the various steps, for their own sake, and because we are sure neither side will give way in the long run : the man will have his mate and all will be well. That is the essence of the higher comic drama—the clear consciousness before the mind, at least of the dramatist, that there is the final triumph of the good end in the most complex of situations.

IV

A comic drama reveals a plan all unknown to the actors. It is not this plan as completed which creates the laughter ; for the plan requires that the end be realised, and is based on a rational insight into the coherent structure of social life. The laughter arises from the incongruity displayed by the actors in their efforts and actions to secure an unfulfilled end, or one attained almost in spite of their efforts. Hence while laughable

situations are the material of comic drama, and while comic drama inevitably creates laughter, the creation of laughter is not the sole purpose of a comic drama. When, as the curtain falls, the actors shake hands, fall on each other's necks, or go off to church, we feel satisfied that the right thing has happened ; we should not have been satisfied with the drama if this had not happened. But, if there has been much laughter in bringing all this about, the result, though correct, is apt to produce a reaction. It may perhaps seem familiar, and we give a clap of general approval of the skill in bringing about the conclusion we have taken for granted all the while : or the plan, which has led to the issue, may seem so complete that the sheer human joy at the triumph of good over such obstacles may overwhelm us in tears. Comic drama, in short, is a planned arrangement of laughable situations, which is constructed on the assumption that the good end must finally triumph over all obstacles and fulfil or satisfy the agent not simply, and certainly not always, in the sense of giving him all he wants or saving him from all pain, but in the sense that his life as a member of a given society finds the real good it desires when the end is attained.

Herein lies the difference between the point of view of comic drama and that of morality. The comic drama takes for granted that the good end will inevitably triumph over all interruptions ; and reveals this by selecting a well-established and what may be called a perfectly safe, conventional, social good, which has long had control over the life of a society. Such a principle is so secure in its grip that it can be relied upon almost to play with the individual wills and events which seem to interrupt its fulfilment, and it will work itself out to a happy issue through all waywardness, with a kind of irresistible necessity. The moral point of view, on the other hand, is inward, something more than the merely conventional and well-established routine of social welfare ; it has its eye on an ideal or a good above the present, and better than it, and in the light of which it judges the actual. Its face is towards the better and the best ; it praises and blames, and allows no routine or social customs to stand in its way. So far from allowing itself to be under the sway of even social necessity, it demands man's free choice and free judgment at all costs.

It looks to the future, not to the past, and bends the present in that direction. It therefore leaves nothing to chance and never supposes chance will work out the best. All this is different from the dramatic attitude. A comic drama never teaches or preaches intentionally. A moral agent cannot leave morality to the mercy of chance. The dramatist is more confident in his moral beliefs; the moral agent more strenuous in his conduct of life. A dramatist can afford to create a laugh at the expense of morality, for he is sure it will succeed in the long run. Morality wants the good done now; and the pith of moral energy would be paralysed if the moral agent felt anything but the immediate compulsion of high seriousness. When a moral agent uses the resource of laughter for his purposes, he does so through mockery and satire; and then the laughter is directed not upon the good and the virtuous, but upon the bad and the vicious.

To the comic dramatist, the moral life is material which he uses to work up into a plan of social existence, a plan which he sees to be controlling the apparently rambling and disconnected actions of men; to the moral agent, there is no such plan, and no order in life except such as he makes by his own voluntary acts. Hence we often find the best comic dramas, *e.g.* those of Molière, appearing when a social life has reached a highly organised level of intensive development and carries itself on by its own momentum in spite of, and through, the free play of the individual lives of men and women.

When we reflect that it is in the treatment of the deeper and more universal social ends that we get the best comic drama, we can understand why it is that such dramas make a universal appeal to readers or observers of every nation. A Chinaman can laugh with Aristophanes, with Molière, with Shakespeare, because those fundamental social ends, whose operation is portrayed in the higher drama, are ends which control the life of developed social man everywhere. Dickens can make a successful appeal in Tokio as well as in London, for the same reason.

V

The different kinds of laughter, which socially laughable situations create, are due both to the character of the ends we

have in mind, and the degree of incongruity in the process of pursuing them. We distinguish between what we call good and bad laughter. We say some things should be laughed at, and other things should not ; meaning thereby, not that there is a moral code in laughter, but that the judgment of appreciation, from which, we saw, the laugh starts, may be accurate and inaccurate in its operation, may be wise or foolish, much in the same way that a judgment of a work of art may be sound or unsound. Again, since the laugh is always spontaneously the outcome of the individual's appreciation of a situation, and as unprepared for as a cry of pain, it is quite true to say that a man's laugh betrays the kind of man he is ; the laugh, in fact, often betrays the man to himself as well as to others. It is also true to say, as Goethe does, that nothing shows the character of men more than what they find laughable, if we mean by that statement to refer to the laughter directed upon the ends of social life, good or bad. But it is not true, if we mean to refer to all laughter ; for laughter is not the outcome of character, but of a judgment upon a certain kind of incongruity ; and only in so far as a man's character may affect this judgment is the statement of importance.

The good and the evil ends are equally able to start laughter, and to some minds the indecent seems peculiarly able to excite it. Rabelaisian laughter and the laughter of the *Contes drolatiques* always make a strong appeal to a certain type of mind, especially that type which lives on extreme or abstract levels of experience. This is what we may expect from the nature of the case. There is no greater contrast than that between the high and the low, and nothing seems more incongruous. Certainly nothing can so easily give rise to the incongruous as the natural conditions of man's higher spiritual ends. They cannot be always ignored or despised : and yet they do not always or generally fit into the higher purposes. In such cases laughter to some minds seems inevitable.

So much does individuality count that even the same person will not always find himself able to laugh at the same situation, even though this be essentially ludicrous. Laughter varies from individual to individual, and with the state of

mind of an individual at a given time. The judgment of appreciation is thus sharply different from the judgment of understanding. The truth about a thing once established will always seem true to the same mind, and, for that matter, to all minds who understand it. But the laughable in a situation has not this quality. Its universality does not mean that we will always laugh; but that the situation may be expected to create laughter. This expectation is, however, sufficiently well grounded to justify us in stating to one another a laughable situation, in constructing a comedy, and in creating situations to provoke laughter. Whether we succeed must depend on the chance of finding the hearing ear and the appreciating heart. This we cannot rely upon.¹ Hence the wise man's remark, "A jest's prosperity lies in the ear of him who hears it, not in the tongue of him who tells it." Hence, too, when a jester laughs at the situation as he is portraying it to us, he almost invariably spoils his jest, not simply because this tends to interrupt the listener's attention, but because he is forestalling the spontaneous appreciation of his listener and makes this but an echo of his own. The jester assumes too much, and, so to say, invades the listener's individual right of private judgment of the case, to which no independent-minded listener will submit. The rudeness of the jester thus destroys the virtue of the jest.

The best kind of laughter, however, is held to be that in which all can join; and it is held to be the best just on that account. The more a laugh is restricted to one or a few individuals, the more it tends to be depreciated. That seems the only standard by which we test healthy and unhealthy, real and false laughter; and the test is clearly a social test. The bitter laugh, the cynical laugh, the hard laugh, etc., is not encouraged, because it arises from some special personal interest. The man who can only laugh at others' expense and cannot join the laugh at his own expense, is suspect. Healthy laughter rests on a judgment of an actual objective situation, and is always detached from personal bias. Hence it is difficult for most people to

¹ It has been remarked by a distinguished actor, that it is only possible to perform the same piece night after night because different audiences take up the points of the play in different ways.

laugh at themselves ; as one writer has put it, the nearer a situation affects ourselves the less we are inclined to laugh at it. In general, it is true, a situation must be remote from our own interest to make it possible for us to enjoy laughter. It is obvious, however, that the social standard of what is laughable will vary from society to society, and from time to time in the same society. The things which our forefathers took seriously become objects of laughter to their successors, and situations which created laughter in them seem often dull or offensive to ourselves.

Laughter is not less keen because it is conventional. For much laughter is the result of social education, imitation, and habit. And this must necessarily be so because of the inherently social nature of our lives. We find a curious corroboration of this feature of laughter in the fact that the mere observation of the facial expression of a laughing person will be found in many cases to set up, by imitative sympathy, the corresponding facial expression in the observers, and thus force the laugh from them almost before they are aware of the source of the laughter. This can be seen any day in an audience listening to a comedian on the stage. Laughter, as we say, is contagious or infectious.

There is another aspect of the social side of laughter to which it is worth while referring. The laughter arising from the appreciation of a given situation implies, as was said, that the end is assured and holds its own against the incongruity in the process of arriving at it, and perhaps in the long run may turn this incongruity to good account. Such an assurance may be tentative or very strong. When tentative we have the timid, hesitating, or nervous laugh ; when strong, the burst or peal of unrestrained laughter. Now, the assurance gains enormously through social intercourse. If it is shared by other individuals, it does not merely gain in intensity for each individual, but the sharing of it acts as a bond of closer fellowship between the individuals. A joint assurance thus plays a great part in enriching social intercourse. The situation itself seems more laughable just because laughed at by several individuals. Hence it is that we do not merely enjoy a laugh better which is shared, but we enjoy the society of those who can laugh with us, for their society

strengthens our judgment of appreciation. This accounts largely for the curious experience that very few care to laugh when they are quite alone, still fewer to laugh alone in a company. Let any one tell a funny story to himself, and note the effect. If we find ourselves laughing when we are alone, we feel either that we must try to find somebody to enjoy the fun with us, or else the echo of our own laughter tends to sound weird and ghostlike, as if we overheard ourselves, or detected ourselves off our guard, or saw ourselves turned inside out. Again, to laugh alone in a company is not merely a breach of decorum ; it is a proclamation that our judgment is not ratified by the common intelligence of the group in which for the time being we find ourselves. It is an insult to their intelligence, or a condemnation of our own.

On the other hand, the effect of this socialising tendency of laughter is that we do not care to laugh with those in whose society, for any reason, we do not care to continue to be. No upper servant will allow himself or herself to laugh freely in the company of a servant of lower standing. The laughter is always condescending on the one side, and restrained or servile on the other. Similarly, no master or mistress cares even to enjoy the same kind of laughable situations as his or her servant. We object to a judge laughing with the man in the dock ; or the officer with the private. Laughter so breaks down the restraints of normal personal life that the free laughter of master and servant together would, so to say, fuse them and imperil the well recognised lines of demarcation which are really necessary to keep up the social relationship between them. On so slight a thread does the safety of public and private dignity depend ! Because all rigid distinctions of privilege and person melt before the flame of laughter, one of the readiest ways, as we all know, of overcoming awkward situations in social life is to create a laugh. This at once reduces or raises human beings to their common humanity, and so smooths away the lines of separation for the time being.

Since laughter has this levelling and socialising influence, it is plain at once that the essence of laughter cannot lie, as some have held, *e.g.* Aristotle and Bain after him, in a consciousness of superiority on the part of the person laughing, and of inferiority

or degradation on the part of the person laughed at. This is so obviously inadequate, after what has been said, that I need not discuss it at length. Some kinds of laughter involve distinctions of this kind. But they do not cover all possible situations that are laughable even in social life. The familiar instance of a man joining in the laugh against himself makes nonsense of the theory. We laugh at things, as well as at persons, and there is no meaning in saying that the person laughing is superior to the thing he laughs at. It would be as true, though equally one-sided, to maintain that laughter reduces the person laughing to the level of the object laughed at. Laughter neither belittles nor magnifies the person laughing or the object of laughter. The theory rests on a confusion between *detachment* from a situation, which is certainly necessary to free laughter, and *superiority* to the situation, which is quite another matter.

A theory, akin to this, is that which declares that we can only laugh at little things, small matters, or relatively unimportant situations, and that laughter reduces great things to small proportions. Such a theory touches the mere surface of the situation, and confounds lightness of heart with littleness of value. We can laugh at all things, small and great ; for the laugh is not the result of a calculation of weight or of importance, but of the sense of incongruity of process with end in view, whatever the process be, and whatever the end be.

VI

I come now to the mental process involved in the state of weeping. For the analysis of this we have already to some extent prepared the way. It, too, presupposes a consciousness of some situation before us, owing to the nature of which weeping arises. But the mere understanding of the situation is not what creates the tearful mood ; in some cases, indeed, understanding may arrest the flow of tears. Many tears, like much laughter, are due to one-sided and often superficial understanding of a situation. Hence we cry more in childhood than in maturer years. But tears are not the prerogative of the young, and no amount of experience can get rid of them. As Goethe puts it :

“ The man perhaps a hero seems
Who stifles tears in sorrow deep,
But if in grief of soul he yearns,
God grant him power to weep.”

And again,

“ Who never ate his bread in tears,
Who never spent the midnight hours
Upon his couch in grief and fears,
He knows ye not, ye Heavenly Powers.”

Understanding, then, does not of itself create tears, nor does complete understanding prevent them. They arise, like laughter, from an appreciation of a situation of a certain kind. There is some discordance in a process : we judge the situation to be of this nature and we judge it in the light of an end. But while in the case of laughter the end holds out securely against the incongruity of the process of reaching it and remains to the last undefeated, in the case of tears the end always is, in fact or in imagination, defeated, and is overthrown by some process that has proved definitely hostile to its preservation. But it is not the mere defeat of the end that is the essence of the situation : for an end may be frustrated without tears thereby arising. The loss of an end may spur us on to new effort to reach it ; we may blame ourselves for its loss, and in consequence resolve to try again. We do not weep in such cases : we regard the loss as temporary, and desire starts afresh in pursuit. Or again, the end may be finally defeated and we may accept the fact with indifference, turning away to new ends to be attained in other directions. In this case also tears do not arise. It is when the end is admitted as finally lost and yet is allowed still to control the current of our desire to possess it, that tears begin to flow. And this situation arises where the process which brought about the overthrow of our end is recognised as fatefully incongruous with the cherished object of our desire. The incongruity is essential, because this alone can account for, and even justify, the continuation of our desire in spite of defeat ; and the supreme value of our end to us throws into relief the discordant character of the process at the mercy of which it has been placed. Where the end lost is all of a piece with the process which has brought about the result, we recognise

no incongruity, and in consequence there are no tears. Similarly, when the good lost is seen from a wider or another point of view to be retained in a fuller sense as part of a completer good, the tears are again arrested, because the incongruity is no longer felt. Thus, it is the recognition of the sharp discontinuity between the course of nature and the sudden disappearance of the life long precious to us, that starts the tears of sorrow over the departed. If we come to see that the good life we valued was bound up with the process of nature by whose gradual operation the life has been terminated, the tears are arrested. This is more easy in the case of those who have reached the full term of years, than in the case of the comparatively young. Hence grief for the latter is more poignant than in the case of the former. Or again, if we come to see that the life lost, even though young, after all enters into a completer life which endures beyond the changing course of things, grief's anguish is largely assuaged. This last point is admirably illustrated in the movement of Shelley's thought in *Adonais*. The overwhelming grief which heaven and earth are called upon to share fills the mind of the poet only so long as his thought dwells upon the profound discontinuity between the frailty of nature's process and the precious good that has gone from the world. When, however, the poet recognises that the life that is fled may yet retain its dominion in a fuller reality, the sorrow passes away and he sings almost in joy—

“He lives, he wakes—’tis Death is dead, not he;
Mourn not for Adonais.

He is a portion of the loveliness
Which once he made more lovely.”

In most, if not all cases of tears, the end lost is one we have strongly desired personally. In order to feel the loss we must have felt the object to be a great good.¹ And the intensity of our grief is often accentuated because of the sense of the defeat and of the futility of the effort spent in striving for the end.

There are two secondary influences which tend to increase the pain of the loss and to open wider the gates of sorrow. One is the

¹ This is so even where, as in the case of children, the good may seem to a maturer judgment to have been imaginary or trifling.

sense of our impotence in the face of an incongruous process which has our ends at its mercy and over which we cannot exert any control. The other is the overshadowing of our whole scheme of good by the actual loss of one element. Our whole good is correspondingly diminished, is lowered in value, and the energy of life is brought down to a poorer level. The influence of each of these varies greatly in different cases and with different people; but they are each present to some extent in most cases.

These seem the essential elements in the situation in which tearful emotion occurs. Incongruity or discontinuity between the end, which has been finally frustrated, and the process that led up to the result, is involved in the situation that gives rise to tears. The incongruity must be real or imagined as real, just as the personal loss must be real or imagined as real, before tears come. We may prove to be mistaken on these points, but we are not aware of being mistaken while the tears last. Hence the seriousness of childhood's tears, and also the facility of allaying them, owing to the frequency of error of judgment in the inexperienced. At the same time, the good lost must still dominate our desire, if tears are to arise. Without this we do not have the shock of arrestment in our pursuit of our end, which is a marked peculiarity of the tearful emotion. The end continues to hold our desire in spite of the recognition of its final loss.

VII

Sometimes the process or the materials for obtaining the end lie outside ourselves in the course of nature, or in the actions of other wills than our own. We watch these from the outside and await a much desired issue. When failure of our desired end comes, we are stricken, and our very helplessness adds bitterness to the tears; we feel overwhelmed. Sometimes the past process of bringing about the frustrated end was partly or wholly in our own control. When this happens we are filled with regret which, if accompanied by self-blame, intensifies the emotion over the defeat of our purpose. Hence, when people weep for their sins or their wrong-doings, it is not because they blame themselves

that they cry ; it is because the ends of goodness have been frustrated by their own actions, and this frustration is their loss : their blaming of themselves is a complication which blends with the regret, and by its influence heightens the feeling of loss of what is good. Thus, as we say, the tears of a penitent are really the beginnings of a reformation of character ; for it is the sense of a loss of good that produces the flow of tears. This cannot take place unless he is to some extent aware of the good lost, and to be aware of good is the beginning of a better life. On the other hand, if a man weeps at the frustration of his evil ends, as is quite possible, he is in a fair way to be a captain of the powers of evil, for he has thereby indicated that evil is his good ; for him no reformation is possible. If, again, a man weeps over the evil he has deliberately done and would do again deliberately in order to accomplish some end he thinks to be a good one—*e.g.* the Kaiser's tears over the destruction of Louvain—we say that such a person is on the borders of lunacy, or is indulging in artificially created or "crocodile" tears.

These, then, are the main types of situation the appreciation of which causes tears : the situation where the process and material for attaining a desired end were outside our control, and that where they were at least in some degree under our control. In both, the end has moulded the direction of our desire, and given it a set tendency which remains in us after, and in spite of, the actual and accepted defeat of the purpose. If we could put this desire aside at once when defeat takes place, we should never weep. It is because we do not or cannot put it aside that we are constrained to shed tears—constrained, because the momentum of the initial tendency of our desire being suddenly arrested without the desire being abandoned, the mental shock must seek some outlet, and our judgment of the case find expression. It expresses itself in the flow of tears.

The tears, though constrained, are quite spontaneous. Sometimes their expression affords relief to mental tension, by slightly directing attention from the situation to the tears which it has produced. Often in children we find that attention to the tears may become so absorbing that they cease to cry. In other cases, again, tears are apt to turn the mind back to their cause, and the

knowledge of the effect adds its influence to the knowledge of the cause and increases the flow of tears. That explains how children, and even older people, can "work themselves up" into a so-called paroxysm of weeping.

Yet, in general, the tears are drawn reluctantly from the individual, because they arise through a check to the trend of his activity, through a thwarted desiring tendency ; and the individual does not accept this state without reluctance. The situations involved always imply a *fait accompli*. The end actually is frustrated, at least to all appearance if not in reality, before tears flow. If a person weeps before the issue in point of fact takes place, it is because the issue has been anticipated, and the imagination of the frustrated end starts in tears. If this occurs when the process is under the person's control, as in the case of a child over a difficult lesson, a boy in a fight, or a lover in pursuit of his heart's desire, the situation is apt to create irritation or amusement in the spectator : irritation, since the tears anticipate an issue which the agent might by effort prevent ; amusement, since the end being still effective (for the agent pursues it) there is transparent incongruity between the process the agent is adopting and the end which still holds its own over his efforts. We never weep over a situation which is really regarded as undecided. There is thus a sharp contrast between laughter and tears. For in laughter the end is secure though the issue is in the balance : in tears the issue is settled, for the end must have been in fact or in imagination frustrated before tears flow, and when the end is frustrated the process towards it has ceased to exist. We therefore weep only over what is regarded as past, never over what may be in the future. But we do not weep over the past merely as what is past ; if so, we should never be done weeping. It is the past which has frustrated ends enduring still within our present desire, that starts the tears. It is the past in its bearing on our present desire that is of importance in tears ; and desire is always a present experience. Thus we find that as the past fades away from us it gradually ceases to trouble the waters of our sorrow ; for the ends which the past frustrated gradually lose their appeal to our desire. Their interest diminishes through repeated experience of

their inefficacy. New ends arise which are effective and so replace the old. The old ends themselves disappear into the past ; they become ends that were, not ends that are desired. Their very memory becomes altered for us. And so the past no longer joins with present desire in a situation that causes tears. We may even be amused at what we formerly wept over ; or the tearful situations of former days may be seen through a perspective in which "the thought of our past years may bring perpetual benediction."

It is because the situation causing tears involves a finished result that in the emotional state of weeping the individual has a sense of resignation as to a kind of fate against which his desire beats in vain. The acquiescence is, doubtless, a matter of degree, and may be very reluctant ; but it is there. Tears of rebellion are an extreme illustration of reluctant resignation, the rebellion being due to an attempt to believe the end to be still possible in spite of its actual defeat. This sense of fatefulness in the situation, because it is finished, is the point of contact, as we shall presently see, between the tearful situation in the proper sense and tragedy in the strict dramatic sense.

VIII

The end which has been frustrated in the tearful situation is in the first instance an end affecting our own personal welfare in some form or other. To begin with, we do not weep for other people's losses, but for our own, and only with developed social consciousness can we so assimilate ourselves to the situations in which other people find themselves as to weep for or with them.¹ Even then, it is by imaginatively regarding their situation as our own that we do weep ; partly too, especially in the case of children, it is sometimes the result of a sympathetic imitative reproduction of the physical conditions of tears. Thus the range of tears is much more restricted than the range of laughter. It is in fact confined to situations affecting personal welfare, directly or

¹ Tears shed over the fate of pet animals is an extension of the same social consciousness. The fate of wild animals never seems to call forth this degree of emotion.

indirectly, our own individual welfare being of chief concern. We do not take up a detached spectacular attitude towards such situations. For the essence of the situation involves the tendency of our own desire in the direction of the end frustrated, and the arrestment of our own activity in that direction consequent on this frustration. Unless we feel this, we either do not cry, or we start artificial tears, *i.e.* simulate the tearful state; and every one regards this as hypocritical. The nearer persons stand to ourselves in intimacy, the more readily are we able to weep in sympathy for them and with them. The further away they are the more difficult it is to do so. It was hardly possible for us to weep for German sufferers in the late war; it was not even easy for the sympathetic to weep for Belgians; it was perfectly easy to do so for the afflicted at home. There is thus an individual insularity about tears that contrasts strongly with the intensely social character of laughter. The more solitary the grief, in fact, the more the tears flow; to weep in sympathy, or to have others weep in sympathy together with us, mitigates the bitterness of tears. Individuals in sorrow and tears prefer to be alone, to go into seclusion, or hide in a corner. Each heart alone knows its own bitterness. An assembly of weeping men and women is difficult to keep together; it has in some cases, *e.g.* in the East, an artificial air. People who are massed together tend to give each other energy and strength, and this is opposed to the tearful mood. It is thus not surprising that the honest outspoken Sterne, on reading out the text "It is better to go into the house of weeping than the house of feasting," began his sermon by bluntly saying, "That I deny." People, of course, may and do weep together quite genuinely, but that is only when they each have an individual situation to weep over. Even then, and where it is a genuine group of mourners, we find that some of those who join with the group in a common orgy of tears are apt to become suddenly aware of a certain unreality in the proceedings, and to break out into suppressed laughter. With this essential isolation of the individual in the tearful mood is associated the feeling that tears mean weakness, and no one cares to reveal weakness in a company. On the other hand, again, the very solitude of tears, especially when they affect the individual

profoundly, often compel him, in default of the support of his fellowmen, to fall back on the refuge of his religious life.

The ends, the defeat of which causes tears, are limited to the range of personal welfare, but within these limits we find that the number of ends with which tears may be associated is very considerable. In early life especially, when every end pursued seems important, the loss of any end that is much desired may bring about tears. That is because in early life the standard of individual values has not been definitely set up, and everything aimed at seems equally significant. There is no differentiation between important and unimportant, accidental and vital. This only comes with experience and with the perspective which mature experience affords. A child will cry at the privation of anything it wants very much. Savages, again, the children of civilisation, are often found to weep abundantly for quite slight causes, like the New Zealand chief who cried because his cloak was soiled. Later on, when a truer sense of proportion is obtained, only the ends which concern permanent human welfare can, when lost, superinduce a flow of tears. Even of these only a very few will affect some individuals in this way, such as the loss of the intimate associations or associates that make human life really precious or even possible at all. In the case of a certain number of persons, mainly men, no loss seems able to move them to tears. This is not strictly because they do not regard any loss as important. The reason is largely social; it is looked upon as unmanly to indulge in tears, and at all costs a man must maintain his manhood with his fellows and in his own eyes. Tears are then considered the refuge of a feminine nature. But while this view is fairly common, both among civilised and uncivilised races, it is by no means universal. Most men succumb at some time or other without being considered unmanly. It is a matter of degree, and varies in extent and in its occasion with racial characteristics and national custom.¹ It takes a good deal to make an Englishman cry, less to make a Scotchman, but not so much to make a Frenchman weep.

¹ Thus it is the custom in a certain primitive tribe to express welcome by shedding tears (see above, p. 140, note).

IX

While the ends involved in the tearful situation are primarily ends affecting personal welfare, there is an easy mental transition from weeping at the loss of one's own individual ends to weeping at the loss of those of another individual. This is a most interesting complication of the social consciousness. We find, for example, that when people weep for those who are dead and gone, they do so, or at least express themselves, as if they were shedding tears for the loss which the *other* individual has sustained.¹ Strictly speaking, it is because the ends of the other have been so closely identified with ours that we fail to distinguish the two, and assign the cause of the tears to his loss instead of to our own. Love for the departed makes us feel that his love has lost our fellowship, and we weep, as we say, for him. But his love for us is really inseparable from our love for him, both in fact and in idea ; and it is this latter love which psychologically plays the greater share in moving us to tears on his account. Our love has lost him and all he meant for our world. This is correctly put in the Sonnets² in the words—

“How many a holy and obsequious tear
Hath dear religious love stolen from mine eye
As interest of the dead.”

The loss, we have said, always affects personal welfare in some form. But it may affect it in two ways, either by taking away part of its substance, or by removing some hindrance that was seriously threatening our welfare. The former is no doubt the more familiar and commoner source of tears. The latter is what we have in the curious case of tears of joy. Here the dreaded issue we were thinking of intensely and, to all appearance, seeing carried out (perhaps even assisting to carry out), was one which would overthrow a great good we wished and hoped for. Events remove the impending or imagined issue, and the

¹ “Oh, weep for Adonais—he is dead.” “Weep for him” because cut off arbitrarily from all the good he knew and which we know : “weep for him” because he cannot weep for himself.

² Shakespeare, Sonnets, 31.

previous current of our thought is arrested. But its sheer momentum, which would have terminated in tears had the issue really taken place, carries us still on in the direction of that issue, and we break down into tears even though the actual result is joyful and gratifying. We do not really weep over the good realised, nor over the loss of the evil that actually did imperil it, but over the loss of the end that we imagine was really impending. At what time we begin to think of the loss of this end, is a subordinate point. Sometimes we think of it beforehand, as when a parent thinks a son injured or dead who afterwards returns: sometimes we think of it after the happy result has arrived, as when the mother begins to weep when she hears from her son in what terrible dangers he has been placed while she supposed him safe and sound.¹ Sometimes it is the discovery of the privation that existed prior to the arrival of a happier state of affairs, as when a poor man weeps on discovering he has been left a substantial fortune. Tears of gratitude, so closely akin to tears of joy, are of this character. In general, any fears and hopes may give rise to tears; and the alternation from one to the other has a mentally disturbing effect which facilitates the flow. As it is put in another of the Sonnets ²—

“What potions have I drunk of Siren tears
Distilled from limbecs foul as hell within,
Applying fears to hopes and hopes to fears
Still losing when I saw myself to win.”

It need hardly be said that the increment of good creating joy does not always produce tears, but only in certain highly susceptible natures.

Sometimes the ends in relation to which tears arise are not clearly before our minds at all. They well up from we know not where, and we know not why.

¹ It is in such cases that we have often an alternation of tears and laughter, an alternation which is not due to hysteria, but is perfectly normal. For in these cases the mind attends alternately to the end as triumphant over haphazard events, and to the end as imperilled or overthrown by such events. The first creates laughter, the second tears: and the alteration of the direction of attention produces the oscillation in the kind of emotion displayed.

² Sonnets, 119.

“ Tears, idle tears, I know not what they mean,
Tears from the depths of some divine despair
Rise in the heart and gather to the eyes,
In looking on the happy Autumn-fields,
And thinking of the days that are no more.”

The last line perhaps gives a very definite clue to the source of the tears, and shows them to be not idle or without meaning. But the poet is portraying a very real and a not unfamiliar experience, at least to those whose appreciation of the world goes deeper than the surface of this sea of change in which we float through space and time. Not merely happy autumn fields, but the glory of light and colour in an awakening spring, or the beating life of a refulgent summer day, can create a mood that overwhelms the spirit by a sadness interfused with joy, if once we have learned

“ To look on nature not as in the hour
Of thoughtless youth ; but hearing oftentimes
The still, sad music of humanity,
Nor harsh nor grating, though of ample power
To chasten and subdue.”

A similar effect can be produced by unusual beauty in poetry, or again, by certain strains of music. How are these half-unconscious overflowings from the well of human tears to be accounted for ? In some cases no doubt they stir up memories of a tearful kind that mingle with the present, as in the case when we think on “the days that are no more.” In others, it is hardly possible to discover anything specific or definite to which to attach the emotion, and give the cause a local habitation and a name. What takes place in such cases is that, underlying the loveliness that meets the eye or ear, there is the sense of the destiny controlling, be it ever so kindly, the transitory purposes of our individual life. The very perfection which makes the loveliness what it is, rests upon a masterful necessity greater than ourselves, and in relation to which, because it seizes us so irresistibly, we seem as nothing. Our mood is hence a compound of a sense of pathos and a feeling of fulfilment ; the fulfilment gives us the gladness that tips with silvery joy the towering waves of feeling ; the pathos carries us to the grim depths whose sombre and unimaginable power

strikes awe into the very heart of life. In all such moods the individual feels himself, as it were, overwhelmed: his selfhood seems to disappear altogether and to melt away into the impersonal being of the world.

X

This complex mood naturally leads to the last point that is worth referring to—the connection between tears and tragedy. We saw before, that comedy is a dramatisation of situations which have in them the conditions of laughter, but that the drama, in virtue of its planned arrangement to secure a happy issue, is something more than a mere series of laughable situations. This something more is the controlled relation of the steps in the drama to produce a result that satisfies the actors in terms of an accepted standard of social good. The agent and the spectator can thus at last see both the how and the why of the process which has taken place. The laughable situation shows the incongruity of a process with an end which holds its own, if necessary even in conflict with the process: the dramatic situation brings out the end finally triumphant over all obstacles. In the first, the issue is in suspension; in the second, it is definitely realised.

In tragedy we have a corresponding dramatic development of the tearful situation. In a situation causing tears we find, as we saw, a finished series of events whose effect is to produce the actual loss of an end desired as a good. Such situations constantly occur in the individual's life history, and in each case he is face to face with a completed process of events beyond his power to change. The issue is not in suspense; it is done, and the end is done away. While the process was taking place, there was some possibility of the good coming through safely. A finished process is beyond recall or modification. It must be accepted as a necessity, as a fate. It brings home poignantly to the individual that his human purposes, those ends that make his life worth while, are not always in favour with the course of the world; shows to him that at least *his* individual purpose is not merely at the mercy of agencies which may thwart him, but

that he is impotent to prevent or alter their operation. Such a situation is unintelligible, when the end desired is, and continues to be, precious ; and none the less unintelligible because the process which thwarted the end may have been inevitable from point to point. The individual thus feels himself and his ends alienated from, and opposed to, the sequence of events without which his purpose cannot be realised, and yet with which, as the issue shows, that purpose cannot succeed.

This is more or less dimly appreciated in every situation which causes tears. Now, the transition in thought is easy from what *has* happened to what may at any time happen, *i.e.* to the conception that the very nature of things is such that at some point or another the individual's particular ends, no matter how much desired, nay, that even the individual himself, be he never so good, may be thrust aside and overthrown. When this conception of things is grasped and worked out in a consecutive plan of action, we have tragic drama. The essence of the tragic situation is that the course of events in nature and human life can and does, in obedience to its own appointed laws or conditions, take a direction which frustrates even the most treasured ends of the individual, and may, if need be, completely overwhelm the personality itself. Whether it be the course of nature alone that does so, as in the tragic ruin of the human splendours of Pompeii, or whether it be the operation of social forces that brings disaster to human individuals and whole nations, as in the supreme tragedy wrought out recently in the case of Belgium, or whether it be both together—in each and every case the situation is the same. The situations lie as evidently and as really within the system of things as life and death. The tragic dramatist seizes on the underlying principle, selects a definite situation, and gives it intellectual and articulate expression. No doubt the most poignant tragedies are those where the very action of the social forces, that make for the welfare of the individual, seems so arranged as to bring about the overthrow of his ends and of his personality ; for there the ends of the individual are so intimate to him that they prescribe the very laws on which his life as a human being is constructed. To be overthrown in obeying these is indeed to be overwhelmed. It is

such tragedies that we find commonly portrayed in the greatest works of both ancient and modern tragic drama. Sometimes it is the legitimate but overstrained ends of individuals which are overthrown, and which overthrow the persons themselves, as in *Julius Caesar* or *Macbeth*. At other times it is the spontaneous operation of perfectly normal and healthy purposes whose tragic overthrow we are allowed to witness ; and then the tension and pathos of the situation reach their highest point. This we have, *e.g.*, in *King Lear*, surely the high-water mark of human tragedy.

But whatever be the situation, the aim of the dramatist is to bring out to view and lay before us such a plan at work in the affairs of men as leads to the overthrow of his cherished ends, or, again, of his entire personality. The difference between the tearful situation and the tragedy lies in the conscious absence in the one case, and the conscious presence in the other of a scheme of events which leads steadily on to the final result. In both the situation is in principle the same. And since life precedes reflection, it seems possible that the everyday fact of the tears of men and women provided the first concrete material to the tragic dramatist, and suggested the task he seeks to fulfil in the higher spiritual interests of humanity.

We must not, however, suppose that the tragedy presents a series of opportunities of tears for the spectator. True comedy is more than a succession of ludicrous situations ; tragedy more than a succession of tearful situations. The success of the tragedy depends on the degree in which the dramatist can portray the steady inevitableness of the issue. When this is displayed, there comes to light a certain coherent orderliness in the whole proceeding, which reacts on our attitude towards the situation itself. Reasonableness has the effect of reconciliation. It furthers the mood of submission and acquiescence. We find that if the tear-stricken individual can realise this, his tears are sweetened, and may even be assuaged. The reasonableness, however, appeals most to the onlooking spectator : a man can rarely be a spectator of his own woes. The spectator, as he observes the development of the plan or plot, finds his immediate sympathy with the actors losing its intensity and giving way before his interest in the

clear view of the whole issue. The intensity of his sympathy would lead him, as it does in everyday life, to weep with the sufferers. Some dramas produce this effect on some spectators. But the comprehension of the plan generally alters his emotional attitude to the actors. Instead of breaking down in tears, the spectator is moved, as Aristotle said long ago, to pity and to fear: pity for the individuals overwhelmed, fear for himself lest he find himself in circumstances which, because typical and general, might very well be his own. The plan is objective, outside the spectator, and grasped as something external. Hence both pity and fear are, so to say, spectacular in character; they can be shared and understood by the spectators in common, and are the emotional correlatives of the intellectual comprehension of the plan which is laid before them.

It need not be said that tragedy is not written or presented *in order* to create such pity or fear; or in order to "purify" the emotions of the spectators. Aristotle's language would seem to suggest this educative influence of tragedy. But it is no more the business of tragedy to educate or exhort than it is the aim of comedy to give moral lessons. The educative effect produced by tragedy is a subsidiary and indirect consequence. The point rather is that the emotions of pity and fear are those awakened by the tragedy, just as the emotion of gladness or satisfaction is the necessary outcome of a successful comedy. Both tragedy and comedy *qua* drama are outside the sphere of morality; they take the moral point of view for granted, and use it to supply material which can be re-cast and interpreted from the dramatic point of view.

XI

It is of interest before leaving the subject to try to answer the question, What is the mental value of laughter and tears in the economy of human experience? What is their vital significance? We seem bound to consider them to be as inevitable expressions of human mentality as joy or fear, or as the pursuit of truth or beauty. There seems no justification for regarding them as pathological in any sense of the term. That they may

take pathological forms is obvious ; so can any normal instinct assume pathological shapes. But the distortion of a human quality is not the test of its meaning. We must therefore rule out as both inadequate and absurd the contention of one medical writer, no less a person than Sir Arthur Mitchell, who maintains that "laughter is a state of mental disorder." Such a view reminds one of the theory that genius is insanity, because, presumably, it is exceptionally sane, or perhaps because some insane people have had moments of unusual inspiration. There is a want of both clear reasoning and accurate analysis in such distorted theories.

Nor can I agree that laughter and tears are in any way due to misapprehension or illusory apprehension of actual human situations. This is in essence what Bergson's view of laughter amounts to. He says, "attitudes, gestures, and movements of the human body are laughable in the exact proportion that the body makes us think it a simple mechanism ;"¹ again, "every incident is comic which calls our attention to the physical aspect of a person, when the peculiar shape of this physical aspect had its source in moral causes : " further, "laughter always arises when a person gives the impression of a thing : " and once more, "every arrangement of acts and events is comic which gives the illusion of life, and the mere sense of a mechanical arrangement." In a word, laughter arises through an illusory apprehension of a living thing as a mechanism. But the effect of laughter is, he oddly says, to correct the illusion : it is a reaction against illusion or disorder, which thus reinstates the truth, and abolishes the disorder. Surely this is straining intelligence to misunderstand a very simple phenomenon ; it is verily a comic distortion of laughter itself. Doubtless in many cases when life takes on the appearance of a mechanism, we certainly laugh : *e.g.* at a clown's movements. But in other cases we are as certainly moved to pity or pain at the sight, *e.g.* when an individual is hypnotised or in a state of somnambulism. Again, we also laugh when a mechanism

¹ Spinoza is said to have found it laughable to watch the struggles of a fly trying to escape the fateful entanglements of a spider. His enjoyment over this minor horror of animal life is perhaps explicable in the light of his theory that animals were automata.

simulates life, *e.g.* a Punch and Judy show ; but in other cases we are terrified at the sight of mechanism assuming the powers of living agents. Moreover, the theory at its best could cover only a limited range of cases of laughter, those, namely, which are or can be visibly mechanised. But it does not apply, *e.g.*, in the complex contretemps of social life, where we have eminently laughable situations which cannot be placed on the stage all at once, and whose elements consist of emotions, motives and ideas. Moreover, Bergson's view does not cover even cases which he considers, *e.g.* the comic element in words ; for this, he has to invent a different interpretation,—the confusion, irregular conjunction or transposition of words and their meanings. It is straining terms to the verge of absurdity to regard this as a mechanising or materialising of the living sense of language. A theory of laughter should be in such a form that it can be applied in the same sense to all cases where laughter occurs. Behind Bergson's view there lies perhaps a vague insight into the principle that I have put forward—that laughter is the appreciation of the incongruity of a process or its elements with an end which holds its own in spite of the incongruity. This clearly covers cases where the mechanical aspect of a process stands in relief against a living reality which it seems to counterfeit, for this living reality is obviously one that works according to ends.

But the most important objection to Bergson's view is that it regards laughter as arising out of illusory apprehension, and in that sense is a kind of illusory experience. In actual experience, however, if there is anything we are sure of, it is that our laughter is no illusion to ourselves, but an intensely vivid experience, that it neither rests on illusion nor consists in illusion, so far as our own experience goes at the time we laugh. For nothing can shake us out of our laughter, except the alteration of our appreciation of the situation. From the point of view at which we see the laughable situation, the laughter arises as inevitably and as spontaneously as fear before a terrifying spectacle. It is highly questionable, indeed, if there is any meaning in the phrase "illusory emotion." All emotions are real while they last, ~~what-~~ever else may be said of them. Our appreciation may be mistaken, and laughter may arise from the mistake ; but the

laughter is justified by the appreciation, such as it was ; and again, a perfectly correct apprehension, as we saw, will in many cases lead to laughter. In short, we do not make things laughable by illusory apprehension ; laughter results because a situation is such that to be aware of it at all will bring about laughter. The situation suggests the appreciation, and so the laughter. The apprehension does not distort the situation. Bergson's mistake lies in confusing those two kinds of knowledge which we carefully distinguished—the intellectual apprehension of a situation, and the appreciation of it. For Bergson, comedy is essentially due to an intellectual understanding or misunderstanding of a situation. As he says, "Comedy is addressed to the pure intelligence." If this were true, then doubtless the laughter might be due to an illusory apprehension, and the correctness of the understanding would, as we said, dissipate the illusion and so abolish the laughter. But laughter is not due to a mere process of understanding at all. The apprehension of a situation is presupposed in laughter ; but in order that laughter may arise, the situation must also be appreciated, *i.e.* must be judged in the light of an end to which the process or material, involved in the situation, stands in a certain relation, namely, the relation of incongruity. The incongruity is an actual fact, so is the end, and therefore the appreciation is *bien fondue*, and is perfectly correct.

The same line of criticism would apply to the case of tears, which, however, Bergson, among his many ingenious discussions, has not yet dealt with.

Setting aside such views, the one to which our analysis points is this. There are many situations in our experience which present real or imagined incongruities, and to these we must and do take up a definite mental attitude. All our mental operations may be said to be simply adjustments of our mind to its mental environment, to its world ; they are ways in which we preserve our identity or unity in the midst of the endless manifold with which we are confronted. Sometimes the manifold details can be well knit together, sometimes they cannot. Yet in both cases we must adapt ourselves to what lies before us. If we cannot put the details of experience into an orderly setting

at once, or after an effort, then we must, to preserve our mental balance or mental unity, meet the facts in some other way which will still maintain a sense of security in face of the confronting environment. The variety of our emotions—fear, hope, etc.—testifies to the variety of our mental attitudes to those things confronting us, which we are unable adequately to grasp in a coherent, intelligible way. Now the emotional attitude expressing itself in laughter is that attitude which we assume towards a situation where a real incongruity exists, or is felt to exist, between a process or element standing in relation to an end which holds its own, but is not fulfilled. The inarticulate outburst of sound in which laughter is expressed, corresponds precisely to the admitted unintelligible character of the situation. We must adopt *some* attitude to such a situation ; it is there to be met, and has to be faced, if we are to give it a place in experience at all. The way we do this is to laugh at it. This preserves our stability of mind, our unity, in the face of this particular portion of our environment ; and we do not preserve it in such cases by any other way. The laughter at once expresses its value for us, and gives us the sense of detachment from what would otherwise be a situation creating serious mental perplexity. Chaos in our environment means chaos in our mental outlook : and chaos is the one supreme peril that our mind cannot possibly meet or endure. To prevent any mental disaster, therefore, we must meet situations containing this sort of incongruity in a manner consistent with our mental stability. Hence laughter ; and hence the note of triumph which almost invariably rings through healthy laughter. It is a note which is justified, for we have in laughter triumphed over the incoherent, we have kept up our belief in the end which holds its own, and we have preserved ourselves in the face of the incongruous.

In tears again, an analogous attitude is taken up to a situation which actually presents an uncomprehended conflict between the course of events and our still desired ends. There is no doubt about the vivid reality of such a situation ; it is not an illusion, it is a fact, and a cruel fact in many cases, that the ends we cherish and pursue are thwarted and overthrown by the course of things. We must meet this situation somehow by taking up an attitude

which will keep our mental balance in the face of the environment that confronts us. We appreciate its significance for us, and must, if possible, express what it means. Otherwise, our mind would recoil in helplessness and alienation from the situation that is presented. This we cannot do, for the simple reason that our mind and the confronting world are inseparably connected, and to give up our capacity to make a proper mental adjustment is to give up being or having a mind altogether. In tearful emotion we meet the situation that spells the failure of our cherished purpose, by assuming an attitude which at once confesses our loss and at the same time the continued value to us of the cherished end which still holds sway over our desire. We submit, but we still sustain our mental unity in clinging to the desired end. The world has foiled our purpose but cannot foil ourselves. If we cannot gain our end, we can at least retain it in our sense of the loss; and to express this keeps us from sheer mental disorder and confusion. We succumb to a situation which admits of no intelligent reconciliation, and in order to express ourselves, we make use of inarticulate processes of organic emotion. We break down into tears which we readily allow to flow. By so doing we relieve the tension which has been created between us and our environment by the defeat of our purpose. And by relieving the tension we help to fill the breach between the two. This prepares the way for new efforts to realise new ends in spite of a temporarily hostile environment. Hence, the curative effect of tears is no merely physical accident due to exhaustion, but implies a vital connection between the mind and its environment.

Bearing in mind the apparent connection between laughter and tears on the one hand, and comedy and tragedy on the other we cannot be surprised that the dramatic aspect of life, which is so profound in its importance and so true to our experience, should take such a hold upon us. Our experience involves the whole incorporated structure of individuality, physical and mental; and part of it can come to light in the apparently fortuitous, but really inevitable, form of laughter and of tears.

NOTE.—A passing reference may be made to the physiological side, if only for the light it throws on the contrast these emotions bear to one another.

To the physiologist laughter appears as a vocal sound of an explosive character, produced by the chest relieving itself of a deep inspiration of air through disconnected spasmodic contractions of the diaphragm, which vary in interval, volume, and quality according to the special structure of individuals and the character of the emotion to be expressed. Its cause seems to be the sudden liberation of a temporarily increased accumulation of central nervous energy, which seeks to discharge its whole force at once, and in doing so diffuses this force throughout the entire organism, but more especially through the outlet of the throat and mouth, in a succession of gradually diminishing shocks or shakings. This explains why the blood is congested prior to the laugh and resumes its normal flow after the laugh has taken place. As a result of the deep inspiration of oxygen and the flooding of the blood vessels, the eye brightens and the face "lights up." The whole organism is raised to a higher pitch of vitality, and when the laughter dies down there is an intense organic sensation of "relief."

In crying, on the other hand, the physiologist sees a muscular compression of the gland situated in the upper outer and nasal side of the eye, and containing a transparent liquid whose chief constituents are water and salt. The primary function of this gland is to lubricate constantly the inner lining of the eyelids and thereby the outer surface of the eyeball, in order to replace the moisture evaporating from this outer surface exposed to the rays of light and heat. Thus, just as laughter is an emotional utilisation of the function of breathing, so weeping is an emotional utilisation of an organic function of lubrication. Development has brought about this transformation and only experience can discover the connection between mental states and bursts of sound on the one hand, and an unusual flow of lubricating fluid on the other.

The cause of weeping seems to lie in a sudden lowering of the tone and flow of vital energy, which reverses its primary tendency outwards and turns the energy of the organism against itself. This disturbance finds expression in effusions of the lachrymal gland, and gradually by a series of convulsions leads to the general collapse of the organism; and in this lower state its equilibrium is restored and rises again approximately to its previous level.

The contrast between laughter and tears on their physical side is plain and is instructive. In laughter we have a sudden heightening of the vital energy of the organism; in weeping a sudden arrest and lowering of the normal outward flow of energy. In laughing we have spasmodic liberation of the accumulation of vital energy in a series of shakings of gradually diminishing violence; in crying a forceful attempt to restrain the outgoing energy in its primary direction. Both are forms of restoration of equilibrium—laughter the restoration from a heightened potential, crying a restoration from a lowered potential. Both again are forms of expression of organic energy, and hence both terminate in a state of relief from nervous tension: in the case of laughter it is the relief of free expansion, in tears the relief from prolonged repression.

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